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ABSTRACT 
Eric Leigh Lopez 
Maximus the Confessor & the Trinity – The Early Works 
          In this study, I will argue that Maximus the Confessor’s (580-662 CE) 
engagement with the ascetic concerns and the theological controversies of the 
sixth and seventh century helped develop his early works toward a unique and 
distinctively Trinitarian articulation of Christian life and post-Chalcedonian 
theology. In the Liber asceticus, Maximus illustrates the Trinity as the beginning, 
means and end of Christian life, highlighting baptism, the Spirit’s appropriation 
of Son’s activities to the baptized, how the incarnate Son serves as the example 
of love and interweaves Trinitarian prayer into the dialogue’s appeal for mercy. 
Using the Liber as a baseline (Ch. 1), Chapter 2 places his Trinitarian grammar 
for Christian life in its ascetic context demonstrating areas of continuity but also 
its unique contribution. 
          The subsequent chapters then track this grammar’s development by 
analyzing the increased complexity, sparked by his engagement with various 
concerns and controversies, displayed in Capita caritate (Ch. 3), Quaestiones et 
dubia and Epistula 2 (Ch.4). The last section of Ch.4 provides a context for his 
engagement of pro-Chalcedonian theology and its development in Opusculum 
13. 
           In the Capita, Maximus’ engagement with Origenism underscores the 
irreducible difference between God and creation yet also how they are 
sustained, preserved and deified through participation. His engagement with 
demonstrates the necessity of joining θεωρία and πρᾶξις, giving an early 
glimpse of union and distinction in his Trinitarian theology. Finally, what was 
only illustrated in the Liber, is made explicit through a robust explanation of 
contemplation and prayer.  
          In Quaestiones, Maximus begins to fix his terminology for the stages of 
ascent. Additionally, while continuing to engage with Origenism, he introduces 
more technical language for the incarnation, utilizes the Logos/λόγοι doctrine 
for ascent and applies the λόγος/τρόπος distinction for the Trinity. Then, in Ep. 
2, he integrates these new features from Quaestiones into his description of 
ascent and the incarnation. Finally, in Op. 13, Maximus departs from his earlier 
concern for ascent yet, like his other early works, reveals engagement with a 
specific controversy – miaphysitism.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this study, I will argue that Maximus the Confessor’s (580-662 CE) 
engagement with the ascetic concerns and the theological controversies of the 
sixth and seventh century helped develop his early works toward a unique and 
distinctively Trinitarian articulation of Christian life and post-Chalcedonian 
theology. This articulation ultimately paved the way for his celebrated 
Trinitarian grammar for the incarnation. As this description suggests, despite 
being unique and distinctive, Maximus’ theology builds upon a set of traditions 
and theological trajectories that had long been in the making. His theology is 
unique, then because he interacts with various aspects of Trinitarian traditions 
and trajectories, each of which had discrete historical developments, in order to 
address issues related to Origenism and miaphysitism.1 By following a broadly 
chronological approach to Maximus’ writings and unpacking his increasingly 
complex engagement with these concerns, traditions and trajectories, this study 
will highlight two Trinitarian grammars that are significant to him while 
providing both a historical context and an opportunity to see his development.  
This study cannot touch on every aspect of Maximus’ Trinitarian thought 
nor on every text where he mentions the Trinity. Such an endeavor would entail 
a recapitulation of the history of numerous aspects of Trinitarian doctrine in the 
post-Chalcedonian era and its engagement with the theology of the fourth and 
early fifth centuries. Furthermore, it would involve detailed determinations of 
whether Maximus’ theology has drawn from those earlier sources, some of 
which he surely read, or any number of intermediate sources. Instead, I will 
                                                 
1 Throughout this study I use the prefix mia- rather than mono- to describe the 
Christological debates surrounding Christ’s nature (miaphysitism), activity (miaenergism) and 
will (miathelitism). My reasons for doing so are pragmatic and historical. One does not find the 
compound terms μονοφυσίτης, μονοενέργητος and μονοθέλητος in Maximus’ writing even 
though he argues that each does ultimately reduce Christ to only one nature. In fact, one does 
not find the compound words using the mia prefix either. Instead, Maximus and those he dialogs 
with often use the word μία as an adjective and only occasionally use μόνη. The compound 
words using the mono prefix, at least those referring to Christ’s will and activity, seem to be later 
developments. See, Daniel Larison, Return to Authority –The Monothelete Controversy and the 
Role of Text, Emperor and Council in the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Ph.D. Diss., University of 
Chicago, 2009).  
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focus on Maximus’ early works up to 626/7 CE. This is intentional since much of 
the work on Maximus’ doctrine of God is often pulled from his later works. 
Rather than drawing a synthetic representation across his writings, I delve into 
those key Trinitarian themes that Maximus develops within his account of 
ascetic life. Concomitant with this account are his engagements with various 
doctrinal controversies. I attempt to deal with both in order to trace out a broad 
set of concerns, traditions and trajectories that demonstrate both his distinctive 
articulation and aspects of continuity. A consequence of focusing on Maximus’ 
early works is recognition that to suggest a grammar for Maximus’ Trinitarian 
thought at this early stage must give way to a set of grammars that address 
specific issues. It will not be until later that Maximus will draw these together to 
form what may be considered one consistently applied theological grammar. 
Justification of Research 
Why another monograph on Maximus? Within the last 35 years, 
Maximian studies have experienced a surge in interest, considered by many to 
be a ripe fruit that can be harvested for the ressourcement of varying 
theological agendas. Despite this marked increase of interest, there is no 
monograph in English-speaking scholarship on Maximus’ Trinitarian thought. 
Maximus’ theology and personality became a subject of interest in English-
speaking scholarship only since the middle of the last century through the work 
of Polycarp Sherwood. In the introduction to his third publication on Maximus, a 
translation of Liber asceticus and Capita caritate, Sherwood gave a helpful and 
brief description of Maximus’ doctrine of God explained in two sections. One 
section focused specifically on the divine nature itself and a subsequent section 
discussed God as Triune. In the first section, he highlighted aspects of 
theological parlance that Maximus utilized or adjusted from Gregory of 
Nazianzus, Evagrius and Pseudo-Dionysius in order to describe God’s simplicity, 
goodness, and infinity.2 The second section posited five areas: “(1) assertion of 
the fact . . . (2) The reference of the Trinity to negative theology . . .  (3) Nature 
and person in the Trinity and Christ . . . (4) the relations of the persons of the 
                                                 
2 Polycarp Sherwood, St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on 
Charity (New York: Newman Press, 1955), 29-32. 
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Trinity to the Incarnate Dispensation . . . (5) Traces of the Trinity.”3 It was the 
last of these; “traces of the Trinity” and its relation to negative and natural 
theology that was to be a source of disagreement between Sherwood and Hans 
Urs von Balthasar.4  Sherwood’s brief description was a synthetic 
representation of Maximus’ thought and most of the information he marshalls 
does not come from the works he translated but from Maximus’ later corpus.5 
Other authors, in introductions and brief studies, have given some attention to 
his Trinitarian theology since then, describing his thought in general as a 
‘Trinitarian Christocentrism” or noting how his “Chalcedonian logic” is 
dependent on the Trinitarian terminology and distinctions of Chalcedon and the 
Cappadocian Fathers.6 Here we can see a trend of viewing his Trinitarian 
thought through his Christology, a tactic likely inspired by Maximus’ own 
famous phrase from Expositio orationis Dominicae.7 These provide suggestive 
beginnings for a more thorough study of Maximus’ Trinitarian thought and a 
context for the present study.  
I should also note several smaller studies by Brian Daley, Andrew Louth, 
John Madden and Felix Heinzer which touch on aspects of Maximus’ Trinitarian 
theology but admittedly only cover it in relation to specific areas of his thought 
and like Sherwood’s presentation tend to pull from Maximus’ later works.8  
                                                 
 3 Sherwood, St. Maximus, 32-45. 
4 Sherwood, St. Maximus, 34-35; 37-45; Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The 
Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, translated by Brian E. Daley (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2003), 104-105; 26, 101.  
5 Sherwood does not draw upon the Liber Asceticus at all and only sparsely cites Capita 
Caritate and Epistula 2. Much of his synthesis focuses on the Ambigua, Quaestiones ad 
Thalassium and Opuscula with scattered references to Expositio orationis Dominicae and 
Mystagogia. 
6 George Berthold, Maximus the Confessor: Selected Writings, ed. and transl. by George 
Berthold, Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1985), 7-9. Louth, Maximus, 
49-51. See also Berthold’s “The Cappadocian Roots of Maximus the Confessor,” in Actes du 
Symposium du Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980, eds. Felix Heinzer and 
Christoph Schönborn. Paradosis 27 (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1982), 51-59. 
7 Maximus, Or. Dom., (CCSG 23:87-89): “For indeed by becoming flesh the Word of God 
teaches us θεολόγια because he shows forth in himself the Father and the Holy Spirit.” 
 8 Brian E. Daley, “Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on the Trinity” in The 
Holy Trinity in the Life of the Church, ed. Khaled Anatolios, Holy Cross Studies in Patristic 
Theology and History (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014) ; Andrew Louth, “Late Patristic 
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Despite the absence of an extensive study in English, one might object 
that there are studies in French. Therefore, learn French and you have your 
desire.9 However, Pierre Piret’s Le Christ et la Trinité, while very helpful and 
lucid, is also a synthetic study. It does not always demonstrate clear connections 
with the traditions the Confessor drew on and even though one can find 
instances where he discusses parallels and influence, he does not show how 
Maximus’ thought develops throughout his writing career. This later point is 
clearly brought out when, as with Sherwood, one looks closely at where he 
draws his primary texts. The focus, almost without exception, is on the Ambigua 
and later Christological writings (Opuscula and Epistulae, Disputatio cum 
Pyhrro). The earlier writings seem to serve no prominent place in establishing a 
reference point for Maximus’ doctrine of God.10  
 Piret’s exceptional review of the literature up to the point of his own 
study does reveal a constant back and forth between Catholic and Orthodox 
castings of Maximus’ Trinitarian thought. This is particularly the case as it 
relates to the skirmishes over the filioque and whether or not Maximus 
embraces the concept of μοναρχίαand what effect that acceptance might have 
on the debate. His review of the state of the question also unveils how Maximus’ 
                                                 
Developments on the Trinity in the East,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, eds. Gilles 
Emery & Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 138-151; Nicholas Madden, 
“Maximus on the Holy Trinity and Deification,” in The Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church 
(Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 100-118; Feliz Heinzer, “L’explication trinitaire de l’economie 
chez Maxime le Confesseur,” in Maximus Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le 
Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre, 1980, eds. Felix Heinzer and Christoph Schönborn, 
Paradosis  27 (Fribourg: Editiones universitaires), 159-172. 
9 Pierre Piret, Le Christ et La Trinité selon Maxime le Confesseur, Théologie Historique 69 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1983) deals with this topic most directly. One could also cite Juan Miguel 
Garrigues’ 1976 Maxime le Confesseur: la charité avenir divin de l’homme whose last chapter, 
"L’avènement de l’amour trinitaire", is suggestive and cites the Liber asceticus and Capita 
caritate more often. However, it is also a synthetic study and often interprets earlier texts in 
light of ideas expressed later in Maximus thought. This same kind of analysis can be observed in 
Alain Riou’s treatment of seven references to the Liber and Capita in his 1973 Le monde et 
L’église selon Maxime le Confesseur. Another suggestive section in Jean-Claude Larchet’s 1996 
study La divinization de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur, entitled, “La participation du 
Saint-Esprit au projet trinitaire de la divinization de l’homme et à se realization par l’économie 
du Verbe incarné,” 383-384, cites neither the Liber or Capita. My citation for Larchet’s study, 
originally published by Cerf in the Théologie historique series (38), follows the 2009 reprinted 
version which is under a different series, Cogitatio Fidei 194.  
10 There are only two references to Liber asceticus and three to Capita caritate. 
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Trinitarian thought is often a secondary or tertiary issue and lacks relation to 
the larger historical-theological context in which the Confessor writes. It is as if 
Maximus is either championing the fresh winds that will inspire Vatican II as an 
example of a new synthesis inspired by Thomas Aquinas or an Orthodox 
contemporary championing Gregory Palamas’ distinction between essence and 
energies. While Maximus’ theology certainly has bearing on these issues and 
authors rightly have historical justification for investigating him through those 
lenses, he knows nothing of the later state of these debates. Consequently, while 
Maximus is universally recognized as a great synthesizer, rarely are the 
traditions he draws upon for his Trinitarian thought parsed out beyond some 
relation to “Cappadocian” or “Chalcedonian” thinking. Nor do these accounts go 
much beyond an analysis of how his thought can defend or contradict later 
theological tradition. 
If we were to add to Piret’s review recent scholarship, the trend has been 
more philosophical in nature. In what ways did Maximus answer philosophical 
questions or, a more basic question: did Maximus receive formal philosophical 
training? If he did, what was it and to what extent does he adopt and adapt it? Is 
Maximus’ portrayal of the Trinity an answer to the classic problem of the one 
and the many and how does he articulate their relation using the grammar of 
participation? These are excellent questions but have been problematized in 
part by debate over whether Maximus is to be seen as a monk from 
Constantinople, following the Greek recensions of his life, or from Palestine 
following the Syriac life.11 Not to mention there is no small issue in determining 
mediating influences. Maximus comes at a stage in Christian tradition where 
many “philosophical” doctrines or parallels could just as easily be found within 
that tradition. Finally, there is a more fundamental question: what do modern 
authors mean when they say “Platonist”, “Neoplatonist” or “Aristotelian” in 
relation to the ideas or persons they review? Do such designations mean direct 
influence and sourcing, mediated influence or something as banal as parallel 
                                                 
11 The latest entry in this debate is Philip Booth, Crisis of Empire: Doctrine and Dissent at 
the End of Late Antiquity, Transformation of the Classical Heritage 52 (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 2014). Booth argues vigorously for Maximus to be located in Palestine and as a 
close associate of Sophronius and John Moschus.    
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thought? While we may acknowledge that Maximus is not a Vatican II proponent 
or a Palamite defender, has he now become another victim of Harnack’s 
“philosophy on the soil of the Gospel”? 
A second objection to another monograph may be that there are 
numerous works that deal with Maximus’ Christology and those have already 
noted Maximus’ “triadology” in relation to it.12 As the title to Piret’s study itself 
suggests, there is a connection to be seen between these two areas of his 
theology. Surely this material touches on Maximus’ Trinitarian thought. This is a 
legitimate objection especially since after Piret’s study there is much literature 
which explicitly connects Trinitarian theology with Christology. The Son is one 
of the Trinity, so it can be said, and to talk about his incarnation surely would 
mean touching on Trinitarian theology. Yet when one scrutinizes this literature, 
it tends, as stated above, to attribute Maximus’ Trinitarian expressions to 
“Chalcedon” or “the Cappadocians” and then follows a well-established canon of 
writers from after Chalcedon to Maximus’ own day in order to narrate how he 
stands in relation to “neo-Chalcedonian” and “Cyrillian” Christology. This group 
usually includes Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem, the conciliar 
decisions of Constantinople 553 CE and at times other figures like John the 
Grammarian, Sophronius and even Justinian. These studies have proven very 
helpful for providing a broader context that earlier studies lacked. However, for 
the purposes of understanding Maximus’ Trinitarian thought, much of this 
literature centers too narrowly on the issues of miaenergism and miatheletism 
                                                 
12 The first to note this with some comment was Hans Urs von Balthasar in the first 
edition (1941) of Kosmische Liturgie and republished in subsequent editions (second edition, 
1947 and third edition, 1988) but see now Cosmic Liturgy, 212-213. Marcel Doucet’s Ph.D. 
dissertation, “Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus: introduction, texte critique, 
traduction et notes,” (PhD diss., Université de Montréal, 1972) and was followed by Heinzer, 
“L’explication trinitaire,” 160 and Pierre Piret’s “Christologie et théologie trinitaire chez Maxime 
le Confesseur, d’après sa formule des natures «desqueelles, en lesquelles et lesquelles est le 
Christ», 220 in the same work who then published his book in 1982. In English, this was first 
noted with some comment by Joseph P. Farrell: The Disputation with Pyrrhus of Our Father 
Among the Saints (South Canaan: St. Tikhon’s Seminary Press, 1990), xxx and then by Demetrios 
Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature and Will in the Christology of Saint Maximus the 
Confessor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 99-114, 130-140, 160; Melchisedec Törönen 
in Union and Distinction in the Thought of St. Maximus the Confessor, Oxford Early Christian 
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 47-48; and Cyril Hovorun in Will, Action and 
Freedom: Christological Controversies in the Seventh Century, The Medieval Mediterranean: 
Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400-1500 77 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 156-158. 
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and not broader Trinitarian questions or providing a convincing historical 
context that accounts for why Maximus has come to see the force of connecting 
θεολόγια and οἰκονομία. 
Another reason, voiced by Polycarp Sherwood in his earliest work, still 
haunts discussions about Maximus’ Trinitarian thought. In the foreword to his 
study on Maximus and Origenism, Sherwood laments that so little work has 
been done to put Maximus in his own context, stating others “have written of his 
doctrine, and written well, but taking here a text, there a text on which to build 
their structure.”13 In the last ten years, many well-written studies have sought 
to investigate and describe various aspects of Maximus’ thought. As a result, 
Sherwood’s complaint has been satisfied by focused studies on the various vita 
of Maximus, the last stages of his life, his role at the Lateran council of 649 CE, 
his place in the history of miaenergism and miathelitism, his relation to “neo-
Chalcedonianism”, and most recently Maximus’ relation to John Moschus and 
Sophronius in the context of a struggling Byzantine Empire.14 Some work has 
also been done on Maximus’ relation to Evagrius, Pseudo-Dionysius, the 
Cappadocians, and Origen.15 However, it still remains that there is very little on 
what Maximus may have inherited or adopted from the post-Chalcedonian 
milieu in regard to his Trinitarian thought. There could be various reasons for 
this, but there are two I would like to highlight here.  
                                                 
13 Polycarp Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and His 
Refutation of Origenism, Studia Anselmiania 26 (Herder: Orbis Catholicus, 1955), vii.  
14 For example, Booth, Crisis of Empire; Hovorun, Will, Action and Freedom; Maximus the 
Confessor and his Companions: Documents from Exile, ed. & transl. by Pauline Allen & Bronwen 
Neil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Rudolf Riedinger, “Die Lateransynode von 649 und 
Maximus der Bekenner,” in Maximus Confessor: actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, 
Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980, 51-59. Eds. Felix Heinzer and Christoph von Schönborn, Paradosis 
27 (Fribour: Éditions Universitaires, 1982), 111-121. In regard to Maximus’ relation to Neo-
Chalcedonianism, see Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of 
Maximus the Confessor, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 21-48 and Bathrellos, The 
Byzantine Christ.  
15 Berthold, “The Cappadocian Roots,” von Balthasar, “Die Gnostischen Centurien” in 
Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenners, Zweite Auflage (Einsiedeln: Johannes-
Verlag, 1961); Beate Regina Suchla, Die sogenannten Maximus-Scholien des Corpus Dionysiacum 
Areopagiticum, Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philogische-
historisch Klasse 3 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980) but a thorough bibliography for 
Maximus and the Dionysian scholia can be found in the English translation of Kosmische Liturgie, 
von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 359-387. 
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The first reason is that only a few authors have attempted to dedicate 
entire works to the development of theology within this period with any depth 
and they are usually accompanied by a general ambivalence toward what the 
Council of Chalcedon did or did not accomplish.16 The period, in general, is 
characterized as “scholastic” and would lead the casual reader to think it is 
merely obsessed with proof texts of earlier Fathers and laboriously written 
definitions. These descriptions surely make this period an unappealing object of 
research and discourage understanding a much more complex era, one in which 
participants sought to navigate several traditions and came up with creative 
ways of doing so. Another more telling reason, as I hinted at above, can be seen 
in the assumption that Trinitarian thought has simply given way to 
Christological controversy, an assumption which still dominates the 
presentation of this period. This is based on an observable shift in theological 
discussion between the Council of Constantinople 381 CE up to that of 
                                                 
16 I am thinking here primarily of Aloys Grillmeier’s multi-volume work in Jesus der 
Christus im Glauben der Kirche (Christ in Tradition) but note here again the focus on Christology. 
Also, Patrick T. R. Gray’s The Defense of Chalcedon in the East (451-553) and his various articles 
on the changes in post-Chalcedonian theological argumentation, Demetrios Bathrellos, The 
Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of St. Maximus the Confessor, Oxford 
Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) and Louth’s “Late Patristic 
Developments,” 138-151 which treats the era as a whole. However, there are also various 
studies done on Tritheism and individuals such as Severus of Antioch, Leontius of Byzantium, 
Leontius of Jerusalem, Justinian and others. See Ian Torrence, Christology After Chalcedon: 
Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite, transl. with introd. & notes by Ian Torrance 
(Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1998); Brian Daley, Leontius of Byzantium, (forthcoming); Patrick T. R. 
Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem: Against the Monophysites: Testimonies of the Saints and Aporiae, 
Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Kenneth Paul Wesche, 
On the Person of Christ: The Christology of Emperor Justinian, (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1991); Rifaat Y. Ebied, Albert Van Roey & Lionel R. Wickham, Peter of 
Callinicum: Anti-Tritheist Dossier, Orientalia Lovaniensia 10 (Leuven: Department Oriëntalistiek, 
1981), Albert Van Roey & Pauline Allen, Monophysite Texts of the Sixth Century, Orientalia 
Lovaniensia Analecta 56 (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 1994), Uwe M. Lang, John Philoponus and 
the Controversies over Chalcedon in the Sixth Century: A Study and Translation of the Arbiter, 
Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense. Études et documents Fascicule 47 (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), S. N. 
Sakkos, ἈΝΑΣΤΑΣΊΟΥ A´ ἈΑΝΤΙΟΧΕΊΣ ἍΠΑΝΤΑ ΤᾺ ΣῼΖΌΜΕΝΑ ΓΝΉΣΙΑ ἜΡΓΑ (Thessaloniki, 
1976); Karl-Heinz Uthemann, “Des Patriarchen Anastasius I. von Antiochen Jerusalemer 
Streitgespräch mit einem Tritheiten,” Traditio 37 (1981), 73-108. For the history of the Church 
see John Meyendorff, Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions: The Church, 450-680 AD, Church in 
History 2 (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1990) and William H. C. Frend, The Rise of 
the Monophysite Movement: Chapters in the History of the Church in the Fifth and Sixth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).  
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Chalcedon 451 CE. However, through this study of Maximus, it becomes 
apparent that too great a separation between these two contexts (Trinity and 
Christ, what eventually is designated θεολόγια and οἰκονομία) creates 
theological problems that Maximus along with other pro-Chalcedonians will 
confront. Similarly, it also generates problems for scholarship as it attempts to 
give an accurate presentation of the subjects that mattered to the participants of 
this era. I cannot fully address the latter part of this critique in the present 
study, however, in a small but hopefully significant way I attempt to shore up 
the historical context precisely around the interaction between these two loci: 
θεολόγια and οἰκονομία. 
 Along these lines, besides the narrowing of scholarship on issues of 
“monotheletism” and “monoenergism” during Maximus’ life, I want to suggest 
that the historical narratives of the post-Chalcedonian era tend to locate the 
concern of participants too narrowly on whether Cyril can be reconciled to 
Chalcedon. When one steps back and lays aside the often repeated assumption 
that Trinitarian controversy gave way to Christological controversy, I would 
suggest this era reveals something much more multifaceted that has direct 
relation to the doctrine of the Trinity and the legacy of the Trinitarian grammar 
of the fourth century as established by “the Cappadocians”, Cyril, Athanasius 
and subsequent pro-Chalcedonian authors. Some scholars have said as much, 
but this phenomena needs to be brought from the background to the 
foreground, from mere assertion to demonstration, from the footnotes to the 
main narrative. When this is done, I argue that Maximus’ Trinitarian theology 
falls in line with a determinable trajectory. In light of this, rather than label his 
Trinitarian thought as “Christocentric”, it may be more apt to regard his account 
of the incarnation as Trinitarian.  
Method of Study 
How will I approach this investigation? My first task will be to use the 
Liber asceticus as a baseline in order to show how his engagement with ascetic 
concerns within his portrayal of ascent is already richly and distinctly 
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Trinitarian and indeed presents us with his primary Trinitarian grammar.17 This 
grammar is forged in the context of giving a rational for Christian life and 
ascent. Next, I review a set of ancient authors in order to highlight how 
Maximus’ baseline fits within a broader ascetic context in order to show how his 
Trinitarian account of ascent bears continuity with and distinction from this 
context. From that point, I will attend to how Maximus’ Trinitarian thought 
develops through Capita caritate, Ep. 2, Quaestiones et dubia up to Opusculum 
13. Using the baseline, I will identify layers of complexity and development that 
are successively added to his account of ascent and which reveal his 
engagement with specific ascetic concerns and the controversies of Origenism, 
Tritheism, and miaphysitism. The last work, Op. 13 departs from the context of 
ascetic concerns and gives us a look at Maximus’ articulation of pro-
Chalcedonian theology. Importantly, it gives us a look at another distinct 
grammar for talking about the Trinity. By “complexity” I mean to indicate more 
developed or new aspects of his account of ascent that were either more simply 
stated in his baseline or only briefly accounted for but which receive more 
explanation and attention in later works. Regardless of whether this increased 
complexity is the result of sensitivity to his audience or a development of his 
thinking, I argue that his writings bear an unmistakable increase in complexity 
which can be tied to specific ascetic concerns and controversies. Consequently, 
when I speak of “development” it is to this increase in complexity that I am 
speaking. In this study, I make regular and intentional use of the terms 
“grammar” and “trajectory”. By “grammar” I mean a determinable “way of 
speaking” for Maximus that has become a consistent feature of whatever subject 
he is talking about. Therefore where earlier studies may have referred to a 
                                                 
17 According to Sherwood’s Annotated Date List, there are several works ascribed to 
Maximus that were written before, by or in 626 C.E He lists with certainty Epistulae 2, 3 and 4; 
Liber asceticus and Capita caritate (by 626 C.E.) and Expositio psalmum LIX (626 C.E.) and with 
less certainty Epistula 6 (before 624/625), Epistula 10 and Opusculum 17 (by 626 C.E.) and 
Quaestiones et dubia (626 C.E.). Although, one should note that while in the chronological index 
he does not give any special note about the certainty attached to Ep. 2, in his annotation for the 
same letter, he simply suggests it is perhaps the earliest writing giving more of a range than a 
certain date suggesting “sometime before the controversies”, referring to miaenergism and 
miathelitism. In this study, when referring to his “early works”, this is the set of writings I mean 
to designate.  
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“logic” in Maximus’ thought I hope to indicate both the logic or principle thus 
named and the language used to communicate it. My use of “trajectory” is found 
in historical sections and is meant to highlight how a set of ideas, strategies or 
grammars regarding a specific topic successively developed as they ran their 
course through the period under investigation. 
How do the role of genre, Maximus’ intentions and his audience relate to 
my conception of “complexity” and “development”? The works covered in this 
investigation are representative of several of the genres Maximus utilizes in his 
overall corpus. The genres represented in the early works include letters 
(ἐπιστολαί such as Ep. 2), centuries (κεφάλια such as Capita caritate and Op. 13) 
and question-response (ἐρωταποκρίσεις such as Quaestiones et dubia). This 
latter genre is often utilized as a means of commenting on Scripture and earlier 
Christian authorities. The Liber asceticus falls within range of the question-
response genre as can be seen by the title usually associated with it (Λόγος 
ἀσκητικὸς κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν) but differs in several ways. Firstly, 
unlike other question-response pieces by Maximus, it does not comment on 
Scripture or specific texts of earlier Christian authorities. Rather it explains the 
purpose of the incarnation as the rationale for the ascetic and Christian life. 
Secondly, while there are questions and responses, these are firmly planted in a 
sustained and imagined dialog between an old man and a younger brother. 
 With the exception of Op. 13, all of the works listed above explicitly 
intend to deal with ascent within the ascetic and Christian life and bear many of 
the same themes. The Liber asceticus, Capita caritate and Ep. 2 tackle this life 
through the lens of love discussing questions and areas regarding its activities, 
goals and means in relation to the human person and God. Quaestiones et dubia 
does so by commenting on difficulties from both earlier Christian authors and 
the Scriptures. These difficulties are prompted by ascetic concerns and Maximus 
consistently interprets them in an anagogical manner seeking to teach his 
audience about various aspects of ascent and how it can be understood and 
engaged.  
Central to his conception of ascetic and Christian life across the genres of 
these earlier writings is an understanding and articulation of the activities of 
God and specifically how the incarnate Son provides the basis and renewed 
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opportunity for human imitation, transformation, and experience of God’s love 
within a process of ascent. Despite the variety of recipients for the works 
covered, this aspect remains a consistent and principal goal in his writings.18 A 
comparison of a larger set of his writings suggests that his audience, some of 
whom were Roman officials, monks and nuns does not prevent Maximus from 
including elements of his ascetic vision even if the main purpose of the work is 
not the ascetic life. 
Now I turn to Op. 13 where Maximus writes specifically about the 
location of identity or difference within the Trinity and incarnation, the relation 
of this identity and difference within the Trinity and the incarnation and the 
correlation of key ontological terms οὐσία, φύσις, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον within 
that discussion. These items either do not occur in his earliest writings or occur 
only sporadically and not together.  
For example, Liber asceticus discusses the Trinity but does not use some 
of the basic ontological terms nor discuss the unity of the Godhead and the 
difference of the persons and how they are related. Maximus discusses briefly 
the fact that there is union and distinction within the Trinity in Capita caritate 
2.29 but does not correlate it with the other areas I listed in Op. 13. The Liber 
and the Capita do not utilize the λόγος/ τρόπος distinction for either 
descriptions of the Trinity or the incarnation and does not detail much how the 
two natures of Christ come together. Quaestiones et dubia utilizes the λόγος/ 
τρόπος distinction to describe the Trinity as both one according to the principle 
of being and three according to manner of subsistence but does not correlate it 
with the terms φύσις, ὑπόστασις or πρόσωπον. Additionally, it uses some 
technical language to describe how the two natures of Christ come together. 
Finally, Ep. 2 integrates this technical language for the incarnation and the 
λόγος/ τρόπος distinction into Maximus’ overall vision of love and yet it unlike 
the Quaestiones et dubia the distinction is not extended to the entire Trinity. The 
treatment of those items I have listed above in Op. 13 receives inconsistent 
                                                 
18 Paul Blowers makes as similar observation in relation to Maximus’ scriptural exegesis 
in Quaestiones ad Thalassium in Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy in Maximus the Confessor: An 
Investigation of Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 7 (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 13-15.  
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articulation within Maximus’ ascetic vision, and Op. 13 does not incorporate 
λόγος/ τρόπος distinction. These ideas, both those in Op. 13 and the λόγος/ 
τρόπος distinction are often cited as central to Maximus’ theology and yet this 
kind of detailed and technical language does not form a consistent grammar in 
the earliest writings despite shared contexts, genres, and purposes.19 
Compare these with some later works – centuries, question and 
response, and commentaries – such as the Ambigua, Mystagogia, and Expositio 
orationis dominicae, which bear the central intention of dealing with ascent 
within the ascetic and Christian life and the difference is striking. Each of these 
consistently displays focused and detailed descriptions of the Trinity that have a 
remarkable resemblance to concepts articulated in Op. 13 and also include the 
λόγος/ τρόπος distinction.  In fact, Mystagogia, Expositio orationis dominicae, 
and the Ambigua have very similar sections that draw on this language.20 The 
most efficient explanation for this difference and the sporadic usage in the 
earliest writings of key concepts would be that Maximus’ earliest writings and 
their way of speaking functioned as a substrate upon which he built increasingly 
                                                 
 19  Törönen, Union and Distinction, 47-59. Törönen identifies basic rules that Maximus 
follows for his discussions of the Trinity and Christ in Chapter 3 of his book. Specifically, he 
draws attention to Ep. 15 (PG 91.545A), where Maximus correlates key ontological terms with 
identity and difference or union and distinction. Maximus earliest writings are not cited. 
Sherwood notes the importance of the λόγος/ τρόπος distinction in Earlier Ambigua 155-165 
and St. Maximus, 35-37. In this last reference Sherwood cites Cap. car. 4.9 as application of the 
λόγος/ τρόπος distinction but a closer look reveals that Maximus is making a distinction 
between God who is simple οὐσία and creatures who have a composite οὐσία with accidents 
(συμβεβηκός). Von Balthasar also notes the importance of these concepts to Maximus’ theology 
in his section on terminology in Cosmic Liturgy, 216-235. The only reference to Maximus’ 
earliest works is Cap. car 4.9 favoring the Opuscula, later Epistulae, Ambigua, Disputatio cum 
Pyhrro and Mystagogia. Piret notes the importance of these concepts to Maximus’ theology in Le 
Christ et la Trinité, 379-397. 
 20 Maximus, Myst. 23 (CCSG 69:52.839-54.868), Or. Dom (CCSG 23:53.440-54.467). 
Compare also longer discussions in Ambigua ad Iohannem 10 in On Difficulties of the Church 
Fathers: The Ambigua, Vol. 2, ed. & transl. by Nicholas Constas, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval 
Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 151-342, Ambigua ad Thomam 1-5 (CCSG 
48:24.105-33.284), Ep. 12 (PG 91.460A-509B), Ep. 15 (PG 91.543C-576D), Op. 3 (PG 91:48B-
49A; 56C) and 7 (PG 91.69B-89B). Capita gnostica also has a focused section that covers the 
same conceptual ground but without some of the technical language, see Capita gnost. 2.1 (PG 
90.1124D-1125C).  
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more complex and technical accounts. The addition of layers to this substrate, 
prompted in his writing by dealing with specific ascetic concerns, is what I call 
“development.” This imagery is intentional because it captures how his earlier 
grammar is not replaced by the later grammar but subsumed. 
Chapter 1 Summary 
In the first chapter, I show how Maximus’ language about God in one of 
his earliest works, the Liber asceticus, is already richly Trinitarian. Maximus 
uses the incarnation as a reference point for the ascetic life and for Christian life 
in general. His account of the incarnation is purposely couched in Trinitarian 
terms and the resultant ascetic vision also has a Trinitarian texture. I will show 
that his portrayal of ascetic life highlights how the Holy Spirit appropriates the 
incarnate Son’s work to the baptized while also offering that life as the prime 
example of love. While Maximus illustrates how the Trinity is the beginning, 
means and ultimate goal of the ascetic life, he does not explicitly state it. Instead, 
he focuses on how the Trinitarian purpose, intention or aim (σκοπός) of the 
incarnation should form a life of love.  
Chapter 2 Summary 
In order to more clearly see how Maximus’ Trinitarian theology fits 
within his ascetic context, it is important to review some significant precedents. 
The authors in this section are almost universally accepted as either having 
been read or having influenced Maximus’ ascetic theology. My purpose for 
reviewing this material is to help locate Maximus in his ascetic context and to 
show how certain features of his Trinitarian thought and ascetic vision are 
unique. My goal is not to show influence but rather continuity and discontinuity 
within the broader ascetic tradition.  
Chapter 3 Summary 
Once the baseline is established and has been placed in context, I can 
begin to show how Maximus develops his themes beginning with the Capita 
caritate. In the Capita, Maximus builds further on themes he discussed and 
illustrated in the Liber with the most noticeable refinement being his extended 
discussion on both practical and contemplative aspects of ascetic life. In these 
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capitula, the Trinity is explicitly identified as the source, means and end of the 
Christian life. In particular, the Holy Spirit’s appropriation of the Son’s activities 
to the baptized gives the help and means by which to live the practical life and 
focus the mind on θεωρία and prayer. This is a process of purification where 
thought, intention and action are cleansed from pretense, false perception, and 
falsely-placed desire and refocused on the Trinity as love. The result is that the 
ascetic mirrors divine simplicity in prayer and is prepared to experience the 
Trinity in a more direct fashion. This creates an ethos that generates a life of 
love, which is maintained by a constant awareness of living out that love.  
Part of this presentation of the ascetic life involves a proper 
understanding of creation and creator and finds expression in Maximus’ early 
anti-Origenist engagement. This concern resulted in an emphasis on the 
transcendence of God and concerted reflection on the nature of creation and 
deification. This discussion should be viewed as part of the overall process of 
weeding out false perceptions of reality, specifically, creation’s relationship with 
its Creator and how human beings are deified. As Sherwood noted in his study, 
The Earlier Ambigua, the terms οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια are important to 
this discussion but I will show why this triad of terms should likely be seen a 
causal sequence and that an equally important term is γνῶσις.21 These terms 
will continue to be a source of reflection and affect the way he talks about his 
Trinitarian theology from this point forward. Finally, in this chapter I look at a 
text in which Maximus talks about Tritheism and attempt to account for why 
this shows up in his writings. I suggest that this engagement is an early example 
of the logic or grammar of union and distinction but is primarily concerned with 
showing the necessity of drawing together γνῶσις and πρᾶξις. 
Chapter 4 Summary 
In the first section of Chapter 4, I briefly discuss Quaestiones et dubia and 
Ep. 2. Both of these works display features discussed in the Liber and Capita 
caritate. In Quaestiones et dubia, Maximus begins to employ more technical 
language for Christ and for the first time uses the λόγος/τρόπος distinction in 
                                                 
21 Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 103-125. 
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an explanation of the Trinity. In Ep. 2, Maximus continues to employ this 
technical language and explicitly uses the λόγος/τρόπος distinction in tandem 
with the Logos/λόγοι doctrine to describe how Christ heals humanity’s divided 
ways by providing the means for which its λόγος and τρόπος can be one 
through love.   
In the second section of this chapter, I attempt to deal with Opusculum 13 
and what it reveals about Maximus’ understanding of pro-Chalcedonian 
argumentation. In order to do this, however, I must review or retell some of the 
features of pro-Chalcedonian theology leading up to the Council of 
Constantinople 553 CE and Maximus. This retelling will help highlight how a 
specific trajectory took shape that talked about the Son in the context of an 
already established Trinitarian grammar. Once this is accomplished, I attempt to 
show how Opusculum 13 demonstrates how Maximus can be located within this 
trajectory.   
While I have tried to be attentive to necessary details, this study is by no 
means exhaustive. I also recognize that the approach I have chosen – to use 
Maximus’ early thought as a baseline – runs the risk of suggesting that what I 
uncover is all there could possibly have been, as if somehow Maximus could not 
have had a much fuller understanding than what I have presented in any one 
work. I do not think that needs be the case and, whatever risk there may be in 
my approach, I hope it is worth the reward of tracking how Maximus’ writing 
exhibits successive layers of complexity surrounding his account of ascent and 
especially his account of the Trinity. As I have mentioned above, there is no 
shortage of studies that provide a synthetic analysis and so by showing 
development in his writing I hope to provide more insight into his engagement 
with particular issues. Finally, I cannot wholly avoid Sherwood’s censure since 
this study looks at Maximus’ writings through the lens of what it might or might 
not say about his Trinitarian thought and only covers some of Maximus’ vast 
theological and historical context. However, I would suggest Maximus’ 
Trinitarian theology is at the core of his thought, and its concerns can be seen to 
drive much of his development throughout his life. This is especially the case 
when placed on the backdrop of late sixth and seventh-century theological 
activity. I attempt to draw on the scholarship that has appeared in the last 50 
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years and purposefully place Maximus’ Trinitarian thought in its post-
Chalcedonian context in a way that surpasses what others were able to do. Yet 
even in this review I must admit that there is a breadth of material that cannot 
wholly be treated here. In most cases, I follow the dating found in Sherwood’s 
classic study although for at least one work I suggest a later date.22 
Challenges in Maximus’ Writings 
Before I move on, it will be helpful to point out some significant 
challenges that confront my investigation into Maximus’ understanding of the 
Trinity particularly as it relates to the idea of development. I will begin with a 
section that deals specifically with dating and the idea of development. 
Subsequent sections will sketch out areas regarding language, influence and 
Maximus’ account of ascent and the virtues.  
When talking about “development” it is important to establish dates if 
only to determine whether writings happened before or after one another. 
Already, however, the issue of dating Maximus’ works is problematic. A number 
of studies in the last decade have suggested that Sherwood’s dating of some 
letters should be rethought. The latest entry is this shift can be found in Booth’s, 
Crisis of the Empire, who also covers the studies of Marek Jankowiak and 
Christian Boudignon.23 In general, the texts I cover here are not affected by 
these studies although I would agree with Jean-Claude Larchet and Booth that 
Op. 13 should likely be disassociated from other works where Maximus’ 
mentions a dispute with Severian bishops concerning energies and wills.24 I 
have chosen only a subset of Maximus’ overall corpus – his early works up to 
626/7 CE. According to Sherwood, these could include Episulae 6, 2, 3, 4, 10 and 
                                                 
22 The work in question is Ep. 2. For Sherwood’s dating see § 6, 7, 8 in his Annotated 
Date-List, 25.  
23 Booth, Crisis of the Empire, 163-169. 
24 Booth, Crisis of the Empire, 150 (esp. note 44) and Larchet’s introduction to Opuscules 
théologiques et polémiques, transl. and notes by Emmanuel Ponsoye, Sagesses chrétiennes (Paris: 
Cerf, 1998), 19-32. I would like to thank Phil Booth for alerting me in January 2014 of a new 
annotated date-list by himself and Marek Jankowiak in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on 
Maximus. At the time I completed my study, the new handbook had yet to come out and so my 
dates are consistent with Sherwood's date-list and the changes discussed in Booth's Crisis of 
Empire with recognition that my study may need to be updated once the new handbook is 
available.  
29 
 
Liber asceticus, Capita caritate, Expositio Psalmum LIX, Quaestiones et dubia and 
Opuscula 17 and 13. But even in this subset, the investigation is fraught with 
uncertainty. Recent studies have shown that Ep. 4 and 10, often thought to be 
early works should likely be dated later; Ep. 4 around 632 CE and Ep. 10 around 
630/631 CE.25 Sherwood himself notes his uncertainty about Ep. 6, Op. 13 and 
17 but nevertheless locates them as early. A similar problem accompanies Ep. 2, 
and its dating depends more on its use of a particular phrase that became 
problematic during the miaenergism and miathelite controversies.26 
Quaestiones et dubia is also listed as uncertain but likely by 626 CE.  
In my study, I do not cover Expositio Psalmum LIX, Ep. 3, Ep. 6 and Op. 17 
which I think present no distinct information related to the Trinity that differs 
from the Liber, Capita caritate or Ep. 2.27 What is left then, after the redating of 
Ep. 4 and 10 and exclusion of the three works just mentioned, is Ep. 2, Liber 
asceticus, Capita caritate, Quaestiones et dubia and Op. 13. With the absence of 
more refined dates for these writings, my tactic was to look at the increased 
complexity of ascent particularly the presence of ideas that are often cited as 
important from his later writings. Since the Liber asceticus and Capita caritate 
are closely tied together by Maximus himself and it is broadly agreed that the 
Liber is an early work, I have chosen to start with the Liber in order to establish 
a baseline. As a result, I have consciously treated the works in their order of 
complexity starting with Liber asceticus, then moving to Capita caritate, 
Quaestiones et dubia, Ep. 2, and Op. 13. I have determined that Opusculum 13, 
which Sherwood thought to be written early in his journey to Africa in either 
626 or 627 CE on the island of Crete, should remain at the end of this 
progression despite its uncertain date. This is because, unlike the other early 
                                                 
 25 See Booth, Crisis of Empire, 163-169.  
 26 Sherwood notes that Ep. 2 is perhaps the earliest work because of “will” language, 
noting how it bears similarity to Ambiguum 7 (PG 91:1076C) where Maximus states, “there is, 
through all, one solitary ἐνέργεια of God and those worthy of God”. In Ep. 2, it is “one will and 
intention with God and one another”. (Ep. 2: PG 91:396C).  
27 Ep. 3 for example uses λόγος, τρόπος language in a way similar to Ep.2 for ascent yet 
does not interweave this same language into his discussion of the incarnation and does not 
explicitly name or discuss the Trinity. Based on the argument of complexity I offer shortly, it fits 
well between Quaestiones et dubia and Ep. 2.  
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works, its subject matter does not address ascent but specifically the issues of 
unity and plurality within the Trinity and the incarnation. This concern to 
address unity and plurality in the Trinity and the incarnation together and in 
relation to one another does not show up in any of his earlier works even 
though there are brief forays into union and distinction in the Trinity and Christ 
separately and within the context of ascent.  Additionally, there is no discussion 
of wills or energies but an attempt to locate unity and distinction using the 
terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις along with οὐσία and πρόσωπον which is typical of 
pro-Chalcedonian engagement with miaphysitism. I will discuss how Maximus’ 
thought in Op. 13 fits this engagement more in Chapter 4. As a consequence, I 
think it represents the introduction of another kind of writing for Maximus – 
writing that is crafted toward his encounters with miaphysitism that begin 
during his flight toward Africa. Admittedly, the relation of complexity and date 
is not, by necessity, a one-to-one relationship. Maximus could have edited his 
writings, or may have intentionally made some writings less complex and others 
more so. As a result, when looking at complexity, writings may only appear to be 
earlier or later. Maximus himself notes that he (re)ordered the Ambigua putting 
the later set ad Thomam before those ad Iohannem.28 However, I think there 
would need to be more evidence like this in order to entirely discount a relation 
between the noticeable increase of complexity, not only in subject matter but 
engagement with sources, from the Liber and Capita to these other writings.  
If the Liber is allowed to function as a baseline and Op. 13 remains at the 
end of this progression then it is only Quaestiones et dubia and Ep. 2 whose 
order remains to be established. Based on their complexity and similarity to the 
Ambigua ad Iohannem, I think both Quaestiones et dubia and Ep. 2 represent 
pieces that were written after the Liber and Capita caritate, but before Op. 13. 
This judgment is based on his treatment of themes and ways of speaking that do 
not appear in his account of ascent or the Trinity in the Liber and Capita 
caritate, especially in areas one would expect based on later writings. These 
                                                 
 28 See the brief discussion and notes in Maximos the Confessor, On Difficulties of the 
Church Fathers: The Ambigua, Vol. 1, ed. and transl. by Nicholas Constas, Dumbarton Oaks 
Medieval Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), viii, ix and §26 in Sherwood, 
Annotated Date List, 31-32. 
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items include the λόγος/τρόπος distinction with reference to the Trinity, the 
Logos/λόγοι relationship in relation to ascent, more technical language for the 
incarnation and the incorporation and consolidation of ideas for ascent such as 
whole and parts, particular and universal, and union and division. These same 
ideas are more developed and present together in the Ambigua ad Iohannem in 
ways that they are not in any of the earlier writings. From the Ambigua ad 
Iohannem forward this synthesis becomes more commonplace and matures into 
a consistent theological grammar. 
Dating aside, there are other reasons that Maximus’ writings can be a 
challenge that have more to do with the content itself. It is not without reason 
that some scholars have noted the profuse nature of Maximus’ Trinitarian 
thought in his writings. One reason this is the case is his generous application of 
the same concepts and terminology to describe the Trinity and created reality. 
One could note here Louth’s observation of Maximus’ “Chalcedonian logic” 
extending the observations of an earlier generation (i.e. von Balthasar, 
Sherwood and Thunberg) and more recently the “logic of union and distinction” 
as proposed by Törönen.29 One does not have to buy into the “pan-
Chalcedonianism” to agree that this grammar is profuse and fluid between 
Trinity, Christ, ascent and creation as is evinced in works like the Ambigua and 
Mystagogia.30 Sometimes these features can seem unintentional although more 
often than not Maximus suggestively and intentionally employs them. There are 
several reasons why this is the case. Maximus, like many other pagan and 
Christian authors, viewed the relationship between the divine and the human 
                                                 
29 Louth, Maximus Confessor, 49-51. Melchisedec Törönen has investigated this concept 
in Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford Early Christian 
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). I agree with Törönen’s assessment that while 
Chalcedon is an important force in Maximus’ theology, it is not the only force. Part of my 
argument is that Maximus’ Trinitarian theology is fed by a confluence of anti-Origenist concerns, 
other distinct ascetic concerns and a specific reading of Chalcedon through the theological 
developments in the sixth and early seventh centuries. Törönen has already noted the latter’s 
influence on Maximus through Leontius of Byzantium and Justinian (Union and Distinction, 2) 
but does not discuss it at length. I will discuss in more detail how the post-Chalcedonian context 
fed into Maximus’ Trinitarian theology in Chapter 4.  
30 Törönen coins this phrase to describe the way Van Balthasar, Sherwood and 
Thunberg presented Chalcedon as the centerpiece of not only Maximus’ Christology, but all his 
theology, Union and Distinction, 2-5. 
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worlds as that between type and archetype— a microcosm— and, as Thunberg 
and Louth have highlighted, Maximus also uses an inversion of this concept by 
casting humanity and Christ as a macrocosm. 31 Therefore, there are often 
attempts to relate them in ways that mirror one another. The modes of language 
he must use in order to describe this relationship are also complex. Like other 
authors during his time, he utilizes imagery that requires his audiences to 
stretch their conception of the relationship of created realities and God as 
simultaneously analogous, symbolic or figural while at the same time striving to 
preserve God’s utterly ineffable essence. Again, the Ambigua and Mystagogia 
reflect these features rather well. Finally, Maximus understands the Trinity to 
be actively working in creation, and so we find the persons of the Trinity or 
more broadly, God, referred to throughout his account of the cosmos and ascent. 
The goal is to see God in all, through all and for all. Judging by scholarly 
comments, he seems to have succeeded. 
There are yet more complex features, however, that can hamper an 
investigation into Maximus’ Trinitarian thought and can be found in the way he 
conceives and describes the ascent of Christian life. Part of the difficulty lies in 
the scarcity of research that attempts to give a comprehensive account of 
Maximus’ conception of ascent, especially how it might have developed 
throughout his writings and how it relates to known influences such as 
Diadochus, Mark the Monk and even Evagrius. For Evagrius, Viller and 
Hausherr’s works are commonly cited even though there has been extensive 
criticism brought by von Balthasar, Sherwood, and Thunberg. To navigate these 
criticisms requires gleaning an assortment of different arguments throughout 
these authors’ writings some of which are made in footnotes or, not being the 
main point, are made in passing as part of a larger discussion. As others have 
                                                 
31 Louth quotes the English translation of Dumitru Stăniloae’s Teologia dogmatica 
ortodoxa— The Experience of God: Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, translated and edited by Iaon 
Ionita and Robert Barringer, (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1994), 4-5, (but see also 
147-148, 179-180) and builds on this theme to argue for humanity’s priestly and thus 
‘interpretative’ role in the cosmos. His contribution, entitled “Man and Cosmos in St. Maximus 
the Confessor,” can be found in Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian 
Perspectives on Environment, Nature, and Creation, eds. John Chryssavgis and Bruce V. Foltz 
(Bronx: Fordham University Press, 2013), 60-62. Thunberg also discusses briefly what he terms 
the “makranthropos-idea”, see Microcosm and Mediator, 140-141. 
33 
 
noted, a new and focused study would be welcome. However, this should not be 
taken to mean there are no valuable studies on any aspects of Maximus’ vision 
of ascent only that there remains to be focused research that connects the 
scattered criticisms of earlier research, tracks his development and accounts for 
all the moving parts of his vision.32 To give just one example, there is a 
discernable increase in detail between a work like Liber asceticus and later 
works like Ambigua ad Iohannem and Mystagogia that is unaccounted for. Part 
of this growing complexity could be Maximus’ sensitivity to his audience’s needs 
and requests or even a concern to ease his audience into more detailed and 
complex accounts. However, it could also indicate that Maximus is incorporating 
new concepts and ideas. A case in point is the use of the λόγος/τρόπος 
distinction, which is rare in his earlier writings but comes to play a prominent 
role in descriptions of the Trinity, Christ and human beings in later writings. I 
hope to address this particular example since it affects his Trinitarian thought, 
but the larger issues still remain. While I do not think the incorporation of new 
ideas at various phases of his writings represents a drastic revision of his earlier 
accounts, it nevertheless could indicate the influence of specific traditions, 
authors and Maximus’ own concern to work out earlier seeds of thought.  
 In addition to the lack of a comprehensive study, each movement of 
ascent, upon closer inspection, contains themes found in other movements. An 
example is γνῶσις and πρᾶξις. In one of several accounts of ascent, Maximus 
splits ascent into two movements –πρακτική and θεωρητική, with πρᾶξις and 
γνῶσις as the main subjects. However, Maximus, as early as the Capita caritate, 
and perhaps earlier, discusses a kind of knowledge (φρόνησις) that is gained in 
                                                 
32 Recent studies have focused on the transformation of desire and Maximus’ 
understanding of natural contemplation. See for example, Joshua Lollar, “‘To See into the Life of 
Things’: The Contemplation of Nature in Maximus the Confessor’s Ambigua to John,” Vol. 1 & 2, 
(PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2011), Paul Blowers, “The Dialectics and Therapeutics of 
Desire in Maximus the Confessor, VC 65.4 (2011), 425-451. The most detailed study to date is 
that of Lars Thunberg in Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the 
Confessor, 2nd ed. (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1995). However, I would suggest that there 
is still more going on than even Thunberg’s extensive study accounts for. Lollar’s study is helpful 
as an in-depth investigation into the development of the contemplation of nature and attempts 
to place Maximus within preceding theological and philosophical traditions. Although Lollar’s 
study fills in important details, he does not attempt to give a comprehensive study of Maximus’ 
entire vision of ascent. Blowers’ work highlights areas of engagement with Gregory of Nyssa. 
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the first movement while πρᾶξις continues into the second movement. Maximus’ 
concern to emphasize the joining of both γνῶσις and πρᾶξις throughout ascent 
creates a kind of fractal quality to his description. As the levels of detail are filled 
in for each movement, one can discern elements from earlier movements.33 One 
side-effect of this feature is that it appears as though he confuses means and 
goal, subject and object and later τρόπος and λόγος.34   
Finally, another reason why Maximus’ Trinitarian theology can be a 
challenge is the knotty issue of influence. Maximus’ place in the history and 
theological heritage of late antique Christianity comes after numerous 
significant councils and after quite a few theological/ascetic luminaries. In other 
                                                 
33 For example, in the Liber there is noticeable movement from ignorance to γνῶσις of 
God, suggesting the standard bipartite account. However, in the Capita caritate, this is filled in 
further. The baptized move from mere knowledge and false knowledge to genuine knowledge 
and then, by the end of ascent, to knowledge of the Trinity. This falls in line nicely with 
descriptions of the mind as “impure”, “pure”, and “perfect” (Cap. car. 3.34, 1.33, 3.99). There is a 
noticeable absence, however, of “perfect knowledge” even though he does discuss perfect love 
and perfect mind. This caveat is understandable in light of statements that distinguish between 
God’s attributes, which are knowable, and his οὐσία, which is unknowable (cf. Cap. car. 1.100). 
This understanding of γνῶσις suggests a tripartite account, which is confirmed by other explicit 
citations (cf. Cap. car. 1.86, 94). While technically speaking πρᾶξις refers to πρακτική, Maximus 
insists there is a kind of γνῶσις that results from πρᾶξις— φρόνησις. Conversely, genuine 
γνῶσις is possessed only when it is joined with πρᾶξις, specifically love. Likewise, θεωρία that 
neglects πρᾶξις cannot lead to genuine γνῶσις and thus aborts knowledge of the Trinity. A 
similar phenomenon accompanies other aspects of ascent where Maximus not only suggests 
that each concept can be found in a particular movement but will also describe that concept 
through the lens of another movement. This “fractal” quality accompanies various aspects of 
ascent and is reinforced by similarly fractal literary techniques (cf. the concepts of illumination 
and the commandments in Liber asc. §1 and 2). 
In attempting to put words to the kind of literary technique Maximus is using and his 
understanding of various aspects of ascent, I was unable to find a precise ancient or modern 
technical term. Consequently, I have chosen the term “fractal”. In using this term I mean to 
invoke the attributes of fractal art, which exhibit a particular structure or design on the macro-
level, and then, when a particular section of that level is inspected more closely, it reveals a 
similar structure or design on each successive micro-levels. Other kinds of literary techniques 
become a means of shaping the interrelated aspects of ascent. For example, in Cap. car. 1.2-3, a 
chiasm is obvious at the conceptual level, but Maximus also switches the words used for those 
concepts from static nouns (fear of God springs from faith) to verbs and attributive participles 
(the one who has faith fears punishment). His use of the chiastic structure in tandem with 
changing nouns to verbs and verbal forms reinforces syntactically and grammatically a point he 
makes often in the Capita caritate – the virtues must become active in the soul if the mind is to 
have true love and genuine knowledge of God. 
34 Prassas notes this difficulty in the introduction to her translation of Quaestiones et 
Dubia, see St. Maximus the Confessor’s Questions and Doubts, transl. with introduction and notes 
by Despina D. Prassas (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 34.  
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words, there are plenty of materials to serve as potential sources. The task 
would be easier if he held to modern citation conventions but such expectations 
are foisting standards on an age when part of the value of theological and ascetic 
writing was the author’s ability to resonate a broader tradition authentically, 
not citation practices. This resonance is much easier to accomplish by echoing 
language or taking pieces from authors established in this tradition. This does 
not mean the Maximus never attributes important ideas to his predecessors. His 
favorite sources to cite are Gregory Nazianzus, Ps.-Dionysius and later Cyril of 
Alexandria. More often than not he is very forthcoming when he is drawing on 
these three but there are more difficult influences to untangle and even Gregory 
and Ps.-Dionysius become problematic when Evagrius comes into the picture. 
For example, Maximus view of ascent, which has been almost unquestionably 
attributed to Evagrius, can find surprising parallels in Gregory of Nazianzus or 
Ps.-Dionysius that if investigated, could lessen Evagrian influence. This is 
further complicated by the fact that Evagrius had a close relationship with 
Gregory. Might his account of ascent depend not mainly on Evagrius but also be 
influenced by Gregory and Ps.-Dionysius in ways beyond just speaking of God’s 
transcendence? The problem is compounded by the fact that there are sources 
that he draws upon which he does not always name such as Gregory of Nyssa, 
Evagrius, Origen and Leontius of Byzantium. As a result, determining influence 
becomes an issue of sorting out not just a one-to-one point of correspondence, 
but an entire network of potential influences and their cumulative effect on each 
other and then on Maximus.  
To sort out such a problem would take a study or several studies that 
consider not only Maximus and one of these authors but Maximus and his 
network of sources and influences. This might be done by discerning a priority 
of authors in his writings, determining areas in which one author or set of 
authors predominate or perhaps demonstrating more clearly how those around 
him may have directly influenced his thought. For my investigation, I have 
chosen not to tackle the issue of influence but rather to demonstrate how 
Maximus fits into a broader set of traditions. Particularly regarding the ascetic 
tradition, I have opted to highlight parallel concerns and ways of tackling those 
concerns by earlier authors and then compare them with Maximus. To this, I 
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dedicate an entire chapter to help distinguish distinct lineaments of Maximus’ 
baseline thought as represented in the Liber. Other areas concerning how 
Maximus engages aspects of tradition are dealt with as needed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Maximus’ Trinitarian Grammar for Christian Life in the Liber 
Asceticus 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, Pierre Piret’s Le Christ et la Trinité 
selon Maxime le Confesseur is one of the only major works dedicated to wrestling 
with Maximus’ Trinitarian thought and there are few references in his work to 
the Liber asceticus or Capita caritate. Likewise, Sherwood’s earlier analysis of 
the Liber and Capita, in which he gave a brief description of Maximus’ doctrine 
of God, was entirely drawn from passages outside the Liber and contained only a 
few references to the Capita. Furthermore, his presentation gave very little 
sense of movement or development, the exception being Maximus’ involvement 
in the miaenergist and miathelite controversies. Overall, contemporary 
scholarly literature in the English-speaking world has spent little time exploring 
Maximus’ thought in the Liber especially for the purpose of analyzing what it 
might disclose about Maximus’ Trinitarian theology. In contrast, this chapter 
will use the Liber to establish a baseline for Maximus’ Trinitarian thought. I 
want to argue that within this early work Maximus establishes a Trinitarian 
grammar for Christian life. This grammar illustrates, rather than stating directly, 
the Trinity as the beginning, means and goal of human life. This is demonstrated 
in several ways: 1) a description of baptism, 2) a particular articulation of divine 
appropriation – how the Trinitarian persons work in concert, 3) a Trinitarian 
presentation of the loving, incarnate life of the Son within salvation history, and 
4) by illustrating Trinitarian prayer. Maximus’ understanding of divine 
appropriation is displayed: a) through his portrayal of the Spirit appropriating 
the activities of the Son to the baptized, and b) how ascent allows the baptized 
to properly participate in and manifest the presence of the Triune God. 
In the next chapter, a review of his predecessors uncovers areas of 
continuity around shared concerns. However, it also reveals how Maximus’ 
account of ascetic and Christian life presented in the Liber is distinctive in the 
Greek East because of its portrayal of the incarnation as exemplifying and 
shaping love in the life of the baptized. I argue that when his vision placed 
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within the context of earlier Greek ascetic writers, it represents a striking 
synthesis of Christian life in Trinitarian terms. I will return to an analysis of 
Maximus’ writings in Chapter 3 when I look at Capita caritate. Finally, in 
Chapter 4, I analyze Quaestiones et dubia, Epistula 2 and Opuscula 13 and 
thereby round out my review of his early writings. In the Capita, Maximus 
continues his Trinitarian account of Christian life explicitly stating what he only 
illustrates in the Liber while continuing to expand on other areas within a more 
complex account of ascent. Finally, he will also add several new ways of 
speaking as a result of engaging Origenism and Tritheism. In the last three 
works I cover, Maximus begins to solidify terminology for the stages of ascent, 
continues to engage Origenism and introduces several important distinctions 
and technical terminology for Christ and the Trinity. With the exception of Op. 
13, Maximus uses the Trinitarian grammar he exhibits in the Liber as a 
framework on which to carefully integrate his engagement with these 
controversies and the new terminology he employs. 
To give a full treatment of Maximus’ view of ascent in Christian life and 
how it relates to previous articulations is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, I hope to draw out how his view of ascent is influenced by his 
understanding of the interaction of the Trinitarian persons and also how the 
Trinity fits into his overall conception of ascent. Similarly, I want to reemphasize 
that, in this chapter, I am not attempting to touch on everything Maximus says 
about the Trinity but only his main themes as a way to uncover his grammar for 
Christian life.  
Like many other ascetic writers, Maximus highlights virtue and union 
with God as the goal of the ascetic life. This life is pursued by disciplining one’s 
body and mind in order to attain ἀπάθεια, which in turn allows the ascetic to 
focus on the activities of meditation, contemplation, and prayer. Maximus is 
well-versed in this perspective, but his own account exhibits a distinctively 
Trinitarian flavor and demonstrates a concerted effort to deal with 
epistemological issues within the rubric of love and God’s activity. Key to this 
process is a series of movements that involve γνῶσις and ἄγνοια — knowing, 
unknowning or ignoring and being aware. This process, at its core, is meant to 
redirect the powers of the soul away from the pleasures of material existence to 
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the delights of divine love thereby reintegrating the parts of the soul so that the 
baptized can love God and fellow human beings. As ascent progresses, the 
perceptibility of God’s indwelling becomes more evident, and the human being 
matures until perfect love is reached. Maximus’ goal in the Liber asceticus is to 
give a basic rationale for this life and an outline of its workings. In order to do 
this, Maximus draws on quite a lot of imagery from the both testaments of 
Scripture and echoes phrases of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed.  
On this last point more should be said. A quick comparison of the Liber 
with the Capita caritate reveals that Maximus avoids technical language in the 
former, only using terms for which he can give biblical support and examples. 
For example, the term ἀπάθεια, which does not occur in the writings of the New 
Testament nor the Septuagint, is used three times in two sentences towards the 
end of the Liber but renouncement and warnings against “material-mindedness” 
is fully supported by references to Jesus’ sayings in the Gospels and 
exhortations against the “flesh” from the Pauline epistles.1 Likewise numerous 
formulations of the scriptural commands to love God, neighbor, and enemy are 
represented and bolstered with references to Jesus’ actions in order to enjoin 
love and forgiveness of one’s enemy. An indicative example can be found when 
Maximus deals with the concept of νῆψις. In one section, Maximus succinctly 
sums up the activities of the ascetic life linking a series of ideas and their 
scriptural support together in order to demonstrate biblical grounding for the 
term but enlists the apostle Paul as an example of its practice.2 Likewise, the 
virtues of love, self-mastery, and prayer all receive biblical support through 
both prescriptive texts and descriptions of biblical characters who are meant to 
serve as indicative examples.3 Of the four major sections of the Liber, all receive 
                                                             
1 Maximus, Lib. asc. §44 (CCSG 40:117.1003-119.1017). Ἀπάθεια in this section is the 
fruit of repentance, which in turn is the forgiveness of sin. Perfect ἀπάθεια is achieved when the 
ascetic is no longer swept away by the passions and thus perfectly forgiven of sin. In §45 (CCSG 
40:119.1020-1022), this maturation of ἀπάθεια is the result of “despising transient things so 
that because of them we do not fight with human beings, thus transgressing the commandment 
of love and falling from love of God.” 
2 Maximus, Lib. asc. §18 (CCSG 40:39.328-41.354). 
3 Maximus, Lib. asc. §19-26 (CCSG 40:41.355-53.466).  
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similar treatment.4 Pablos Argárate, while investigating the use of Scripture in 
the third section where the old man addresses the younger brother’s lack of 
contrition (κατάνυξις), notes that overall there are at least 156 citations of the 
Bible more than half occurring in the third section. Maximus pulls examples and 
texts from both testaments to give his account of the ascetic life.5 Argárate 
concludes that the Liber is “d’une certaine perspective une meditation biblique 
prolongeé.”6 While the Logos/λόγοι doctrine receives no direct treatment, 
Maximus’ preferred way of referring to Scripture in the Liber as either a λόγος 
or λόγοι is suggestive and it is tempting to call to mind Maximus’ later 
explanation of both Scripture and creation as containing the λόγοι that draw the 
mind toward the Logos in Ambiguum 10, Capita gnostica, and Quaestiones ad 
Thalassium.7 If Maximus’ portrayal of the Christian life is intentionally placed on 
a biblical foundation and is also purposefully Trinitarian, this suggests that his 
Trinitarian portrayal of this life is equally based on his reading of the Septuagint 
and the New Testament.  
§1.1 Overview of Liber Asceticus 
In a sense, Liber asceticus functions as an introductory work, which 
spares the reader from a whole range of technical terminology that Maximus 
will use later and gives the basic lineaments of not only ascetic life but Christian 
life. Virtually all the material discussed in both the Liber and Capita caritate 
could be applied by non-monks as well as monks.8 Maximus, through a dialogue 
                                                             
4 Argárate suggests the major sections are §1-15, 16-26, 27-39 and 40-45, see Pablos 
Argárate, “«Car mes iniquities dépassèrent ma tête»: Les fonctions du texte biblique dans la 
section katanyktique du Logos Asketikos de Maxime le Confesseur,” in The Reception and 
Interpretation of the Bible in Late Antiquity: Proceedings of the Montréal Colloquium in Honour of 
Charles Kannengiesser, 11-13 October 2006, eds. Lorenzo DiTommaso and Lucian Turcescu 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), 25-34. Sherwood suggests three sections §1-26, 27-39, 40-45, see St. 
Maximus, 99. 
5 Argárate, “Les fonctions du texte biblique,” 27.  
6 Argárate, “Les fonctions du texte biblique,” 34. 
7  Argárate draws attention to Maximus manner of citing in the Liber, see “Les fonctions 
du texte biblique,” 24 n. 37. 
8 Louth comes to a similar conclusion, listing Ep. 2 and Maximus’ concern to show the 
importance of baptism in Capita gnostica 1.87 as evidence, see Maximus, 35. Booth argues for a 
similar broadening of Maximus’ audience based on a concern to address the shifting fortunes of 
 41 
                                                             
ascetic communities caused by political and economic pressures in the Late Antique Roman 
Empire. He highlights similar concerns in Sophronius and John Moschus and also cites for all 
three a growing concern to reconcile ascetic and sacramental areas of Christianity in order to 
interpret and persevere through the Persian and Arab incursions and the internal tensions of 
the Empire, see Booth, Crisis of the Empire, 182-185.   
In the Liber, there are several additional pieces of evidence that reveal tensions within 
the ascetic community and point in the direction of an attempt by Maximus to broaden his 
audience. None of these are conclusive by themselves but they do indicate a concern that 
precedes Maximus’ Mystagogia, which Booth draws upon for his argument. Not enough is known 
about the recipient of both the Liber and Capita caritate, Elpidius, to help in this regard. 
However, based on Maximus address to him as “Pater”, he may well have overseen an ascetic 
community or at least, as Ceresa-Gestaldo notes, it may mean he was a monk and superior to 
Maximus (Cap. sulla car., 49 n. 1). A significant piece of evidence that points to a broader 
audience is the way Maximus uses the life of Christ, especially his temptation. In Liber asceticus 
§10-13 (CCSG 40:23.174-31.254), Jesus’ temptation begins in the desert and continues into 
“society”, suggesting that Maximus is concerned to show how asceticism could and should be 
lived out by those in society while at the same time addressing how monks should handle 
interactions within community. In the same work, Maximus addresses the created goodness of 
food, possession, relatives, money and even fame. However, as a result of the human obsession 
with them, he confronts them as distractions that enslave human attention and steal it away 
from God. Therefore, they must be renounced. However, in §23 (CCSG 40:45.401-47.417), he 
permits their use according to the needs of the body but not as a source of complete satisfaction 
and pleasure. Renunciation, then, does not mean a complete abandonment of their use but 
rather the relinquishment of an ownership selfishly exercised for one’s pleasure.  
In Cap. car. 4.66 (Cap. sulla car., 222), Maximus makes a similar statement about the 
inherent goodness of the list of items mentioned above, but this time explicitly highlights 
“having children” and states he does not forbid such things but forbids immoderation, thinking 
of things passionately and corrects irrationality. It seems difficult to explain why Maximus might 
address having children in communities that were expected to be celibate unless he was either 
correcting misguided ascetic complaints, expected a wider audience or both. In 4.67 (Cap. sulla 
car., 222), Maximus distinguishes between commandments of love and free-will gifts which he 
assigns to various ascetic practices. This could be interpreted as simply confronting vainglory 
within ascetic communities but could also point to Maximus’ awareness of a broader readership. 
The centrality of following the commandment of love, a main theme in the Liber and Capita 
caritate, for everyone strengthens this sentiment. Similarly, Maximus will make statements that 
intimate he is addressing Christian life in general and not specifically the life of monks.  
Another example in the Lib. asc. is the general conception of salvation. The old man 
states, “but the Lord, knowing that for the Christian the observation of these [commandments] is 
not sufficient for perfection said, ‘Truly I say to you that if your righteousness does not far 
exceed that of the scribes and the Pharisees, you might not enter into the kingdom of heaven,’” 
Lib. asc. §30 (CCSG 40:63.552-556). Yet, another example ties both baptism and the 
commandments together early on in the Lib. asc. §2 (CCSG 40:7.32-9.48) suggesting the 
commandments are for all the baptized not just ascetics. Finally, Maximus’ correspondence with 
those who were not monks, such as the example given by Louth in John Cubicularius; a member 
of the imperial court in Constantinople, bears similar concerns as those touched upon in the Lib. 
asc. Taken together, these examples demonstrate that Maximus, at the very least, has a concern 
to confront vainglory on the part of his fellow ascetics but also strongly supports that he is 
addressing Christians living outside the confines of monastery or cave.  
 42 
between an old ascetic and a presumably younger brother, gives us the seeds 
from which he will develop themes in the Capita caritate. This dialogue is 
shaped by the younger man’s initial question, “What is the purpose of the 
incarnation?” In the Liber asceticus, Maximus’ answer to this question is found 
in the way he speaks of the Trinity as the beginning, means and goal of human 
life. This understanding is illustrated in his account of Christian life rather than 
explicitly stated. One way Maximus accomplishes this is through his portrayal of 
divine appropriation or how he conceives of the actions and activity of the 
divine persons together. This portrayal plays out in two arenas. The first arena 
is by explaining how the Holy Spirit applies or continues the work of the Son in 
the life of the baptized. The second arena is the process of ascent itself and how 
it is a necessary habitus for properly participating in and manifesting God’s 
presence. A second way he accomplishes this is with a Trinitarian presentation 
of the incarnate Son’s life as an example of love to be imitated. Finally, this 
grammar is illustrated through Trinitarian prayer, which Maximus displays 
rather than prescribes or explicitly discusses. Maximus interleaves two of these 
three ways of speaking to present the Trinity as the beginning and goal of the 
Christian life while imitation of the Son’s activities and the Holy Spirit’s 
appropriation of those activities to the baptized are the means of participating 
and manifesting the divine life. In this first section, I will give a brief overview of 
the Liber and then in subsequent sections address each of the ways this 
grammar plays out as described above. In order to facilitate an easier reading 
between the older critical edition by Cantarella and Sherwood’s translation 
which both use section numbers and the new critical edition by Van Deun, 
which uses line numbers, I have used both in my citation and provided a table in 
the Appendix that correlates them.9 
An important framework for understanding how Maximus’ portrayal of 
Christian life is Trinitarian is recognizing that he sees it as response to God’s 
commands, primarily through imitation (μίμησις/ μιμέομαι) of God but also of 
                                                             
9 The current critical edition is Liber Asceticus, ed. Peter Van Deun, CCSG 48 (Turnhout: 
Brepols-Leuven, 2002). The older critical edition is S. Massimo confessore: la mistagogia ed altri 
scritti, ed. Raffaele Cantarella, Testi cristiani con version italiana a fronte, introduzione e 
comment 4 (Firenze: Testi cristiani, 1931). 
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the saints. Christian life as imitation is understood within the context of 
Scripture’s history of the divine/human relationship, especially as it relates to 
dealing with the problem of alienation as a result of sin. Maximus gives this 
history in brief in the first main section of the dialogue (§1) where it is 
recounted in response to the initial inquiry of the young man. Specifically, the 
old man tells of humanity’s transgression in paradise, God’s providence despite 
humanity’s downward spiral into despair and ends with the incarnation, 
ascension and giving of the Holy Spirit. The sub-section on the incarnation is the 
most lengthy and focuses on the Son’s activities through the incarnation that are 
then continued by the Holy Spirit for the baptized who “struggle to keep his 
commandments for their salvation”.10 It is the Son in the incarnation that shows 
the deiform way of life and then the Holy Spirit who is sent to appropriate the 
activities of the Son to the believer. The material from this point forward is 
essentially the continued dialogue between the old man and the younger man 
over how to understand and engage this struggle and live this life (§2-40). The 
exception is the very last sections §41-45, which are directed toward the 
reader(s) but nevertheless follows the sentiment of the dialogue.11 
In section, §2, the Christian life begins with obedience to Matthew 28:19-
20a and thus baptism is accomplished in the name of the “deifying” Trinity. The 
old man enjoins the younger man that the baptized join true faith along with all 
Christ’s commands.12 These commands, as the young man discovers after 
expressing concern at their number, are accomplished through imitation of the 
Lord and the power he provides. This power can only be received through 
struggling against “invisible enemies” and separation from worldly passions.13 
Yet the young man is still distraught at the number of commands in light of his 
poor memory and so the old man notes that they are encapsulated in the 
                                                             
10 Maximus, Lib. asc. §1 (CCSG 40:5.7-7.31): τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ὑπὲρ τῆς ἑαυτῶν 
σωτηρίας φυλάξαι τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ. 
11 From §41 (CCSG 40:107.912) onward Maximus uses exhortation language “let us” 
and ends §45 (CCSG 40:119.1018) and the book with “brothers, let us . . .” Sherwood notes this 
as well, see St. Maximus, 247 n. 189. 
12 Maximus, Lib. asc. §2 (CCSG 40:7.32-9.48).   
13 Maximus, Lib. asc. §3-5 (CCSG 40:9.49-15.91). 
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commandments, “Love the Lord your God with all your strength and all your 
mind and your neighbor as yourself” which are in sharp contrast with loving 
material things especially “mammon”.14 Food, money, possessions, fame and 
relatives are all created by God as good and should be used in service to him. Yet 
hate is driven by lust for material possessions and an obsession with worldly 
concerns. As a result, war is fought both within and with others over these 
things.15 The war within must be fought and in order to engage it successfully 
means to fight against hate and the passions. This requires not just faith but 
fulfilling Christ’s commands as summed up by the citations of the various 
biblical formulations of loving God and loving neighbor.16 Calling upon 
Johannine language, the old man highlights the direct relationship between 
loving God and loving one another.17 Maximus, in several instances in the 
dialogue, has the old man state that God does not command what is impossible. 
At first he does this to highlight how the struggle to love must mean to love 
one’s enemies but then later repeats a similar statement when discussing 
ceaseless prayer.18 However, as the dialogue continues, he insists that to do 
these things one must be graced with an understanding of the σκοπός of the 
incarnation.19 
                                                             
14 Maximus, Lib. asc. §6 (CCSG 40:15.92-109). 
15 Maximus, Lib. asc. §7 (CCSG 40:17.110-122). Maximus cites as the main objects of the 
passions food, money, possessions, reputation and relatives.    
16 Maximus strings together various formulations of this command sometimes citing 
them from the Gospels explicitly, other times simply alluding to them: cf. Mark 12.30 and Lib. 
asc. §6 (CCSG 40:15.97-99); John 14.15, 15.12 and Lib. asc. §7 (CCSG 40:17.123-126); Matt. 5.44 
and Lib. asc. §8 (CCSG 40:19.146-21.148); Matt. 22.37-40 and Lib. asc. §10 (CCSG 40:25.183-
185). 
17 Maximus, Lib. asc. §7 (CCSG 40:17.122-19.131). 
18 Maximus, Lib. asc. §8, 19, 24-25, 9 (CCSG 40:19.139-21:160; 41.355-360; 49.430-466, 
23.167-173).  
19 Maximus, Lib. asc. §9 (CCSG 40:23.167-173): Ἀδύνατόν τινα ἀγαπῆσαι ἐκ καρδίας τὸν 
θλίβοντα, κἂν τῇ ὕλῃ τοῦ κόσμου ἔδοξεν ἀποτάξασθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν σκοπὸν τοῦ κυρίου ἐν 
ἀληθείᾳ γινώσκῃ· ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ κυρίου αὐτῷ χαριζομένου δυνηθῇ γνῶναι καὶ σπεύδῃ κατ’ αὐτὸν 
περιπατεῖν, δύναται ἐκ καρδίας ἀγαπῆσαι τὸν μισοῦντα καὶ θλίβοντα, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι 
ἐγνωκότες ἠγάπων, [emphasis is mine]. 
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The theme of love now becomes a central lens through which one views 
the Son’s incarnate life during his temptation “in the desert” but also during his 
sojourn in “society” especially in relation to the Pharisees and scribes. Christ, in 
both arenas of human life, is presented as the example of love and, therefore, 
represents the believer’s response to God. His example is then fleshed out 
within the main portion of the dialogue between the old man and the younger 
brother.20 Christ’s war is fought with love against hate and the instigator of 
hate—the Devil.21 He succeeds in keeping the commandment of love, which 
results in conquering the devil, crowning himself with resurrection, and 
renewing the old Adam. The elder enjoins the younger man to have the same 
mind as Christ, quoting Philippians 2.5.22 He then highlights the voluntary 
character of Christ’s actions even though it led to his death. By being conquered 
voluntarily (ἑκουσίως), he conquered the devil and his tyranny. By being 
crucified in weakness, he made dead death and the one who had the power of 
death.23 The old man highlights this victory now by shifting attention to the 
Apostle Paul who boasted in his weakness so that the power of Christ might 
dwell in him and recognized that his wrestling was not with flesh and blood but 
against “invisible enemies”. Like Christ, Paul suffers and yet in the midst of it 
finds power and victory responding, as Jesus did, with love.24 At the end of this 
tour through the lives of Jesus and Paul, the young man acknowledges the truth 
of the old man’s words and adds a few of his own observations about the love of 
Jesus— he shows both love and sympathy at the cross through forgiving his 
enemies. He then asks for prayer so that he may know perfectly the Lord and 
Apostles’ σκοπός and may be able to be “sober-minded” (δυνηθῶ νήφειν) in 
temptation.25  
                                                             
20 Maximus, Lib. asc. §10-12 (CCSG 40:23.174-29.242). 
21 Maximus, Lib. asc. §12 (CCSG 40:27.215-29.221). Maximus reemphasizes that this 
war is not fought against fellow human beings but against Satan citing Ephesians 6.12 and 
alluding to 6.11, 13-17. 
22 Maximus, Lib. asc. §12 (CCSG 40:27.221-29.242). 
23 Maximus, Lib. asc. §13 (CCSG 40:29.243-31.251). 
24 Maximus, Lib. asc. §14-15 (CCSG 40:31.252-35.295). 
25 Maximus, Lib. asc. §16 (CCSG 40:35.296-311). 
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What ensues from §17-26 is what it takes to be “sober-minded” (νήφειν) 
and a careful presentation of how concern for earthly things is overcome by 
meditation on divine Scripture and the development of the virtues.26 In order to 
progress in love and fully devote oneself to God, one must pursue the virtues of 
love (ἀγάπη), self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια) and prayer (προσευχή). The last of 
these, prayer, is presented as a grace and one which allows the mind to be 
joined with God and become Godlike (θεοειδὴς).27 This term “deiform” alludes 
to Maximus’ initial description of Christ’s life in §1, which he stated “traced out a 
deiform way of life,” (πολιτείαν ἡμῖν θεοειδοῦς ζωῆς ὑποδειξας).28 There is, 
however, no extended discussion on how to conceive of prayer as both a virtue 
and a grace.  
Within this larger section, Maximus spends much of  §19-23, 
demonstrating how these three virtues accomplish their task of taming anger, 
quenching lust and presenting the mind, naked (γυμνός), to God.29 This 
nakedness is in relation to thoughts (τά νοήματα) about things (τά πράγματα), 
specifically anything that is not God. Focusing on this last virtue, Maximus states 
that occasional prayer does not meet the final goal of a habit of divine love (ἕξις 
τῆς θείας ἀγάπης) but must be ceaseless, as suggested by the Apostle Paul, in 1 
Thessalonians 5.17.30 Maximus explains, “For prayer is unceasing, when the 
mind is held in great awe and passionate devotion to God, when it always hangs 
on hope in him, when it is confident in him in all things, in both those things 
which it does and those things which happen to it.”31 Hope here is presented as 
one of the means by which full devotion perseveres in the midst of an active life 
                                                             
26 Maximus, Lib. asc. §17-26 (CCSG 40:35.311-53.466). 
27 Maximus, Lib asc. §24 (CCSG 40:49.423-426): ἡ δὲ χάρις τῆς προσευχῆς τῷ Θεῷ 
συνάπτει τὸν νοῦν, τῷ δὲ Θεῷ συνάπτουσα, χωρίζει πάντων τῶν νοημάτων. Τότε οὖν ὁ νοῦς 
γυμνὸς αὐτῷ προσομιλῶν, θεοειδὴς γίνεται. 
28 Maximus, Lib. asc. §1 (CCSG 40:7.17). 
29 Maximus, Lib. asc. §19-23 (CCSG 40:41.355-47.417). 
30 Maximus, Lib. asc. §24-26 (CCSG 40:47.418-53.466). 
31 Maximus, Lib asc. §25 (CCSG 40:49.437-51.441): Ἀδιάλειπτος γάρ ἐστι προσευχή, τὸ 
τὸν νοῦν ἔχειν ἐν εὐλαβείᾳ πολλῇ καὶ πόθῳ προσκείμενον τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ τῆς ἐλπίδος αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ 
ἀποκρέμασθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν θαρρεῖν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς τε ἔργοις καὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν. The 
command to pray ceaselessly is at the end of §24 (CCSG 40:49.428-430). 
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and circumstances. The Apostle Paul, mirroring Christ, serves as an example of 
someone who is able to pray ceaselessly despite his activities or whatever 
befalls him. It was with this disposition that he perceived God’s love despite 
tribulation (Romans 8.35, 38) and bore with such tribulation “so that also the 
life of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh” (he gives the full 
quotation from 2 Corinthians 4.8-10).32 Finally, Maximus relates this disposition 
directly to other saints who rejoiced despite their tribulations so that they might 
come into “the habit of divine hope” and concludes the section with Paul 
glorying in his weakness so that the power of Christ might dwell in him.33 
Maximus, by emphasizing the constant practice of the activities surrounding 
virtue, illustrates that ascent has a cumulative effect producing a “state” or 
“habit of divine hope”. This hints at an eschatological feature of ascent, but most 
clearly shows it is a process of maturation that can be aborted or reengaged.  
After the younger man has realized that he lacks virtually everything he 
needs to understand and know the σκοπός of the incarnation, he is distraught 
over his own lack of contrition (κατάνυξις).34 What follows in the rest of §27 on 
into §39 is a tour through “divine Scripture” that is meant to incite the fear of 
God and ends with a prayer for mercy. The strategy seems to work, and the 
young man is struck with contrition acknowledging his sins with the language of 
Psalm 37.5. His cry is met with a reference by the old man to Matthew 19.25-26 
“With human beings salvation is impossible; but with God all things are 
                                                             
32 Maximus uses διακείμενος to indicate Paul’s state or disposition in §25 (CCSG 
40:51.441). This, along with repeating the statement from Colossians 3.5, is meant to echo the 
end of Lib. asc. §12 where the old man quotes Paul’s command from Phil. 2.5: «τοῦτο φρονείσθω 
ἐν ὑμῖν, ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ . . . » and the beginning of §13 where he ties Paul’s power in 
weakness with Christ’s crucifixion in weakness resulting in the defeat of death and Satan. In this 
portrayal Christ’s death is tied directly to the tribulations and weaknesses experienced by the 
baptized both of which, if endured, result in power. The list of activities here is prompted by the 
brother’s inquiry concerning how it is possible to pray ceaselessly and yet remain active in other 
aspects of life.  
33 Maximus, Lib. asc. §26 (CCSG 40:53.458-464): Διὰ τοῦτο ταῖς θλίψεσιν ἀεὶ ἔχαιρον 
πάντες οἱ ἅγιοι, ἵνα εἰς ἕξιν ἔλθωσι τῆς θείας ἐλπίδος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ὁ ἀπόστολος· 
«Ἥδιστα οὖν καυχήσομαι ἐν ταῖς ἀσθενείαις μου, ἵνα ἐπισκηνώσῃ ἐπ’ ἐμὲ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ Χριστοῦ· 
διὸ εὐδοκῶ ἐν ασθενείαις, ἐν ὕβεσιν, ἐν ἀνάγκαις, ἐν διωγμοῖς, ἐν στενοχωρίαις ὑπερ Χριστοῦ· 
ὅταν γαρ ἀσθενῶ, τότε δυνατός εἰμι.» Maximus has in mind here 2 Cor. 12.9, 10. 
34 Maximus, Lib. asc. §27 (CCSG 40:53.467). 
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possible,” and is quickly followed with another, shorter tour through the 
Scripture that emphasizes God’s mercy in the face of sin.35   
In the last section §41-45, Maximus addresses his audience directly. It 
begins by drawing conclusions from the vast survey of God’s judgment and 
mercy given from both the “Old and New Testaments”. Like the σκοπός of the 
incarnation, the knowledge to be gained from the Scriptures is not only the fear 
of God but also his gentleness and φιλανθρωπία.36 This section ends with 
exhortations and finally a doxology, “. . . let us hymn, together with the angels, 
our Lord Jesus Christ to whom at the same time with the Father [and] together 
with the Holy Spirit be the glory and the power, now and forever and into 
eternity. Amen.”37 
As can be seen from the overview above significant indication that 
Maximus means to emphasize the Trinity in the ascetic life is the way he 
identifies and incorporates the divine persons within his recounting of the 
incarnation and the way, at key points, he draws attention to the Trinity in the 
Christian life. Maximus’ scriptural usage highlights points in salvation history, 
the life of Christ and the process of ascent where discussion of the divine 
persons becomes acute. For Maximus, the incarnation includes not only that 
point when the Son becomes human, but his entire life, including baptism and 
the ways the incarnate Son obeys the command of love and will return to sit at 
the right hand of the Father. Baptism, the beginning of Christian life, is in the 
name of the “deifying Trinity”. Prayer, the height of that life is portrayed as an 
important activity for deification and is more generally illustrated with a 
Trinitarian plea for mercy. Everyday struggles against temptation and the 
passions are portrayed as a choice between being a temple of Christ and the 
Spirit, or devils; between being sons of the Father or sons of Hell. One 
overcomes these by the work and help of the Spirit and Christ, both sent to help 
the baptized live a life of love not only through an indwelling presence but 
                                                             
35 Maximus, Lib. asc. §40 (CCSG 40:99.852 -101.858). 
36 Maximus, Lib. asc. §41 (CCSG 40:107.912-14). 
37 Maximus, Lib. asc. §40 (CCSG 40:123.1042-1044): σὺν ἀρχαγγέλοις ὑμνήσωμεν τὸν 
κύριον καὶ θεὸν ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν· αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα καὶ τὸ κράτος ἅμα τῷ Πατρὶ σὺν τῷ ἁγίῳ 
Πνεύματι, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων ἀμήν. 
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through the example of Christ’s life. As I will show in Chapter 2, investing 
aspects of Christian life with attention to the Trinity is not necessarily unique to 
Maximus but the way he executes his vision and illustrates it Trinitarian texture, 
indeed, that the way he demonstrates the Trinity as beginning, means and end is 
distinctive. 
In this portrayal, there is a sense in which love is seen as both the means 
and the goal of ascetic and Christian life. As one learns to grow in love towards 
God, it is possible to come to a habit of hope and ceaseless prayer, which enables 
power in weakness, self-mastery and ultimately growth in love for neighbor. 
There is a sense in which all the virtues seem to function in this same way. How 
is this possible? How can the goal also be the means? The answer to this is 
hinted at in the aforementioned phrase “habit of divine hope” and likewise in 
the discussion of ceaseless prayer. These are goals but the only means by which 
they become a habit or ceaseless is by continuing to do them. Thus, if one wants 
to be a genuine believer, then according to Maximus, one must continue to 
imitate Christ until Christ is made manifest in the believer’s life.  
The framing of the Christian life in Liber asceticus, from the surprise 
expressed by the old man at the brother’s ignorance concerning the σκοπός of 
the incarnation, to his lack of contrition, to a plea for God’s mercy and his 
eventual expression of contrition, suggests Maximus is tackling here something 
he states rather tersely later in the Capita –it is not good enough to be a monk 
outwardly, one must be a monk inwardly.38 Thus, the practice of asceticism 
must be done with the internal orientation fixed on the σκοπός of the 
incarnation, which is love. In order to mature one must learn to love both God 
and fellow human beings despite whatever afflictions are faced. However, 
frequently encountering the impossibility of this task, the young man anxiously 
queries his older counterpart realizing that the only way to accomplish this is by 
appealing to God’s mercy and love. Both the maturation through practice and 
the impossibility of the task by one’s self are an important feature for 
understanding Maximus’ view of ascent. This overview gives us only a brief 
taste of the Liber, but already the main themes I listed at the beginning of this 
                                                             
38 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.50 (Cap. sulla Car., 214).  
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chapter are visible. In the next four sections, I will focus on specific areas within 
the Liber in order to investigate and demonstrate each theme.  In following 
section (§1.1.2), I will cover the first pericope in order to show two-thirds of this 
sequence – how the Trinity is the beginning and means of Christian life and its 
relation to a particular understanding of divine appropriation. In the second 
section (§1.1.3), I will show the later third – how Maximus sees the Trinity as 
the end or goal of the Christian life. Finally, in the last two sections (§1.1.4 and 
1.1.5) I will show the importance of ascent for participation in, the 
manifestation of the presence of the Trinity, and one area where Trinitarian 
prayer is illustrated. 
§1.1.2 The Trinity as Beginning and Means of Christian Life & Divine 
Appropriation 
Even though there are several places that are suggestive for further 
study of the Trinity as beginning, means and end of the Christian life and divine 
appropriation, there are two areas I want to look at more closely. The first 
pericope is located at the beginning of the dialogue and the second is found a 
few sections later. Both of these are in response to the question, “what was the 
σκοπός of the incarnation?”39 In the first response, Maximus follows the 
question with a short reply of surprise from the old man since he knows the 
brother hears the symbol of faith every day. When he is queried further the old 
man gives a confession-like response. As Van Deun notes in the critical edition, 
Maximus appears to be echoing phrases from the creed of Constantinople 381 
CE.40 This language assists the narrative flow of the old man’s response and 
provides scaffolding on which Maximus hangs his own additions which are 
mainly allusions to scriptural language with some direct quotation.41 The 
                                                             
39 Maximus, Lib. asc. §1 (CCSG 40:5.1-2).   
40 CCSG 40:247. The phrase are: ὁ σκοπὸς τῆς τοῦ Κυρίου ἐνανθρωπήσεως ἡ ἡμετέρα 
ἦν σωτηρία (CCSG 40:5.5-6) . . . ὁ μονογενὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱός (CCSG 40:5.13) . . . ὁ ἐκ Θεοῦ Θεός 
(CCSG 40:5.14) . . . σαρκωθεὶς ἐκ Πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ τῆς ἁγίας Παρθένου (CCSG 40:7.16-17) . . 
. καὶ εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀνελθών, καὶ ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ Πατρὸς καθεσθείς (CCSG 40:7.25-26). Van Deun 
only notes CCSG 40:5.5-6, 7.16-17, 25-26. 
41 Maximus, Lib. asc. §1 (CCSG 40:5.5-7.30). For example, Van Deun notes phrases taken 
from 2 Tim. 3.13, Luke 1.79, Heb. 2.14 and I Cor. 15.22. 
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overall effect is an abbreviated salvation-history. The σκοπός of the incarnation 
is “for our salvation” as a response to humanity’s transgression in paradise and 
fall into sin and death. Additionally, it is the “the only begotten Son of God, the 
eternal Word, God of God, the fount of life and immortality” who “enlightened us 
who sat in darkness and the shadow of death, having become flesh by the Holy 
Spirit and the holy virgin . . . ,” and who “ascends to heaven and is seated at the 
right hand of the Father.”42  
There are several notable aspects of this narrative. The first is that all the 
persons of the Trinity make an appearance; however, the activities listed focus 
on those of the Son and the Spirit within the σκοπός of the Son’s incarnation 
(ἐνανθρώπησις). Here we can note some similarities and differences in the 
activities of the Son and the Spirit as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.1. 
Comparison of the activities of the Son and the Spirit in Liber asceticus §1a 
Section Son Section Spirit 
5.14 . . . ἡ πηγὴ τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τῆς 
ἀθανασίας . . . 
7.26-27 . . . [τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον 
κατέπεμψεν] εἰς 
ἀρραβῶνα τῆς ζωῆς 
5.15-
7.16 
. . . ἐπέφανεν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἐν 
σκότει καὶ σκιᾷ θανάτου 
καθημένοις . . . 
7.27-28 
. . . καὶ εἰς φωτισμὸν . . . 
[τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν] . . . 
7.16-17 . . . σαρκωθεὶς ἐκ Πνεύματος 
ἁγίου καὶ τῆς ἁγίας 
παρθένου . . . 
- - - - - - 
7.17 . . .καὶ πολιτείαν ἡμῖν 
θεοειδοῦς ζωῆς ὑποδειξας . . 
. 
7.28 
. . . καὶ ἁγιασμὸν τῶν 
ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν . . . 
7.17-20 . . . καὶ ἐντολὰς ἁγίας 
δεδωκώς, καὶ βασιλείαν 
οὐρανῶν ἐπαγγειλάμενος 
 
 
. . . καὶ εἰς βοήθειαν τῶν 
ἀγωνιζομένων ὑπὲρ τῆς 
ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίας 
                                                             
42 Maximus, Lib. asc. §1 (CCSG 40:5.6-7.26). 
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τοῖς κατ’ αὐτὰς 
πολιτευομένοις, καὶ κόλασιν 
αἰώνιον τοῖς παραβαίνουσιν 
ἀπειλήσας, . . . 
7.28-30 φυλάξαι τὰς ἐντολὰς 
αὐτοῦ. 
7.20-26 . . . παθὼν τὸ σωτήριον 
πάθος, καὶ ἐκ νεκρῶν 
ἀναστάς, τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς 
ἀναστάσεως καὶ τῆς 
αἰωνίου ζωῆς ἡμῖν 
ἐχαρίσατο, τὸ κατάκριμα δι’ 
ὑπακοῆς λύσας τῆς 
προγονικῆς ἁμαρτίας, καὶ 
τὸ κράτος τοῦ θανάτου 
θανάτῳ καταργήσας, ἵνα 
ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ πάντες 
ἀποθνήσκουσιν, οὕτως ἐν 
αὐτῷ πάντες 
ζωοποιηθήσονται· καὶ εἰς 
οὐρανοὺς ἀνελθών, καὶ ἐκ 
δεξιῶν τοῦ Πατρὸς 
καθεσθείς, . . . 
- - - - - - 
7.26-27 . . . τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον 
κατέπεμψεν . . . 
- - - - - - 
a The Greek text is taken from CCSG 40:5.14-7.30. 
While Maximus uses the language from the symbol of faith to structure 
the narrative, he also carefully casts the relationship between some of the 
activities of the Son and Spirit as complementary. The Son sends (κατέπεμψεν) 
the Spirit, who continues activities the Son accomplished within the incarnation 
in the Christian life.43 For example, the Son is the source (ἡ πηγὴ) of life, and the 
                                                             
43 Although the subject of κατέπεμψεν can safely be identified as the Son, Maximus is 
not attempting to purport a doctrine of filioque. He does not use ἐκπορεύεται. Instead, Maximus’ 
intent in using the compound verb καταπέμπω, which does not occur in the New Testament, is 
likely to signal that the Son, whom he has stated “ascended into heaven and is seated at the right 
hand of the Father”, is sending down the Spirit in accord with the use of πέμπω (send) in John 
15.26, 14.26 and 16.7. Later in his life, Maximus answers several accusations against Latin 
theology in Opusculum 10 concerning its understanding of the source and relation of the Son and 
the Spirit. For a helpful and thorough recent study see A. Edward Siecienski, “The Authenticity of 
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Spirit is sent as a deposit of life (ἀρραβῶνα τῆς ζωῆς). Also, the Son in his 
incarnation enlightens (ἐπέφανεν) humanity and sends the Holy Spirit as 
illumination (φωτισμὸν) for the soul. Again, the Son gives the commandments 
while the Holy Spirit is given as help (βοήθειαν) for those who are attempting to 
fulfill them. As a result, Maximus, by addressing the question of the σκοπός of 
the incarnation, shows how the Son and Spirit accomplish its telos. Maximus’ 
concern in aligning these concepts is to address God’s activities concerning the 
incarnation specifically and he does not, at this point, seem interested in 
expounding an in-depth confession of the Trinity’s ontological constitution. 
However, following the creed of 381 CE, the use of “God of God” along with 
“only-begotten Son of God” and “the eternal Word” are used. These descriptors 
“of God” and “eternal” attached to the titles “God”, “only-begotten Son” and 
“Word” demonstrate the Son’s divinity and consubstantiality with the God.44  
What is remarkable, however, is what is not here. There is no use of 
ontological terms like οὐσία, ὁμοούσια, φύσις or ὑπόστασις that are so 
indicative of his later presentations of the Trinity. The Father has only a brief 
mention at the end of this section where it states that the Son is “seated at the 
right of the Father”.45 It could also be that Maximus sees “God” as referring to all 
three persons although this is slightly ambiguous since the descriptor “of God” 
which was used for the Son could refer either to the Father or simply relate the 
Son to divine nature of the Godhead. The source of divinity or μοναρχία is not 
directly touched on. Either way, the titles and descriptors used to name the Son 
demonstrate a way of speaking garnered from the Nicene-Constantinopolitan 
creed and the New Testament that is meant to show his divinity and 
consubstantiality with the Father. The Spirit here receives no explicit 
designation as consubstantial but does share common activities with the Son. 
The broadest common activities; meaning, those shared amongst the 
persons of the Trinity and are exclusive to divinity, are the making of humanity 
                                                             
Maximus the Confessor’s Letter to Marinus: The Argument from Theological Consistency, VC 61 
(2007), 189-227 but more importantly his The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).   
44 Maximus, Lib. asc. §1 (CCSG 40:5.13-14). 
45 Maximus, Lib. asc. §1 (CCSG 40:7.26). 
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and subsequent providence after their transgression in paradise. This 
providence culminates in the Son taking on flesh and ends with the sending of 
the Spirit. However, as the table above shows there are kinds of activities that 
are not shared. For example, while the Son and Spirit both participated in the 
event of the incarnation, the Spirit’s unique role is in Christ’s conception while 
the Son’s role is to become incarnate, live the incarnate life, and send the Holy 
Spirit. These activities can also be deemed inseparable based on their mutual 
involvement but also on the fact that what is appropriated to the life of the 
baptized by the Spirit is predicated on what the Son has accomplished in his 
incarnation. So in relation to the Christian, the Son and the Spirit exhibit 
common and inseparable activities but in regard to the activities of the 
ὑποστάσεις toward each other and how the common activity of providence 
takes place through the incarnation there is discernable difference. This way of 
portraying the activities of God gives us a baseline for how Maximus correlates 
the activities of the Son and Spirit in the life of the Christian but also shows how 
the Trinity is both the ground and means of that life. This basic grammar 
Christian life is Trinitarian and depends on a specific understanding of how 
divine appropriation functions in salvation history and in the life of the 
baptized.  
In the next chapter, I will show how in several places in his writings, 
Evagrius appeals to the common activity of “revealing” the Father as an 
argument for the consubstantiality of the Son and Spirit. It may well be that 
Maximus has a similar rationale for tying so closely the activities of the Son and 
Spirit, especially as it relates to illumination. If the Son is consubstantial and the 
Spirit continues or completes the activities of the Son, then the Holy Spirit must 
also be seen as consubstantial. However, there is not enough in these opening 
lines to know whether the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Father and 
Son, something Maximus surely believes, is in view or whether tying these 
activities closely together is only a result of his concern to show them at work in 
Christian life. 
§1.1.3 Incarnate Son’s Life as End or Goal of Christian Life  
 55 
In this section, I demonstrate how Maximus conceives of the Son as end 
or goal of the Christian life. By “end” I mean to communicate that the Son serves 
as an example of the ethos and telos of Christian life that must be imitated. This 
end can be simply summarized as love, but there are nuances that I hope to bear 
out. The ethos of the Son as love is a practical goal of daily life, but it is put 
within a framework that aims toward a consistent habit or state – a deiform way 
of life.  While the incarnate Son tends to be the particular focus of this theme, 
Maximus intentionally illustrates it within a Trinitarian framework. This is 
accomplished by an explanation of Jesus’ baptism that names the persons of the 
Trinity and highlights the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Son. His 
portrayal also demonstrates how God fulfills his own command of love as the 
incarnate Son even while there is language that describes Christ as obeying the 
Father. I now turn to the second pericope in the Liber where the young man 
again probes his elder regarding the σκοπός of the incarnation. In this particular 
exchange, the younger brother is at the point of despair in his attempt to 
understand how to love and old man is ready to explain further what is meant 
by the σκοπός of the Lord. He responds again in a confessional tone, 
Therefore our Lord Jesus Christ, being God by nature, also stooped down 
to become a man because of [his] love of humanity (διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν), 
‘was born of a woman, born under the law’ according to the divine 
apostle, so that as a man, after having kept the commandments, he might 
overturn the ancient curse of Adam. Therefore the Lord, having known 
that the entire law and the prophets hang on these two commandments 
from the law—You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and 
your neighbor as yourself—sought eagerly to keep them as a human 
being from beginning until the end.46  
Maximus frames the entire aim of the incarnation within the framework 
of God recapitulating his own command of love as a human being. This 
recapitulation undoes the disobedience of the first Adam and its consequences – 
                                                             
46 Maximus, Lib. asc. §10 (CCSG 40:21.178-23.186).  
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namely deception and death. The old man continues and will go on to recount 
Jesus’ baptism,  
When [the Devil] saw him at his baptism, accompanied by the Father’s 
testimony, receiving as a man also the Holy Spirit who is of the same 
kind, and after he [Jesus] went into the desert in order to be tempted by 
him, he [the Devil] waged his entire war against him. . .47   
While in the desert, Jesus faces temptation in the same areas the old man 
had earlier highlighted as necessary renouncements for the baptized: food, 
money, fame. Christ succeeds in overcoming these temptations and 
demonstrating his love for God.48 The old man then describes Jesus interactions 
with the scribes and Pharisees after he returns to society. They are portrayed as 
being spurred on by the devil to persecute Jesus in order to compel him to 
transgress God’s commandment of love. Jesus, however, in responding to this 
“paradoxical war”, “not only teaches the ways of life but also demonstrates the 
heavenly manner of life” and so overcomes their hatred through his love and 
secures victory over the devil and thus victory over death through his own 
death in weakness.49 The σκοπός of the devil, to entice Jesus against loving God 
and neighbor, fails.50 Maximus ends §12 with the full quotation of Phil. 2.5-11 
and then in §13 states plainly,  
Therefore this was the σκοπός of the Lord, that he might obey the Father 
unto death as man on our behalf, keeping the commandment of love and 
that, in another way, he might ward off the devil by suffering from him 
those who were being acted on by him; the scribes and the Pharisees. In 
this way, he conquered him who hoped to conquer by being voluntarily 
conquered and rescued the world from his domination.51  
                                                             
47 Maximus, Lib. asc. §10 (CCSG 40:25.187-192). 
48 Maximus, Lib. asc. §10 (CCSG 40:23.174-25.199).    
49 Maximus, Lib. asc. §12 (CCSG 40:27.215-29.242). 
50 Maximus, Lib. asc. §11-13 (CCSG 40:25.199-31.254). 
51 Maximus, Lib. asc. §13 (CCSG 40:29.243-31.2). 
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The combination of both Phil. 2.5-11 and its subsequent explanation 
gives additional biblical content to the concept of the σκοπός of the Lord and its 
orientation toward the mind. Maximus is giving support for another common 
concept within ascetic thought — φρόνησις — by citing Paul’s command “Τοῦτο 
φρονείσθω . . .” and by calling attention to the larger context of the verse in 
which the verb is used three times. The term in the context of Phil. 2.5-11 is, like 
σκοπός, another word for “purpose” or “intention” but can also mean “practical 
wisdom”, “thoughtfulness”, and “prudence”. The use of these terms underscores 
aptly how the σκοπός of the Lord, which is God’s love of humanity especially in 
the life of the incarnate Son, becomes an example of the ethos and telos of the 
Christian life. Maximus’ restatement of the importance of the incarnation 
suggests that there is something more that is to be learned from it over and 
above the fact that it gives knowledge about how the Son loved in his incarnate 
life. 
In fact, Maximus does give us more information in another section (§17). 
Striving against the passions and attentiveness (μελέτη) to the examples of 
Christ and his apostles is meant to help the ascetic clearly grasp the devil’s 
thoughts (τὰ νοήματα). This allows for a sober and compassionate assessment 
of others who, like the ascetics themselves, are being tempted. Thus, pardon 
(συγγιγνώσκω) is the means by which one avoids responding to the devil’s 
contrivance to hate. Through this attentiveness, the intention of God’s 
incarnation can be known; it is “to love human beings and have sympathy for 
them in their failures and to war ceaselessly with evil demons through love.”52 
The use of both ἀγαπᾶν and συμπάσχειν (love and sympathy) is meant to echo 
§16 where the brother reflects on Christ’s response to those who participated in 
his beating, mocking and crucifixion (Lk. 23.24, “Father, forgive them for they do 
not know what they are doing.”).53 When viewed in the context of the opening 
list of activities, it is clear that part of the illumination of which Maximus speaks 
is the σκοπός of the incarnation. Additionally, to know this σκοπός is not only to 
                                                             
52 Maximus, Lib. asc. §17 (CCSG 40:23.174-25.199): καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἀγαπᾶν 
καὶ συμπάσχειν αὐτοῖς πταίουσι, τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς δαίμοσιν ἀδιαλείπτως διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης 
πολεμεῖν. 
53 Maximus, Lib. asc. §16, 17 (CCSG 40:35.296-39.327). 
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see the revelation of God’s love in the incarnate Son and how he demonstrated a 
love of God and neighbor that must be imitated but it is also self-knowledge in 
light of God’s mercy. These two realities combined are meant to produce 
solidarity with fellow human beings, which in turn puts one in solidarity with 
God and his love. 
To summarize, Jesus fulfilled the first commandment (love the Lord your 
God) during his temptation in the desert and the second commandment (love 
your neighbor as yourself) when he returned to civilization or society (ἡ 
οἰκουμένη).54 Maximus balances this by emphasizing Christ’s restraint as a 
human being in the desert which demonstrates his love for God. Then he 
emphasizes Christ as God, who knows Satan’s plans, is good by nature, and loves 
despite persecution and death in society which demonstrates complete 
obedience in love for neighbor. In both the desert and society then, the 
incarnate Son succeeds in fulfilling the commands of loving God and loving 
neighbor even enemies and thereby serves as an example of Christian life and 
thus reveals the σκοπός of the incarnation. His example, reinforced by other 
biblical characters, demonstrates how God’s providence through the incarnation 
should produce a sympathetic and merciful solidarity with one another that 
recognizes one’s own temptations and failings. It should also produce a 
solidarity with God the Son which understands and emulates Christ’s war 
against hate and the devil and his love for God, neighbor, and enemy.  
I want now to look more closely at Maximus’ portrayal of Christ’s 
baptism in §10 in order to show an additional way that he illustrates the 
incarnate Son’s life in a Trinitarian context. In §1, the second person of the 
Trinity was referred to as the “only begotten Son of God”, “God of God”, and 
“eternal Word”. There the descriptors served to portray the Son as God and 
consubstantial with the Father. In §10, where the old man recounts Jesus’ 
baptism, the role of the Father and the consubstantiality of the Spirit come to 
the foreground. Jesus “receives the testimony of the Father” and the Holy Spirit 
                                                             
54 The concern to show the viability of an ascetic life both in monastic settings and in 
“society” can also be discerned in John Moschus’ Spiritual Meadow. See Booth, Crisis of the 
Empire, 125-126. 
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from heaven. Maximus also uses here the first instance of a specifically 
ontological term, stating Jesus is “by nature God”. Maximus will make such brief 
statements elsewhere stating Christ is “by nature good” (§12, 40) and “God and 
Master” (§43). The reference here to the Spirit as “of the same kind” (τὸ 
συγγενὲς) serves much the same purpose as the language from §1 signaling the 
consubstantiality Spirit with the Son and in a broader sense that the Spirit is 
divine. Again, Maximus does not use a term one would expect, like ὁμοούσια but 
chooses one that has biblical usage, yet the effect is still same, the Son and Spirit 
are of the same nature and that shared nature is divine.55 Maximus also 
highlights that Jesus is not only God but also good by nature. The implication 
being that because he is God and good by nature he will respond with love. But 
why highlight the consubstantiality of the Son and Spirit and not also the Spirit 
with the Father? 
In the history of interpretation surrounding Jesus’ baptism, there was a 
precedent for emphasizing the consubstantiality of the Son and Spirit. In the 
theological controversies intervening the councils of Constantinople 381 CE and 
Chalcedon 451 CE, Cyril of Alexandria, writing against Theodore of Mopsuestia, 
emphasizes the Spirit as consubstantial with the Son during the Christological 
debates of early fifth century. For Cyril, in both his commentaries on the Gospels 
and his correspondences, this tactic served to guard against diminishing Christ’s 
divinity. Jesus in his baptism had no need of anything from the Holy Spirit that 
he did not already possess as the Son. Instead, as Cyril argues, Jesus receives the 
Spirit “as one of us” so that the Spirit may renew and “be rooted” to human 
nature.56 Jesus’ baptism serves as a convenient place to tackle the 
consubstantiality of the Spirit and the Son and indeed Trinitarian theology but 
for Cyril it was also a means of addressing the divinity of Jesus and sparked 
reflection on passages elsewhere in the Gospels that drew attention to the 
Spirit’s involvement in the incarnate Son’s earthly ministry. In fact, Cyril paints 
                                                             
55 The term in the New Testament is often translated “relative” or “kinsmen”, cf. Mark 
6.4, Luke 1.58, 2.44, 14.12, 21.16, John 18.26, Acts 10.24, Rom. 9.3, 16.11, 21. 
56 Cyril, Commentarii in Iohannem, 2.1 in Sancti patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi 
Alexandrini in D. Joannis Evangelium: Accedunt fragmenta varia necnon tractatus ad Tiberium 
diaconum duo Vol 1., ed. Philip Edward Pusey (Oxford: Claredon, 1872), 184.  
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an entire picture of salvation history around the loss and re-reception of the 
Holy Spirit, the latter accomplished in Jesus’ baptism. This description depends 
on a particular explanation of the shared events of the Son and the Spirit 
throughout the Son’s incarnate life.57 Maximus neither here in Liber nor 
elsewhere, casts God’s economy of salvation in this way. The closest he comes to 
such a formulation is later in Ambiguum 42 where he will suggest that 
humanity’s prelapsarian manner of birth was by the Spirit and, because of the 
incarnation, can once again be achieved by the Spirit.58 However, for both Cyril 
and Maximus, as we have seen, there is a conception of common and 
inseparable divine activity, which nevertheless allows each person to act in a 
distinguishable way in a particular event or towards one another. Maximus cites 
no one in the Liber outside biblical authors and, in general, does not cite Cyril as 
freely as he does Gregory Nazianzus or Ps.-Dionysius until much later in his 
writings.59  
Although Maximus may have read Cyril’s commentaries at this stage of 
his writings, as well as the literature surrounding the Third (431 CE) and Fourth 
(451 CE) Council, Cyril’s influence could have equally been mediated through 
                                                             
57 This is part of the conclusion reached by Daniel A. Keating in his very helpful study 
entitled, The Appropriation of Divine Life in Cyril of Alexandria, Oxford Theological Monographs 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). This relationship is explained most clearly when Cyril 
comments on Jesus’ baptism in his Commentarii in Iohannem, 2.1 (Pusey, in D. Joannis 
Evangelium Vol.1, 174-190) and also in his commentary on the various references to the Spirit’s 
involvement in Christ’s ministry in Luke’s Gospel. See, for example, Homily 2 for explanations of 
Jesus’ Baptism (Luke 3.21-23) in Commentary on the Gospel of Saint Luke, translated by R. Payne 
Smith, (Studion Publishers, 1983), 78-81, of Jesus being full of the Spirit in Homily 12 (Payne, 
Gospel of Saint Luke, 85-87) where Cyril casts the purpose of the incarnation in the terms 
discussed above (Luke 4.1), of Jesus returning to Galilee in the power of the Spirit who is 
consubstantial with the Son (Luke 4.14) in Homily 12 (Payne, Gospel of Saint Luke, 91), of Jesus’ 
quotation of Isaiah 61 (Luke 4.18) also in Homily 12 (Payne, Gospel of Saint Luke, 92-95) and 
finally of Jesus rejoicing in the Holy Spirit (Luke 10.27) in Homily 65 (Payne, Gospel of Saint 
Luke, 277-78).  
58  Maximus, Ambiguum 42 (The Ambigua, 180.31-186.33: PG 91.1345C-1349A).  
59 On this see Keating’s work but also Brian Daley’s helpful, “The Fullness of the Saving 
God: Cyril of Alexandria on the Holy Spirit”, in Thomas G. Weinandy and Daniel A. Keating (eds.), 
The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria: A Critical Appreciation (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2003), 113–
48 and in the same volume Marie-Odile Boulnois, “The Mystery of the Trinity according to Cyril 
of Alexandria: The Deployment of the Triad and Its Recapitulation into the Unity of Divinity,” 75-
111. 
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the work of the second Council of Constantinople (553 C.E.). A key issue in the 
Three Chapters controversy was Theodore of Mopsuestia’s interpretation of the 
Spirit’s role in Christ’s life— a subject on which Cyril dedicated one of his 
anathemas and which received intense review at the fourth and fifth session of 
the Fifth Council. 60 To demonstrate Maximus’ dependence on this literature 
would entail a comparison of Maximus and the work of the Council of 553 CE. 
While I touch on this in later chapters, I will forego such an investigation here so 
as not to distract from the overall goal of the chapter which is to provide a 
baseline of Maximus’ Trinitarian theology. Finally, given his focus on love and 
the activities of the Son and Spirit, it is surprising that Maximus does not cite 1 
John 4:8. However, his focus on the activities of the incarnate Son as the goal of 
Christian life (love of God and others), his persistent inclusion of language that 
draws attention to the common activities of the persons of the Trinity along 
with phrases that signal their consubstantiality gives his account of the 
incarnation and, therefore the Christian life, a distinctively Trinitarian flavor.61  
§1.1.4 The Power of Christ, the Fruit of the Spirit - The Importance of 
Ascent for the Manifestation of the Presence of the Triune God 
In this section, I will show how the process of ascent, as it relates to the 
concepts of power, indwelling and fulfilling the commandment of love, is 
important for participation in and the manifestation of the presence of the 
Triune God. These concepts demonstrate how Maximus’ underlying assumption 
of the unity of divine action plays out within ascent. After a brief review of an 
earlier section regarding power, I will analyze several pericopies in the latter 
                                                             
60 It also received an anathema in Justinian’s Edictum rectae fidei (canon 11) in Drei 
dogmatische Schriften Iustinians, 2nd ed., ed. Eduard Schwartz, Legum Iustiniani Imperatoris 
Vocabularium Subsidia II (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1973), 150.26-152.13. See also the Acts of the 
Council of Constantinople 553, Volume One: General Introduction, Letters and Edicts Sessions I-IV, 
transl. with intro. and notes by Richard Price, Translated Texts for Historians 51 (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2009), 145, 225-370. Hereafter cited Price, TTH 51.1. 
61 Felix Heinzer also notes the Trinitarian character of the Maximus portrayal of the 
incarnation in “L’explication trinitaire de l’économie,” 159-172. Heinzer draws attention to the 
numerous Trinitarian descriptions of the incarnation throughout Maximus’ work but does not 
include Maximus’ portrayal of the incarnation and its employment as the source and goal of 
Christian imitation from Liber asceticus.  
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part of the Liber (§27-45) which tie all these ideas together. The latter part of 
the Liber, §27-45 can be sub-divided into several sections. The first is the 
lengthy survey through “Divine Scripture” that addresses the young man’s 
concern for his own lack of contrition (§27-39). This section ends with a prayer 
for mercy. The second section is another, shorter, survey that addresses the 
young man’s contrition and anxiety over his sins (§40-41). The last section 
summarizes what knowledge was gained through both surveys and then 
addresses the audience directly by giving an extended exhortation (§42-45). 
This section ends with a doxology. There are many passages in each section that 
are ripe for investigation, but I will look at just a couple texts that bear out the 
importance of ascent for the participation and manifestation of the presence of 
the Triune God. In my final section (§1.1.5), I will look at the prayer offered in 
§37-39. 
As the old man has argued throughout the Liber, ascent – defined as the 
activities of renouncement and attentiveness to the σκοπός of the incarnation 
and the pursuit of the virtues – is important in order to fulfill one’s telos, which 
is mature love. For Maximus, it is in light of one’s weakness and God’s love and 
sympathy that the σκοπός of the incarnation is truly understood, and power 
(δύναμις) is made available for Christian life. The devil may have the power of 
death, but the Son conquers death through his own weakness and gives power 
to be crucified to the world and to imitate him in love.62 Maximus addresses the 
issue of power several times throughout the Liber, and it is usually conjoined 
with several ideas. The first idea is renouncement. As stated in §3, one must 
leave all and follow Christ and then Christ gives power to imitate him and do his 
commandments.63 In this instance, Paul serves as an example of someone who 
walks “not according to the flesh but according to the spirit.” David also serves 
as an example. The second idea is that of weakness. In the overview, I briefly 
reported how at the end of §13 Maximus talks about Christ’s weakness. There 
Christ’s “weakness” (ἀσθένεια) was not retaliating against the instigation of the 
devil through the Scribes and Pharisees.  This was itself a victory but when he 
                                                             
62 Maximus, Lib asc. §3-4, 10, 13 (CCSG 40: 11.56-70, 25.187-188; 29.243-251).  
63 Maximus, Lib. asc. §3 (CCSG 40:11.56-60). 
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was crucified “he killed death” and “rendered impotent the one who holds the 
power of death,” through his weakness. 64 Afterward, the old man states, Christ 
crowned himself with the resurrection. Later, the young man recapitulates this 
section stating that the baptized “have been graced” (χαρισάμενος) with victory 
over “the devil and his rulers” by the risen Christ who also “loosed the power of 
death and offered the whole world his resurrection unto life.”65  
As noted before, there is a transition from the example of Jesus to that of 
Paul. The transitional statement is a commentary on 2 Corinthians 12.9, “Paul, in 
himself, was weak and boasted in his weakness so that the power of Christ 
might dwell in him.”66 Like Jesus, Paul realizes he is fighting “invisible” enemies 
and recognizes the need to fight this battle with the breastplate of 
righteousness, the helmet of hope, the shield of faith and the sword of the 
Spirit.67 Paul does not retaliate but instead he drives out the passions and 
perseveres in the commandment of love. Thus he “conquers evil with a good 
imitation of the Savior.”68 Maximus use of the examples of Jesus and Paul 
suggests that “weakness” here means something like voluntary passivity, 
suffering or non-retaliation. It is through this “weakness” that a battle is fought 
and won against the devil and demons who wish to incite hate and pleasure by 
appealing to the passions for material concerns. A reference to the indwelling 
power of Christ taken from 2 Cor. 12.9 is found twice. Once at the end of §13 and 
again at the end of §26 and provides an inclusio for old man’s explanation of 
how one comes to know perfectly (τελείως) the σκοπός of the Lord. The process 
takes the baptized through pursuance of sober-mindedness (νῆψις), 
attentiveness, fear of God and the knowledge all of which can be possessed 
through the pursuit of the virtues and, when done consistently, leads to the 
habit of hope.  
                                                             
64 Maximus, Lib. asc.  §13 (CCSG 40:31.249-251). 
65 Maximus, Lib asc. §16 (CCSG 40:35.296-311). 
66 Maximus, Lib asc. §13 (CCSG 40:35.296-311).  
67 Maximus, Lib asc. §14 (CCSG 40:35.296-311). 
68 Maximus, Lib asc. §15 (CCSG 40:35.296-311). 
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It is tempting, based on this portrayal, to identify Maximus’ conception of 
the indwelling power of Christ directly with the Holy Spirit because of earlier 
statements about the Holy Spirit as pledge, enlightenment, sanctification and 
help in §1. This is especially the case since these activities are paired with that 
of the Son. One could be tempted, for example, to take the statement Maximus 
makes in §42, that “the Lord has shown the means of salvation and given the 
power to become sons of God,” as meaning that imitation of Christ’s love is the 
means while the Holy Spirit is the power.69 Yet, Maximus does not make an 
explicit connection between the Holy Spirit and power. However, Maximus’ way 
of making connections can sometimes be found through the linkage of key ideas 
and their biblical support. In the case of the Spirit and the indwelling power of 
Christ, there is a complex of ideas linked through biblical images and concepts 
that clearly demonstrates correlation even though explicit identification is 
elusive. 
 These linkages are essentially a grouping of biblical texts that describe 
the divine activity and presence within Christian life and can be seen in his 
discussion of four ideas. I will briefly list these below then provide an example 
in the following paragraphs where they all meet. The first idea Maximus 
discusses is the contrast between flesh and spirit and is rooted in passages from 
the Pauline letters of Galatians and Romans. However, many modern biblical 
commentators have been ambivalent about whether “spirit” in this contrast is 
meant to signify the Holy Spirit or something else. On the surface, a similar 
problem presents itself in translating some of Maximus’ uses.70 So, while this is 
suggestive, it may not immediately provide clarity on whether the power of the 
indwelling Christ and the Spirit can be directly correlated. However, part of his 
                                                             
69 Maximus, Lib. asc. §42 (CCSG 40:115.979-981): Ἰδοὺ ἐχαρίσατο ἡμῖν ὁ κύριος τρόπον 
σωτηρίας, καὶ ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ἐξουσίαν ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τέκνα Θεοῦ· καὶ ἐν τῷ θελήματι ἡμῶν ἐστι 
λοιπὸν ἡ σωτηρία ἡμῶν. 
70 See for example Lib. asc. §4 (CCSG 40:11.67), §41 (CCSG 40:109.927), §45 (CCSG 
40:119.1022-121.1023). Several authors comment on this feature of Maximus and conclude that 
Maximus does in fact mean to connote the Holy Spirit even if every instance of spirit does not 
denote the third person of the Trinity. See for example Josef Loosen, “Logos und Pneuma im 
begnadeten Menschen bei Maximus Confessor,” (PhD diss. Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität 
Münster, 1940), 95. 
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employment of this contrast is an explanation of what it means to live by the 
Spirit, which encompasses for Maximus a range of texts that talk about the fruit 
of the Spirit, sonship, being temples of God, being born of the Spirit and, finally, 
the Spirit being taken away from human beings. These are more explicit in the 
identification of the term πνεῦμα with the Holy Spirit and are taken variously 
from New Testament texts like Gal. 5.22-25, Rom. 8:14, 1 Cor. 3.16, John 3.6 and 
Gen. 6.3. Another more explicit use is in his discussion of “indwelling”. As noted 
above Maximus utilizes 2 Cor. 12.9 twice. The key verb in these passages is 
ἐπισκηνόω with the prepositional phrase ἐν αὐτῷ. Beyond these two uses, 
though, this exact language is not used of Christ himself or the Spirit but rather 
only for the power of Christ. There are cases, however, where Maximus does us 
“ἐν” or the dative case without a preposition to describe similar concepts of 
indwelling. Thirdly, Maximus describes in several places how the life of Christ or 
the fruit of the Spirit are made manifest in the human person drawing on 
language from 2 Cor. 4.8-11 and Gal. 2.20.71 Finally, Maximus also discusses the 
role of the commandments in this process of making manifest the life of Christ 
and the fruit of the Spirit. All of these ideas helpfully come together in one 
section toward which I now turn. 
The ideas above coalesce in a particular subsection (§31-37) in the third 
major part of the Liber (§27-39). Section 27 begins a courtroom-like setting 
harkening back to the dramatic prophetic scenes in such books like Amos or 
Isaiah. The old man brings the charges and the evidence in §27-33 suggesting 
that the reason why the brother and “we” do not have contrition is a result of 
the lack of the fear of God. This turn in the dialogue from characters addressing 
each other to addressing the audience with the first person plural adds to this 
section’s intensity but also introduces a shift from the dialogue between the two 
men toward a direct appeal to the readers. He begins with a series of biblical 
scenes spanning Moses, biblical prophets, to Daniel, Psalms and Ecclesiastes 
before turning to a combination of sayings from Jeremiah, Isaiah, Paul’s letters, 
Jesus’ sayings in the Gospels and the creed of 381. Echoing a similar statement 
made about baptism at opening of the Liber, he states at the end of §30 that “the 
                                                             
71 Maximus, Lib. asc. §34 (CCSG 40:75.649-652); §25 (CCSG 40:51.448-53.455). 
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Lord knew that merely keeping these [commandments of Moses] is not enough 
for Christian perfection.”72 Instead, the old man quotes Matthew 5:18 and 20, 
stating one’s “righteousness must exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees in 
order to enter the kingdom of heaven.”73 Consequently, like Jesus and his 
disciples, there must also be a “genuine love for all human beings” if the 
baptized are to sanctify both soul and body and attain true love for God.74 The 
old man moves on to a section of mourning in §31 that extends to the first part 
of §32 before moving to a direct interrogation that extends to the first part of 
§34.  
This section is insightful because it demonstrates where Maximus locates 
failure in the Christian life in relation to its goal. Within the first part of the 
interrogation, there is a section that discusses the Spirit, 
Are we not negligent of the Savior’s commandments? Are we not entirely 
filled-full of every evil? Are we no longer temples of God but instead 
temples of idols? Are we, instead of being filled with the Holy Spirit, filled 
with evil spirits? Are we not calling on God as Father pretentiously? Are 
we not, instead of being sons of God, being sons of hell? 
Here there is a close correlation between being temples of “God”, “being filled 
with the Spirit” and “being sons of God”. Additionally, the Spirit, beings sons and 
temples of God and the commandments have been brought together to imply 
that the “negligence of the commandments” indicates an absence of God’s 
presence and relationship.  In the next section (§33), there is more interrogation 
but, in addition to rhetorical questions, it involves some commentary. Here, 
Maximus brings these ideas together in a way that makes their relationship 
even clearer. He connects being led by the Spirit, citing Rom. 8.14, to being sons 
of God. Then he states that those being led by the Spirit are made evident from 
the fruit of the Spirit (ἐκ τῶν καρπῶν τοῦ Πνεύματος δῆλοί εἰσιν), citing Gal. 
6.22-23. The old man then laments that these things are not seen “in us” and 
                                                             
72 Maximus, Lib. asc. §30 (CCSG 40:63. 552-554). 
73 Maximus, Lib. asc. §30 (CCSG 40:63. 554-556). 
74 Maximus, Lib. asc. §30 (CCSG 40:63.548-65.561). 
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explains that things are like what begets them therefore that which is born of 
the Spirit, should be spirit, citing John 3.6. Yet, “we” are flesh and desire against 
the Spirit and “so rightly we hear from him ‘My Spirit will not remain in these 
human beings because they are flesh.’ How then, can we entirely obey as 
Christians when we do not have anything of Christ in us?”75  
In this subsection, Maximus ties obedience to the commandments with 
being led and born of the Spirit as evinced from the fruit of the Spirit. He ends by 
inferring that these things serve as evidence of having Christ “in us”. Again we 
see the activity of the Spirit and the Son closely correlated. Particularly, the 
reference to Genesis 6:3 suggests it not just the fruit of the Spirit, being led by 
the Spirit or being born by the Spirit but also the Spirit’s indwelling that is in 
view. Additionally, it is clear is from the biblical language Maximus uses and the 
lament from the old man that the divine persons are correlated in a way that 
draws an important inference. The neglect of the commandments infers a lack of 
the Spirit, a lack of relationship with the Father and a lack of Christ “in us”. The 
presence of the three divine persons are correlated and the manifestation of the 
Son and Spirit from within hinges on engaging the struggle against “invisible” 
enemies and the passions which culminates in fulfilling the commandments of 
love. 
This becomes more lucid as the old man continues. The interrogation 
that began in §33 is briefly interrupted by an objection echoing James 2.14: “I 
have faith and for me faith in him is enough for salvation.” The objection is 
quickly met with another reference from James but this time from 2.19 (“the 
devils also believe and tremble”) and 2.17-18 (“Faith without works is dead by 
itself”). The old man then resumes his interrogation stating  
“How do we believe in him? Surely we believe him concerning future 
things, yet we do not believe him concerning present and transitory 
things and for this reason are we not mixed-up with material things even 
living by the flesh and waging war against the Spirit?”  
                                                             
75 Maximus, Lib. asc. §33 (CCSG 40:71.618-73.638). 
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He ends his interrogation here but then gives a positive exhortation 
highlighting the kind of response those who truly imitate Jesus and do his 
commandments have, 
But those who believe Christ in truth and those who have him dwelling 
wholly in themselves through the commandments speak thusly, ‘And I no 
longer live, but Christ lives in me and that which I now live in the flesh, I 
live by faith which is in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for 
me.’76   
The old man returns again to the issue of suffering and not-retaliation 
referencing 1 Cor. 4.12-13which is followed by a saying from Jesus regarding 
one’s response to enemies from Luke 6.27-28. He concludes, stating, “from both 
words and deeds, the one who works in them—Christ—is made manifest 
(ἐφανεροῦτο).”77 From both this section and §33, it is clear that is not just the 
power of Christ that indwells but Christ himself. 
 These sections demonstrate that there is a clear and significant 
correlation of ideas involving the presence of Christ and the Spirit, relationship 
with the Father and whether the commandment of love is fulfilled or not. In fact, 
Maximus goes so far as to describe Christ as “dwelling wholly” in them through 
the commandments. Yet it is not just Christ but the Spirit and relationship with 
the Father that is in view. Moreover, both Christ and the Spirit find expression in 
the baptized: Christ’s through the words and deeds of those who truly believe 
and the Spirit through fruit. To follow the commandments means to be led by 
the Spirit and ultimately when the commandments are lived out to have Christ 
wholly dwelling in them. Likewise to have desires contrary to the Spirit means 
the Spirit cannot remain in them and raises the question of whether anything of 
Christ is within. A cursory glance suggests that the fulfilling of the 
commandment serves as both the evidence of Christ’s indwelling and the 
means. However, the presence of adverbs such as “truly”, “wholly”, “accurately”, 
                                                             
76 Maximus, Lib. asc. §34 (CCSG 40:75.647-652). 
77 Maximus, Lib. asc. §34 (CCSG 40:75.659-77.660). 
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“genuinely”, “all” suggest Maximus views salvation as a continual progression 
and process of maturation concerning which I have already discussed above.78   
To summarize, for Maximus when the baptized do not fulfill the 
commandment of love, it also means they do not evince being temples of God, 
being filled with the Spirit or having God as a Father. In order to be clear about 
the consequences of not fulfilling the commandment of love, he adds that this 
means they do not evince having the Spirit, being led by the Spirit, being sons of 
God, being born of the Spirit, or having anything of Christ within. Furthermore, 
it means Christ does not wholly dwell within. Conversely, to fulfill the command 
of love is a demonstration of being sons of God, is evident from the fruits of the 
Spirit and manifests Christ. This is a thoroughly Trinitarian way of explaining 
how engaging ascent demonstrates one’s participation in and manifestation of 
the presence of God.  
How this plays into his understanding of the roles of the Son and Spirit 
and the relation between the indwelling of Christ and Spirit is not, in this work, 
fully fleshed out. The concern for suffering and non-retaliation was highlighted 
earlier where “weakness” was a pre-requisite for the indwelling power of the 
Christ and we see similar language concerning suffering and non-retaliation 
here even though the term for weakness is not present. All of this is suggestive 
yet these examples do not equate the indwelling power of Christ to the person 
of the Spirit nor is the indwelling of Christ himself and that of the Spirit himself 
equated. All that can be concluded with surety at this point is that they are 
closely correlated so much so that to not evince the presence of one divine 
person excludes the presence of the other two. Other sections are less explicit 
but display similar language. In one section, Maximus again highlights Christ’s 
role as an advocate in relation to the Father, and when Christ is sought, he 
loosens the bands of wickedness. When Maximus explains what this looks like, 
he uses language much like the beginning of the dialogue where he described 
                                                             
78 Beginning in §43 through to §45 Maximus use adverbs and various adjectives to 
emphasize 1) the extent of one’s giving of oneself (completely: ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου, CCSG 40:115.982), 
2) how the baptized are to hope in their Lord (all: πᾶσαν; only: μόνον, CCSG 40:117.989-990), 3) 
how they are to love (everyone: πάντα ἄνθρωπον; from the soul: ἐκ ψυχῆς, CCSG 40:117.992), 
4) the quality of their ἀπάθεια (perfect: τελείαν, CCSG 40:119.1012); and, 5) how they are to 
repent (genuinely: γνησίως, CCSG 40:119.1017).  
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the activities of the Son and Spirit who give life, illumination, and help to those 
struggling against the passions yet in this instance there is no explicit reference 
to the Spirit.79  
This will not be the last time Maximus brings these ideas into close 
proximity but until I review further examples from his writings, how exactly 
Maximus sees the appropriation of the Son’s activities by the Spirit in the 
context of the indwelling of Christ or the Spirit must remain an open question. 
What can be said is that Christ himself and thus his power both indwell the 
baptized. Likewise, the baptized are meant to be temples and sons of God, filled 
with the Spirit, led by the Spirit, manifest the fruit of the Spirit and finally have 
the Spirit in them. These concepts, along with the importance Maximus places 
on devotion to God, demonstrate how imitation of the Son’s love exhibited in the 
incarnation fulfill not only the goal of loving neighbor but loving God himself. 
The fact that the example of Christ and devotion to God are given central 
importance shows that love toward God is the utmost priority and one which is 
inextricably bound to loving one’s neighbor. The pursuit of both occurs 
together, and both commandments are fulfilled when Christ is imitated. Yet, the 
constant reminder of the challenges gives space for Maximus to emphasize the 
place of weakness, suffering and the necessity of possessing the indwelling of 
Christ and the Spirit. In the pursuit of fulfilling the commandments, weakness is 
embraced, and Christ’s power is able to make love mature. The result is that 
Christ along with the fruit of the Spirit are made manifest through the believers’ 
words and deeds. 
§1.1.5 A Plea for Triune Mercy – Illustration of Trinitarian Prayer 
In this last section, I will look at an additional way Maximus uses 
Trinitarian grammar for the Christian life. In this case, I will analyze more 
closely the old man’s prayer for mercy toward the end of the Liber (§37).  I 
should state again that Maximus does not explicitly prescribe this language but 
rather illustrates it through the prayer of the old man. This prayer is not 
                                                             
79 Maximus, Lib. asc. §41 (CCSG 40:111.935-115.967). 
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haphazard but is carefully crafted on the basis of God’s name and intentionally 
enlists each person of the Trinity.  
In the previous section, I talked about how the old man lamented the 
contrast between the ideal garnered from biblical imagery of the baptized and 
their actual state— full of sin and without Christ in them. This lament signaled a 
turning point in the Liber because it is there that the dialogue shifts to a direct 
address to the reader. Once the old man’s assessment of their actual state 
reaches its climax, he addresses the consequence. The result of such hypocrisy 
is captivity to “savage devils” and their ruler.80 This amounts to “having 
trampled the Son of God underfoot and having regarded the blood of his 
covenant as unclean.”81 The section (§37-39) ends with a prayer for mercy that 
names each of the persons of the Trinity.82  
As can be expected, Maximus draws on biblical allusions and quotation to 
structure the old man’s prayer. Language from Daniel 3, Psalm 78 and Isaiah 63 
and 64 help frame each appeal but also ground the prayer primarily on God’s 
concern for his name although concern for the Apostles, Prophets, Fathers, 
Patriarchs and the holy Church are also given a supplemental role. The prayer 
begins with a series of allusions brought together from an exilic text (Daniel 
3.32) and carries over the theme of exile and covenant from quotation above:  
Yet, in the end, do not hand us over for the sake of your name, O Lord,  
nor scatter your covenant, and do not withdraw your mercy from us— 
For the sake of your mercies, our Father in heaven,  
and for the sake of the affections of your only-begotten Son,  
and for the sake of the mercy of your Holy Spirit.  
Do not remember our former lawlessness,  
but let your mercies swiftly capture us in advance  
since we are exceedingly poor.  
Help us God our Savior.   
On account of the glory of your name, O Lord, deliver us  
                                                             
80 Maximus, Lib. asc. §32-34 (CCSG 40:67.581-77.669).  
81 Cf. Hebrews 10.29 
82 Maximus, Lib. asc. §37 (CCSG 40: 766-815). 
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and forgive our sins on account of your name . . . 83  
The prayer begins by using the title “Lord” and it is clear that the prayer 
is addressed to the Father through the use of the pronoun “your” when referring 
to the only-begotten Son and the Holy Spirit. It is for the sake of the Father’s 
mercies (οἰκτιρμούς), his only-begotten Son’s affections (σπλάγχνα) and his 
Holy Spirit’s mercy (ἔλεος) that the plea appeals. While these three terms are 
used specifically for each divine person here, a search through the rest of the 
Liber does not reveal a strict rule by which Maximus assigns them. For example, 
ἔλεος is used several times throughout the prayer and is just as well assigned to 
the Father as it is to the Spirit. Later, it is the Father’s “holy name” that is upon 
the baptized from the beginning along with the name of his only-begotten Son 
and his Holy Spirit.84 This appeal is likely meant to echo the Trinitarian formula 
used in baptism and cited in §2. The basis of the last line “deliver us and forgive 
our sins” is not only for the glory of his name nor the name itself but as further 
reading suggests, also because of “the [Son’s] precious blood”, the Son’s “holy 
Apostles and Martyrs who poured out their own blood on behalf of his blood” 
and “the Holy Prophets, Fathers and Patriarchs who strove to be well-pleasing 
to your [Father’s] holy name.”85 Another request is made based on the Father’s 
“goodness” (ἀγαθότης) asking that, “the mystery administered to us for our 
salvation by the only-begotten Son might not become a judgment upon us.”86 Yet 
another request, based on the Father’s “great mercy” (κατὰ τὸ μέγα σου ἔλεος) 
and “multitude of mercies” (κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν σου), asks him not 
to “loathe our unworthiness” so that they might “draw near without 
                                                             
83 Maximus, Lib. asc. §37 (CCSG 40:91.766-775): Ἀλλὰ μὴ παραδῴης ἡμᾶς εἰς τέλος διὰ 
τὸ ὄνομά σου κύριε, καὶ μὴ διασκεδάσῃς τὴν διαθήκην σου, καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσῃς τὸ ἔλεός σου ἀφ’ 
ἡμῶν, διὰ τοὺς οἰκτιρμούς σου, Πάτερ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ διὰ τὰ σπλάγχνα τοῦ 
μονογενοῦς σου Υἱοῦ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἔλεος τοῦ ἁγίου σου Πνεύματος. Μὴ μνησθῇς ἡμῶν ἀνομιῶν 
ἀρχαίων, ἀλλὰ ταχὺ προκαταλαβέτωσαν ἡμᾶς οἱ οἰκτιρμοί σου κύριε, ὅτι ἐπτωχεύσαμεν σφόδρα. 
Βοήθησον ἡμῖν ὁ Θεὸς ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν· ἕνεκεν τῆς δόξης τοῦ ὀνόματός σου κύριε ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς καὶ 
ἱλάσθητι ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἡμῶν ἕνεκεν τοῦ ὀνόματός σου . . . 
84 Maximus, Lib. asc.  §37 (CCSG 40:95.804-806): . . . ἀλλὰ σύ κύριε, Πατὴρ ἡμῶν, ῥῦσαι 
ἡμᾶς· ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τὸ ὄνομά σου τὸ ἅγιον ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ἐστι, καὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς σου Υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου 
σου Πνεύματος. 
85 Maximus, Lib. asc. §37 (CCSG 40:93.779-783). 
86 Maximus, Lib. asc. §37 (CCSG 40: 93.786-89). 
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condemnation and be considered worthy of the protection of your only-
begotten Son”.87  
The prayer clearly identifies the source of many, if not all, aspects of the 
life for the baptized. From forgiveness of sins, hope, salvation, protection and 
help to making known the schemes of one’s adversaries to delivering them from 
their own machinations, the baptized cannot rely on their own name or their 
own righteousness and are unable to overcome opposition by themselves. It is 
the Lord who is powerful.88 His name is called upon because he is “the one who 
works all in all.”89 Maximus, through this prayer, attempts to clear away any 
sense of self-righteousness, shoring up any remaining doubt with yet another 
section drawn from Isaiah 63.15-19 to describe the sober realities of their 
condition and then follows it with Isaiah 64:1-12 which calls upon Yahweh to 
act on their behalf.90 Maximus’ use of one of the rare places in the Septuagint 
where God is addressed as “Father” ties in well with the argument based on 
God’s “name” and the naming of the three divine persons. While the Spirit is 
only mentioned twice, both instances are in the context of the other two divine 
persons. The prayer is addressed to the Father, yet the requests call forth the 
same actions that were named as significant areas of need for the baptized and 
were earlier assigned to the Son and the Spirit. These are not and cannot be 
found in the baptized but instead are requested from the Father for the sake of 
the Son or received from the Son himself. Specifically, the language which 
highlights each divine person’s compassion and mercy and how “from the 
beginning the name of the Father, Son and Spirit is upon us” illustrates aptly 
how the Trinity is beginning, means, and end and highlights how Maximus can 
conceive a unity of action while still being able to distinguish differences in 
those actions and roles. 
                                                             
87 Maximus, Lib. asc. §37 (CCSG 40:93.790-794): . . . μὴ δὲ βδελύξῃ ἡμῶν τὴν ἀναξιότητα, 
ἀλλ’ ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς κατὰ τὸ μέγα σου ἔλεος, καὶ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν σου παράγαγε τὰ 
ἁμαρτήματα ἡμῶν, ἵνα ἀκατακρίτως προσελθόντες κατενώπιον τῆς ἁγίας σου δόξης, 
ἀξιωθῶμεν τῆς σκέπης τοῦ μονογενοῦς σου Υἱοῦ . . . 
88 Maximus, Lib. asc. §37, 39 (CCSG 40:93.795-796; 99.846-847).  
89 Maximus, Lib. asc. §37 (CCSG 40:95.797-798). 
90 Maximus, Lib. asc. §37, 38 (CCSG 40:95.799-838). 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I attempted to use the Liber asceticus as a way to 
establish a baseline for Maximus Trinitarian thought. I have demonstrated how 
this early work is already robustly Trinitarian and whose main theme – the 
Trinity as beginning, means and goal of the ascetic life – provides a Trinitarian 
grammar for Christian life. This can be seen in how Maximus holds out the 
incarnate life of the Son as the example of the ethos and telos of Christian life but 
also in how he pairs the activities of the Son and Spirit at several places within 
the Liber as a way to show the means of that life. This demonstrated Maximus’ 
conception of the common activities of the persons but also an inseparability of 
action. Yet, despite these common and inseparable activities, there was still 
space for distinct roles and differentiation in how those activities were enacted. 
Additionally, the divine persons were often correlated, and their divinity and 
consubstantiality affirmed by the use of titles and descriptors such as τὸ 
συγγενὲς. The pairing of the Son and Spirit in the presentation of the 
incarnation at the beginning of the Liber highlighted the activities of the Son and 
Spirit in relation to the baptized. After this initial section, there were two 
additional ways this was displayed. The first way was in a complex of ideas that 
showed a close correlation with the indwelling power of Christ and activities of 
the Spirit. It was not always clear whether the power and indwelling of Christ 
could be equated with the Holy Spirit. Regardless, the result of pursuing 
renouncement, imitation of the incarnate Son and the virtues was to manifest 
Christ and the fruit of the Spirit in the life of the believer until mature love was 
established. Finally, another way it was illustrated, and one which drew many of 
these ideas together, was a prayer for mercy towards the end of the Liber.  
All of these features demonstrated Maximus’ intentional Trinitarian 
grammar for the Christian life. Baptism, imitation of the life of the incarnate Son, 
the pursuit of the virtues and pleas for mercy were all formulated around or 
addressed to the Trinity and highlighted divine appropriation within Christian 
life. This grammar, in and of itself, is striking but perhaps equally striking is 
what does not appear. There was no use of the λόγος/τρόποςdistinction for the 
Trinity or Christ which was to play such an important role later in Maximus’ 
theology. Likewise, there was no use of Chalcedonian language nor the 
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Logos/λόγοι doctrine in relation to Christ although there was a clear use of 
earlier creedal material. There was also no sustained reflection on divine 
simplicity nor even union and distinction as it relates to the Trinity even though, 
in places, Maximus showed a concern to express consubstantiality. Additionally, 
there was no in-depth treatment of contemplation (θεωρία) nor, more 
specifically, of θεολόγια. Consequently, contemplation of the Trinity was not 
presented as a goal of ascent in the Liber even though the Trinity as experienced 
in prayer was portrayed in heightened language. Given the absence of a full-
blown presentation on contemplation, it is not surprising that Maximus 
displayed none of the qualifications about the knowability of God’s nature that 
he employed later. Knowledge of God in the Liber was restricted to the 
perceptibility of God’s presence in the life of the baptized and what could be 
garnered from the symbol of faith and “Divine Scriptures”. However, Maximus 
did show that he viewed the activity of prayer as a grace which involved driving 
away mental images in an expectation of joining to and conversing with God 
which in turn transformed the mind to be Godlike (θεοειδὴς).91 I will explore, in 
the third chapter, how Maximus also envisioned θεολόγια as a grace and how 
the indwelling presence of God was related to prayer and θεολόγια in Capita 
caritate. While contemplation (θεωρία) was not spoken of explicitly in the Liber, 
there was a significant place given to the mind and its activities. Additionally, 
the term ἀπάθεια was only used three times in one section of the Liber and was 
correlated with despising transient things in favor of love for neighbor and God. 
While the example of Christ demonstrated these features, the term itself along 
with related terms such as the adjective ἀπαθής or adverb ἀπαθῶς were not 
used to describe God or any of the divine persons and their actions. As I stated 
earlier, even though Maximus highlighted many important Gospel passages on 
love, he nowhere cited 1 John 4.8 (“God is love”). Maximus’ baseline shows that 
he had a particular way of referring to the divine persons and describing their 
activity especially as it related to Christian life. We must await later writings to 
hear Maximus reflect directly on Trinitarian theology but already we see a 
                                                             
91 Maximus, Lib. asc. §24 (CCSG 40:47.418-49.430). 
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strong tendency to locate the Son and his incarnation in the context of the other 
divine persons and actions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Ascetic Context of Maximus’ Trinitarian Grammar for Christian life 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, in order to demonstrate the 
distinctive aspects of Maximus’ ascetic thought, it would be necessary to review 
earlier ascetic authors. It is to this review that I now turn. In this chapter, I will 
demonstrate that Maximus’ distinctiveness lies not so much in the ascetic 
concepts he employs but rather how he hangs these concepts on his account of 
the incarnate Son’s life as an example of love, how he pairs the Son and Spirit’s 
activities in that account and ultimately how his conception of ascent is 
intentionally Trinitarian. Despite his distinctiveness, Maximus is not as explicit 
or clear as other ascetic authors in some areas. One example that was already 
explored in Chapter 1 is how the concepts of indwelling Christ and indwelling 
Spirit can be understood side-by-side. When appropriate, I will draw out some 
of these areas as well.  
My first task will be to lay out areas of comparison from each of the 
authors I review here. After I have drawn these brief sketches, I will summarize 
some observations about the ascetic context in general and then dive into a 
comparison of Maximus with these ascetic writers. Finally, I will conclude this 
chapter by highlighting Maximus’ distinctive contribution but also aspects of his 
thought that are not represented in the Liber either in part or en toto. In Chapter 
3, I will return to Maximus’ writings to look briefly at Capita caritate. 
Some challenges lay before me in this part of the study, not the least of 
which is who to choose from in the vast ascetic tradition and what themes to 
focus on. In an effort to narrow the scope of this chapter, I have chosen to focus 
on only a few writers who wrote during the late fourth and fifth century and 
who are recognized as having influenced Maximus directly or through a broader 
tradition. They are Evagrius, Ps.-Dionysius, Diadochus and Mark the Monk. My 
review will end with a brief look at the literature contemporary with Maximus 
before delving into specific areas of comparison. 
The second challenge is more difficult. As I stated in the last chapter, 
Maximus’ avoidance of some technical language and his attempt to ground the 
ascetic life using thoroughly biblical concepts and examples creates a unique 
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problem.  For example, when looking at an ascetic like Evagrius, the term 
ἀπάθεια is very important yet Maximus’ use of the term is concentrated in one 
small section towards the end of the Liber that can easily be overlooked. 
However, the concepts associated with the term, such as the shedding of both 
the passions and impassioned thoughts about material things and material 
existence, were clearly present in the Liber. In line with this concern, the goal of 
the review is not an exhaustive history of the ascetic tradition on all fronts nor 
is it a concerted effort to draw out direct lines of influence between authors. 
While my initial choice of concepts in this chapter was based on themes I saw 
were important to Maximus in the Liber, I have had to broaden that set in order 
to allow for variance between authors. This broader focus I think is justified 
because not all the concepts appear using the same language nor serving the 
same exact purpose as they do for Maximus. Probing a broader set of ideas 
allows for a variance of language and purpose and gives a higher probability of 
finding areas of comparison.  I will focus my attention then on the following 
concepts 1) love and ἀπάθεια, 2) the knowledge of God, and 3) the activity of 
the divine persons or God in general in Christian life. By knowledge of God, I 
mean to include not only what an author thinks can be known of God but also 
how God’s presence can be perceived and how that knowledge is gained. When 
it seems helpful, I will draw out parallels between authors, but these parallels 
should not be mistaken as arguments for direct influence. 
 As I have noted several times, the term ἀπάθεια appears sparsely in the 
Liber and, in fact, could have been totally absent without damaging Maximus’ 
presentation. However, Maximus will eventually use the term and related words 
in Capita caritate and elsewhere more freely. It was these later uses that Lars 
Thunberg in his work, Microcasm and Mediator, compared with a broad survey 
of the term from writers before Maximus. Contrasting him specifically with 
Evagrius, he concludes that Maximus’ conception of ἀπάθεια is closer to what is 
found in other Christian writers because it is “so closely associated with the 
positive activities of love.”1  As I noted in Chapter 1, Maximus does not explicitly 
                                                 
1 Lars Thunberg, Microcasm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the 
Confessor, 2nd edition, (Chicago: Open Court 1995), 308 but see the larger section 299-309. 
Thunberg does not discuss the uses of ἀπάθεια in the Liber choosing a synthetic approach from 
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use the term to describe God even though the example of the incarnate Son 
clearly demonstrates some of the activities associated with the term’s use in the 
later part of the Liber. As a result, despite its sparse usage, I have included it as 
one of the concepts to review. While some of the authors I cover here overlap 
with Thunberg’s study, I offer several more. With those authors who do overlap 
with his study, I hope to relate their views to the broader set of issues outlined 
above. 
Finally, my presentation of other ascetic writers in this chapter is 
synthetic, meaning I draw from across their writings or from a general depiction 
of their writings and compare it with Maximus’ baseline Trinitarian thought in 
the Liber. Admittedly, this may seem like comparing apples to oranges or a 
blossom to a fully mature fruit but if the distinctive character of Maximus 
thought is already visible in his earlier work (in his baseline) when compared 
with the entire set of writings from any one of these ascetic authors then my 
point is still made. In later chapters, I will explore ways in which Maximus 
thought slowly gathers different ways of speaking and expands ideas only 
mentioned or illustrated in the Liber.  I do not think these new ways of speaking 
contradict his baseline but rather allow him to explore more deeply various 
aspects of ascent and theology. 
§2.1 Ascetic Context of Maximus’ Early Life 
Something should also be said about Maximus’ ascetic context. Maximus’ 
two major vitas, the Syriac and Greek, each offer their own challenges especially 
when trying to ascertain his actual ascetic environment. The Greek recensions 
borrow from another ancient author’s biography, Theodore the Studite, in order 
to fill in the Confessor’s earlier life and follow a typical hagiographical approach 
                                                 
uses in Capita caritate, Capita gnostica, Ad Thalassium and Epistula 1. Thunberg does not 
attempt to draw parallels or show influence from other writers on Maximus. Of the writers he 
reviews (Clement, Origen, Ps.-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius) Clement of Alexandria 
seems to bear the closest affinity highlighting, as Maximus will, the concept’s close relationship 
to love and it being something that should be imitated because God himself is ἀπαθής. Von 
Balthasar, commenting on Maximus’ Capita gnostica 2.98, sees aspects of Evagrius and Ps.-
Macarius in Maximus’ use of this term but has similar reservations about attributing the entirety 
of it to Evagrius, see Kosmische Liturgie 2 ed., 557-58.  
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of purporting noble origins and court activity in Constantinople.2  This account 
places him in the court of Heraclius as the Emperor’s first secretary until his 
decision to pursue the ascetic life in Chrysopolis across the Bosporus. In light of 
the well-documented attempt in the Greek recensions to supply the Studites’ 
early years for Maximus’, it cannot dependably be drawn upon for his early life. 
Other documents, among which are some that play into the making of the Greek 
vita, give accounts of Maximus’ later life and are still considered essential to 
understanding his trials, exiles, and death.3  
The incomplete Syriac vita provides another, less flattering, account of 
his origins and early life.4 In this account, Maximus is the son of an adulterous 
relationship between a Samaritan and Persian slave girl and is situated in 
Palestine. He eventually becomes a monk and disciple of the Origenist Pantaleon 
at the Palaia Lavra.  The Syriac vita goes out of its way to provide a detailed 
account of Maximus’ early family life, the author explicitly citing his sources but 
is hampered by a hostile tone. There is a seamless transition between Maximus’ 
early life which ends with his discipleship under Pantaleon and the mentor’s 
death and the Confessor’s activities related to Sophronius at the Cypriot Council 
of 636 CE.  This indicates a rather lengthy period of time which is compressed 
into a couple of lines.  Within these lines is enough time for significant travel 
and makes any absolute statement about Maximus’ inability to be associated 
with monastic communities or activities elsewhere problematic. Given this large 
gap, and vita’s clearly pejorative quality, it seems unwise to invest more into it 
than can be corroborated from other evidence. Some scholars have strongly 
                                                 
 2 There are three recensions of Maximus’ Greek vita along with various biographical 
materials. There are also materials in Slavic and Georgian. For a thorough discussion see The 
Life of Maximus the Confessor (Recension 3), ed. and transl. by Bronwen Neil & Pauline Allen, 
Early Christian Studies 6 (St. Pauls Publication, 2003) and Maximus the Confessor and His 
Companions: Documents from Exile, ed. and transl. by Pauline Allen & Bronwen Neil, Oxford 
Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For a recent review of the 
Georgian versions of Maximus’ life see Leila Khoperia, “Maximus the Confessor: Life and Works 
in the Georgian Tradition,” in Maximus the Confessor in Georgia, Iberica Caucasica 3 (London: 
Bennet & Bloom, 2009), 25-48.  
3 For texts and translations see Allen & Neil, Maximus the Confessor and His Companions.  
 4 For the Syriac life see, Sebastian Brock, “An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the 
Confessor,” in Analecta Bollandiana 91 (Bruxelles: Société des Bollandistes, 1973), 299-
346. 
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argued that there is enough corroborated to embrace Maximus as monk of 
Palestine rather than Constantinople.5 The Palestinian milieu was tortured by 
long-standing disputes over the orthodoxy of Origenism and between Origenist 
groups. These groups eventual entanglement with the pro and anti-
Chalcedonian conflict under Justinian provides a fitting context for Maximus’ 
knowledge of Origenism and a rationale for why he might write against it while 
participating in a ground-level resistance against miaphysitism.6  Additionally, 
others have noted the overlapping influence of both Antioch and Alexandria on 
Palestine and their connections with Persia, which easily gives a plausible 
account of his access to and extensive knowledge of ascetic authors and 
philosophical fluency.7 Until a clearer account can be made either from new 
evidence or a convincing reconstruction, a patchwork of dates and accounts are 
the best we can do to fill in the exact details of Maximus’ early life. From this 
author’s perspective, Palestine is increasingly becoming a more suitable context 
for Maximus even while aspects of the Syriac vita may be treated with suspicion. 
§2.2 Evagrius of Pontus8 
Evagrius’ influence on Maximus’ ascetic thought was noted very early by 
modern scholarship and he has much to say about the three areas I identified as 
important points of comparison with Maximus’ baseline Trinitarian though in 
the Liber. 9 Maximus distinctiveness in relation to Evagrius is, as a suggested in 
                                                 
 5 Booth, Crisis of Empire, 140-185. 
 6 For this see Daniel Hombergen, The Second Origenist Controversy: A New Perspective 
on Cyril of Scythopolis' Monastic Biographies as Historical Sources for Sixth-Century Origenism 
(Roma: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 2001) and TTH 51, 270-286. 
 7 CCT 2/3, 82-83; 169-183.  
8 In this section, I have attempted to look through the critical texts for Evagrius and cite 
as specifically as possible. However, in some instances I was simply unable to get my hands on 
the critical texts and so rely on the range and citation provided by either Sinkewincz or Casiday. 
9 For more in-depth studies of Evagrius’ thought, see Robert E. Sinkewincz, Evagrius of 
Pontus: The Greek Ascetic Corpus, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), Augustine M. Casiday, Evagrius Ponticus, The Early Church Fathers (London: 
Routledge, 2006) and Julia S. Konstantinovsky, Evagrius Ponticus: The Making of a Gnostic, 
Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies (Surrey: Ashgate, 
2009).  
In 1930, Marcel Viller outlined nine areas where Maximus was thought to have been 
influenced and this same article is still cited as necessary reading for the relationship between 
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the opening paragraphs of this chapter, not in the concepts per se, but how he 
fits them together and (re)defines them. In some cases, Evagrius is much more 
explicit than Maximus about the connection between the Son and the Spirit and 
their role in ascent which is likely a result of his late fourth century milieu. In 
fact, Maximus’ distinctiveness in relation to Evagrius does not even lie in 
formulating a Trinitarian grammar for ascent but rather how Maximus uses the 
narrative of the incarnate Son’s life as an example of the ethos and telos of a 
Christian life of love. A quick note here regarding Evagrius’ Capita gnostica: any 
references taken from Cap. gnost. are based on the S2 Syriac translation, which 
follows the general consensus that it is more reliable than the S1.10 
§2.2.1 Ἀπάθεια & Love 
Evagrius does tie love and ἀπάθεια together. In one passage, he states 
plainly that love springs from ἀπάθεια.11 Love is the result of progressive 
discipline towards ἀπάθεια and the victory of the ascetic through the passage of 
virtue in the practical life.12 This practical life revolves around separating 
oneself from a love of self and anything else that may distract from love of God, 
be they thoughts, memories, dreams or demons.13 Ἀπάθεια comes from 
                                                 
the two ascetics. Viller’s study was published in two parts. The first part was Marcel Viller, “Aux 
Sources de la Spiritualité de S. Maxime: Les œuvres d’Evagre le Pontique,” Revue d’ascétique et 
de mystique 11 (April 1930), 156-184 and then by the same name and volume number (July 
1930), 239-268. The nine areas are 1) Psychology, 2) The Common Distinction between the 
Active Life and the Gnostic Life, 3) The Tripartite Division of the Spiritual Life, 4) The Order of 
the Virtues in the Active Life, 5) The Πρακτική: The Active or Practical Life. Πάθος and Ἀπάθεια, 
6) The Causes of Good and Bad, 7) Ἀγάπη and Γνῶσις, 8) The Five Θεωρίαι and 9) The Series of 
Austerities and Successive Purifications. 
10 See the critical edition Les Six Centuries des “Kephalia Gnostica” de Évagre le Pontique: 
Édition Critique de La Version Syriaque Commune et Édition d’une Nouvelle Version Syriaque, 
Intégrale, avec une Double Traduction Française, ed. Antoine Guillaumont, PO 28.1 (Paris: 
Firmin-Didot, 1958). 
11  Evagrius, Practicus, 81 (SC 171:670). Cf. also Tractatus ad Eulogium §22 (PG 
79.1124C) where Evagrius states that love is the bond of impassibility and expunges the 
passions. 
12 Evagrius, Practicus 58-60, 81, 84 (SC 171:636-640; 670; 674). 
13 Evagrius, Excerpts 10-12, in Joseph Muyldermans, A tranvers la tradition manuscrite 
d’Évagre le Pontique. Essai sur les manuscrits grecs conserves à la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, 
Bibliothéque du Muséon 3 (Bureaux du Muséon: Louvain, 1932), 86. 
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prudence and is produced by the grace of God.14 It is the glory and light of the 
soul.15 Love of God as the goal of the practical life is accomplished by not loving 
worldly things and leads towards knowledge of God.16 Faith begins love, which 
terminates in knowledge of God.17 He also states that God is love, and although 
Evagrius never states explicitly that God is or has ἀπάθεια, such a conclusion 
can be inferred from his conception of humanity as being renewed in the image 
of God.18 This idea of image leads Evagrius to draw out two related ideas. The 
first idea is that one ought to love the image as the archetype. The related 
implication is that, because humans are fellow-images of God, they should treat 
each other with love.19 Consequently, in several places Evagrius grounds the 
ethos of the ascetic to these two principles.20 The test of this love is keeping 
Christ’s commandments, which includes hospitality and generosity toward 
other ascetics.21 The test of ἀπάθεια is centered explicitly on one’s attitude 
towards worldly things; their mental representations and one’s response to the 
demonic temptations wrought through them.22 For Evagrius, there is a priority 
of love. Thus, in tandem with positive statements about loving others, we see 
warnings against excessive concern for others including angels who might 
                                                 
14 Evagrius, Capita gnostica 1.37; Sententiae ad monachos 68 in Hugo Gressmann 
“Nonnenspiegel und Mönchsspiegel des Euagrios Pontikos,” Texte und Untersuchungen 39 
(1913) 152-165. I was unable to view for myself Gressmann’s work and so rely on the range 
provided by Sinkewincz. 
15 Evagrius, Capita gnostica 1.81 (PO 28: 55 S2).  
16 Evagrius, Practicus 84 (SC 171:674).  
17 Evagrius, Sententiae ad monachos 3 (TU 39: 152-165). 
18 Evagrius, Tractatus ad Eulogium §22 (PG 79.1124C).  
19 Evagrius, Practicus 89 (SC 171:680-688).  
20 Evagrius, De oratione 121-125 (Sinkewicz, Greek Ascetic Corpus, 206); Tractatus ad 
Eulogius 24.25-26 (Sinkewicz, Greek Ascetic Corpus, 51-52). 
21 Evagrius, Capita paraenetica 3.20. I was unable to find a single critical edition of these 
short sentences. Here I use the numbering of Sinkewicz (Greek Ascetic Corpus, 232), cf. Gnomica 
I: Sexti Pythagorici, Clitarchi, Evagrii Pontici sententiae, ed. Antonio Elter (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 
1892), 54 (listed as 68). See also Tractatus ad Eulogium §25-26 (PG 79.1125C-1128C) and 
Capita gnostica, 5.38; 6.44. 
22 Evagrius, De malignis cogitationibus 20 (SC 438: 222-224); Practicus, 56, 58, 60, 64 
(SC 171: 630-632; 636; 640; 648). 
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distract from love of God.23 In prayer, Evagrius will also give a role to love 
(ἔρως) stating that through ‘supreme love’ the impassible habit of the state of 
prayer “carries off to an intelligible height the philosophic and spiritual mind.”24 
This evidence clearly shows that Evagrius values love in the ascetic life and its 
function as a path towards knowledge of God in prayer. Elsewhere, he states 
pragmatically that equal love towards all is impossible but nevertheless 
suggests that one ought to relate to all with ἀπάθεια, lack of resentment and a 
lack of hatred.25 While reviewing a series of excerpts from various ancient 
authors, Joseph Muyldermans identified a set as Evagrian; two of which are 
relevant to this discussion.26  The first excerpt is simply “treat others as you 
want to be treated,” which is thought to be taken from the Sententiae Sexti but 
could just as easily be a restatement of scriptural data or of his already 
mentioned conception of human beings in the image of God.27 The second 
excerpt states,  
The distinguishing features of perfect love are loving one’s enemies—for 
he says, ‘Love your enemies; benefiting those who hate you—for he says, 
‘Do well to those who hate you’; praying for the unrighteous—for he 
says, ‘Pray for those who despitefully use you’; not only giving measure 
for measure, but doing good instead—for he says, ‘Conquer evil with 
good’ rejoicing in a neighbour’s successes, commiserating in his failures 
and abiding with him in both—for he says, ‘Rejoice with those who 
rejoice and weep with those who weep’; teaching the unlearned and 
leading them by the hand into salvation; giving mercy in cheerfulness of 
heart to those in need; making discordance of sinners one’s own and thus 
                                                 
23 Evagrius, De oratione 112; Rerum monachalium rationes 5-7. Cf. also Sententiae ad 
virginem 7.  
24 Evagrius, De oratione 52 (PG 79.1177).   
25 Evagrius, Practicus 100 (SC 171:710). Cf. also Tractatus ad Eulogium 19 (PG 
79.1117C) where Evagrius suggest attitudes and actions towards others when warring against 
fornication. 
26 Amongst this group were also sayings from Gregory of Nazianzus, Maximus the 
Confessor, Ephrem and Diadochus.  
27  Evagrius, Excerpts 59 (Muyldermans, tradition manuscrite d’Évagre le Pontique, 92; 
transl. Casiday, Evagrius, 179-180). Cf. Sexti sententiae 210 (Gnomica 1: 15). 
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grieving and lamenting over them and fervently propitiating God as if for 
one’s own sins; and laying down one’s soul for one’s friends. These 
distinguishing features of perfect love make a man into an imitator of 
Christ; and with refined dinner companions and the like is a wandering 
and false shadow of love. 28 
The combination of themes, scriptural citation and allusion expressed in 
this excerpt finds no exact correspondence in any other of Evagrius’ works. 
Unlike his other works, it goes beyond concern for other ascetics and does not 
explicitly base love on the fact that human beings are in the image of God. It is 
not qualified by any concern for distraction and frames the ascetic life within 
the context of imitation of Christ not just obeying Christ’s commands. This 
imitation is located specifically around loving one’s enemies and concern for the 
well-being of one’s neighbor. There is no explicit tie between ἀπάθεια, Christ or 
God and consequently while perfect love is seen as a goal, it is not explained in 
relation to ἀπάθεια.  
These examples do show that love and ἀπάθεια have a place in his 
ascetic teaching; however, my synthetic approach may give the impression that 
love is an often talked about subject. In reality, his thoughts on love are 
scattered throughout his works, and one can easily go through many pages in 
between examples. In terms of the quantity of material he writes for ascetics, 
much of it is concerned with virtues, vices, γνῶσις, ἀπάθεια and what could be 
termed a “psychology of temptation”. Thus, his ideas concerning love, because 
of their place in his scheme of spiritual teaching and their connection with 
ἀπάθεια, are important but they nevertheless receive less real estate. 
§2.2.2 Knowledge of God 
In Evagrius’ conception of the knowledge of God, I come to a much more 
difficult subject and one with a rather long history of debate. I will briefly 
attempt to sketch out why it has been problematic and then delve into specific 
examples. The main difficulty lies in disentangling the various ways Evagrius, 
                                                 
28 Evagrius, Excerpts 69 (transl. in Casiday, Evagrius, 179-180; Muyldermans, tradition 
manuscrite d’Évagre le Pontique, 94). The Scriptural texts are Lev. 19.18; Matt. 19.19, 22:39, Mk. 
12:31, 33, Lk. 10:27, Ro. 13.9; Gal. 5.14, Ja. 2.8. 
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particularly in his Capita gnostica, envisions the relationships between the 
concepts of unity, Christ, monad, Trinity and knowledge, especially the 
problematic idea of essential knowledge. In several places, Evagrius asserts that 
essential knowledge is either Trinity or Christ (or is in Christ) and that the νοῦς 
can receive this knowledge.29 This formulation could easily be taken either as a 
sort of assimilation of the mind into essential knowledge or the indwelling of 
Christ and Trinity in the mind.30 The former interpretation plays more clearly 
into hands of the Origenist myth of the henad of rational beings. When it comes 
to descriptions of Christ, the term “unity” is often used as a descriptor.31 In Cap. 
gnost., he favors talking about the incarnation as Christ who has in him the 
Word of God (or unity) – expressions that could undoubtedly result in 
accusations of a double-subject Christology. 32 Additionally, his style of denying 
something and then offsetting that denial in subsequent statements could just as 
easily have appeared provocative in later centuries as Christological language 
continued to be refined. For example, in one passage he begins by baldly stating, 
“Christ is not connatural with the Trinity. Indeed, he is also not essential 
knowledge, but he alone always has essential knowledge inseparably in him.” 
He then ends the passage stating, 
However, Christ, I mean to say, the one who has come with God the Word 
and in the spirit is the Lord, is inseparable from his body, and by that 
union he is connatural with his Father since he is also essential 
knowledge.33  
 Elsewhere he states one cannot separate Christ into two subjects (“not 
two sons” or “two christs”) and that the body of Christ is connatural with ours 
                                                 
29 Evagrius, Capita gnostica 3.3, 5.48, 6.28, 29, 30 (PO 28: 101, 197, 229 S2). 
30 In one passage, Evagrius seems to discuss this directly suggesting that the νοῦς bears 
the likeness of God, not because it is essential knowledge, but because it is receptive of essential 
knowledge, see Capita gnostica 6.73 (PO 28:247, 249 S2).  
31 Evagrius, Capita gnostica 4.18 (PO 28:143 S2). 
32 Evagrius, Capita gnostica 4.18, 6.79 (PO 28:143, 251 S2). 
33  Evagrius, Capita gnostica 6.14 (PO 28:223 S2). 
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along with his soul but “the Word which is in him is essentially coessential with 
the Father.”34 
Sherwood, on comparing Maximus and Evagrius, identified that the 
reason why humans were receptive to knowledge of the Trinity according to 
Evagrius was because they are found in his image—they have an innate capacity 
to perceive the Triune God.35 This actually should be more specific. It is the 
νοῦς, according to Evagrius, in human beings that is able to receive knowledge 
of God. Evagrius makes a point of saying that corporeal existence lacks the 
ability to see, know, receive or be united with the Trinity, thus the reason he 
calls for the νοῦς to be made naked and perfect.36 This is the location of the 
image of God for Evagrius and is what can receive the Trinity.37 Corporeal 
nature is only receptive of the wisdom of God since it is created and can be 
received through the contemplation of nature. Evagrius is making a strong 
distinction between the image of God, which is located in the νοῦς and is 
receptive of Christ who is essential knowledge as is the Trinity and the νοῦς in 
its body. In addition, despite what he states about the mind being able to receive 
essential knowledge (Christ, Trinity) he continues to make standard pro-Nicene 
assertions that one cannot know God’s nature.38  
Julia S. Konstantinovsky tackles these issues at length in Making of a 
Gnostic and suggests that recognizing the different contexts of the 
Cappadocian’s debate with Eunomius and Evagrius’ writing to ascetics does 
much to alleviate a perceived conflict regarding how and what about God can be 
known. There are several more pieces of relevant evidence that could be added 
to the discussion. In light of past debate that suggests Evagrius did not have 
enough of an apophatic sensibility, the first piece of evidence is that Evagrius’ 
focus on imageless prayer is an apophatic qualifier to knowledge of God. It 
                                                 
34 Evagrius, Capita gnostica 6.16, 79 (PO 28:223, 251 S2). 
35 Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 137-139. 
36 Evagrius, Capita gnostica 3.6, 3.11-13, 3.15, 3.30 (PO 28:101, 103, 111 S2). 
37 Evagrius, Capita gnostica 3.32 (PO 28:111 S2). 
38 Evagrius, Capita gnostica, 5.51, 62, 63, 79 (PO 28: 199, 203, 205, 211 S2). These 
assertions are entirely overlooked by Thunberg. Compare also Capita gnostica 3.80-81 (P0 28: 
131 S2). 
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acknowledges that materiality, material experiences, and memories or 
representations of them are not God and must give way to another kind of 
contemplation. As Sherwood notes, Evagrius understands the image of God in 
human beings as granting them the ability to perceive the creator, specifically 
the Trinity, but it should be noted that this knowledge is given by God through 
an experience with him. Thus, he does not shy away from saying that the gnostic 
can have a “substantial knowledge” of God. There is a tension between an 
affirmation that God’s nature is not knowable and this “substantial knowledge” 
of God available in prayer. We may well be dealing with a distinction between 
two different senses of γνῶσις; one which focuses on discursive thought and 
another which focus on the experience of phenomena, but Evagrius does not 
make it a point to name and describe this distinction.  
§2.2.3 Trinity in Ascetic Life & More on the Knowledge of God 
In this section, I will look at a notable theme in Evagrius’ spiritual 
writings – the role of the Trinity in ascetic life. While some of the same issues 
from the previous subsection are revisited, I will look more closely as some 
specific examples that relate the Trinity to other areas of Evagrius’ conception 
of ascetic life including contemplation and knowledge of God. It should be noted 
that while Maximus presents love of God as both the ethos and telos of ascetic 
life in the Liber, the Trinity is not presented as a goal of contemplation. The 
closest we have in that regard is God addressed in Trinitarian prayer and the 
suggestive language of the baptized being made deiform. Maximus will 
eventually present the contemplation of the Trinity as a goal in the Capita 
caritate and in later writings. Evagrius talks about the Trinity in ascetic life in 
several ways that bear some parallel to Maximus, particularly as it relates to 
giving a role to the Son and Spirit in ascent. This is seen in references to the 
Spirit and the pairing of the Son and Spirit in revealing the Father. Evagrius is 
much more explicit about this than Maximus is in the Liber.  
In several of his letters, Evagrius gives us a rather clear picture of his 
pneumatology. In his Epistula fidei, Evagrius sets out to defend himself against 
the charge of Tritheism. To do this, he shows how the Son is divine and of the 
same substance as the Father and then moves on to demonstrate the same 
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status for the Holy Spirit. Several things are worth noting about his argument. 
Firstly, Evagrius makes an argument for the shared power and activity of the 
persons as an indication of their equal divine status. Here he suggests that 
Scripture presents three creations: the transition from non-existence to 
existence, the transformation from worse to better, and the resurrection of the 
dead. Concerning these he states, “In them, you will find the Holy Spirit co-
operating with the Father and the Son.”39 As support he gives examples of the 
shared activity of the persons in the first creation, based on Ps. 32.6; in baptism, 
based on 2 Cor. 5.17 and Matthew 28.19; and in the resurrection, based on Phil. 
3.11. The last few sections argue that the Holy Spirit is God based on 1) his 
indwelling in Christians as described in 1 Cor. 6.19 by equating the phrase 
“temple of the Holy Spirit” with “temple of God”, 2) his knowledge with an 
allusion to 1 Cor. 2.11, and 3) a series of conflated images that link concepts and 
words found throughout Scripture such as “sword of Spirit’’ and “the Word”, 
based on Eph. 6.17; “the Son” and “the Father’s hand”, based on Ps. 117.16 and 
Ex. 15.6; and lastly “the Holy Spirit” and “the finger of God” based on Lk. 11.20 
and Mt. 12.28.40  
Finally, there are several areas in the letter where Evagrius, in passing, 
mentions the role of the persons of the Trinity in the spiritual life. In an 
argument meant to show that holiness is an essential characteristic and not 
something added to God, he states, “but the font of holiness, from which every 
reasoning creature is made holy in proportion to its virtue, is the Son and the 
Holy Spirit.”41 In another section discussing the importance of certain doctrinal 
truths, Evagrius states that “the Holy Spirit all the while protects our 
understanding, so that we do not fall from one idea while grasping another; and 
while focusing on the theology, we despise the incarnation (τῇ θεολογίᾳ 
προσέχοντες τῆς οἰκονομίας καταφρονῶμεν); and our incompleteness become 
                                                 
39 Evagrius, Epistula fidei §11 in Basilio di Cesarea. Le lettere, Volume I, ed. Marcella 
Forlin Patrucco, Corona partum 11 (Torino: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1983), 106.6-7, 
transl. Casiday, Evagrius, 55. 
40 Evagrius, Ep. fid. §11 (Le lettere I, 106.6-110.40). 
41 Evagrius, Ep. fid. §2 (Le lettere I, 90.45-46, transl. Casiday, Evagrius, 48). 
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impiety.”42 In this case, the Holy Spirit functions as a guardian of a Christian’s 
coherent understanding of two distinguishable aspects of doctrinal truth. 
Unlike the Ep. fid., it does not appear that Evagrius gives too much direct 
attention to the Holy Spirit in his other ascetic writings.43  However, to say that 
Holy Spirit is completely absent would be inaccurate. In his Epistula ad 
Melanium (Ep. 64), Evagrius gives a detailed picture of contemplation in the 
ascetic life. He employs several elaborate metaphors throughout the letter, 
many of which are meant to show how one thing reveals another. One of these 
metaphors revolves around the constitution and function of letter-writing itself. 
The letter communicates the love and intention of the author. In this metaphor, 
creation is seen as a letter and exists “through his [God’s] power and his wisdom 
(that is, by his Son and Spirit).”44 Throughout the rest of the letter, the Son and 
Spirit are often referred to as “power” and “wisdom” or, as in Ep. fid., “hand” and 
“finger”. Wisdom and Power are the “signs” through which the Father’s love is 
made known. Likewise rational beings are “signs” through which the Son and 
Spirit are known. Because of this “we must eagerly advance by them toward, 
and come to understand, things invisible.”45 In this instance, there is a chain of 
revelation whereby creation and rational beings are signs of the Son and Spirit, 
and the Son and Spirit are signs of the Father. This chain is the means by which 
the ascetic proceeds in contemplation. 
Another elaborate metaphor uses the relationship between mind, soul 
and body to explain how the Spirit and Word make known both the Father and 
the human mind to itself. The human mind is the “body” of the Spirit and Word, 
which in turn reveals the “mind” or the Father.46 The human mind cannot know 
                                                 
42 Evagrius, Ep. fid. §3.50-53 (Le lettere I, 92.50-53, transl. Casiday, Evagrius, 49-50 with 
some changes). 
43 Jason Scully, “Angelic Pneumatology in the Egyptian Desert: The Role of Angels and 
the Holy Spirit in Evagrian Asceticism,” 292-295. 
44 Evagrius, Epistula ad Melanium (Ep. 64) §5, 6 (Wilhelm Frankenberg, Euagrius 
Ponticus (Berlin: Weidmann, 1912), 612/613.187bβ-188aα; transl. in Casiday, Evagrius, 65). The 
section numbering for this letter are from Casiday, Evagrius, 64-77. 
45 Evagrius, Ep. 64 §12-13 (Frankenberg, Euagrius, 614/615.188bβ-189aα; transl. in 
Casiday, Evagrius, 67).   
46 Evagrius, Ep. 64 §15 (Frankenberg, Euagrius, 614/615.189aβ-616/617.189bβ).  
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the Father like the Father knows himself, but the Son and Spirit can make him 
known to the human mind.47 The human mind is receptive to this because, “the 
mind is alone amongst all the creatures and orders in being the true form that is 
receptive of the knowledge of the Father, for it ‘is being renewed in knowledge 
according to the image of its creator’.”48 The ability of the Son and Spirit to make 
known the Father rests on their shared essence.49 Likewise the Son and the 
Spirit are able to make the human mind know itself since they are the “soul” of 
the human mind. This laborious metaphor is hard to follow even in the Greek 
and is likely one of the pieces of his work that was misinterpreted by later 
Origenist movements. For example, one could easily mistake what he says here 
as meaning that the human mind is of the same essence as the Father and is the 
reason why, through the Spirit and Word, it will return to a connatural state per 
the Origenist myth. However, Evagrius qualifies what he says in the next 
sections of letter, which makes clear that there is a divide between created 
existence and the nature of the Father, Son, and Spirit.50 There are two notable 
items in his presentation. Firstly, the entire rationale behind Evagrius’ 
conception of human ability to have knowledge of God is that the human mind is 
                                                 
47 Evagrius, Ep. 64 §15-17 (Frankenberg, Euagrius, 614/615.189aβ-616/617.189bβ). In 
the latter part of §15 he states that the Father through the mediation of his Spirit acts in the 
mind. For the lacunae in §17, 24, 25 of Frankenberg’s edition and the last part of the letter (§33-
68) see Gösta Vitestam, “Seconde partie du traité qui passe sous le nom de ‘La grande letter 
d’Evagre le Pontique à Mélanie l’Ancienné’ publiée et traduite d’après le manuscript du British 
Museum Add. 17192,” in Scripta minora Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis 
1963-1964, no. 3 (Lund: CWK Glerrup, 1964), 6-29. 
48 Evagrius, Ep. 64 §16, 19 (Frankenberg, Euagrius, 614/615.189bα-616/617.189bα; 
616/617.189bβ-190aα; transl. in Casiday, Evagrius, 67).   
49 Evagrius, Ep. 64 §19 (Frankenberg, Euagrius, 616/617.189bβ-190aα). 
50 Evagrius, Ep. 64 §22-25 (Frankenberg, Euagrius, 616-617.190aα-190bβ). In §26-30 of 
the letter, even though he suggests that the joining of the minds to the Father will not increase 
or decrease the one nature and three ὑποστάσεις of the Trinity and that these minds had a 
temporal creation, his description of their final state could easily be taken as support for later 
‘Origenist’ ideas. Konstantinovsky’s conclusion that Evagrius’ language is “uncomfortable” in 
relation to modern and ancient formulations but can nevertheless be shown within “orthodox” 
understandings seems a fair assessment (Making of a Gnostic, 153-178). Yet given his language, 
writing style and elaborate use of metaphor, it is understandable why it was problematic; either 
because it was interpreted in ways that eventually were deemed Origenist and condemned or 
because it continued to fit so uncomfortably within what were considered orthodox 
descriptions of Christ, deification and the eschaton in sixth and seventh century. 
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“being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator” through the 
work of the Son and Spirit who make known the Father. Likewise, the Father is 
said to act in the mind by his Spirit. Secondly, the human mind is able to come to 
self-knowledge through the Son and the Spirit. Evagrius does not discuss in 
these passages the role of faith but elsewhere makes clear the beginning of the 
journey toward knowledge of God is faith.51 Knowledge, for Evagrius, is based 
on the image of God within human beings and God’s activity through the Son 
and Spirit. As we will see, Maximus will touch on similar issues but will revise 
their relationships. 
In the next few paragraphs, I hope to show how Evagrius sees the work 
of Trinity in various aspects of ascetic life. For, Evagrius there are three basic 
stages to this life: 1) the practical life, 2) natural contemplation, and 3) prayer. 
Within the practical life, Evagrius envisions not an ascetic on their own but 
someone who accomplishes ἀπάθεια and love, despite temptations, with the 
help of God. In some places the Holy Spirit or God, in general, is a helper who 
produces zeal, gives rest or grants prayer.52 Already, here, we see movement 
from practical to the latter to stages of ascent. More specifically we find 
references to persons of the Trinity. In this context, for example, the Spirit acts 
in two ways. The first way is by the Spirit speaking through Scripture. In a few 
places, Evagrius will say the Spirit speaks and then follows this with a quotation 
from Scripture.53 The second way is related; the Spirit often helps evaluate the 
ascetic’s thoughts and actions through the medium of Scripture.54 This self-
awareness, however, is not the only kind of knowledge available. Likewise, 
teaching and knowledge, which are contained in wisdom, are also granted as a 
                                                 
51  Evagrius, Ep. ad Anatolium (= prol. ad Practicum, SC 171: 490.45-492.51) 
52 Evagrius, De oratione 58 (PG 79.1180); Scholia in Ecclesiasten 29 (Eccl. 4.11; SC 397: 
108); De malignis cogitionibus 9 (SC 438: 184.45-46), cf. Institutio sive Paraenesis ad monachos 
(recensio brevior) (PG 79.1237C).  
53 Evagrius, De malignis cogitationibus, 18, 37 (SC 438: 214-216; 280-284). 
54 Evagrius, De malignis cogitationibus 7, 18, 37 (SC 438:174-176; 214-216; 280-284); 
cf. Capita gnostica 3.77. 
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gift of the Spirit.55 Sharing a similar concern that was expressed in his letters, he 
states the necessity that right doctrine about the Spirit be taught.56 While the 
correlation between the Son and the Spirit is not as strong in his ascetic writing 
as it is in texts that are concerned with specific theological issues, there are 
areas where it is assumed and are most lucid in his comments regarding the 
biblical conception of adoption and sonship.57  
On the last stage, prayer, more can be said. Evagrius has a place for a 
Trinitarian understanding of prayer based on a tradition of exegesis on the 
Pater nostra.58 While commenting on Matthew’s version of the prayer, Evagrius, 
like Gregory of Nyssa, interprets the request “your kingdom come” as a request 
for the Holy Spirit.59 Again, in a latter section of the prayer he comments that 
the phrase “for yours is the power” refers to the Son and the phrase “and the 
kingdom” refers to the Holy Spirit.60 In De oratione, Evagrius adds to his 
exegesis stating that those who seek to pray should ask God, who is the giver of 
                                                 
55 Evagrius, Scholia in Proverbia 101 (Prov. 8.10-11; SC 340: 200); Expositio in Proverbia 
Salomonis 88.17-18; Practicus epil. (SC 171:712); Scholia in Ecclesiasten 42 (Eccl. 5.17; SC 397: 
138). 
56 Evagrius, Scholia in Proverbia 249 (Prov. 22.28; SC 340: 344-346); Expositio in 
Proverbia 106.23 cf. Capita gnositica 2.69. 
57 Evagrius, Scholia in Proverbia 101 (SC 340: 200), 163 (Prov. 17.17; SC 340:260), 169 
(Prov. 17.25; SC 340: 264), 210 (Prov. 20.9; SC 240: 306); Expositio in Proverbia Salomonis in 
Constantin von Tischendorf, Notitia editionis codicis bibliorum Sinaitici auspiciis Imperatoris 
Alexandri II. susceptae: accedit catalogus codicum nuper ex oriente Petropolin perlatorum : item 
Origenis Scholia in Proverbia Salomonis : partim nunc primum partim secundum atque 
emendatius edita (Lipsiae: F.A. Brokhaus, 1860), 88.17-18, 96.17, 101.21. In order to 
consistently cite Tischendorf’s edition I give first the page number and then the line(s). There is 
another set of uses that are suggestive and observable in the numerous wordplays on the 
Ephesian’s phrase “sword of the Spirit which is the word of God”. However, Evagrius often has 
scripture in mind rather than the God the Word as he will at times use ῥῆμα instead of λόγος, 
see Scholia in Proverbia 9 (Prov. 1.13; SC 340: 100); 275 (Prov. 24.22: SC 340: 370); Expositio in 
Proverbia Salomonis (Tischendorf, Notitia editionis, 78.2, 110.1).  
58 Evagrius, Expositio orationis dominicae; P. de Lagarde, Catenae in Euangelica 
Aegypticae (Göttingen: Hoyer, 1886), 13.  
59 Evagrius and Gregory of Nyssa base their interpretation on a textual variant that 
eventually did not make up the main text of the prayer in current critical editions of the New 
Testament. Gregory, Evagrius and Maximus use this references as an opportunity to make the 
prayer more explicitly Trinitarian. The relation between the kingdom of God and the Holy Spirit 
is not without precedent elsewhere in the New Testament (cf. Romans 14.17).    
60 Evagrius, Expositio orationis dominicae (de Lagarde, Catenae, 13).  
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prayer (ὁ διδούς εὐχὴν).61 In this instance, there are two lines of the prayer, 
“hallowed be your name” and “your kingdom come” which he states are the 
Holy Spirit and the only-begotten Son. He then comments that the Father 
desires to be worshipped in spirit and in truth implying the Spirit and the Son. 
In the next few lines, he ties theology with prayer and then adds that the Holy 
Spirit visits those who pray and, if he finds them praying to him in love for truth, 
he will take away all images and representations and urge them on to a love for 
spiritual prayer.  
In this state of pure prayer, Evagrius warns of the temptation of 
“localizing” God and having notions of God as an object that leads to potential 
vainglory. Divinity is “without quantity and without form”. Even though the 
passions are no longer an issue, demons can beset the mind and tempt it into 
thinking that its own manifestations of the divine are God himself.  It should be 
noted that the only place where Evagrius uses the names of the persons of the 
Trinity in De oratione is at the very end of his section on demons, which directly 
precedes the section on true prayer. Elsewhere he simply refers to “God” or the 
“Lord”. This suggests that Evagrius goes beyond just asserting that the ultimate 
part of spiritual ascent is simply God but God as Trinity. Prayer is not only an 
address to God but a purgative and unifying process where one experiences God 
as Trinity. 
This understanding of Evagrius’ asceticism and its relationship to the 
Trinity is confirmed by a study done by Gabriel Bunge on several key terms that 
appear in Evagrius’ Capita gnostica and Epistula fidei.62 In the 1989 study, Bunge 
investigated the use of the terms ἑνας και μονάς and μονάς in the Ep. fid. and 
noted the discrepancy between the Greek manuscripts and the Syriac 
translation. Bunge concluded that the reordering of the Syriac terms used for 
ἑνας και μονάς, where the Greek is consistent throughout, is an unintentional 
scribal error.63 This is confirmed when he compares the Greek fragments of Cap. 
                                                 
  61 Evagrius, De oratione 58 (PG 79.1180). In a similar statement in Tractatus ad Eulogius 
28.30, Evagrius gives the same advice alluding to Romans 8.26.  
62 Gabriel Bunge, “Hénade ou Monade? Au Sujet de Deux Notions Centrales de la 
Terminologie Évagrienne,” Le Muséon 102.1 (1989), 69-91.   
63 Bunge, “Hénade ou Monade?”, 74. 
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gnost. with its two major Syriac translations: S1 and S2. By comparing a variety 
of Greek witnesses, Bunge furthermore came to the conclusion that S1 replaces 
Evagrius’ genuine terminology. The result is that the new terminology collapses 
several distinct ideas associated with the Greek terms into one idea – a méprise 
fatale – that ultimately results in “shocking” Christological conclusions and “un 
sens intolérablement panthéiste,” where the mind becomes one with the very 
substance of divinity.64 Bunge suggests that the S1 could represent an Isochrist 
reading of Evagrius and is similar in flavor to translations of Mar Babai.  
More important for my study here is that Bunge goes on in the article to 
attempt a preliminary set of meanings for Evagrius’ use of the Greek phrase 
ἑνας και μονάς and μονάς by itself. By comparing the use of the ἑνας και μονάς 
in Ep. fid. and Cap. gnost., now properly out from under the problems posed by 
the inconsistent Syriac of S1, Bunge finds the phrase is a kind of synonym for the 
Holy Trinity, one term accenting the absolute unity of the divine essence while 
the other implies the persons of the Trinity.65  Μονάς by itself, however, is found 
in the discussion of three specific themes. An important theme is that of unity 
with the Trinity or as Bunge terms it “un état d’être”. Therefore, despite being 
distinct from the phrase ἑνας και μονάς, the term μονάς by itself is related since 
ἑνας και μονάς signifies God as Trinity whose unity draws together his 
creatures.66  His is example is from Ep. fid. 7.54-56 where Evagrius states, “For, 
since God is one, he unifies all having come to be in each and number is lost in 
the sojourn of the monad.”67 This passage is preceded by a quotation of John 
17.21 where Jesus prays that his followers be one in himself and the Father 
even as he and the Father are one. Earlier in the letter, Evagrius discusses in 
detail how exactly God is one suggesting that his unity is non-numerical, since 
number is assigned to material and circumscribed natures.68 It would seem, 
based on these texts, that Evagrius is stating God’s sojourn (ἐπιδημία) produces 
                                                 
64 Bunge, “Hénade ou Monade?”, 78-80. 
65 Cf. Evagrius, Ep. fid. §3.19-31 (Le lettere I: 90.19-92.31). 
66 Bunge, “Hénade ou Monade?”, 81-82. 
67 Evagrius, Ep. fid. §7.54-56 (Le lettere I: 102.54-56). 
68 Evagrius, Ep. fid. §2.17-46 (Le lettere I: 88.17-90.46). 
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a unity in or with ascetics that is akin to his own non-numerical unity and by 
implication immaterial. 
 Yet, it is important to put this in the context of the letter. Evagrius, 
throughout the letter, is defending the consubstantiality of the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit and does so by asserting an identity of essence (§2.1-21). The place 
where this quote is found is in the context of a set of sayings by Jesus, which 
Evagrius tells us have been used as evidence of the subordination of the Son 
(§4-9). Evagrius’ response to these Scriptural texts gives a revealing look into 
his understanding of Christ and one that fits well with the Cap. gnost. as does his 
use of the Greek terms Bunge investigated.69 Like the Cap. gnost., there are 
statements that initially look very problematic and for similar stylistic and 
theological reasons. Evagrius is concerned to highlight the difference between 
the Word and the material existence that he indwells.70 However, in the letter it 
is clear that this is an advantage to humanity since they must find a means to get 
to immaterial knowledge. It means that Christ, who is the Son and who “for our 
sakes” took on material existence, can, through his indwelling, resurrect the 
mind toward immaterial contemplation and direct it to recognize the Word’s 
status as part of the ἑνας και μονάς or, as he states elsewhere, part of the 
Trinity.71 Like the Cap. gnost., this strained way of speaking certainly could and 
probably did appear to later readers as threatening a single-subject 
understanding of Christ. Taken together with the areas discussed above about 
the Holy Spirit, Evagrius’ defense of both the Son and Spirit as ὁμοούσια with 
the Father deeply affects his description of their role in ascent. As Bunge states 
“On n’aura donc pas tort d’appeler la spiritualité d’Évagre une mystique 
radicalement trinitaire.”72 
§2.3 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite 
Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite has long been seen as a significant source 
for Maximus, but surprisingly few full length studies have been done to show 
                                                 
69 Bunge, “Hénade ou Monade?”, 82-83. 
70 Evagrius, Ep. fid. §4.14-15 (Le lettere I: 94.14-15). 
71 Evagrius, Ep. fid. §4.16-23; 7 (Le lettere I: 94.16-23; 98.1-102.64). 
72 Bunge, “Hénade ou Monade?”, 83. 
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exactly how Maximus has appropriated his thought. Some notable exceptions in 
English and French scholarship arose in an early debate around how Maximus 
appropriated Ps.-Dionysius’ concept of ἔκστασις and whether this concept was 
compatible with Evagrius’ concept of ἐκδημία.73 Sherwood concluded this 
debate affirming that Maximus had drawn from both but not uncritically. In 
addition, he agreed with von Balthasar that these two ideas could be 
complementary. According to Sherwood, Maximus chose to use Ps.-Dionysius’ 
concept of the good and the “going out” of the soul toward God but not in the 
“full Dionysian sense of an irrational, supra-rational estrangement of the mind 
in the divine darkness,” but rather an “outgoing of the volitive power, which 
effects the final gnomic harmony of unity and love.”74  Likewise, much has been 
made about the relationship between the Areopagite’s and Maximus’ 
conceptions of the limitations of language and their consistent appeal to God’s 
transcendence. Yet, in the Liber, this language is absent. Knowledge of God in 
the Liber revolves around the perceptibility of God’s indwelling presence and 
what can be ascertained from the symbol of faith and the narrative of Scripture 
rather than on questions concerning whether or not one can know or what can 
be known about God’s essence.  
Even less has been done on the Areopagite’s Trinitarian and 
Christological thought, much scholarship choosing instead to focus on his 
language of transcendence or how Ps.-Dionysius supports or subverts current 
philosophical and theological discussions. An exception here is the role his 
infamous phase concerning Christ’s “theandric energy” played in miaphysite 
argumentation with pro-Chalcedonians in the years following the Council of 
Chalcedon. While a thorough study would be preferable, I will attempt to touch 
                                                 
73 This debate was started with Viller’s study on the relationship between Maximus and 
Evagrius and continued with Hausherr, Sherwood and von Balthasar. The end result is summed 
up in Sherwood’s affirmation of von Balthasar in St. Maximus where he states that the two 
concepts are compatible; however, Maximus does not take them over uncritically. There are also 
some notable exceptions in Andrew Louth, “The Reception of Dionysius Up to Maximus the 
Confessor,” in Re-Thinking Dionysius the Areopagite, eds. Sarah Coakley, Charles M. Stang 
(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 43-70. 
74 Sherwood, St. Maximus, 96. 
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on some of the main lineaments of his thought concerning the key areas of study 
I enumerated at the beginning of the chapter. 
 §2.3.1 Ἀπάθεια 
 Ps.-Dionysius does have much to say about the Trinity and the 
knowledge of God but rarely uses ἀπάθεια/ἀπαθῶς. The overall conception of 
ascent in Ps.-Dionysius can be viewed through the lens of liturgy and 
“hierarchy” conceived as a means to union with God and likeness of God rather 
than a series of barriers to him.75 To say that he rarely uses it, however, does 
not mean it is unimportant. In De ecclesiastica hierarchia, where the Areopagite 
expounds the liturgy and gives accompanying θεωρίαι for how the rites 
symbolize divine realities, ἀπάθεια is listed as the desired “state” (ἕξις) along 
with endurance for those who “will be at the same time, at their highest point of 
divinization, a temple and attendant of the divine Spirit.”76 Earlier in De 
ecclesiastica, it is those who are being made perfect that are “adorned with the 
human and deiform ἀπάθεια toward contraries.”77 Ps.-Dionysius, in referring to 
contraries, is echoing an earlier discussion in which he stated that those who 
wish to have communion with the One cannot live a life divided by those things 
that are contrary to it.78  
 A similar use, in an equally similar context of heightened ascent, can be 
found in both De divinis nominibus and De caelesti hierarchia.79  Perhaps the 
most striking use is found in De caelesti 2.4. In this section, Ps.-Dionysius is 
arguing that everything can assist in contemplation provided that what is 
perceived by the senses (τό αἰσθητός) is understood in a different way than 
intellectual realities (τά νοερά). As an example, he discusses how anger can 
often be perceived as the result of irrationality from passionate impulsiveness 
but when understood in relation to intellectual realities it must mean a “rational 
                                                 
75 Ps.-Dionysius, De cael. hier. 3 (CD 2:17-20). 
76 Ps.-Dionysius, De eccl. heir. 3.7 (CD 2:86). 
77 Ps.-Dionysius, De eccl. heir. 2.3.8 (CD 2:78). 
78 Ps.-Dionysius, De eccl. heir. 2.3.5 (CD 2:76).  
79 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 1.4 (CD 1:114, 115); De cael. heir. 7.1 (CD 2:28).  
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and relentless state in deiform and unchanging foundations.”80 Likewise desire 
(ἐπιθυμία), for those who are irrational, is “a thoughtlessness and materiality 
from an inborn movement or friendship with those things which change, 
uncontrollably taking place as a passionate craving and irrational predominance 
of bodily desire . . .”81 For those that are intellectual it is “a divine desire for 
immaterial things which are beyond reason and the mind; an unwavering and 
unceasing yearning for the simple and impassible contemplation (ἀπαθοῦς 
θεωρίας) of the super-essential.” 82 This is striking because it is the language of 
desire that frames ascent but nevertheless leads to impassible contemplation. 
Clearly, ἀπάθεια and the language of desire are compatible. The key, it seems, is 
for the Christian to decide towards who/what each of these things is directed 
and understanding the adjustments necessary when speaking of divine realities.  
In a similar vein, Ps.-Dionysius later suggests that the attribution of the 
senses to incorporeal realities in the Scriptures indicate something real about 
heavenly beings and the divine. The sense of sight, for example, suggests that, 
“heavenly beings have an ability of discerned upward motion and in turn have a 
gentle, pliant, non-resistant but quickly moving, pure and impassibly open 
reception of the divine lights.”83 Finally, in Ep. 9, Ps.-Dionysius refers to the 
passive element of the human soul (τὸ ἀπαθὲς τῆς ψυχῆς) and in Ep. 10 he 
refers to some who are already with God despite being in the midst of humanity 
“fitted with all impassibility, divine names, holiness and every other good 
thing.”84 All of these examples focus on ἀπάθεια as a desired goal for human 
beings. There is no explicit affirmation of God as ἀπαθῶς nor that ἀπάθεια as a 
goal should be pursued on the basis that it is an attribute of God let alone 
illustrated by the Son’s incarnate life. Nor is there an explicit connection of 
ἀπάθεια and love as we saw with Evagrius. For my study, this means I will need 
to cover love in Ps.-Dionysius in an additional section (§2.2.3).  While it is likely 
                                                 
80 Ps.-Dionysius, De cael. heir. 2.4 (CD 2:14). 
81 Ps.-Dionysius, De cael. heir. 2.4 (CD 2:14) 
82 Ps.-Dionysius, De cael. heir. 2.4 (CD 2:14).  
83 Ps.-Dionysius, De cael. heir. 15.3 (CD 2:53).  
84 Ps.-Dionysius, Ep. 9.1.2 (CD 2:198); Ep. 10 (CD 2:209).  
 100 
that Ps.-Dionysius, like Clement, may have understood these connections, he 
does not choose to make them explicit. In several instances, above, however, 
there is a clear understanding that language about emotion or aspects of 
creation indicate aspects of divine or heavenly realities and while indicating 
something real, must nevertheless be understood in a qualified manner.  
 §2.3.2 Knowledge of God – Language, Knowledge & Prayer 
One of the dominant themes in Ps.-Dionysius is his concern for language, 
specifically those names applied to God from Scripture. All of his major works 
and several of his letters are concerned to show how certain titles contained in 
Scripture or phenomena observed in creation indicate something about the 
invisible realities of God and the heavenly hosts while simultaneously 
maintaining that God is above them. To review this at length would require a 
much fuller study, however, I want to focus on several aspects of Ps.-Dionysius 
thought found mostly in De divinis nominibus but also several ideas in his De 
mystica theologia. 
 The first of these ideas has to do with how Ps.-Dionysius frames his task. 
In De divinis nominibus, he states that his main goal is to explain the divine 
names as found in Scripture. Yet before he gets started, he cites Scripture itself, 
1 Corinthians 2.4, as means of encouraging a particular way that the task be 
done,  
‘not in the persuasive words of human wisdom but in a demonstration,’ 
from Spirit-moved theologians (τῆς πνευματοκινήτου τῶν θεολόγων), 
‘of power’ by which we are united, unutterably and unknowably, with 
things unutterable and unknowable by a union far superior to our 
rational and intellectual power and activity.85 
Here, as both Rorem and Louth point out, “theologians” are the Scriptural 
authors themselves.86 Similarly, “divine words” often means the words of 
Scripture themselves. Later, he will make a similar call in which he invokes 
                                                 
85 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 1.1 (CD 1:108.1-5) 
86  Paul Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to 
Their Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 7 and Andrew Louth, Denys the 
Areopagite, Outstanding Christian Thinkers (Continuum: London, 1989), 26. 
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prayer to the Trinity as the source of good (ἡ ἀγαθαρχική) and beyond good (ἡ 
ὑπεράγαθος). This is seen as a necessary step when drawing near to God and 
when being initiated into his good gifts. He explains that even though the Trinity 
is transcendent and present everywhere, not everyone is present to it. The 
initiated are present to the Trinity when they “invoke it in all-holy prayers, with 
an untroubled mind and with a suitability (ἐπιτηδειότης) for divine union.”87 He 
subsequently qualifies the idea of location since the Trinity is “beyond all things 
and is infinitely able to contain all things.”88 Ps.-Dionysius proceeds to explain 
how prayer actually draws the initiated toward God rather than bringing God 
toward them using the example of someone climbing a rope or a boat being 
pulled toward the rock to which it is anchored. He concludes, 
Therefore it is necessary to lead, before everything and certainly before 
theology (θεολογία), with prayer, not for the purpose of pulling [toward 
us] that power which is present everywhere and nowhere, but so that 
with divine memorials and invocations we entrust ourselves to him and 
are united with him.89 
The Areopagite shows in these two texts, first of all, a concern to 
understand the source of and proper approach to the task of theology. It is 
sourced in Scripture since no one would dare speak of the transcendent one 
with their own words, but behind that lay God himself who through Scripture 
and his good gifts allows union with himself. Secondly, theology is a multi-
layered concept. On one level, a “theologian” is not only a scriptural writer but 
also those who reflect on Scripture. Likewise, theology is not only what is 
contained in Scripture but reflection upon Scripture. In this sense, it is a means 
toward union with God and finally must give way to silence or praise. On 
another level, theology is also the encounter of the theologian with God himself 
                                                 
87 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 3.1 (CD 1: 138.8-9). Cf. Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 9.4 (CD 
1:210.18) where the same root term is used in relation to “participation” (μετέχειν) and 9.10 
(CD 1:214.4). 
88 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. (CD 1: 138.11-12). 
89 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 3.1 (CD 1:139.13-16). 
 102 
through Scripture and is itself portrayed as union with God. The proper context 
of theology is prayer, especially with an untroubled mind.  
The language observed in Evagrius’ writings concerning γνῶσις as the 
end goal is replaced by union in Ps.-Dionysius. However, before too much is 
made of this, it should be noted that Evagrius conceives of γνῶσις as having 
essential knowledge indwelling the human mind. However, the fact that Evagrius 
identifies essential knowledge with Christ and the Trinity suggests he sees 
ascent as a union of God and the mind. The extent of this union can continue to 
be debated without discarding this feature of his thought. Ps.-Dionysius and 
Evagrius then see the end goal as union with God. Both authors also see the role 
of prayer and the activity of the Spirit as important features to Christian life, 
particularly as it relates to theology. The Areopagite chooses a grammar whose 
main way of speaking is found in the language of desire, love and union while 
Evagrius chooses a grammar that is more fluent in the language of γνῶσις. For 
Evagrius true γνῶσις is union with God found in theology as a heightened 
movement within prayer. Part of the process of prayer and theology is an 
unknowing in order to know. For Evagrius, this means imageless prayer so that 
one’s own thoughts of God are not mistaken for God himself. As was seen in 
Capita gnostica, this is mixed with assertions that God’s οὐσία is unknowable. 
Ps.-Dionysius sees three movements within theology. The first movement is 
affirmation, which recognize the symbolic role that Scripture and creation play 
in telling us about God. The second movement is negation, which recognizes the 
uniqueness of God in relation to creation and, therefore, the need to deny 
exactly those things which symbolize him. The final movement is the denial of 
negations which is variously portrayed as silence, a belonging to that which is 
beyond everything or praise but which invariably means escaping the confines 
of thought so that one “knows beyond the mind by knowing nothing.”90 If his 
thought is synthesized from both De mystica theologia and De divini nominibus, 
then this third movement is union with God. The stark contrast between 
Evagrius and Ps.-Dionysius is exactly over the use of the words γνῶσις/ἄγνοια. 
Evagrius uses a union-oriented meaning of knowledge in which ignorance or 
                                                 
90 Ps.-Dionysius, De myst. theol. 1.2 (CD 2: 141-145). 
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unknowing is portrayed as something negative except in stripping oneself from 
images in prayer. The Areopagite, on the other hand, uses several senses of 
knowing/knowledge and ignorance/unknowing to describe both negative and 
positive aspects of ascent. While the Areopagite chooses to remain in the realm 
of desire, love and union he is not beyond a certain awareness that union of 
knower and known or ignorant and unknowable is a superior kind of 
knowledge than simply knowing about a thing. 
 §2.3.3 Love & the Language of Desire 
 Another significant theme in Ps.-Dionysius is his concern to extend the 
language of desire to the divine. In fact, Ps.-Dionysius in several places sees the 
need to address how such provocative language can be applied to the divine and 
his discussion in De divinis nominibus enters into one of his most prolonged 
arguments for how to interpret scriptural language, eventually even prompting 
a discussion of theodicy.91 Ἔρως and ἀγάπη are discussed and in so doing we 
get a sense of how he understands their relationship with knowledge of God. 
Firstly, from the side of creation, Ps.-Dionysius understands these to be natural 
aspects of human existence that are meant to drive the soul toward divine 
things terminating in God himself. Thus, while these can be (mis)applied toward 
created things, they are meant to be a unifying impulse toward God. From the 
side of God, one of his celebrated attributes is his love for humankind, his 
φιλανθρωπία, displayed most clearly in the incarnation.92 Love and desire are 
placed alongside the term Ps.-Dionysius states is preeminent for God; τὸ 
ἀγαθόν/τἀγαθόν.93 Specifically in the section discussing love and desire, Ps.-
Dionysius consistently uses the phrase τὸ κάλον καί τὸ ἀγαθόν.94 Another key 
argument to this section though is the affirmation of God as Source and Cause 
such that anything that can be said to be or have life must be sourced or caused 
by God. He is the source of every source (1.3). In relation to love, this is also the 
case. God is the source of love but he is also the object of love and ultimately the 
                                                 
91 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 4.10-35 (CD 1:154-180). 
92 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 1.4 (CD 1: 113). 
93Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 4.1 (CD 1: 155.8-162.5). 
94 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 4.10-17 (CD 1: 155.8-162.5).   
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means by which all longing for what is loving, beautiful and good are fulfilled 
(4.12-17). Ps.-Dionysius, in one of several attempts to anticipate his critics, then 
delves into why evil exists if in fact God is  the source, object and means of love, 
beauty, and goodness (4.18- 35). By comparison, Maximus’ understanding of 
God’s love through the incarnation, his φιλανθρωπία, is not in and of itself 
unique and even his description of the incarnate Son as “by nature good” is not 
necessarily striking. 
 §2.3.4 Trinity in Christian Life 
 In De divini nominibus, Ps.-Dionysius demonstrates how the names or 
titles given to God are understood in relation to his divinity. There are several 
aspects to this argument some of which I have already touched on above, but I 
want to focus specifically on how this affects his Trinitarian thought. Firstly, Ps.-
Dionysius has an extended argument where he deals with the classical problem 
of the relation between the whole and its parts or the one and the many. Ps.-
Dionysius states that elsewhere he has argued that there are some titles given to 
God in the Scriptures that are to be understood as applying to the entire 
divinity, but there are others that express distinctions such as Father, Son, and 
Spirit. Ps.-Dionysius labors to explain that this means whatever is true of the 
entire divinity must be participated in by each of its parts.95 As evidence of this 
argument, he draws attention to the common activities and titles of the divine 
persons and ends the scriptural portion of his argument with Jesus own words 
from John 16.15 and 17.10.96 In another section, he states that he had discussed 
the divine unions and differentiations found in Scripture in his Theological 
Representations and goes on to say that even those things revealed in Scripture 
only grant a share of what the divine is – “[t]heir actual nature, what they are 
ultimately in their source and ground, is beyond all intellect and all being and all 
knowledge.”97 Yet Scripture states that “The Father is the originating source of 
the Godhead and that the Son and the Spirit are, so to speak, divine offshoots, 
                                                 
95 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 2.1-3 (CD 1:122.1-126.2).  
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the flowering and transcendent lights of divinity. But we can neither say nor 
understand how this could be so.”98 As if to drive this home, he states toward 
the end of the treatise, 
And the fact that the transcendent Godhead is one and triune must not be 
understood in any of our typical senses. No. There is the transcendent 
unity of God and the fruitfulness of God, and as we prepare to sing this 
truth we use the names Trinity and Unity for that which is in fact beyond 
every name, calling it the transcendent being above every being. But no 
unity or trinity, no number or oneness, no fruitfulness, indeed nothing 
that is or is known can proclaim that hiddenness beyond every mind and 
reason of the transcendent Godhead which transcends every being.99 
Despite this presentation, there are places in Ps.-Dionysius’ portrayal 
that leave the impression that there is a oneness that is above the threeness 
which is the true object of ascent. One such section is found in 1.4 where he 
states, 
And so all these scriptural utterances celebrate the supreme Deity by 
describing it as a monad or henad, because of its supernatural simplicity 
and indivisible unity, by which unifying power we are led to unity. We, in 
the diversity of what we are, are drawn together by it and led into a 
godlike oneness, into a unity reflecting God.100 
However, this is followed by an assertion that the Scriptures also describe God 
as Trinity “for with transcendent fecundity it is manifested as ‘three 
persons.’”101 In fact, it is not only the unity of God that is a source but so also the 
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persons impart “fatherhood”, “sonship” and “perfection”.102 In this last instance, 
Ps.-Dionysius gives his standard caveat stating, 
In reality there is no exact likeness between caused and cause, for the 
caused carry within themselves only such images of their originating 
sources as are possible for them, whereas the causes themselves are 
located in a realm transcending the caused . . .103 
These examples show how the activities of God either seen through his 
oneness or threeness serve as cause of particular things within the created 
realm, which are nevertheless not exactly the same as God. This discussion 
bears some likeness to areas in Evagrius where he highlights the oneness of 
God, as seen in Jesus prayer, as the basis for the unity for all. For both Evagrius 
and Ps.-Dionysius “henad and monad” indicate the Trinity. For Ps.-Dionysius, all 
of creation is sourced and caused by God even unity and multiplicity because 
this is found in God himself. However, this also creates potential problems for 
him and prompts him to give a detailed account for evil.  
 In the Liber, Maximus does not go beyond establishing the 
consubstantiality of the persons and giving an illustration of divine 
appropriation through his description of the activities of the Son and Spirit in 
the Christian life, the life of the incarnate Son and Trinitarian prayer. The issue 
of the relation between oneness and threeness of God is not in view, nor is there 
concern to address language and attribution in light of God’s transcendence. 
Additionally, the role of divine simplicity as a unifying power in ascent is also 
not within Maximus’ purview although it could be argued Maximus assumes it. 
Regardless, these issues will eventually become part of his understanding of 
ascent.  
 §2.4 Macarian Connections 
 Due to the exigencies of providing a background for Maximus within this 
investigation, it was necessary to delineate a limited set of  authors otherwise 
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one could credibly review a long series of authors all the way back to the New 
Testament period or even further following an extensive chain of ideas, terms 
and concepts. Since my goal has been to investigate Maximus’ Trinitarian 
thought, my selection of authors for this chapter was based on those who were 
often identified as significant within Maximus’ ascetic context and touch on 
some aspect of Trinitarian thinking. Initially, I choose to limit this as far back as 
Evagrius, interacting with earlier authors on an as needed basis, but upon more 
sober counsel, I found it necessary to include a brief exposé on another author 
that looms in the background of Maximus’ broad ascetic context and who in 
many areas gave language to and initially framed longstanding ascetic concerns 
– Ps.-Macarius or Macarius-Symeon. The challenge of discussing Ps.-Macarius in 
relation to Maximus lies in several areas, not least of which is the complex 
manuscript tradition of the Macarian writings themselves and the obscure 
details of the author, especially in relation Messalianism.104 Fortunately, a series 
of careful studies explore not only these aspects but more importantly the 
impact of the author on subsequent ascetics. 105 As I stated in the introduction, 
my goal in reviewing various ancient authors is not to establish influence, but 
rather to locate Maximus’ baseline grammar for the Christian life as portrayed 
in the Liber asceticus within its ascetic context in three areas: 1) love and 
ἀπάθεια, 2) knowledge of God and 3) activity of the divine persons in the 
Christian life. In light of the work already done in the above cited studies and 
rather than attempt to surpass this earlier scholarship, my tactic in this brief 
section is to lean heavily on the work of Plested to give a synthetic presentation 
of the three areas listed above and then to assimilate aspects of Plested’s study 
in later sections and chapters. For fuller treatment of Ps.-Macarius, his 
                                                 
 104 On the manuscript tradition see Hermann Dörries, Symeon von Mesopotamien. Die 
Überlieferung der Messalianischen "Makarios"-Schriften, Texte und Untersuchungen zur 
Geschichte der altchristlichen 55 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1941). 
 105 These studies are Marcus Plested, The Macarian Legacy: The Place of Macarius in the 
Eastern Christian Tradition, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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connection with Messalianism and the broad reach of the Macarian writings, I 
point the reader to more thorough studies done by Plested, Fitschen, and 
Stewart. 
 In 2004, Marcus Plested published his 1999 doctoral thesis originally 
titled The Place of Macarian Writings in the Eastern Christian Tradition to AD 
700. The new title The Macarian Legacy: The Place of Macarius-Symeon in the 
Eastern Christian Tradition captures even further the careful handling required 
to describe the relationship between Ps.-Macarius and later authors. The study 
was conducted in two-parts. The first part, spanning chapters 1-4 investigated 
the background of the Macarian writings, including their historical context, their 
themes and concepts, their relation to the Cappadocians, especially Basil and 
Gregory of Nyssa and tackles the often-made dichotomy between Macarian and 
Evagrian spiritualties. The second part contained chapters 5-8 and analyzed 
four more sets of writings in order to establish how the Macarian legacy has 
influenced, both directly and indirectly, their various visions of ascetic 
spirituality, especially in areas related to the Messalian controversy. The 
authors of these writings were Mark the Monk, Diadochus of Photikē, Abba 
Isaiah and Maximus the Confessor. Plested delineated areas of influence when 
clear evidence was available but focused on how significant themes and 
concepts were later sustained within ascetic traditions. In relation to Maximus, 
he highlighted eleven areas which demonstrate either direct or indirect 
connections with Ps.-Macarius.106 
                                                 
 106 In Chapter 8 entitled, “Maximus the Confessor,” (213-254) these areas are 1) 
Transfiguration, 2) The Incarnation of the Logos, 3) The Depiction of the Imago Dei, 4) Baptism, 
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the phrase “earth of the heart” in Op. 17 and Maximus’ conception of the knowledge of God as 
πεῖρα. Likely because of the introductory nature of the piece, Louth does not provide specific 
evidence from Ps.-Macarius. Instead, he points the reader to the index fontium of the CCSG and 
Miquel Pierre’s ““Πεῖρα: Contribution à l’étude du vocabulaire de l’expérience religieuse dans 
l’oeuvre de Maxime le Confesseur.”  As Plested notes, this claim was criticized by Thunberg who 
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 §2.4.1 Love & Ἀπάθεια 
 In relation to the theme of love and ἀπάθεια, Plested notes that Ps.-
Macarius, much like Evagrius, has a negative evaluation of the passions.107 Ps.-
Macarius denies that they are integral to humanity’s original creation and 
describes them as “alien” or “counter-natural”, a theme shared by Maximus and 
Gregory of Nyssa.108 Additionally, ἀπάθεια is liable to the neglect and 
carelessness of the individual which strikes at any conception that it is an 
unassailable state – a Messalian theme.109 A common understanding within the 
Macarian corpus is that Christ serves as an example for ascetic imitation 
especially in the context of enduring suffering. More specifically, there is 
evidence that Christ and the Spirit as ἀπαθής are justification for the ascetic to 
endure suffering and remain undistracted by pain or pleasure.110  
 §2.4.2 Knowledge of God 
                                                 
cited an overall lack of evidence for Macarian influence and suggested that the Macarian phrase 
may be “isolated” in Maximus works and “commonplace” within patristic tradition. Plested’s 
study fills the lacuna of evidence left by Louth and directly addresses Thunberg’s criticism 
showing that the contested phrase is not commonplace in patristic tradition and is also not an 
isolated instance in Maximus but rather is one of the strongest evidences of direct input (239-
241). 
 107 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 250, 251. This is also shared with Mark the Monk and 
Diadochus. See Plested, Macarian Legacy, 251 and below. 
 108 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 250, 251 (cf. Maxmus, Disput. Pyh. 309B-312A). In this 
section, Plested notes Maximus’ broader understanding of the passions as movement that can be 
both against nature and useful to the spiritual life citing Cap, Car. 2.16, Amb. 7 and Qua. Thal. 1. 
In one example, Plested notes Maximus’ phrase “blameless passion of holy love” in Cap. Car. 3.67 
(cf. also 236). See also a similar phrase in Cap. Car. 3.70 (Cap. sulla Car., 176) where Maximus 
contrasts a “blameworthy passion of love” (Πάθος ἀγάπης ψεκτὸν) with a “praiseworthy 
passion of love” (πάθος ἀγάπης ἐπαινετὸν). In both instances of this positive valuation, the 
passion of love binds the mind to divine things. Plested also suggests that Maximus’ positive 
evaluation has earlier representation in Ps.-Dionysius and Abba Isaiah. 
 109 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 24. There are several lists of propositions from Timothy of 
Constantinople and John of Damascus that are often cited as of key importance. On these lists, 
see Fistchen, Messalianismus und Antimesslaianismus, 69-86 and also the helpful correlation, 
synopsis and analysis of the lists in Stewart, ‘Working the Earth of the Heart, 241-281. 
 110 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 36-38. In one of his homilies, Ps.-Macarius makes a 
connection between the Savior as ἀπαθής and the ἀπάθεια of the worthy. See Collection 1, Logos 
40.1.1-2 in Heinz Berthold, Makarios/Symeon, Reden und Briefe, Die Sammlung I des Vaticanus 
Graecus 694 (B), 2 Vols., Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte 
55, 56 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973). See also a similar reference in 40.1.14 to the Spirit. 
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 In the area of knowledge of God, Ps.-Macarius’ writings bring into sharp 
focus the problems with overgeneralizing and dichotomizing the Evagrian and 
Macarian conceptions of spirituality. Ps.-Macarius describes the central aspect 
of humanity as the heart and yet understands this to include the νοῦς which 
governs the whole person. 111 As a consequence of the Fall of Adam, the ascetic 
task is to purify oneself so as to become worthy of being fully indwelt by the 
Holy Spirit and Christ. Beginning with baptism and moving toward spiritual 
struggle as a result of the coexistence of sin and grace, this purification is 
achieved by the activity of the Holy Spirit and the soul working in tandem to 
participate in the suffering and glory of Christ.112  The intellect is meant to be 
purified so that through prayer it may experience the light of Christ, harkening 
back to the Taboric light of the Transfiguration. This purification and 
cooperation take place in both individual and corporate contexts through 
prayer and liturgical acts such as the Eucharist.113 For Ps.-Macarius, there is not 
a complex and staged portrayal of contemplation in the same way as Evagrius 
and thus the tenor of knowledge of God is expressed in highly experiential 
terms and focuses on participating in and manifesting the presence of God.114  
 §2.4.2 Activity of the Divine Persons 
 The activity of the divine persons in Ps.-Macarius can be seen in the way 
both the Son and Spirit grace the ascetic life and dwell within the worthy to 
imitate and manifest Christ.115 This is the purpose of the incarnation and is a 
key part of what Plested considers to be Ps.-Macarius “Trinitarian dynamic of 
salvation.”116 Within Ps.-Macarius’ language of indwelling, there is mutuality; 
God gives himself to dwell in humanity, but humanity finds it purpose and focus 
                                                 
 111 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 32-35. 
 112 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 35-38, 42, 43.  
 113 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 38-42. Compare also Plested’s discussion of Maximus and 
Ps.-Macarius on the Transfiguration, 218-223. 
 114 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 44, 45. 
 115 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 44-45.  
 116  Plested, Macarian Legacy, 42-45. 
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in God.117 Yet there is a clear distinction between creation and creator bridged 
by God’s love.118  In the context of the fourth century, affirming the divinity of 
the Spirit, the incomprehensibility of God and the place of both negative and 
positive theology all find a place in the Macarian vision and provide important 
connections to the Cappadocians especially Basil and Gregory of Nyssa.119 The 
Spirit and the Son are both spoken of as indwelling and acting on the ascetic yet 
there seems to be no conscious effort to explain how both can be said to indwell 
the human person which may have contributed to the rise of some of the 
questions I will review in Mark the Monk. Grace and the Spirit mutually imply 
one another – a connection also seen in Diadochus.  
 In several ways then, Ps.-Macarius writings give us a ground level look as 
issues that will consistently be discussed by ascetic communities. Within the 
struggle to understand and describe the dynamics of grace and sin, the activity 
and presence of God within ascetic life became a significant topic and, at least 
initially, drove much of the reflection on how God purifies his people so that he 
can dissipate the effects of the Fall and make space to fully indwell his people. 
This nexus of ideas continued to be a source of reflection for Mark the Monk, 
Diadochus and Maximus to whom I now turn 
§2.5 Diadochus of Photikē 
Over the last 50 years, numerous authors have noted similarities 
between the Bishop of Photikē (c. 400-487 CE) and Maximus, but only a few 
have endeavored to give a substantial account of his influence. Edouard des 
Places in his introduction to the critical edition of Diadochus in 1966 mentions 
similarities but then only cites some observations made by von Balthasar. Then 
in 1980, he compiled all the disparate references to similarities between 
Maximus and Diadochus up to that point but did not necessarily argue for their 
                                                 
 117 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 31. 
 118 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 31. 
 119 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 50-57. There is a long standing debate about the 
relationship between Ps.-Macarius Epistula magna and Gregory of Nyssa’s De instituto 
Chrisitano which Plested interweaves into his discussion (see 49ff.)   
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influence on Maximus.120 Another short study was done by Nicholas Madden in 
1989 looking specifically at the pair’s understanding of αἴσθησις νοερά.121 Since 
the late 1980s, several other scholars have noted similarities between the two 
authors but not necessarily devoted space to a detailed discussion.122 As I have 
shown in other authors up to this point, these themes are present but at times 
not explicit or not explicitly related to one another. In Diadochus, we come 
closer to a linkage between ἀπάθεια and love, knowledge of God and the Trinity 
within Christian life. As a result, rather than have separate sections for each of 
the areas I listed in the introduction I will treat them within one section. 
In the writings attributed to Diadochus, there are only ten instances of 
ἀπάθεια in its various forms. His very first definition in Capita centum de 
perfection spirituali states that faith is “an impassible reflection concerning 
God.”123 In the same set of definitions, knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) is “to be unaware 
of oneself in being amazed at God” while love is defined as “growth in 
affectionate regard toward those who insult us.”124 This definition of knowledge 
is notable because it draws together several aspects of Diadochus conception of 
ascetic life. The first aspect is being “unaware,” literally, to be “ignorant of” or 
“ignoring” (ἀγνοεῖν) oneself. The second aspect is being captivated by God. The 
                                                 
120 Edouard des Places, “Maxime le Confesseur et Diadoque de Photicé” in Maximus 
Confessor, Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980, eds. Felix 
Heinzer & Christoph Schönborn, Paradoxis 27 (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1982), 29-35. 
 121 Nicholas Madden, “Aisthesis neora (Diadochus-Maximus),” SP 23 (1989): 53-60. 
122 See for example, Andrew Louth’s entry for Maximus the Confessor in Patrology: The 
Eastern Fathers from the Council of Chalcedon (451) to John of Damascus (†750), eds. Angelo Di 
Berardino, Institutum Patrisiticum Augustinianum (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2006), 149 
and his Maximus the Confessor, The Early Christian Fathers (London: Routledge, 1996), 25, 26, 
35.  
123 Diadochus, Capita centum, proem.1 (BBTT 8:12). Des Places original 1943 critical 
edition, SC 5, was reprinted in 1966 with revisions and additions and then again in 1997 with 
additional correction and is still helpful for the Visio and Oratione. Despite some doubt 
expressed about authorship, these works continue to be attributed to Diadochus. For the critical 
edition of his Capita see One Hundred Practical Texts of Perception and Spiritual Discernment 
from Diadochos of Photike, ed. Janet Elaine Rutherford with translation and commentary, Belfast 
Byzantine Texts and Translations 8 (Belfast: Belfast Byzantine Enterprises, Institute of 
Byzantine Studies, the Queen's University of Belfast, 2000).  
124  Diadochus, Capita centum, proem.1. Ermatinger is probably right to translate ἔννοια 
as “consideration” in Following the Footsteps of the Invisible: The Complete Works of Diadochus of 
Photikē, transl. Cliff Ermatinger, Cistercian Studies 239 (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2010), 67. 
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verb ἐξίστημι is notable because it serves to underline the ignorance of self and 
the focus on God; the phrase could just as easily be translated ‘in departing for 
God’. Knowledge in this sense is an unknowing of created things in order to 
know God. This departing for God is described with very vibrant language 
exploiting the various terms for love, friendship and affection (ἀγάπη, φίλος, 
φίλια) and desire (θέρμη, ἐπιθυμία, σφοδρός, ἔρως, πάθος).125 This dual 
concern is reinforced by Diadochus’ reading of John 3.30 (he must be exalted, 
but we must be diminished), which contrasts the one who has affection for one’s 
self and one’s own glory with the one who has affection for and love of God and 
his glory. This humility results in being made a friend to God (οἰκειωθῶμεν). His 
first capitulum capsulizes this sentiment, stating that faith, hope and above all 
love are to guide θεωρία. Faith and hope “thoroughly teaches [us] to look down 
upon the good things which are visible” and “love along with these joins 
together the soul with the virtues of God by tracking the unseen with 
intellectual perception.”126 
The Messalian background is important for understanding Diadochus’ 
writings and seemed to revolve around, among other things, what exactly it is 
baptism accomplishes particularly in light of post-baptismal sin.127  From 
Diadochus’ writing, we are informed that one solution proffered for the struggle 
within Christian life was that in the baptized both Satan and the Holy Spirit 
warred for possession of the soul. Diadochus goes to great lengths to argue that 
this is an untenable account maintaining that the Holy Spirit entirely displaces 
evil from the soul and chases it off to realm of the body.128 As a result, any 
internal struggle is an issue of the will, not an issue of competition between the 
                                                 
125 Diadochus, Capita centum, 13, 14 (BBTT 8:22, 24). 
126 Diadochus, Capita centum, 1 (BBTT 8:14). 
127 The best study on Messalianism in English is still Columba Stewart, ‘Working the 
Earth of the Heart’but see the more recent and thorough investigation of Klaus Fitschen, 
Messalianismus und Antimessalianismus. Ein Beispiel ostkirchlicher Ketzergeschichte, Forshungen 
zur Kirchen- und Domengeschichte 71 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998) and the 
helpful discussions in Plested’s, The Macarian Legacy. 
128 Diadochus, Capita centum, 82 (BBTT 8:112-114). Plested notes in Diadochus’ 
response a critique of Ps.-Macarius’ solution to this issue in Macarian Legacy, 150-153. 
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indwelling of both Satan and the Holy Spirit.129 The Holy Spirit takes up 
residence at baptism and at first the presence of grace is perceptible to the heart 
in relation to the redirecting of desire toward God and then as one’s freedom 
and will are given over to remembering and keeping the commandments, it 
becomes perceptible to the external senses of the heart. Finally, when all the 
virtues are bound to the baptized, “grace illumines the entirety of one’s nature 
with an even deeper perception,” (τὴν πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ βαθυτέρᾳ τινὶ αἰσθήσει 
περιαυγάζει φύσιν).130 The interaction within this process between the Spirit 
and the baptized trains the soul to discern God’s presence and yet even at the 
beginning stages when the soul cannot perceive it, grace is working.131  
Involved in this process are three distinct gifts of the Spirit: γνῶσις, 
σοφία, and θεολογία. Γνῶσις binds human beings to God through experience 
(πείρα) but does not involve speaking about things nor of the divine.132 Σοφία is 
similar but involves the additional activity of speech. Diadochus warns that 
when someone does not have true γνῶσις, they should not speak. Nor should 
they speak “when richly shown upon by the kindness of the Holy Spirit” since 
the soul is in the midst of exulting in the glory of God.133 Only after γνῶσις is 
gained from such experience in faith and through love should it be spoken of 
and only as God grants it.134 True spiritual discourse, then, is free of vainglory, 
humble and changes the entire soul into the love of God and allows the mind to 
remain in the movements of θεολογία.135 Θεολογία is also a divine gift and 
according to Diadochus, “nothing kindles and moves the heart toward [God’s] 
                                                 
129 Diadochus, Capita centum, 78, cf. also 29 (BBTT 8:104-106, 38-40). 
130 Diadochus, Capita centum, 4, 28-30, 74, 77, 85, 89 (BBTT 8:14-16, 36-40, 98-100, 
102-104, 120, 128-130).  
131 Diadochus, Capita centum, 69, 76, 77, 85 (BBTT 8:92, 100-102, 102-104, 120). 
132 Diadochus, Capita centum, 9 (BBTT 8:18): Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνῶσις πείρᾳ τὸν ἄνθρωπον 
συνάπτει τῷ θεῷ, εἰς λόγους τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ κινοῦσα. Διὸ καί τινες τῶν τὸν 
μονήρη φιλοσοφούντων βίον φωτίζονται μὲν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἐν αἰσθήσει, εἰς λόγους δὲ θείους οὐκ 
ἔρχονται.  
133 Diadochus, Capita centum, 8 (BBTT 8:18). 
134 Diadochus, Capita centum, 9 (BBTT 8:18).  
135 Diadochus, Capita centum, 7, 10, 11 (BBTT 8:16, 20). 
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love like θεολογία.”136 There is ambiguity here as to what exactly θεολογία is. Is 
it the soul’s experience of God through Scripture, through the words of the wise 
or is it a kind of mystical experience with God? In one sense, it accompanies the 
ascetic by preparing them to despise affections toward earthly life, illumining 
them with “the fire of change for which they are also made partakers of the 
ministering spirits.”137 Additionally, it appears to be a virtue, which rears the 
mind on the sayings of God (τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ) thus betrothing it to God the 
Logos for marriage.138 Θεολογία in this conception, then, is a not just discourse 
about God but rather the passionate exchange of discourse between the beloved 
soul and its lover the Word of God. Whether this exchange happens via an 
experience through Scripture or something else is not always made clear, an 
ambiguity that may be intentional. However, Diadochus does have a significant 
role for Scripture and its proper interpretation in evaluating other kinds of 
experiences. This is evinced by his concern for the proper interpretation of 
Scriptural passages that seemed to have been significant in the Messalian 
controversy.139 
For Diadochus, there is a concern for rightly discerning all spiritual 
experiences. This is developed, as stated above, through gaining true γνῶσις, 
wisdom and theology—the experience of God, which attunes the mind to 
discern good from evil. One way this plays out is when the baptized attempt to 
discern the reasons and sources of good and evil within, but it is also affects the 
evaluation of specific kinds of experience such as dreams and visions. 
Diadochus concern with the latter is illustrated clearly in the way he 
categorically warns against obeying φαντασίαι. This broad category includes 
dreams (ὄνειροι) and visions (ὁράματα), especially visible signs of God’s 
                                                 
136 Diadochus, Capita centum, 67 (BBTT 8:88). 
137 Diadochus, Capita centum, 67 (BBTT 8:88). 
138 Diadochus, Capita centum, 67 (BBTT 8:88). 
139 For example, in Capita centum 67, at the height of the process of ascent, Diadochus 
inserts the phrase “through the holy prophets” which suggest the prophetic witnesses within 
Scripture. In addition to his normal appeal to Scriptural texts, there is an important section in 
the latter part of his Capita focused on countering Messalian misunderstandings of scriptural 
passages, see Capita centum, 80, 82, 83, 84  (BBTT 8:108-110; 112-114; 116-118; 118).  
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invisible glory.140 On the other side of this issue, is also a concern to properly 
understand an apparent abandonment by God. For Diadochus, there are two 
types of abandonment (παραχώρησις). The first kind is for education 
(παιδευτική) and occurs when grace hides itself in order to spur the baptized on 
to greater devotion, discernment, and humility. Here Diadochus uses the image 
of a mother and a child. The second kind of abandonment is a turning from 
(κατὰ ἀποστροφήν), where God abandons the soul to hopelessness, 
faithlessness, anger and folly. Both are meant to turn the soul toward God.141 
From the above description, it is already evident that at each stage of 
ascent the activity and role of the Holy Spirit is prolific in Diadochus’ writings. 
This feature is likely a response to Messalian teachings and is especially the case 
in terms of baptism. Unlike Evagrius, however, the joining of the Son and the 
Spirit by the titles Word or Wisdom and their functioning together to reveal the 
Father is absent. A chain of revelation based on consubstantiality and common 
and inseparable actions is absent. The concept of one person of the Trinity 
making known another is briefly mentioned in a passage where the incarnate 
Son makes known the Father likely alluding to the Gospel of John.142 This 
discussion in Diadochus’ Visio is in the context of queries regarding John the 
Baptist’s experience of Jesus baptism. However, it is clear that the divine 
persons have specific roles. The Spirit is given the predominant role in the 
purification of the mind and senses, the molding and preserving of the ascetic 
toward the good and the illumination of the ascetic towards knowledge and 
θεολογία. The concept of indwelling is exclusively cast in reference to the Spirit 
(rather than the Spirit of Christ, Christ or the concept of adoption/sonship) as 
                                                 
140 Diadochus, Capita centum, 36-41 (BBTT 8:48-56).  
141 Diadochus, Capita centum, 85-87 (BBTT 8:120-126). Maximus deals with this in 
Capita caritate 4.96. There he identifies four kinds of abandonment (ἐγκατάλειψις): 1) a 
seeming abandonment (δοκοῦσα ἐγκατάλειψις) so that the Lord might save those who had been 
abandoned, 2) Another for trial (ἡ πρὸς δοκιμήν) as seen in the lives of Job and Joseph so that 
they become pillars of prudence (σωφροσύνη) and courage (ἀνδρεία), 3) a third for paternal 
education (ἡ πρὸς παίδευσιν πατρικήν) as seen in the life the apostle so that he might guard 
with humility the superabundant grace, and finally, 4) another corresponding to a turning away 
(κατὰ ἀποστροφήν) as provided for the “Jews” that they might repent. Maximus, like Diadochus, 
sees the purpose of abandonment as salvific “full of divine goodness and wisdom”. 
142 Diadochus, Visio 21 (SC 5 175.15-176.2).  
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Diadochus attempts to confront the Messalian view that grace/Holy Spirit can 
dwell in the heart along with evil/Satan/demons. 
Ἀπάθεια, though having a place in Diadochus conception of ascent, is not 
tied to God explicitly in a way that it provides an example of the ascetic life and 
gives way to speaking about the role of the Spirit to train the soul’s sense of 
taste.143 In Evagrius, love sprung from ἀπάθεια, yet according to Plested, he 
reserved love to the practical life and natural contemplation.144  Diadochus 
reverses the connection suggesting ἀπάθεια is the consequence of love, but 
there are also instances in which the effects of ἀπάθεια purify and transform the 
soul’s desire into mature love.145 While there are instances when Diadochus 
directly ties love of neighbor (or enemies) to love of God most of his writings in 
the Capita are spent discussing the process of the soul’s redirection of desire 
toward God and the role of grace throughout. This focus is much more prevalent 
in Diadochus than it is in Evagrius and, as we shall see, in Mark as well. As 
Plested notes, Diadochus understanding that ἀπάθεια does not rid the soul of its 
need to war against temptation and is connected with love is shared with both 
Ps.-Macarius and Evagrius.146  
§2.6 Mark the Monk 
Robert L. Wilkens and Paul Blowers, in their translation of select texts 
from Maximus, are careful not to attribute direct influence of Mark and his 
reflection on baptism on Maximus suggesting rather that Maximus own 
discussion of baptism in Ad Thalassium 6 “echoes the wisdom of this earlier 
tradition and brings to it his own fresh insights.”147 Mark, like Diadochus, 
                                                 
 143  Diadochus, Capita centum, 35, 72, 74 (BBTT 8:46, 96, 98-100). In this instance 
Diadochus attribute ἀπαθής and ineffability (ἄρρητος) to the Spirit. 
 144 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 246. 
 145 Plested also notes the reversal in Macarian Legacy, 165-166. In Capita centum, 17 
(BBTT 8:28) the crux of the soul’s transformation from desire for pleasure to perfect love is a 
journey through fear and ἀπάθεια. See also Capita centum, 89 (BBTT 8:130). 
 146 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 165-166. 
147 This influence is either by his own admission or by noted by modern scholars. 
Blowers and Wilken are careful not to attribute direct influence of Mark on Maximus. However, 
in regard to baptism, they do suggest that, in Quaestiones ad Thalassium 6, Maximus “echoes the 
wisdom of this earlier tradition and brings to it his own fresh insights,” see Cosmic Mystery, 40.  
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confronts Messalianism in his writing and thus reflects specifically on the 
presence of God in the baptized and more widely on what baptism 
accomplishes. Yet, Mark also addresses issues of how to understand the 
language of “indwelling” that is attributed to both Christ and the Spirit in a way 
that is much more explicit than Maximus. Mark values ἀπάθεια and even 
attributes it to Christ in his anti-Nestorian writings. Additionally, Mark portrays 
the ascetic life as practicing the God’s commandments and capsulized in the 
commands to love God and love neighbor. The role of the Spirit is vitally 
important in this life as is the grace he brings and the way in which the process 
of ascent is meant to make manifest the indwelling of Christ. Already, an affinity 
to Maximus’ conception of ascetic life is observable but there are still 
discernable differences. 
§2.6.1 Ἀπάθεια, Love & the Doctrine of God 
The concept of ἀπάθεια in Mark while present is not a main theme in his 
writing. Instead, Mark displays a mind that is concerned with the relationship 
between faith, grace, πρᾶξις and knowledge. Particularly in his three works De 
lege spirituali, De his qui putant se ex operibus justificari, and Consultatio 
intellectus cum sua ipsius anima, he is concerned with confronting an 
overconfidence in one’s external ascetic practices and mere knowledge as 
opposed to faith, grace and true knowledge gained through the genuine practice 
of God’s commandments.148 The ability to endure affliction is the mark of a 
genuine ascetic.149 In these ascetic writings, Mark uses ἀπάθεια only a couple of 
times. Two are found in Ex operibus justificari. The first use states that stillness 
taken together with long-suffering, humility, vigilance and self-control in prayer 
helps the ascetic attain ἀπάθεια.150 The second describes the person who has 
attained it and that its attainment does not exempt one from experiencing 
affliction either for himself or on account of his neighbor.151 He shares with Ps.-
                                                 
148 Mark, Ex operibus justificari, 6 (SC 445:132).  
149 Mark, Ex operibus justificari, 115, 125, 128, 142, 156 (SC 445:164, 166, 168, 176, 
180). 
150 Mark, Ex operibus justificari, 28 (SC 445:138).  
151 Mark, Ex operibus justificari, 123 (SC 445:166).   
 119 
Macarius and Evagrius the theme that ἀπάθεια is not permanent state but 
rather dependent on the watchfulness and actions of the individual.152 The third 
occurrence in Consultatio is a reference to the use of gold and possessions. They, 
in and of themselves, do not cause harm. Only their impassioned abuse causes 
harm. Thus, it is possible that “someone who is rich without passion (ἀπαθῶς) 
can be pleasing to God, as were holy Abraham, Job, and David.”153 While 
ἀπάθεια does not play a central role in his explanation of these concepts, it is 
clear he still expects it to be part of the process. It is also worth commenting on 
Mark’s conception of prayer as the “mother of all virtues”, the most valuable of 
which is love.154 So in his ascetic writings while love and ἀπάθεια are brought 
into proximity through prayer, Mark does not necessarily go as far as Evagrius 
to explicitly state that love is the final product of ἀπάθεια. 
 The last set of references to ἀπάθεια are found in Mark’s treatise; De 
incarnatione sive Adversus Nestorianos. In section 26 and 27, Mark argues that 
Christ took on the passions without passion (ἀπαθῶς) in order to defend 
theopaschite expressions such as God died, or God suffered.155 Using the 
example of fire and gold, he points out that if it is possible for created things to 
both suffer something and yet remain what they are, how can it be put past God 
to do the same. Mark both here and in later occurrences emphasizes that the 
attribution of these phrases to God are made of him as a human being, not in his 
divinity.156 Ἀπάθεια clearly has a role to play in Mark’s Christology and while it 
is not discussed at length it is also an expectation of the ascetic life. However, he 
does not, like Evagrius, draw together love and ἀπάθεια nor make an explicit 
appeal to God or Christ’s ἀπάθεια as an example to be imitated.  
§2.6.2 Trinity in Christian Life 
Although we may safely assume Mark sees God as Trinity, only De 
baptismo contains direct references. The sixth and seventh quaestio et responsio 
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records the question, “Therefore who does the one who is baptized receive? 
Christ or the Spirit? For sometimes you ask Christ to dwell [in you] and 
sometimes the Holy Spirit.”157 The answer states that because the Spirit is “of 
God” and “of Christ” both are received through him. The seventh question 
continues this line of questioning querying whether the Spirit is the Trinity. The 
answer, 
We do not say he, as only one person, is the Trinity but since there is no 
separation of the Father and the Son, then, for this reason, we confess the 
Trinity is in him according to his divinity. For just as the Son and the 
Spirit are in the Father and, again, the Father and Spirit are in the Son, so 
also the Father and the Son are in the Spirit — not in a confusion of the 
three ὑποστάσεις but in its union of one will and divinity so that whether 
we confess the Father as consisting of only one part or the Son or the 
Spirit, we confess with one name the Trinity . . .158 
In relation to baptism, the sixth question has warrant from biblical texts 
as the answer itself implies.159 The seventh question can be seen as a natural 
follow-up and reveals a certain tension between expressing the unity and 
plurality of the Trinity. In ascetic contexts, there is a clear precedent that the 
goal of the ascetic pursuit is to see Christ and the Spirit wholly indwell the 
human person. Yet, as we saw with Ps.-Macarius, whether or how one might 
articulate both indwelling simultaneously was left open. According to Mark, in 
one respect it could be said that when one has the Spirit, one also has the Father 
and the Son. As he suggests, this is because each of the ὑποστάσεις has the same 
will and divinity.160 In the context of sixth century debates, this issue was raised 
repeatedly through the question, how can only the Son be incarnate? In 
miaphysite circles, this was answered variously with an appeal to the term 
φύσις and the fact that it could indicate a particular nature. Pro-Chalcedonians 
tended to emphasize that even though perfect divinity was fully possessed by 
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each ὑπόστασις only the ὑπόστασις of the Son was incarnate. It is unclear 
whether, in addition to the question on baptism, Mark may be throwing his hat 
into this debate. While he writes against Nestorianism, scholars have 
continually questioned whether he should be seen as a fifth or sixth century 
author.161 Regardless, this text gives us an example of how questions about the 
relationship between Trinitarian plurality and unity could be raised specifically 
in reference to the Holy Spirit and God’s indwelling presence. As we will see 
later, Maximus will take on this concern both within his ascetic writing and 
within his works against miaphysitism. 
In regard to the relation of God to Christian life beyond the 
considerations reviewed above, Mark has more to offer us. At the beginning of 
De lege spiritali, Mark states, in a way that parallels Ps.-Dionysius, that God is 
“the beginning, middle and end of everything good and it is impossible to do 
good or believe unless by Jesus Christ and [the] Holy Spirit.”162 While Mark does 
not frame this in quite the same terms of “procession” and “return” as does Ps.-
Dionysius, there is a shared concern to show the Christian life is sourced in and 
aimed toward God. In the second capitula, he makes this more explicit stating, 
“Everything good is given by the Lord and the one who believes thusly will not 
lose it. The steadfast faith is a strong tower and Christ becomes all things for the 
one who believes.” 163 The ideas expressed in the first text are filled in further 
throughout the rest of the work. Mark points out the origins of virtue and the 
importance of right intentions in order to fulfill the commandments of God. The 
second statement, however, finds less expression. Given the background of 
Evagrius, we might expect such a statement to lead toward a pairing of Christ 
and the Spirit throughout the work but this does not seem to be Mark’s concern. 
Instead, he disperses statements throughout that show either the Spirit or God 
in general as being the source of something. 164 Mark does not attempt to pair 
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the activities of the Son with those of the Spirit or vice-versa except to describe 
the indwelling as that of the Spirit, of grace or of Christ. 
§2.6.3 Knowledge of God & the Activity of the Spirit  
In order to get at what Mark says about the knowledge of God and the 
Holy Spirit, it is important to remember his main concern is to confront two 
related issues: 1) Grace and works, and 2) what baptism accomplishes. If Mark’s 
works report to us an accurate reflection of the teachings of Messalianism or, at 
the very least, struggles within the ascetic community then they give us another 
portrait of communities that questioned the function of ascetic struggle in the 
life of faith and exactly what it is that happens to the human person when he or 
she is baptized. The effect of Mark’s concern to answer these questions is that 
he does not give a detailed structure of spiritual ascent but instead focuses his 
attention on how things get accomplished in Christian life: who does what and 
what is at stake if this is not properly understood? This emphasis means that 
Mark does not spend much energy giving us an explicit framework of ascent like 
Evagrius’ tripartite approach. However, this does not mean he did not have one 
in mind, only that it is not his main concern in the writings we have. Given this 
emphasis, I will center my discussion on Mark’s conception of the Christian life 
as related to baptism. In the next few paragraphs, I will give a concise 
description of his conception of knowledge and how the Holy Spirit acts within 
this framework.  
Mark sees baptism as accomplishing something real and lasting. This 
lasting reality depends entirely on the activity of God. The opening capitula in 
his De lege spirituali states, “Firstly, we see that God is beginning, middle and 
end of everything good. It is impossible to do or believe the good except in 
Christ Jesus and the Holy Spirit.”165 Within this framework, faith itself is sourced 
in Christ and the Holy Spirit. The result of this faith is grace, particularly the 
dwelling of Christ in the human person. At this point, the Christian is set free, 
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and is able to choose between doing good and doing evil.166 The law of liberty, 
which replaces the law of death, enjoins the Christian to do good, not because it 
earns anything, but out of a thankful recognition of the love of God. This law of 
liberty are the commands given after baptism which are Christ’s commands, the 
most comprehensive of which is loving God and neighbor.167 Obedience to 
Christ’s commands allows the hidden grace in the Christian to become more 
perceptible.168 Mark contrasts mere knowledge and true knowledge in this 
context as related to the ability to put into practice Christ’s commands. Πρᾶξις 
then becomes the avenue of knowledge as revealed through Christ’s 
commandments.  
We might ask further, what exactly is the ascetic to learn while following 
the commandments? This is made difficult since Mark tends to describe the 
effect of true knowledge rather than the content of knowledge itself. Mark gives 
us some clues, which can be ascertained in his distinction between true 
knowledge and mere knowledge. As was already pointed out the difference 
between these two is one of πρᾶξις, but what can be learned is found in various 
descriptions of true knowledge and his teaching with regard to afflictions. Mark 
cautions against expecting to know too much about God’s judgments beyond 
acknowledging that God is worthy of faith, because only God knows how to fit 
everything together, and, regardless of circumstances, God is working.169 
Consequently, true knowledge teaches to have faith in God.170 Additionally, true 
knowledge teaches a resignation towards circumstances, particularly when one 
faces affliction because of hope in God’s activity.171 Therefore, a sign of 
knowledge is perseverance and not accusing others over one’s own 
misfortunes.172 Endurance to these wrongs is “in proportion to their faith,” 
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(κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως).173 This true knowledge, just like faith, is a gift of 
God as Mark states “Grace upon grace: True knowledge is given to human 
beings by God, above all it teaches those who partake of it to believe in the one 
who has given [it].”174 Yet we are given more direction elsewhere. In the 
penultimate capitula of Ex operibus justificari (210) Mark states, 
Every word of Christ manifests (ἐμφαίνει) God’s mercy, righteousness 
and wisdom and their power rushes into those who gladly listen through 
their hearing. For this reason the unmerciful and unjust, listening 
unwillingly to the wisdom of God, were not able to know [it] but even 
crucified him for speaking. Therefore let us see if we also listen willingly 
to him. For he said, “The one who loves me and keeps my 
commandments will also be loved by my Father and I will love him also, 
and I will manifest (ἐμφανίσω) myself to him.” Do you see how he has 
hidden his self-manifestation (τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐμφάνειαν) in his 
commandments?175  
He continues by explaining that the most comprehensive of all the 
commandments is love of God and love of neighbor which is sustained through 
abstinence (ἀποχή) towards material things and the stilling (ἡσυχία) of one’s 
thoughts. Thus, the Lord commands not to worry. Otherwise seriousness of sin 
might not be taken into consideration and cleansing cannot take place. If the 
place of pure nature (τὸν τόπον τῆς καθαρᾶς φύσεως) is not found then, the 
Christian will not see the “inner dwelling-place of Christ” which is the Christian 
himself. Mark enjoins his audience to seek out this dwelling place through 
prayer so that whether in this life or at death “the Master of the house might 
open the door to us and not say, as a result of [our] negligence, ‘I do not know 
where you are from.’”176 Mark’s understanding of the ascetic life suggests that 
the commandments contain God’s self-revelation, but obedience to them also 
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contains our self-revelation.177 This revelation of God and self-revelation leads 
the Christian toward a perception and understanding of their status as 
dwellings of God. Thus, the function of self-revelation is to discover our true 
nature as dwellings of Christ. This is reminiscent of Evagrius and his dual 
emphasis on self-knowledge and knowledge of God. 
This is confirmed at the end of De baptismo (quaestio et responsio 17) 
when Mark argues that whatever else ascetic struggles for obedience to Christ’s 
commands produce, the ascetic finds nothing more or, at least, is able to find 
only that which he or she has already received through baptism; that is, Christ. 
As a prooftext Mark quotes the Letter to the Galatians 3.27 and states, “Christ 
being perfect God, gives the gift of the Spirit perfectly to those who have been 
baptized.”178 Mark is concerned to point out that within self-knowledge and 
obedience to Christ commands the ascetic finds Christ dwelling in him or her 
and that this grace is not of the ascetic’s doing but rather “it is revealed 
(ἀποκαλυπτομένην) and manifested (ἐμφανίζουσαν) to us in proportion (κατὰ 
ἀναλογίαν) to the practice of the commandments, causing in us an advance of 
our faith.”179 Mark goes on to quote the Letter to the Ephesians 4.13 
underscoring the “fullness of Christ” as the goal of this advancement. He 
emphasizes this again stating, “. . . this was already hidden in us, being by him 
and for him.”180 He then ends with what could be a citation from Romans 11.34-
36, which emphasizes the inability of human beings to know the mind of God or 
give him gifts and therefore how all things are from him, through him and to 
him.181  
In this discussion regarding the perceptibility of grace, Mark the Monk 
places less emphasis on the redirection of desire as seen in Diadochus and more 
often formulates his answer by stating that an assurance of grace is had in 
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proportion to the keeping of the commandments.182 As we saw above this 
means a progressive manifestation of Christ in the life of the baptized. Likewise 
in Mark’s writings, there is a concern to confront those who to want to perceive 
grace before being active in the commandments. Mark will have none of this 
kind of reasoning stating tersely in one place, “Some say: ‘We are unable to do 
good unless we palpably receive the grace of the Spirit.’ Yet, those addicted to 
the inclination of the pleasures, like people without help, are forever asking for 
this power.”183 To add to his cutting criticism Mark adds in the next capitulum, 
“Grace has been mystically given to those who have been baptized in Christ,” yet 
it is “active in proportion to the practice of the commandments,” (κατὰ 
ἀναλογίαν τῆς ἐργασίας τῶν ἐντολῶν).184 Indeed, the Lord himself is “hidden in 
his own commandments and correspondingly (κατ’ ἀναλογίαν) is found by 
those who seek after him.”185 Yet, despite a ceaseless and secret grace, 
ultimately, “it is for us to do good or not to do good according to [this] 
power.”186 Those who do not recognize the indwelling of Christ are 
“worthless”.187 This issue and several others witnessed to in Mark’s De baptismo 
give us evidence of what was at stake in his quarrel with Messalian teaching. It 
was not simply a matter of discouragement as a result of the presence of sin 
after baptism or a question of whether baptism was effectual; there was also an 
issue of shifting responsibility for one’s spiritual life to something or someone 
other than oneself.188 Mark’s writings in this regard and in his overall attempt to 
confront vainglory suggest; that, in addition to understanding the sources of and 
reasons for the presence of evil in the lives of the baptized, there is an equal 
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concern to identify the sources of and reasons for good and to tread a path 
between these two poles in order to ensure the perfection of baptism and God’s 
grace but equally to enjoin the baptized to take responsibility for their spiritual 
progress albeit under the auspices of grace. In regard to this latter issue, Mark 
and to some extent Diadochus both seek to highlight the working of God as 
initiating, helping within and responding to ascetic struggle. Thus, asceticism as 
a reciprocal set of responses between God and the baptized uncovers the reality 
of one’s baptism or more specifically the indwelling presence of the God.189 
Finally, I want to note several aspects of Mark’s writings in relation to 
Evagrius. Mark, like Evagrius, does not take the time to articulate a positive 
place for desire or passion in his writings. Again, this does not necessarily mean 
that he does not conceive of its positive role only that, beyond highlighting the 
value of love, he does not focus on its redirection as much as he emphasizes the 
shedding of the passions, faith in affliction and obedience to the command of 
love or as he puts it the “law of liberty”.190 Even De baptismo, where he 
dedicates a large portion his discussion to the freedom of the will, the 
discussion is predominantly cast in terms of choice rather than desire. I might 
note also the internal orientation of Mark’s conception of the ascetic life, which 
is much like that of Evagrius. The knowledge one seeks is ultimately a 
perceptible manifestation of Christ’s indwelling.  
§2.7 Ascetic Literature in the Mid-Fifth & Sixth Century 
In this section, rather than look specifically at each ascetic in-depth, I 
want to note some broad similarities and differences in literary style and 
emphasis for several authors from the mid-fifth to sixth centuries. In the post-
Chalcedonian era, there seems to be an observable trend in the literary 
approach of ascetic material. An early work, Asceticon of Abba Isaiah, while not a 
theological treatise does deal with theological topics within ascetic contexts 
particularly as it relates to Christ’s reestablishing postlapsarian human nature 
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to its prelapsarian state.191 Important for the author is the Cross of Christ, a 
rubric under which to understand ascent as imitation.192 The life of Christ then 
is funneled through the crucifixion. 
However, as one traverses the period rather than the terse centuries 
seen in the previous authors reviewed or the material in the Asceticon there is a 
turn or perhaps return to styles that are dominated by dialogue within 
embedded narratives. These dialogues are reminiscent of those seen in earlier 
ascetic writing like the Apophthegmata patrum and the Vita of Antony. The 
contents of these narratives are often the acts of particular ascetics and how 
they serve as examples or whose miracles demonstrate the validity of a 
theology that is often unexplained but clearly assumed. Some examples of this 
come from the early to mid-fifth century in the Epistulae of Barsinuphius and 
John.193 These letters do not contain much explicit theological argumentation, 
instead there is discussion about ascetics being troubled by heretical teaching 
and asking advice about what to do along with miracles that demonstrate the 
validity of the pro-Chalcedonian stance without necessarily delving into 
theological specifics. The Trinity is to be believed and worshipped but the 
incarnate Son rarely serves as an example to be imitated, nor is there a fully 
developed ascetic vision of ascent being proffered. Later, in the sixth century, 
the tales of John Moschus’ Spiritual Meadow and hagiographies of Sophronius of 
Jerusalem (Account of the Miracles of Saints Cyrus and John and the Life of John 
the Alsmgiver), while serving as a kind of polemic against anti-Chalcedonians, do 
not by delve into theological specifics as much as illustrating a kind of superior 
ethos.194  
Another contemporary of Maximus, John Climacus departs from this 
trend but only partially. Climacus embeds narratives amongst terse sayings 
rather than dialogue and resolves to use both the lives of exemplary ascetics 
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and short centuries about theological and ascetic realities to shape his vision of 
ascent in Scala paradisi. There he states that “A Christian is an imitator of Christ 
in thought, word, and deed, as far as humanly possible, and he believes rightly 
and without blame in the Holy Trinity.”195 The Scala fleshes this statement out 
in several directions. Hainthaler draws attention to the centrality of “the 
metaphor of sporting competition” for ascetic life taken from Paul’s letters and 
how Christ’s “gentleness” or “meekness” (πραΰτης) serves as an example to be 
imitated. Yet there are only allusions to events and no extended description of 
Christ’s life that demonstrate Christ’s humility.196 Likewise, John has only brief 
statements about what to believe “rightly and without blame” about the Trinity 
(Trinity in Unity and vice-versa) although evincing a concern to locate himself as 
a pro-Chalcedonian in a way that Maximus does not in the Liber.197 Love is the 
goal of the ascetic life but this life is seen mainly through the lens of angelic 
imitation, itself an achievement in synthesizing previous traditions.198 Despite 
differences and in light of similarities, John’s work is much closer in literary 
style and concern to that of Maximus’ Liber and Capita caritate. 
§2.8 Summary Observations of Ascetic Background  
Concerning the key areas I have reviewed, many of the authors have 
something important to say. Often ἀπάθεια is listed or assumed as an important 
intermediate goal toward union with God. Love, like ἀπάθεια and understood as 
either ἔρως or ἀγάπη, is also seen as an important goal. However, with the 
exception of a few instances in Evagrius and Diadochus, it is almost exclusively 
cast in terms of God’s love for humanity through the incarnation and 
consequently the love we should have toward God; there is not an explicit and 
sustained discussion of love toward neighbor. According to Ps.-Dionysius, God’s 
love is in fact what draws our love toward him. Knowledge of God is often 
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acknowledged as impossible on one level, usually the level of nature or οὐσία, 
but possible in terms of union. Both the intermediate goal of ἀπάθεια and 
redirecting of desire through love toward God bring the Christian into a loving 
knowing of the divine. 
In Evagrius, the Son and the Spirit work together to reveal the Father and 
the mind to itself. In all of these authors the work of the Holy Spirit is 
recognized both in the inspiration of the Scriptures but also as bearer of grace 
and help for the Christian. The Spirit both indwells the baptized and helps them 
in their pursuit of ἀπάθεια and love. For Diadochus and Mark the activity of 
grace whether recognized or not is always at work. For Diadochus the presence 
of God is perceptible inasmuch as the baptized redirect their desire toward God 
in θεολογία, conceived as a spiritual conversation between the soul as bride and 
her beloved the Word. For Mark, the indwelling Christ is made manifest in 
proportion to obedience to his commandments to love God and neighbor. 
In the midst of these concerns was scattered evidence of lingering 
Trinitarian questions. As evinced in Mark the Monk, this took form in the 
question, is it Christ or the Spirit who actually indwells the soul? This gave 
opportunity for Mark to explore how it can be said that the Trinity indwells the 
baptized as a result of the shared divine nature but also because each divine 
person can be described as “ἐν” one another. More broadly, though, it raised the 
issue of the relation between the threeness and oneness of God, which Ps.-
Dionysius demonstrated in his concern to present the Christian life as a return 
to the simplicity of God. My investigation in fact seems to suggest that these 
three areas – how God is known, the perceptibility of God’s presence, and the 
relation of God’s oneness and threeness – were concerns that continued to crop 
up in ascetic literature. To this can be added the protracted debate between the 
miaphysite and Pro-Chalcedonian communities concerning Christology, which I 
will discuss more in the later chapters, and is not entirely unrelated. 
§2.9 Maximus in Light of the Authors Reviewed 
§2.9.1 Love & Ἀπάθεια 
What exactly is Maximus’ unique contribution? Maximus’ distinctive 
presentation of the Christian life lies less in the concepts involved than in the 
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way he puts them together. Love, ἀπάθεια, knowledge of God and calls for 
imitation can all be found within the writers reviewed with various levels of 
emphasis. Maximus puts a high premium on the incarnate Son’s earthly life in a 
way that is not found in these same writers. This narrative, an amalgam of the 
381 CE symbol of faith and biblical texts, and the sustained reflection on the 
σκοπός of the Lord within the rubric of love as a source of imitation is in stark 
contrast to the authors reviewed. For Maximus, imitation means being like Jesus 
and other biblical examples in loving God by renouncing anything that might 
distract or take place of loyalty to him in order to devote oneself fully to him. 
For Evagrius, love and ἀπάθεια are linked with loving God, neighbor and enemy 
but there is little real estate used to flesh this out or to describe a redirection of 
desire in the same way as Diadochus or Ps.-Dionysius do. For Ps.-Macarius, as 
for Maximus, love is what drives the ascetic through all stages of ascent into 
prayer.199 Maximus subsumes both the redirection of desire and ἀπάθεια under 
obedience to the commandments of love, drawing parallels with Mark the 
Monk’s extolling of the two greatest commandments. Maximus’ most distinctive 
feature then is his portrayal of the incarnation as God not only sending the Son 
as a result of φιλανθρωπία but also the incarnate Son’s earthly activities as 
fulfilling his own command of love and it being served up as  the primary ethos 
and telos for Christian life. 
§2.9.2 Knowledge of God 
Evagrius gives a significant role to self-reflection but whereas he focuses 
most of this activity on seeing the brilliance of one’s own mind as the place of 
God, Maximus, in Liber Asceticus, views self-reflection as an opportunity to see 
one’s self in light of God’s mercy which in turn is meant to encourage solidarity 
with one’s neighbor and solidarity with God’s love toward humanity.  Evagrius 
also views creation as a place where the wisdom of God can be perceived but 
not God’s nature. The mind is the place where the union of essential knowledge 
(Christ or Trinity) and the mind takes place. Maximus also has a place for 
Evagrius’ language within his wider corpus as will be seen in Capita Caritate, 
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but it in the Liber the focus is mainly on knowing God’s love and the 
perceptibility of God’s presence.  
Maximus’ portrayal of the knowledge of God can be seen primarily in his 
description of the σκοπός of the incarnation. There it is God’s love and in 
particular God’s love of humanity through the incarnate Son’s life that is to be 
pursued. Yet this knowledge has a double-effect. It highlights God’s disposition 
and action toward humanity but also spurs self-reflection. Maximus is more 
explicit than other writers that knowing the σκοπός of the incarnation not only 
reveals God as good and loving but also reveals the ascetic’s own need of mercy, 
which consequently leads to sympathy and mercy toward others. Similarly, 
knowledge of God is viewed under the rubric of a perceptible manifestation of 
God’s presence. This way of expressing knowledge of God finds more parallels 
in Ps.-Macarius, Diadochus and Mark the Monk than Evagrius although an 
argument could be made that seeing the brilliance of the mind is akin to a 
perceptible manifestation of God’s presence.  
In the Liber, Maximus lays out no explicit apophatic caveat for knowledge 
of God although his description of prayer as helping the mind become “naked” 
by withdrawing it from all other thing can be found in Evagrius. Surprisingly 
then, there is no appeal to the Areopagite or Gregory of Nazianzus although the 
language of desire as a means of describing ascent is already perceptible and 
highlighting the attributes of “good” and “love” in relation to God are also key 
concepts for the Areopagite. 
§2.9.3 Trinity in Christian Life 
The coupling of the activities of the Son and Spirit is also reminiscent of 
Evagrius. However, whereas Evagrius’ major emphasis is found in a sustained 
apologetic for the divinity of the Son and Spirit based on their role of revealing 
the Father and the mind to itself, Maximus comes at this from the opposite 
direction. He demonstrates the divinity of Son and Spirit through titles and 
descriptors that communicate consubstantially and illustrates how the activities 
of the Son in the incarnation are common to how the Spirit acts towards 
Christians. Maximus does not mention where he might have picked up this way 
of talking about the Son and Spirit. This kind of portrayal is not displayed by 
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either Diadochus, Mark or Ps.-Dionysius but as I explored briefly in Chapter 1 
there are examples of this kind of pairing in Cyril of Alexandria and echoes of it 
in Gregory Nazianzus. Ps.-Macarius demonstrates a concern to highlight the 
divinity of the Spirit and the ontological gulf between creation and creator but 
the Trinitarian dynamic is expressed mainly in the way in which the Son and 
Spirit indwell and are manifested in the ascetic life. 
Ps.-Dionysius draws attention to the simultaneous value and caution that 
be observed when applying language such as “good” and “love” to God. 
Concerning the latter, Ps.-Dionysius is concerned with giving a defense of such 
language and how it can be used of God. Maximus also highlights God who is 
“good by nature” and whose φιλανθρωπία becomes an opportunity for self-
reflection and solidarity.  Similarly, there is a shared teleological and 
eschatological architecture between Maximus, Ps.-Dionysius and Mark the Monk 
all of whom see God as the beginning, middle and end of Christian life. The 
cosmic aspects of this will become more prominent in Maximus’ later writings. 
Beyond these three points, Maximus’ similarity with Ps.-Dionysius is less 
obvious in the Liber than with other authors. This will change significantly as 
Maximus continues in his writing career precisely in the area of cosmology. 
Both Diadochus and Ps.-Dionysius give a significant place for language of 
love and desire. However, Maximus joining together of ἀπάθεια and its related 
concepts with ἀγάπη fits more closely with Diadochus. However, Maximus at 
this point does not include ἔρως in the Liber instead ἀγάπη/ἀγαπάω is the 
primary word set used will others such as πόθος, σχολάζω and ἐπιθυμητικῶς, 
make a supplemental appearance 200 For Diadochus the reorientation of desire 
is related more to activity of the Spirit. Maximus sets love, as revealed in the 
Biblical narrative, as the primary rubric of God and Christian activity and 
develops it at greater depth in relation to Christ and biblical examples. Maximus, 
like Diadochus, is concerned to show the place of the Spirit; yet, Diadochus does 
not tie the Spirit’s activities to those of the Son’s incarnation in such an explicit 
way. While Maximus contains several sections in the Liber that show the 
                                                 
200 For πόθος see §25 (CCSG 40: 51.439.).  For σχολάζω see §18, 19 (CCSG 40: 41.354; 
41.356-7, 364) and for ἐπιθυμητικῶς see §7 (CCSG 40: 19.130). 
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activities and importance of the Spirit, Diadochus concentrates his efforts on 
tying the grace of Christian life whether hidden or apparent with the Holy Spirit. 
This feature in Diadochus is also a theme in Mark the Monk and Ps.-Macarius. 
Maximus does not tie grace and the Holy Spirit so closely together in the Liber 
even though he places grace or being graced as central to the Christian life. In 
the Capita caritate, Maximus will bring these ideas together. Diadochus, in an 
effort to focus the mind’s activities and remember its experiences with God, 
focuses prayer on meditation on and the verbalization of Christ’s name: “Lord 
Jesus”.201 Maximus refines this and gives more detailed content for reflection on 
God’s past mercy by focusing the mind on the σκοπός of the incarnation, 
highlighting it as an object of memory, meditation, and imitation.  
Ps.-Macarius, Diadochus and Mark find love as an important mark of 
Christian life. However, Maximus’ explanation of how Christ fulfills the 
command of love as God and human and his intent that Christ’s example ground 
the teleological goal of ascetic life exactly in love toward the Father and love 
toward neighbor is unique. In terms of conceiving of Christian life as baptism 
and then the giving of the commandments, the sum of which are the 
commandments to love God and neighbor, Mark and Maximus show remarkably 
similar concerns. Yet, again, it is Maximus’ ability to envision a thoroughly 
Trinitarian texture of Christian life, through his description of the activities of 
the divine persons within his extended portrayal of the incarnation of the Son as 
fulfilling the command of love that stands out within the ascetic literature 
reviewed.  For Maximus, the beginning of the Christian life is found in faith in 
the Trinity and baptism in the name of the Trinity. God is means by virtue of the 
                                                 
201 Diadochus, Capita centum, §30, 31, 59, 61 (BBTT 8:40, 42, 72, 74, 76, 78) On this 
aspect of Diadochus teaching see Rutherford, BBTT 8, 5; Ermatinger, 30-35 and Kallistos Ware, 
“The Jesus Prayer in St Diadochus of Photice,” Thyateira: A Festschrift for Archbishop Methodios 
of Thyateira and Great Britain, ed. George Dragas (London: Thyateira House, 1985), 557-568. 
Ware offers a broader tradition in which the Jesus prayer had developed variously into ‘Lord 
Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me’ or “Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me.” In light of 
these variations, Maximus’ emphasis on being attentive to the σκοπός of the incarnation (i.e. the 
love and mercy of God as exemplified in the Son’s incarnation) and his emphasis on prayer as a 
means of focusing the mind on a dual solidarity with humanity and God suggests Maximus may 
be drawing on several of these traditions. However, as Ware notes, the dating of some of these 
variations is hard to secure and consequently it is difficult to see how Maximus fits into a 
narrative of their development, “Jesus Prayer”, 561-62. 
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Spirit’s appropriation of the Son’s activities to the life of the baptized. God is 
goal in that love of God is cast in terms of a full and undistracted devotion 
culminating in prayer while imitation of the Son’s love in the incarnation with 
the help of the Son and the Spirit becomes an example of how love of God and 
neighbor must be lived out despite the circumstances of life. When mature, this 
life manifests Christ and the fruit of the Spirit. 
Conclusion 
In the Liber asceticus, Maximus lays out his understanding of the ascetic 
and Christian life. In his portrayal, the Spirit and the Son play an important role 
in shaping this life into one that wholly displays love of God, neighbor and 
enemy. Yet parallels in the areas of love, ἀπάθεια, knowledge of God, divine 
activity and literary usage with the lengthy list of personalities that fill his era 
require a close investigation in order to locate exactly where his distinctive 
contribution lies and how he could have said anything distinctive even if he 
wanted to. In the end, it is Maximus ability to synthesize these various aspects 
into a sustained reflection on the incarnation of the Son that demonstrates his 
distinct contribution. When looking at Maximus immediate context, there was 
an attempt during the mid-fifth to sixth centuries to experiment with literary 
styles in order to find a way of broaching the topics of theology, politics and 
ascetic practice without engaging in full-scale theological or political 
argumentation. Narratives are used to demonstrate the validity of a theological 
position without directly confronting theological specifics. However, John 
Climacus and Maximus attempt to synthesize ascetic practice and theology in 
such a way that to deny one aborts the other. As Sherwood stated long ago, 
Maximus’ “originality and strength” in confronting Origenism was his ability not 
just to deny their theological position but envision another reality.202 This 
strategy offered a surrogate theology and spirituality that disallowed or 
inoculated against positions he deemed problematic. For Maximus, this would 
not be a surrogate but a truer vision attained through the process of ascent and 
graced by the Trinity. In light of these literary developments, Maximus’ 
originality, while still distinctive, can nevertheless be located as a product of 
                                                 
202 Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 91. 
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that period’s experimentation – a literary environment that intentionally sought 
to find ways of engaging theology, politics and ascetic practice outside of direct 
argumentation choosing instead illustration and appeals to a superior, often 
supernatural, ethos. Consequently, Maximus’ distinct contribution in the area of 
literary usage is not found in partaking of this period’s experimentation. Rather, 
it is found in the focus of his dialogue on the narrative of salvation history, 
specifically on the life of the incarnate Son along with biblical characters to 
demonstrate a superior ethos (love) rather than angels, other ascetics or even 
just the crucifixion. 
An investigation into Maximus’ long context, rather than dull his 
distinctiveness, allows its details to be even more striking even though it 
uncovers shared concerns around the areas of love, ἀπάθεια, knowledge of God 
and divine activity. He chooses dialogue and uses the narrative of salvation 
history, specifically the Son’s incarnate life as an example to be imitated. He 
focuses on love of God, neighbor, and enemy inextricably linking them. The 
theme of love, by itself, is not without ascetic precedent. However, its sustained 
illustration through Christ’s love of God in the desert, love of neighbor in society 
and love of enemy at the Cross and his stress on how reflection on this narrative 
should produce solidarity with other human beings and God is unmatched. The 
appeal to ethos is demonstrated in the σκοπός of the incarnate Son and his 
Apostles whose power comes from weakness and, for the baptized, through the 
presence of the Triune God. He avoids controversial language instead focusing 
on what, by then, would have been standard Trinitarian descriptions of 
consubstantiality and attempts to correlate the activities of the divine persons 
in the life of the baptized in order to illustrate the divine φιλανθρωπία and the 
Trinity as their beginning, means and end. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 Building on the Baseline:  
Maximus, Θεωρία & Seeing Things Clearly 
  
In the prologue to the Capita caritate, there is what has been considered 
clear evidence of the work’s close relationship with the Liber and thus an early 
dating. The early dating was universally accepted by earlier scholars, although 
there have been several proposals about how early.1  In this chapter, I will 
investigate the Capita caritate and draw attention to how Maximus further 
builds on his Trinitarian grammar for Christian life and introduces some new 
vocabulary and grammar. This new vocabulary and grammar involves a more 
robust view of ascent, especially contemplation (θεωρία), and an engagement 
with Origenist and Tritheist theologies. In the last two chapters, I reviewed 
Maximus’ Liber asceticus and his ascetic context in order to show areas of 
shared concern and detail his distinctive contributions. I showed how Maximus’ 
grammar for Christian life illustrated the Trinity as beginning, means, and end. 
This was exhibited in his discussion of baptism, a particular articulation of 
divine appropriation, a Trinitarian presentation of the incarnate life of the Son 
as an example of love and prayer with Trinitarian language. His articulation of 
divine appropriation was observed in the activities of the Son and the Spirit at 
the beginning of the Liber and the life of incarnate Son as an example to be 
meditated on and emulated. On this last point, I showed how his articulation of 
the Son as an example of love was unique not only in relation to Evagrius but 
distinctive in relation to many earlier ascetic writers. Maximus’ description of 
the σκοπόςof the incarnation and its relevance to Christian life is already richly 
Trinitarian.  
                                                 
 1 Maximus, Cap. car. (Cap. sulla car., 48): “. . . πρὸς τῷ περὶ ἀσκητικοῦ βίου λόγῳ καὶ τὸν 
περὶ ἀγάπης λόγον πέπομφα τῇ σῇ ὁσιότητι, πάτερ Ἐλπίδιε . . .”  As Sherwood notes in his 
Annotated Date-List, 26, Joseph Pegon suggested sometime between 618-25 CE (SC 9:24). 
Sherwood follows von Balthasar in dating the work by 626 and bases his decision on Maximus’ 
complaints about the lack of books the Confessor would have needed in order to write his 
compilation, an observation Pegon himself makes. Aldo Ceresa-Gestaldo did not offer any new 
date in his critical edition Massimo Confessore, Capitoli sulla carità, Verba seniorum 3 (Rome: 
Editrice Studium, 1963) which I use throughout the chapter. 
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 There are certain challenges to investigating the Capita since Maximus 
engages two major issues that require some explanation and background: 1) 
Origenism, and 2) Tritheism. I have chosen to deal with their background within 
each section rather than dedicate a separate chapter to their investigation. The 
chapter is broken down into two major sections. The first section (3.1) is an 
overview of the Capita caritate, which provides a much-needed context for 
discussing smaller passages. The second section (3.2) and its subdivisions treat 
areas of development, refinement of and connection between the several ways 
Maximus expressed his Trinitarian grammar for Christian Life in the Liber. 
Section 3.2.1 shows a refinement of Maximus’ conception of imitation as a goal 
of Christian life in the Liber. Section 3.2.2 demonstrates how Maximus expands 
the activities of the mind by discussing θεωρία and locates the Trinity explicitly 
as its goal. In section 3.2.3, I show how Maximus draws together how the Spirit 
appropriates the activities of the Son and correlates the indwelling of the Spirit 
with the indwelling of Christ to manifest the presence of God. Finally, new areas 
of engagement are brought out in section 3.3:  his engagement with Origenism 
(3.3.1) and Tritheism (3.3.2) which build up and refine his grammar as Trinity 
as beginning, means and end. In the following paragraphs, I will delineate what 
can be expected in the capitula that I cover before I delve in to a closer analysis 
of each text and its background. 
There are several places in the Capita where Maximus fills in and 
connects the two major themes already found in Liber asceticus. Capitulum 1.25 
will serve as my starting point and explores how Maximus further develops the 
concept of imitation as the means of learning how to love. This concept, already 
found in the Liber, illustrated how the Trinity was means and end and is found 
throughout the Capita. The primary example for imitation being God and Christ 
while secondary examples are the saints and angels. Capita 1.86-100 will give 
an example of Maximus’ more dense account of ascent touching on what he sees 
as possible to know about God and how Maximus sees the Trinity as the goal of 
ascent. Finally, in 4.69-73, I will give an example of how these areas are drawn 
together within his understanding of divine appropriation and connects the 
concept of God as means and the perceptibility of God’s presence. 
 139 
After reviewing areas where Maximus further develops concepts from 
the Liber, I will investigate two places where he develops a new sub-theme and 
consequently a supplemental vocabulary and grammar. The first instance where 
Maximus provides a supplemental vocabulary and grammar is in order to clarify 
the relationship between God and creation in contrast to Origenist cosmology in 
3.21-36 and 4.1-15. The second instance demonstrates reflection around the 
oneness and threeness of God and its relation to γνώσις and πρᾶξις in 2.24-36. 
As I noted in the previous chapter, both of these issues did not register in the 
Liber.  
In his dealings with Origenist thought, Maximus explains the genesis, 
movement and telos of creation, especially human beings. Maximus’ 
understanding of God as Creator and the consequences of this reality affect the 
way he conceives of ascent. 
This is especially the case in regard to knowledge of God and what it 
means to be one with God. In the Liber, Maximus described union with God as 
“the mind joining with God through the grace of prayer” (ἡ δὲ χάρις τῆς 
προσευχῆς τῷ Θεῷ συνάπτει τὸν νοῦν) and complemented this with the 
language of desire, in one place explicitly basing this on the issue of will. Any 
deeper reflection on how to describe this union was absent. Maximus, drawing 
on the irreducible distinction between Creator and created, will assert that 
God’s nature is unknowable. The epistemological consequences that follow 
mean that, while union with God is a possible and desired goal, human 
knowledge of God is simultaneously chastened and experiences awe and 
deification.2 This “awe” is variously described by Maximus later as “eternally 
moving repose” or “immoveable eternal movement,” and is prompted by his 
understanding of God as “boundless” (ἡ ἀπειρία).3 In Capita caritate, Maximus 
describes God using this term but does not describe the soul’s eternal fixed 
movement or satiety in God.4 Despite Maximus’ engagement with Origenist 
                                                 
 2 Maximus, Cap. car., 1.100, 2.6, 3. 97, 4:1-2 (Cap. sulla car., 88, 92, 190, 194).  
 3 Maximus, Myst. §19 (CCSG 69: 47.745-751). 
 4 For more on this aspect of Maximus’ thought see Paul C. Plass, “‘Moving Rest’ in 
Maximus the Confessor,” Classica et Mediaevalia 35 (1984), 177-190, Paul M. Blowers, “Maximus 
the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of ‘Perpetual Progress’,” VC 46.2 (June 1992), 
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thought in the Capita, there are several features that are absent when one 
compares it with the Ambigua ad Iohannem. These include his arguments 
against the Origenist conception of satiety, its subsidiary discussion of 
movement, a detailed explanation of the Logos/λόγοι doctrine, and the 
λόγος/τρόπος distinction. Instead, Maximus focuses specifically on the core 
issue of the irreducible difference between Creator and creation and what this 
means for knowledge of God and for some aspects of participation in God. 
Ultimately, this further shapes the theme that the Trinity is beginning, means, 
and end by providing a metaphysical language to clarify how this is the case. 
There are two chief places where Maximus comments on the differences 
between creation and God and the consequences of this difference: in 3.21-36 
and in 4.1-15. These will provide an opportunity to explore this new sub-theme 
and its supplemental vocabulary and grammar. Thunberg, in his analysis of 
Maximus’ cosmology in Microcosm and Mediator, listed eight aspects from 4.1-
14, but rather than discussing them within the context of the Capita or the 
Confessor’s early writings, he used them as jumping points for exploring these 
aspects throughout Maximus’ other writing in an effort to  present an overall 
synthesis.5 Capita caritate 3.21-36 did not receive the same treatment, and so 
much of my discussion will focus on those capitula while 4.1-15 will be utilized 
to complement my discussion.  
Maximus explains this distinction first in relation to knowledge/knowing 
(γνώσις/γιγνώσκω) and then participation (μετοχή) using a set of terms that 
Sherwood highlighted in his study on the Ambigua ad Iohannem: οὐσία, δύναμις, 
ἐνέργεια.6 Notably, Sherwood did not reference the Capita caritate when 
describing Maximus’ refutation of Origenism nor when reviewing earlier 
instances of the triad of terms listed above, focusing instead on Amb. 7, 15, 
Capita gnostica and other later writings. This sub-theme – the irreducible 
distinction between God and creation – is of central significance to Maximus in 
this work. It is not significant simply because scholars have judged that it 
                                                 
151-171 and Blowers, “The Dialectics and Therapeutics of Desire in Maximus the Confessor,” VC 
65 (2011), 425-452. 
 5 Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 49-50.   
6 Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 103-123. 
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underlies Maximus’ theology as an implicit assumption, but because Maximus 
himself makes a conscious and overt effort to highlight this distinction and 
explain its consequences – consequences that affect his view of Christian life 
and ultimately the Trinity. 
A second area of new vocabulary and grammar that shows itself briefly is 
reflection on the oneness and threeness of God or more specifically union and 
distinction. Capitula 2.24-36 give the first example of Maximus discussing the 
relations of union and distinction in the Trinity and how θεολόγια is related to 
his view of humanity. This demonstrates how Maximus’ view of the constitution 
of the Trinity affects his view of theological anthropology drawing together both 
love of God and neighbor and thus shaping the goal of Christian life. Noticeably 
absent is the λόγος/τρόπος distinction and, like the Liber, any detailed 
Christological language that might be considered controversial. This leads me to 
my final chapter where I deal briefly with Ep. 2, areas in Quaestiones et dubia in 
order to focus most of the remaining chapter on the context and review of 
Opusculum 17 which thereby rounds out my investigation of Maximus’ 
Trinitarian thought in his early works. 
§3.1 Overview of Capita Caritate 
In the prologue to Capita caritate, Maximus clearly links his four 
centuries on love to the Liber asceticus and while the main themes of Liber are 
given further treatment, he also gives more detail to his view of ascent. It will be 
helpful to have an understanding of how the Capita caritate is structured 
thematically. The Capita caritate contains four centuries. The first two centuries 
begin with very focused definitions. The first century begins with a definition of 
love and spends the remaining capitula fleshing out various aspects of it: its 
source, examples, the things that prevent it, and the things that encourage it. 
The second century begins with a definition of prayer and spends the remaining 
capitula addressing kinds of prayer, the conditions for prayer, and the struggles 
of prayer. The third century begins with statements about the “rational use of 
things and thoughts” and goes on to distinguish between kinds of knowledge 
and knowing (how God, the angels and human beings know), kinds of thought 
(impassioned/compounded, simple), various levels of love and various kinds of 
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motivations for love. Finally, the fourth century begins with the awe 
experienced during contemplation of the divine and goes on to explain how to 
maintain perfect love, a true sense of the nature of things, and above all union 
with God.  
The introductory capitula of each century, as I have described them 
above, suggest that each century may actually be the progressive movements 
Maximus expects the baptized to travel through during their ascent toward God. 
These movements fall along the lines of the virtues of love, self-mastery and 
prayer as discussed in the Liber. For example, the first century corresponds to 
the virtue of love while prayer is discussed in the second century. However, in 
the second century, Maximus suggests that there are two “uttermost states” of 
prayer.7 One type of prayer occurs with practical things (τοῖς πρακτικοῖς) and 
springs from fear of and hope in God. The second type of prayer occurs with 
contemplative things (τοῖς θεωρητικοῖς) and springs from an intense longing 
for God and total purification. Clearly, the first type was illustrated in the Liber. 
According to this scheme, if the Capita are following a progression then prayer 
should appear twice and in fact, after the third century, which evinces a concern 
for self-control, the description of awe that begins the century echoes some of 
the same features as the second state of prayer Maximus described in 2.6.  
If this assessment is correct then Maximus’ Capita caritate are meant to 
guide the reader through spiritual ascent and reveals how Maximus can use 
concepts like love, self-control and prayer on more than one level describing 
them not only as states or virtues but also processes drawn together until the 
ultimate effect of genuine love and union with God is possessed. Yet despite the 
fact that each of the centuries focus on the concept or virtues that introduce it, 
the subsequent capitula often cover similar issues dealt with in other centuries, 
particularly when it comes to the passions and the struggles of the ascetic life, 
albeit from the perspective of the introductory theme. In using the virtues this 
way, we come face-to-face with an example of Maximus’ fractal treatment of 
ascent mentioned in the introduction. I now turn to a treatment of the various 
                                                 
7 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.6 (Cap. sulla car., 92). 
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sections of Capita caritate, but having this framework in mind will help locate 
the thrust of Maximus’ concerns. 
§3.2 Maximus Building, Refining & Connecting – Trinity as Beginning, 
Means, and End & Divine Appropriation 
§3.2.1 Capitulum 1.25: God’s Example as Goal of Imitation & Imitation as 
Possession of God Himself 
In this section, I will show how Maximus builds on his baseline of 
Trinitarian grammar for Christian life as it relates to imitation. In the Capita 
caritate, Maximus builds on this baseline’s rationale for love by applying the 
term ἀπαθὴς to God and finally by identifying God as love per 1 John 4.8. This 
new application of terms is paired with an appeal to the common nature of 
humanity and by describing the quality of the love called for. 
In Liber asceticus, Maximus drew attention to the example of the Son, 
who becomes a man because of God’s love for humanity. God fulfills his own 
command of love in the life and death of Jesus Christ. This kind of love which 
suffered abuse and affliction but maintained love towards enemies through 
prayer and even in the act of rebuke is seen as the primary battleground of the 
Christian life. In order to win this war, one must continue to love like Christ 
despite one’s circumstances. This was accomplished by understanding the 
σκοπός of the incarnation which focused on God’s mercy toward one’s self and 
encouraged the baptized to have the same response toward fellow human 
beings. In other words, one must possess a solidarity with humanity according 
to common weakness and temptation as well as a solidarity with God in 
showing sympathy and mercy. As might be expected, Maximus continues the 
themes he began in the Liber in the Capita caritate. However, he now adds 
another set of ideas that supplement his rationale for love. In Capita caritate, 
Maximus still grounds the necessity of love on the common experience of 
weakness, but he draws attention to humanity’s common nature along with 
imitation of God’s nature as good and impassible (ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς). This is 
slightly different than his rationale in the Liber where there is no mention of 
humanity’s common nature nor a focus on God as ἀπαθὴς. Whereas there was 
an appeal to common activities of humanity in temptation and weakness joined 
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with the imitation of Son’s nature, as good and expressed through his loving 
activities, there is now added an appeal to humanity’s common nature. 
In the Capita, these ideas first cross our path in 1.24 where Maximus 
discusses almsgiving. If someone wants to imitate God when giving alms for 
bodily needs, then there should be no discrimination on the basis of someone’s 
moral status but distribute “to all equally according to their need”. This should 
be the case even though one might prefer those who make good choices.8 
Maximus bases this call for imitation on God’s own merciful doings, a similar 
sentiment found in the Liber, although noticeably here there is a more general 
appeal to God rather than specifically the incarnate Son. In the following 
capitulum, Maximus underscores God as good and without passion along with 
an appeal to the common nature of humanity. The implication is that God’s 
impartial love flows not only from his goodness but also from his status as 
ἀπαθής. He states, 
Just as God, being by nature good and without passion, loves all equally 
as his works but glorifies the virtuous inasmuch as they are also familiar 
with his will and, because of his goodness, shows mercy on the bad and 
corrects them with discipline in this world. So also the one who is good 
by his will and without passion loves all human beings equally, the 
virtuous because of their nature and good choices and the bad because of 
their nature and sympathy, showing mercy [on them] as though they 
were passing by without sense and in darkness.9 
This succinct set of statements draws together several strands that are 
important throughout Capita caritate. The first strand is the distinction between 
God’s nature as ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς and human beings becoming ἀγαθὸς καὶ 
ἀπαθὴς by an exertion of their will or intention (ἡ γνώμη). God’s will falls in line 
                                                 
8 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.24 (Cap. sulla car., 56). 
9  Maximus, Cap. car. 1.25 (Cap. sulla car., 58): Ὥσπερ ὁ Θεὸς φύσει ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ 
ἀπαθὴς πάντας μὲν ἐξ ἴσου ἀγαπᾷ ὡς ἔργα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἐνάτερον δοξάζει, ὡς καὶ τῇ 
γνώμῃ οἰκειούμενον, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον δι’ ἀγαθότητα ἐλεεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ παιδεύων 
ἐπιστρέφει· οὕτω καὶ ὁ τῇ γνώμῃ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐξ ἴσου ἀγαπᾶ, τὸν 
μὲν ἐνάρετον διά τε τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἀγαθὴν προαίρεσιν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον διά τε τὴν φύσιν καὶ 
τὴν συμπάθειαν, ἐλεῶν ὡς ἄφρονα καὶ ἐν σκότει διαπορευόμενον. 
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with his nature. What is seen in God’s nature and will is meant to be reflected in 
the human will with the same result – equal love for all. For the virtuous receive 
glory and the bad receive correction. In this conception, correction and 
discipline are not antithetical to God’s love but its very expression. When the 
human will falls in line with God’s will, the Christian is ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς. 
Maximus will expand more on how he understands this in Cap. Car. 3.21-36. In 
the Liber, imitation was based on God as good and merciful but in the Capita 
caritate the concept ἀπαθὴς is added and easily becomes an example for human 
ἀπάθεια in ascent. This connection remains implicit in the Liber but now 
becomes explicit. It should also be noted that God’s love and the concept of 
ἀπαθὴς are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the way the passage is written 
highlights that the reason God is able to love so thoroughly and equally is 
because he is good and without passion. If we supplement this statement with 
the concepts found in the Liber, it could be stated that God does not have a 
selfish or needy lust for material possessions nor is he obsessed with worldly 
concerns and therefore is able to love impartially. 
The second strand is the shared nature of humanity, which provides an 
additional rationale for love. Whereas in the Liber this was based on a 
recognition of the shared experience of temptation and weakness in tandem 
with God’s activities and nature displayed in the incarnation, Maximus adds an 
additional focus on the common nature of humanity in contrast to the 
disposition of their will or choices.  
The third strand is the concise way Maximus describes the kind of love 
God desires: it must be love for all equally (πάντα ἐξ ἴσου). Often in the Capita, 
πάντα is accompanied by ἄνθρωπος to make this point even clearer. Perfect 
love is constantly found in the context of loving all human beings equally.10 This 
love must be proactive, positive, equally distributed, and consistent.11 Maximus 
uses this formulation no less than ten times in six capitula in the first century 
and twice more in two capitula in the second century.12  
                                                 
10 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.61 (Cap. sulla car., 72); 1.71 (Cap. sulla car.,  76); 2.48, 49 (Cap. 
sulla car., 116). For instances where this is not the case cf. Cap. car. 1.75 (Cap. sulla car., 78). 
11 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.40; 2.49, 50 (Cap. sulla car., 62, 116, 118).  
12 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.17, 24, 25, 61, 71; 2.10, 30 (Cap. sulla car., 56, 58, 72 76, 94, 106). 
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This further distinguishes Maximus from Evagrius, who viewed loving all 
equally as a practical impossibility.13 This way of defining the kind of love God 
desires and its grounding in a shared nature finds no parallel in Diadochus or 
Mark. Something like what Maximus does here can be found in Evagrius who 
grounded the necessity of love on humanity’s status as the image of God. The 
logic goes that because the archetypical image (Christ) is loved, so then should 
those in his image also be loved. In the Capita, Maximus never articulates the 
matter in this fashion but the logic behind it bears a loose similarity. The force 
of the logic in Evagrius’ statement falls on the archetype and image of the 
archetype relationship, but an important assumption is that all humanity bears 
equally the image of the archetype. Maximus will expand on these ideas further, 
tying them again to the first strand but in a slightly different way in 2.24-36. 
Suffice it to say, Maximus has built on his conception of love and his way of 
grounding love in a shared solidarity with God and fellow human beings.  
 At this point it is worth exploring whether, in addition to the new ways of 
talking about the kind of love that is imitated and its grounding in the realities of 
human and divine nature, Maximus continues to call for a love that imitates the 
Son’s incarnate activities of love for neighbor just as he did in the Liber. Is it 
simply “God” or does he name the divine persons. In fact, Maximus does use the 
titles “Son” or “Christ”, especially when abuse, suffering, and affliction are in 
view and often in calls for an equal love for all.. There are several places, 
however, where Maximus uses simply “to imitate”, “imitation” or “God-
imitation” (μιμέομαι, μίμησις or θεομίμητος) without explicitly using the πάντα 
ἐξ ἴσου formulation.14 A good example of this is found in 4.55 where Maximus 
states, 
The one who loves Christ surely imitates him as far as it lies in his power. 
For example, Christ never ceased from doing good to human beings and, 
having been treated with ingratitude and blasphemed, he was patient 
and, having been struck by them and murdered, he endured reckoning 
                                                 
13 Sherwood notes this in his introduction to his translation. It should be noted though 
that Maximus does make a concession towards Evagrius in Cap. car. 4.82 (Cap. sulla car., 230). 
14  Maximus, Cap. car. 4.55, 90; 3.33 (in reference to angels) (Cap. sulla car., 216, 234, 
158). 
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evil to no one whatsoever. These three things are the work of love 
towards our neighbor, apart from which the one who says he loves Christ 
and has gained his kingdom deceives himself. “The one who says to me,” 
he states “Lord, Lord, will not enter into the kingdom of heaven, but the 
one who does the will of my Father.” And again he says, “The one who 
loves me will keep my commandments,” and so on.15 
It is not enough for the ascetic to refrain from evil for the sake of the 
commandment. They must also do good, even as repayment for evil. There is a 
similar way of discussing love and commandments here that mirrors Mark’s 
concern.  Maximus bases imitation on Christ’s example hinting that the domain 
of imitation is on the level of will with the statement “as far as it lies in his 
power” and appeals neither to humanity’s shared nature nor God’s nature as 
ἀπαθὴς or ἀγαθὸς as he does in the texts reviewed above (1.25 and 4.55).  It 
would seem that when suffering is in view so also is the incarnate Son even 
though the title “Son” is rarely used often making way for the title “Christ”. 
Maximus can also use simply the title “God” along with suffering. In 4.90, 
Maximus states, 
God alone is good by nature and the one who imitates God is alone good 
by will. For [his] aim (σκοπός) is to join the wicked to himself, who is by 
nature good, so that they might become good. For this reason, though 
being reviled by them, he blesses, though being persecuted, he endures, 
though blasphemed, he entreats, [and] though murdered he makes 
intercession. He does everything in order that he might not fall from the 
aim (τοῦ σκοποῦ) of love, which is our God himself.16 
In this case, Maximus draws together the idea of imitation with “God” but 
then gives the list of things suffered that often accompanies the title “Christ” or 
“Son”. Additionally, while the will is underscored as the domain of imitation it is 
also his joining (συνάψαι) with the wicked that allows them to become good 
and serves the reason why he, presumably the incarnate Son, endured suffering 
                                                 
15 Cap. car. 4.55 (Cap. sulla car., 216). 
16 Cap. car. 4.90 (Cap. sulla car., 234). 
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so that he would not fall from the σκοπός of love, which is God himself. In this 
formulation, a common activity of God and Christ is love but the term itself is 
identified with God. In the context of the Liber and in light of these other texts, 
love is a common and inseparable activity, at least between the Son and “God” 
but also a defining characteristic of God. Whereas, in the Liber, Maximus does 
not equate love with God as in 4.8, Maximus now makes this link explicit in the 
quote above and elsewhere (1.38 and 4.100). 
An important aspect of imitation is that the will’s own σκοπός be 
directed toward love of God rather than some other purpose. Thus, activity and 
suffering in and of themselves do not garner God or his kingdom, but rather only 
when activity is done, and suffering endured because of Christ and according to 
his example.17 Maximus demonstrates in these passages how pursuing imitation 
of God fulfills not only the teleological goal of loving one’s neighbor but also 
brings the ascetic to the ultimate goal of love of God. This means “possessing” 
God himself (4.100 cf. 1.38). In this way, love can be seen as both a means and a 
goal. Maximus refines this further by identifying the final goal of love with God 
himself incorporating 1 John 4.8.  
Maximus’ integration of an argument based on the nature of God as 
ἀπαθὴς and the shared nature of humanity to support his call for a specific kind 
of love within the rubric of imitation allows love to be understood as both a 
means and goal. This is a unique aspect of Maximus’ thought, especially when 
compared with the writings of Evagrius, Diadochus, Mark or Ps.-Dionysius. 
Diadochus seems to be his closest parallel, drawing a distinction between what 
God is by nature and what humanity can become via attention to God.18 In one 
passage in Capita centum (15), Diadochus, touches on both love of neighbor and 
love of God but despite the profuse use of affective language, love is almost 
                                                 
17 Maximus makes this point in the third century (3.47, 48). There are three examples 
where cognate words for imitation are not used but imitation is communicated using the phrase 
κατὰ Χριστὸν in 1.37, 3.47, 4.30 (Cap. sulla car., 62, 164, 206). Finally, there is the concept of 
likeness (homoiōsis) to God, but I will discuss this more in the section on 3.21-36 (Cap. sulla car., 
152-160).  
18 Diadochus, Capita centum 2, 3 (BBTT 8:14) Diadochus gives a definition of love “an 
increase of affection toward those who are insulting”. The closest he comes to Maximus in his 
conception the imitation of Christ can be seen in 51, 64, 91 (BBTT 8:64, 82-83, 134). 
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entirely framed in reference to God with none of the same kind of parity 
Maximus attempts to bring concerning active love toward neighbor. 
Additionally, there is no grounding for love in the shared nature of humanity. 
These could simply be because these authors assume as much and do not see 
the sense in stating it, but that Maximus is emphatic on this point only allows his 
thought to stand out more in comparison to writers in his own milieu. There is 
some evidence for a similar configuration of ἀπάθεια, love and imitation in 
Clement of Alexandria.19 Specifically, on the theme of love, there is also much 
paralleled in Maximus’ concern for love in Origen’s prologue to Commentaria in 
canticum canticorum where the imitation of Christ plays a significant role in his 
thought. Even, in this case, Maximus differs by giving a central place to the 
pairing of love and ἀπάθεια, the latter of which is not a significant theme in 
Origen.20 Finally, the Liber demonstrated the divine love through the activities 
of the divine persons, especially through the incarnate Son. The Capita takes this 
further, and both demonstrates these same activities and explicitly identifies 
God as love. Thus, the Trinity is the beginning, means, and end of Christian life 
because God is love. 
§3.2.2 Capitula 1.86-100: Trinity as Goal of Ascent 
 I have already shown how the imitation of God leads to the possession of 
God through Maximus’ unique way of describing love as both means and goal. 
This imitation deals specifically with one’s relationship to neighbor in the 
context of love for God. Maximus also relates the concern for love of God and 
love of neighbor to aspects of the human person as part of his overall goal of 
union with the Trinity. In this section, I will show how the Trinity can be seen as 
a goal of contemplation and prayer, but to do so requires some understanding of 
Maximus’ view of ascent within the Capita caritate. An important corollary to 
the Trinity as the goal of ascent is also what Maximus perceives is attainable 
                                                 
19 Thunberg, in his short study on the matter of ἀπάθεια, also found early examples of 
this same theme in Clement of Alexandria. Maximus distinctive take on this may be unique 
within his own milieu but could very well be the result of going back to earlier sources, see 
Microcosm and Mediator, 299-309.  
20 Henri Crouzel, Théologie de l’image de dieu chez Origène, Theologie 34 (Aubier: 
Éditions Montaigne, 1956), 222-232.  
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knowledge of God. Consequently, in tandem with a brief overview of how he 
locates each of the parts of the human person to his conception of ascent, I will 
also look closely at how Maximus describes knowledge of God through θεωρία 
and prayer. A closer look at these concepts in capitula 1.86-100, will allow me to 
show further how Maximus’ grammar for Christian life is shaped by the Trinity 
and thus Trinitarian.  
In his tripartite understanding of the human person, hinted at already in 
Liber asceticus, Maximus envisions that love of God corresponds to the 
ἐπιθυμητικόν part of the soul while love of neighbor corresponds to the θυμικόν 
part of the soul.21 These in turn correspond to the virtues of love (ἀγάπη) and 
self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια). When these are united by the λογιστικόν toward the 
virtue of prayer, they come to ἀπάθεια where lust (ἐπιθυμία) abounds and 
changes into divine desire (θεῖος ἔρως) and anger (θυμὸς) is refined into divine 
love (θεῖα ἀγάπη).22 When this becomes a habit (ἕξις), the baptized have 
reached perfect love.23 Such heights, however, are precarious so Maximus will 
often give advice on how to maintain this habit and warns against vainglory.24 
Much of the first century continues to detail how to develop ἀπάθεια, 
love for God and, by consequence, love for one’s neighbor. However, toward the 
end of the century (1.85-100) Maximus ventures into a denser account of his 
idea of ascent. Sherwood notes how the last 15 capitula (1.85-100) are meant to 
form a series that deals specifically with the pure mind.25 While Sherwood does 
                                                 
21 On this this tripartite distinction see Blowers, “Gentiles of the Soul: Maximus the 
Confessor on the Substructure and Transformation of the Human Passions,” JECS 4.1 (1996), 73-
75 and Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 104-112, 169-207 and 259-266. Maximus also gives 
a bipartite distinction τὸ λογιστικόν/τὸ παθητικόν the latter of which includes τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν 
and τὸ θυμικόν. In Liber asceticus, Maximus does not describe these as part of the ψυχή and only 
the first two appear while nous is used rather than λογιστικόν. He simply lists θύμος, ἐπιθυμία, 
νοῦς as those things that the virtues tame, quench and separate (ἡμερόω, μαραίνω, χωρίζω) to 
support the mind’s journey toward God (Lib. asc. §19, CCSG 40:41.355-364). 
22 Maximus, Lib. asc. §19-26 (CCSG 40:41.355-53.466); Cap. car. 2.48 (Cap. sulla car., 
116). 
23 Maximus, Lib. asc. §19-26 (CCSG 40:41.355-53.466); cf. Cap. car. 1.1, 4.75, 4.91 (Cap. 
sulla car., 50, 226-228, 234).  
24 Maximus, Cap. car. 3.84, 4.79-80 (Cap. sulla car., 184, 230). 
25 Sherwood suggests the larger pericope is 1.85-100 (Cap. sulla car., 82-88), see St. 
Maximus, 252 n. 79.   
 151 
not provide a reason other than the recurring theme of pure mind, I agree that 
these last capitula form a progression that details the mind’s successive journey 
toward God. This is in part because of the repeated presentations of ascent, the 
first of which occurs in 1.85 and appears as simply a bipartite possession of 
ἀπάθεια and flight to the “knowledge of the heavenlies”.26 Then in 1.86, there is 
a tripartite presentation and finally in 1.94 and 1.97 there is a four-part 
presentation. Each gives more detail and looks at ascent from a slightly different 
angle, but all the presentations are related to the mind.  
The first presentation in 1.85 highlights the importance of ἀπάθεια for 
the mind. The second arrangement in 1.86 highlights the importance of 
continuing toward contemplation and knowledge. In 1.94, Maximus describes 
the successive activities necessary to arrive at a knowledge of the Trinity and 
the fourth describes specifically the pure mind and what it dwells on. The 
intervening capitula fill out these presentations.  These terse bipartite and 
tripartite presentations are repeated throughout the Capita. Several of the 
explicit references to the “Holy Trinity” (ἁγίας τριάς) are found in these 
presentations of ascent and are always found at the end of the progression.27 
These provide a continual reminder of the goal of the ascent and how various 
kinds of activities fit within it. While imitation of the incarnate Son was called 
for and an orientation toward the Trinity was illustrated in the Liber, placing 
knowledge of the Trinity at the end of this progression gives Maximus’ account 
of ascent further complexity. Likewise, they provide an additional Trinitarian 
texture to the Capita. Several examples are notable and are worth exploring 
before I move on since they provide an important context for 1.86-100. 
 In 2.21, Maximus inserts ecclesial titles into a tripartite description of 
the mind’s ascent drawing a comparison between the title and the ascetic 
himself. Maximus starts with the deacon (διακόνος) “who anoints the mind for 
sacred contests and who drives away from himself impassioned thoughts”. He 
then moves to presbyter (πρεσβυτέρος) who “illumines [the mind] with regard 
to the knowledge of the things which exist and destroys knowledge falsely so-
                                                 
26 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.85(Cap. sulla car., 82). 
27 Cf. for example Cap. car. 2.4,  
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called” and then ends with the bishop (ἐπίσκοπος) who “perfects with holy 
myrrh the knowledge of the worshipped and holy Trinity.”28 This tripartite 
division and the roles described are similar to those in Ps.-Dionysius’ De 
ecclesiatica hierarchia 5. Ps.-Dionysius uses λειτουργός, ἱερεύς, ἱεράρχης and 
although Maximus uses a different set of titles the progressive tasks of purifying, 
illuminating and perfecting are the same.29  
A second example, in 4.47, is instructive since it gives us an idea of how 
Maximus understands doctrines or dogmas (δόγματα) and faith within ascent. 
There he states, “The Christian philosopher is in these three things: in the 
commandments, in the δόγματα and in faith. The commandments separate the 
mind from the passions. The δόγματα introduce it to the knowledge of the 
things which exist and faith [introduces it] to the θεωρία of the holy Trinity.”30 
His explanation here reveals how δόγματα and faith relate to his tripartite 
distinction and also demonstrates how, though δόγματα gives a broad scope of 
knowledge, it is faith that enables the contemplation of the Trinity. A similar 
explanation is found just before the 1.86-100 in 1.77 where Maximus places the 
δόγματα in a bipartite description of ascent stating, “Through the 
commandments, the Lord fully perfects those who have been laboring at them 
as ἀπάθεια while through the divine δόγματα he graces them with the light of 
knowledge.”31 He follows this with a description of the scope of δόγματα in 1.78: 
                                                 
28 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.21 (Cap. sulla car., 100).  
29 Ps. Dionysius, De eccl. heir. 5.3 (CD 2: 106). Maximus’ description of the διακόνος is 
the one who anoints (ὁ ἀλείφων). In Ps.-Dionysius, it is the priest (ἱερεύς) that anoints with oil 
although the λειτουργός purifies and leads the initiates up to this point. Maximus’ description of 
the πρεσβυτέρος, however, shows how he can view illumination as a kind of purification. 
Maximus’ description could signify that by his time the deacon anointed with oil even though 
formal task of baptism was left to the priest and/or bishop. Ps.-Dionysius also mentions myrrh 
along with the sacraments of the σύναξις in De eccl. heir. 5.3 as “providing a perfecting 
knowledge of the divine workings and that it is through this that there is effected both the 
unifying uplifting toward the divinity and the most blessed communion with it,” (CD 2:106, 
transl. by Luibheid in Complete Works, 235-236). 
30 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.47 (Cap. sulla car., 212). 
31 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.77 (Cap. sulla car., 78): Διὰ μὲν τῶν ἐντολῶν ὁ Κύριος ἀπαθεῖς 
τοὺς ἐργαζομένους αὐτὰς ἀποτελεῖ· διὰ δὲ τῶν θείων δογμάτων τὸν φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως 
αὐτοῖς χαρίζεται.  
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they are either about God, visible and invisible things or providence and 
judgment.  
Taken together, these examples show how Maximus conceives of θεωρία. 
However, these examples also paint a picture of Maximus’ understanding of the 
role of faith and God in the movement of ascent. Within θεωρία, especially when 
the divine δόγματα are in view, grace and faith play an important role. The 
second movement of ascent according to the tripartite division, therefore, is a 
reflection on God, creation and their relationship where there is either false 
knowledge or δόγματα accessed by faith and grace. Likewise in the first 
movement the goal is freedom from passions and it is the commandments or 
rather obedience to the commandments that allows this to happen but it is 
God’s role to perfect their work into ἀπάθεια. This is affirmed elsewhere where 
God, as in the Liber, is described as a help in the Christian’s battle against the 
passions. These instances of Maximus’ various formulations are examples of 
how he can present ascent from a variety of perspectives whether it be actions, 
virtues or kinds of knowledge, but also demonstrate how in all three 
movements God’s role perfects and graces the baptized as they continue in 
ascent toward the ultimate goal of the Holy Trinity. With this context in mind, I 
know turn to 1.85-100. 
In 1.85, Maximus provides an analogy using the flight of a sparrow to 
describe the minds difficulty with the “knowledge of the heavenlies” if it does 
not have ἀπάθεια.  In 1.86, Maximus gives us the first tripartite presentation of 
ascent and describes it in three movements: freedom from the passions → 
contemplation of creatures → knowledge of the Trinity.32 Perfection in the first 
movement (freedom from the passions) allows the mind to be pure, and it is 
able to reflect on things without being impassioned by them (1.87). Once the 
baptized are free of the passions, prayer can commence as the mind is drawn by 
the beauty of knowledge in spite of demonic activity (1.88-91). In the next 
century (2.5), Maximus will further detail that this first stage, which he calls, ‘ἡ 
πρακτικὴ μέθοδος’ does not “completely free the mind from passions so that it 
can pray without distraction.” It only liberates the mind from hate and self-
                                                 
32 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.86 (Cap. sulla car., 82).  
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indulgence. Instead, it must receive in succession (διαδέχονται) spiritual 
contemplations that allow the mind to escape forgetfulness and ignorance. Only 
then is it able to pray as needed.33 In 1.92, Maximus explains that joining the 
virtues with knowledge allows the ascetic to see things in proper perspective; to 
see them “according to their nature clearly” and, therefore, determine how to 
use them properly.34 A sign that one has reached the highest degree of ἀπάθεια 
is that thoughts are simple and not impassioned (1.93).35  
The next presentation of ascent, in 1.94, now makes an appearance and 
underscores a successive “stripping off” that the mind accomplishes through 
various activities, 
The mind strips off the passions through the exercise of the 
commandments and through the spiritual contemplation (θεωρία) of 
visible things [strips off] the impassioned thoughts of things and through 
the knowledge of things unseen [strips off] the contemplation (θεωρία) 
of the visible and this [is stripped off] through knowledge of the Holy 
Trinity.36  
In this capitulum, the second movement (contemplation of creatures) is 
now further subdivided into two distinct movements – the spiritual 
contemplation of visible and invisible things. Both of these movements are 
meant to provide knowledge and are to be joined to the practice of the virtues. It 
has already been shown how the acquiring of δόγματα is an important goal in 
this movement and permits the baptized to “seeing things clearly”. However, 
how exactly this is the case has not been made clear. The next series of capitula 
(1.95-97) give more specific content to the kind of knowledge that is to be 
                                                 
33 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.5 (Cap. sulla car., 90). 
34 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.87-93 (Cap. sulla car., 84, 86). Maximus will also discuss the 
importance of both knowledge and love often emphasizing the necessity of both πρᾶξις/ἀγάπη 
and θεωρία/γνῶσις. For example, later in the fourth century, Maximus addresses knowledge 
without love and its potential dangers of vainglory. The consequence is aborted knowledge, see 
Cap. car. 4.56-62 (Cap. sulla car., 170, 173). 
35 Maximus gives this further treatment in 3.42-43. 
36 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.94 (Cap. sulla car., 84, 86). 
 155 
gathered from the contemplation of visible and invisible creation but not before 
examining God’s role in the process. 
 Maximus begins in 1.95 with a simile that compares the sun’s rising, 
when it reveals itself and everything its illumination touches, with the “Sun of 
Righteous”, which “when it rises on the pure mind, reveals the λόγοι of all things 
that have been and will be.” Whatever it is the ascetic is supposed to learn, the 
mind is assisted by the “Sun of righteousness”. This title “Sun of righteousness” 
is prolific in theological literature and is at times directly tied to Malachi 4.2.37 A 
notable parallel can be found in Clement of Alexandria, Protrepticus 11.114 and 
Gregory of Nazianzus’ Or. 45 where the title emphasizes the Son’s role in 
illumination.38 Konstantinovsky discusses this phrase in relation to Evagrius, 
but it should be noted that the phrase can be found in Diadochus, Ps.-Dionysius, 
Basil of Caesarea, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa and Origen.39 Regardless 
of who Maximus might be drawing on, the title gives a clear indication that God, 
likely the Son, is the source of this illumination but only goes part way in 
explaining how he affects pure vision. 
The next capitula (1.96-99) give us an initial idea of what can be known 
of God and what the source of this knowledge is. Firstly, there is a negative 
statement: God is not known from his οὐσία. Unlike the Liber, Maximus 
incorporates here a caveat about knowing God. Despite the fact that the Trinity 
is the beginning, means, and goal toward which desire is redirected, there is 
something that cannot be known – his οὐσία. Yet, initially, he does not explain 
why.  God is known, however, from his great works (μεγαλοεργία) and his 
providence (πρόνοια) of existing things. These serve as a mirror through which 
the baptized perceive his infinite goodness (ἀγαθότης), wisdom (σοφία) and 
power (δύναμις) (1.96).40 Maximus restates the four-part presentation of ascent 
again in the next capitulum (1.97) but this time from the perspective of thought. 
                                                 
37 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.95 (Cap. sulla car., 86). Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum 
canticorum, homilia 5 (Wernerus Jaeger, Gregorii Nysseni Opera, Vol. VI), 147.18. 
38 Clement, Protrepticus 11.114 (SC 2 2nd ed.:182-183); Gregory, Or. 45  (PG 36:641, 
645). 
39 Konstantinovsky, Making of a Gnostic, 97.   
40 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.96 (Cap. sulla car., 86). 
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“The pure mind is found either in the simple ideas of human things, in natural 
contemplation of visible or invisible creation or in light of the Holy Trinity.”41  
In the following two capitula, Maximus divulges what may be gained 
through the contemplation of visible and invisible creation. Within visible 
creation the mind searches in order to find their natural λόγοι, or what is 
signified by them or their cause (1.98). For invisible creation, the mind searches 
their natural λόγοι, the cause of their becoming, the things which correspond to 
them and what providence and judgment concerns them (1.99). These taken 
together show that regardless of how the λόγοι are defined, the intermediate 
goal is to see God’s goodness, wisdom, and power through creation and that this 
recognition serves as a means to see their cause. The successive stages of 
contemplation and the knowledge gained from them are meant to draw the 
mind toward their cause.  It is likely that Maximus means to infer that their 
cause is God but conspicuously absent in the Capita caritate is an explicit 
affirmation of God as “Cause”. God is affirmed as Creator, infinite and infinite 
substance (4.9), Word, Spirit, and holy Trinity but never explicitly as “Cause”. 
This title, which was important to the Areopagite, will play largely in Maximus’ 
description of God in the Ambigua ad Iohannem. Maximus does identify divine 
simplicity as the reason why the mind must travel from the plurality of created 
existence through their λόγοι to the one simple God. He does, however, note the 
effect of focused attention on creation and God on the observer.  In 3.97, he 
notes how the mind is naturally shaped and transformed by and toward what it 
contemplates, but “when it has come to be in God, it becomes entirely without 
form and without figure. For by contemplating he who is simple, [the mind] 
becomes simple and wholly luminous.” 42 Nor is there an explicit reference to 
the λόγοι of creation being drawn together into the divine Logos. Maximus does, 
                                                 
41 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.97 (Cap. sulla car., 86). 
 42 Maximus, Cap. car. 3.97 (Cap. sulla car., 190): Δεχόμενος ὁ νοῦς τὰ τῶν πραγμάτων 
νοήματα, πρὸς ἕκαστον νόημα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκε· θεωρῶν δὲ ταῦτα πνευματικῶς, 
πρὸς ἕκαστον θεώρημα ποικίλως μεταμορφοῦσθαι· ἐν δὲ Θεῷ γενόμενος, ἄμορφος πάντη καὶ 
ἀσχημάτιστος γίνεται· τὸν γὰρ μονοειδὴ θεωρῶν, μονοειδὴς γίνεται καὶ ὅλος φωτοειδής. 
Maximus is careful here using the preposition πρὸς instead of the more familiar εἰς or accusative 
for the verbs μετασχηματίζω and μεταμορφόω to indicate the mind being shaped by objects of 
contemplation rather than becoming identical with them. 
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however, echo a sentiment similar to Areopagite’s concerning the aesthetics of 
knowledge in 1.90 and later in 2.77. 
Finally, after a detailed progression from 1.85-1.99, in 1.100 Maximus 
describes the final goal of ascent,  
Having come to be in God, [the mind] searches first, the λόγοι concerning 
his essence (οὐσία). Yet inflamed by passion, it does not find consolation 
from those things proper to Him. For it is equally without means nor 
acceptable for any kind of nature to do so. However, it does receive 
consolation from those things concerning him, I mean, above all the 
things concerning eternity, boundlessness and limitlessness, goodness, 
wisdom and power as Creator, provider and judge of existing things. And 
this alone is able to be apprehended about him by all—his 
boundlessness. And knowing nothing itself [is] to know beyond [the] 
mind, as the theologians Gregory and Dionysius say somewhere.43 
While the entire set of capitula from 1.85 to the end of the first century 
form a progression, these three final capitula are meant to be taken together 
and are dependent on one other. The statement of the subject (the mind) in 
1.98, is not restated but assumed in 1.99 and 100. In other presentations of 
ascent, the Trinity is at the end of the progression, and so we might expect to 
find a reference here either to any one of the divine persons or the whole 
Trinity, but an initial reading does not make this immediately apparent. 
Maximus simply uses the title “God”. 
The first phrase (Ἐν δὲ Θεῷ γενόμενος) is important to Maximus, and he 
repeats it elsewhere within similarly heighten contexts and affirms Sherwood’s 
observation that it is at the height spiritual life. 44 This experience is not only 
                                                 
43 Maximus, Cap. car. (Cap. sulla car., 88):  Ἐν δὲ Θεῷ γενόμενος, τοὺς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας 
αὐτοῦ πρῶτον λόγους ζητεῖ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ πόθου φλεγόμενος, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν δὲ 
παραμυθίαν εὑρίσκει· ἀμήχανον γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνένδεκτον πάσῃ γενετῇ φύσει ἐξ ἴσου. Ἐκ δὲ 
τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν παραμυθεῖται, λέγω δὴ τῶν περὶ ἀϊδιότητος, ἀπειρίας τε καὶ ἀοριστίας, 
ἀγαθότητός τε καὶ σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως δημιουργικῆς τε καὶ προνοητικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς τῶν 
ὄντων. Καὶ τοῦτο πάντῃ καταληπτὸν αὐτοῦ μόνον, ἡ ἀπειρία· καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μηδὲν γινώσκειν, 
ὑπὲρ νοῦν γινώσκειν, ὥς που οἱ θεολόγοι ἄνδρες εἰρήκασι Γρηγόριός τε καὶ Διονύσιος. 
44 Maximus, Cap. car. 1.100 (Cap. sulla car., 88), 2.26 (Cap. sulla car., 102); 2.100 (Cap. 
sulla car., 142); 3.97 (Cap. sulla car., 190). 
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where the ascetic perceives the attributes of God but also receives those 
attributes like a transfusion of light. It is deification.45 While the Liber briefly 
described the naked mind becoming deiform as a result of joining with (τῷ Θεῷ 
συνάπτει) and conversing with God (αὐτῷ προσομιλῶν), here the mind finds 
consolation (παραμυθεῖται), not in his οὐσία but in his boundlessness, 
goodness, wisdom, and power.46 There is some question about how exactly to 
understand what Maximus says here. Does he mean “having come to be with 
God”, “having come to be in God”? If the latter is correct, in which sense should it 
be taken? A review of the texts in the Capita do not necessarily shed any light on 
this, and so this must remain an open question until the Ambigua ad Iohannem 
where Maximus discusses explicitly how human beings participate in God. This 
discussion begins in the Capita but does not draw on this specific language in 
order to describe the dynamics of participation as it relates to ontology.  
While Maximus clearly encourages contemplation and knowledge of the 
Trinity, he is emphatic that λόγοι concerning God’s οὐσία, variably referred to as 
οἱ κατ’ αὐτὸν is unknowable. While “reasons” may be an applicable meaning for 
λόγοι in reference to visible and invisible creation, it makes less sense in 
relation to God. “Ground” or “principle” or even a more literary meaning such as 
“definition”, if it is to be understood similarly in each context, seems to be a 
more likely meaning. Maximus states that created nature is not only without 
means (ἀμήχανον) of finding encouragement from his οὐσία but it is 
unacceptable for it to do so (ἀνένδεκτον). Maximus contrasts the two phrases οἱ 
κατ’ αὐτὸν and οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν. These phrases are translated variously but it 
seems likely neither is meant to communicate location as much kind of 
knowledge based on the relation of the subject to the object: what God is himself 
and what is known about God by others. This seems to be most consonant with 
the distinction he has already made in 1.96 and the one he attempts to make in 
1.100. He is, therefore, not attempting to refer to a physical location or even 
location of accidents relative to their substance but the source of perspective 
(God himself or someone else). This is further reinforced by double use of 
                                                 
45 Sherwood, St. Maximus, 21, 252 n.79. Cf. Cap. car. 2.26, 100; 3.97 and a similar phrase 
παρίστησι τῷ Θεῷ in 3.44, 4.86. 
46 Maximus, Lib. asc. §24 (CCSG 40). 
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preposition περὶ in the phrases “Ἐκ δὲ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν. . .” and “. . . λέγω δὴ τῶν 
περὶ. . .”.47 Translations that use language of location suggest (perhaps 
unintentionally) that the list of attributes Maximus enumerates are somehow 
revolving around him. Maximus makes this distinction in order to highlight 
what may or may not be known about God within contemplation and prayer. If 
the capitula in this section are synthesized the distinction is between knowledge 
based on apprehension of God’s μεγαλοεργία and πρόνοια which is accessible to 
created beings and apprehension of his οὐσία which is accessible only to God 
himself.  The ineffability of God’s οὐσία and knowing God from his activities is 
something that had become a standard maxim of theology and emphasized in 
Neo-Platonic philosophy.48 Theologically, it can be witnessed to not only in the 
debates between Eunomius and the Cappadocians Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of 
Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus but is an affirmation that can be found in 
Evagrius, Ps.-Dionysius, Cyril of Alexandria, Severus of Antioch. 49 Maximus 
makes no explicit mention here of the persons of the Trinity although Sherwood 
sees such a reference in the listing of “goodness”, “wisdom”, and “power” in 
1.96. These three similarly appear in 1.100. While this is possible, Maximus does 
not make such a connection explicit here or anywhere in the Capita caritate.50 
The possibility though is greatly increased when an observation made by 
Sherwood is taken into consideration. The contrasted phrases, οἱ κατ’ αὐτὸν 
and οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν, are found in Gregory’s Oration 38.7 and 45.3 (PG 36.317B = 
PG 36.625A) where Gregory is emphasizing how God is “beyond all our notions 
of time and nature” and is only “grasped by the mind alone, but in a very dimly 
                                                 
47 Maximus, Cap. Car. 1.100 (Cap. sulla car., 88).  
48 Ilaria Ramelli, “The Divine as Inaccessible Object of Knowledge in Ancient Platonism: 
A Common Philosophical Pattern across Religious Traditions,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
75.2 (April 2014), 167-188. There are aspects of this article with which I disagree, nevertheless 
it well observes the phenomenon across the spectrum of pagan, Jewish and Christian authors of 
appealing to the unknownable οὐσία of the divine while affirming what can be known from 
divine activities.  
49 The importance of this distinction has been noted in relation to the development of 
Pro-Nicene theology in the fourth century; see Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach 
to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 282-283.  
50 Cf. Maximus, Cap. Car 4.2, 3. (Cap. sulla car., 194). 
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and limited way; he is known not directly but indirectly.”51 Likewise, the list of 
attributes Maximus associates with the latter phrase (οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν) follows 
closely Gregory’s discussion in sections 7-9 of Or. 38 and 45.3-5(PG 36.317B-
321A = PG 36.625A-629B), including the correlation of “boundlessness” 
(ἀπειρία) with “eternity” (ἀΐδιος) and “limitlessness” (ἀοριστία) and its 
affirmation as the sole apprehendable attribute.52 Gregory, in his discussion, 
describes creation as a result of Goodness. The angelic and heavenly powers 
having been conceived by Goodness, and this conception is fulfilled by his Word 
and perfected by his Spirit.53 In this description, “Goodness” seems to correlate 
with the Father although Gregory does not explicitly connect the two titles. After 
angelic and heavenly powers the creation of the material world followed and 
thus “mind” and “sense” serve as able receptors for the invisible and visible 
worlds both of which are heralds of the work (μεγαλοεργία) of the Creative 
Word (δημιουργός Λόγος) and which are ultimately brought together in the 
creation of humanity (PG 36.629A- 631B). Gregory likewise will go on to speak 
not only of the creation of the κόσμος but also of his care and salvation of it 
through the incarnation. Maximus had, in 1.96, stated that God cannot be known 
in his essence (οὐσία) but could be known from his work and his providence of 
created things (ἐκ τῆς μεγαλουργίας αὐτοῦ καὶ προνοίας τῶν ὄντων). Maximus 
subsumes the activities of creation, providence, and judgment under goodness, 
wisdom, and power.  
The way this is formulated suggests two ways of deciphering creation. 
On one level, God is known as boundless with the corresponding affirmation of 
his eternity and limitlessness. On another level, it speaks of God as three 
perceived in goodness, wisdom and power through the activities of caring and 
judging creation. Later in the Capita Maximus will state, “God, existing from 
                                                 
 51 Gregory, Or. 38.7 (PG 36.317B; SC 358:114). The translation may be found in Gregory 
Nazianzus, transl. Brian E. Daley, The Early Church Fathers, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 120 
[emphasis mine].  
52 “Ἀεί or ἀΐδιος , ἀπειρία, and ἀοριστία in Or. 38.7 and 8 (PG 36.317B; 320A, B: SC 
358.114-120). Ceresa-Gestaldo, (Cap. sulla car., 89 n. 42) gives us another reference in Maximus’ 
Ep. 2 (PG 91.400D) and also notes von Balthasar’s reference to Ps.-Dionysius Ep. 1-5 (CD 2:156-
163).  
 53 Gregory, Or. 38.9 (PG 36.320B-C: SC 358.118-120).  
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eternity, creates when he wants, by his Word and Spirit because of his infinite 
goodness.”54 This second phrase is slightly different and tells of the problem of 
applying the formula goodness = Father, Wisdom = Son, and Power = Spirit too 
rigidly. If applied strictly the passage would read, “God created . . . by his Word 
and Spirit because of his infinite Father.” However, it is God’s goodness and so 
while in this particular capitula (4.4) goodness may not unequivocally mean 
Father the distinction between God and his Word and Spirit allows for the term 
to connote the Father. Thus from these two capitula and with Gregory’s oration 
in the background, it seems Maximus means to suggest a correlation between 
goodness, wisdom, and power and the Father, Son, and Spirit even though there 
is not an explicit correlation between the titles and elsewhere it is not applied as 
strict formula. There is also an interesting phenomenon here which Maximus 
will later take the time to address – the oneness and threeness of God reveal 
each other. Following Maximus understanding in 1.86-100, within 
contemplation of creation, the activities of the divine persons in tandem with 
the λόγοι reveal God; however, within prayer God is revealed as unbounded but 
also as goodness, wisdom, and power. This feature of his thought and the 
process of contemplating the λόγοι and by doing so perceiving God being 
revealed as one and three will be developed further in the Ambigua ad 
Iohannem. 
The very last phrase in 1.100 is instructive: Maximus sees a common 
teaching from Gregory and Dionysius concerning the relation between 
ignorance and knowing. In light of the material already covered from the Liber 
and earlier capitula, Maximus likely means here an ignorance, ignoring and 
unknowing of all created things complemented by a loving knowing of God 
whose essence is unknowable. There is here a confluence of Evagrius, Ps.-
Dionysius, and Gregory Naziaznus both in how he articulates his theology but 
also in the language used. I will briefly attempt to parse out these various 
influences. 
Dionysius’ literary role, in 1.100 is to give language to the divine side of 
the ascetic’s ἀγνοία. The Areopagite’s Ep. 1 contains the phrase: αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπὲρ 
                                                 
54 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.4 (Cap. sulla car., 194). 
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νοῦν καὶ οὐσίαν ὑπεριδρυμένος, αὐτῷ τῷ καθόλου μὴ γινώσκεσθαι μηδὲ εἶναι, 
καὶ ἔστιν ὑπερουσίως καὶ ὑπὲρ νοῦν γινώσκεται.55 This is joined with the 
already stated ἀγνοία of creation that parallel’s closely the concerns of both 
Evagrius and Diadochus in their understanding of ἀπάθεια. In order to see 
things clearly, one must unknow these things according to lustful passions. 
There is, then, in Maximus, several senses in which unknowing and knowing are 
applied. In terms of unknowing/ignorance, it is applied to both creation and 
God. This concern can be subdivided into desire and knowledge which are 
connected. In one sense, the ascetic must ignore attachments to material things, 
including one’s self, in favor of God. This in turn allows the ascetic to unknow 
former ways of viewing these things in favor of perceiving their true nature and 
use. At the same time there is an acknowledgment of our ignorance of God’s 
οὐσία, a perpetual ignorance in the face of an infinite God and an unknowing of 
false conceptions about God so the baptized may be encouraged (παραμυθεῖται) 
from knowing his activities and experiencing God as the Father, Son, and Spirit. 
The entrance to this journey is by faith toward the development of love for God 
and human beings through prayer and self-control resulting in union with God 
and deification. The structure of ascent as described here by Maximus, stresses 
the importance of both ἀγνοία and γνῶσις within the context of ἀγάπη.  
This progression of capitula demonstrates how Maximus presents a 
more robust understanding of contemplation and its relation to the journey 
toward union with God in prayer. The various presentations of ascent that place 
the Trinity at the end of this journey give an explicit expression of the Trinity as 
telos of Christian life. Additionally, Maximus’ conception of the relation between 
oneness and threeness and the inaccessibility of the Trinity’s οὐσία shapes what 
is expected and sought within his view of ascent. The incorporation of these 
items gives further texture to his already established Trinitarian grammar for 
Christian life. Yet these items are not just a more Trinitarian styling that he 
places over the Trinitarian grammar he presented in the Liber. They give a more 
robust picture of what takes place in prayer and becomes part of the core of his 
teaching concerning the ascetic life. Maximus’ conception of ascent is robust and 
                                                 
55 Dionysius, Ep. 1 (CD 1:157). 
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draws together various aspects of the tradition he has inherited to address the 
issues of knowledge and desire and their relation to God and creation. 
§3.2.3 Capitula 4.69-78: Means of Ascetic Life & the Manifestation of God’s 
Presence  
In century four, there are ten capitula which exhibit a marked concern 
for one of the ways Maximus portrays God as means in the Liber:  participation 
and manifestation of the activities of God in the Christian life. These capitula, 
however, focus specifically on the perceptibility of the presence of God in the 
Christian life. They are an example of an early answer by Maximus to issues that 
had long become established questions within the ascetic community regarding 
sin and the presence of God within the Christian. Historically, these questions 
were brought to a head in the Greek East through the rise of Messalianism and 
their account of why Christians sin despite having been baptized and the 
presence of the Holy Spirit. Judging by the various responses in Ps.-Macarius, 
Diadochus and Mark the Monk, these questions continued to hold the attention 
of ascetic communities up until the time of Maximus. Thus, while this is the first 
time Maximus will touch on this subject with the explicit purpose of addressing 
the questions of perceptibility, it is not the last time and it is important for this 
study because it in this vein the Maximus touches on the presence of God in the 
life of the baptized with special reference to Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
Maximus to a large extent follows the trajectory laid out by the three 
writers mentioned above. Maximus, however, includes the redirection of desire 
under the rubric of practicing the commandments of loving God and loving 
people. So in a way that is not prevalent in Mark, Maximus draws on the 
language of desire. This he likely draws from Diadochus although it must be 
noted that Ps.-Macarius, Ps.-Dionysius and both Gregorys (Nyssa and 
Nazianzus) also used this language to describe the Christian life. Maximus’ 
writings also show marked similarity concerning the indwelling of God 
becoming increasingly manifest in proportion to one’s spiritual ascent. This is 
seen most vividly in Expositio orationis dominicae, where he heightens this 
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theme with the language of incarnation.56 At this stage of Maximus’ writing, 
however, we have only gone part way towards this heighten language. As was 
evident in Liber Asceticus, Maximus portrays the life of the baptized as an 
appropriation of the Son’s activities to the believer through the Spirit, utilizing 
the language of indwelling. Additionally, he also discusses the manifestation of 
Jesus’ indwelling power in the body drawing on the language of 2 Corinthians 
4.8-10 and 12.9, 10. Yet these two themes, similar as they are because of the 
concept of “indwelling” do not seem to come together explicitly in the Liber. In 
Capita 4.69-78 we see much of Diadochus and Mark’s concerns and means of 
confronting them woven together. 
Capitulum 4.69 opens the foray into these concerns by addressing the 
suppositions of “some of the brothers”, (Τινὲς τῶν ἀδελφῶν . . .) and the concern 
here, as Maximus tells us, is that, “they think they are outside the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit.”57 Maximus’ response is noticeably less abrasive in comparison to 
Mark, yet shares the same rationale. Firstly, Maximus cites a neglect of 
practicing the commandments as the problem. This negligence is “why they do 
not know that the one who has an unadulterated faith in Christ possess in 
themselves all the divine graces together.”58 The second reason is broader and is 
put in the first person plural. In this case, he cites “idleness” (ἀργία) in active 
love for God, which would bring to light the divine treasures (θησαυρός) “in us”, 
as another cause for their false suppositions.59 Maximus here contrasts 
inactivity with activity and correlates them with internal and external realities, 
and perception. Those who are active in love make known the treasures in 
them. Those who are not active in love are unable to see themselves clearly, 
thinking these gifts are external to their lives. 
What follows is a series of capitula that calls upon no less than nine 
biblical passages, using both the scriptural language and images, to highlight 
how the baptized must pursue purification by the commandments, specifically 
                                                 
 56 Maximus, Or. Dom., 4.391-8, 554-9 (CCSG 23:50, 59). Plested, Macarian Legacy, 223-
226 notes the connection of this theme with Ps.-Macarius.  
57 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.69 (Cap. sulla car., 224).  
58 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.69 (Cap. sulla car., 224).  
59 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.69 (Cap. sulla car., 224).  
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love, in order to come to see and manifest the indwelling presence of God.60  The 
series is connected by two parallel chains of words. One chain focuses on 
describing the internal aspect of the baptized: “in himself” (4.69) → “heart” 
(4.70)→ “field” (4.71) → “heart” (4.72)→ “mind/heart” (4.73) → “mind” (4.74-
77).61 Capitula 4.69-72 focuses on purification through the commandments, love 
and self-mastery and then in 4.73 the identification of “mind” with “heart” is 
made.62 Then in 4.74-76 the means by which this call is fulfilled is explained 
through an explanation that echoes the Liber where love of God leads to self-
mastery over the passions and love of neighbor leads to opposing anger. In 4.76, 
there is another call for the cleansing of the mind, and the consequent result is 
that the baptized will be able to see the indwelling Christ. The second parallel 
chain focuses on what is meant to be found or what becomes perceptible when 
the process of purification takes place. Starting in 4.69 up to 4.76 the 
progression runs as follows: “Holy Spirit’s gifts of grace” → “divine graces” → 
“divine treasures within” → “Christ” → “treasures of wisdom and spiritual 
knowledge” → “God” → “Lord” → “indwelling Christ”.63 Maximus emphasizes 
that these are hidden, waiting to be found, perceived, seen, or revealed through 
active love. In 4.70 and 4.73, Maximus states that it was through “faith” and “the 
grace of holy baptism” that specifically Christ had come to dwell in the heart or 
mind.64 In capitulum 4.70, Maximus draws together two scriptural texts, 
Ephesian 3.17 and Colossians 2.3, to fill in more specifically the idea of 
“treasure” stating,  
If, according to the Divine Apostle, Christ dwells in our hearts by faith 
and all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden in him then 
the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden in our hearts.65  
                                                 
 60 See the discussion of similar texts in Ps.-Macarius and their connection to Maximus in 
Plested’s, Macarian Legacy, 238-242  
61 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.69-77 (Cap. sulla car., 224-228).  
62 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.73 (Cap. sulla car., 226).  
63 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.69-76 (Cap. sulla car., 224-228).  
64 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.70, 73 (Cap. sulla car., 224, 226). 
65 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.70 (Cap. sulla car., 224). 
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 These treasures are made manifest to the heart “in proportion to each 
one’s purification through the commandments.”66 In capitulum 4.71, alluding to 
Matthew 13.44, Maximus admonishes that this treasure “hidden in the field of 
your heart” is obscured because of idleness. Instead, of understanding its value 
and pursuing it, “nearby things” are pursued but turn out to be nothing more 
than “thorns and prickles”.67 In 4.72, Maximus utilizes Matthew 5.8: “Blessed are 
the pure in heart for they shall see God”.68 Since God is hidden in the heart of 
those who believe, they will see him and the treasures in him when they purify 
themselves through love and self-mastery with an ever-increasing clarity of 
vision. It is clear in this capitulum that Maximus is connecting the title “God” 
with Christ from 4.70-71. Maximus in the next capitulum (4.73) ties this more 
directly with selling one’s possessions and giving alms. By doing so, the body is 
no longer the locus of attention but the baptized can focus on the purification of 
their mind, “For these things, which stain the mind do not allow it to see the 
indwelling Lord in it through the grace of baptism.”69 Maximus in 4.74 now 
weaves in the theme of love stating that the Scriptures name the virtues “ways” 
(ὁδοί), the greatest of which is love. He quotes 1 Corinthians 12.31 and 
correlates this “more excellent way” with a description that echoes his very first 
definition of love from century one – a preference for eternal things over 
material and temporal things. Building upon this thread, he aligns the 
commandments of love in the next capitulum (4.75) with aspects of the soul 
asserting that “love for God withstands lust (ἐπιθυμία) persuading it to exercise 
self-mastery in regard to the pleasures while love for neighbor withstands anger 
(θυμός) and makes the baptized despise fame and possessions.” He then 
interchanges Christ, his audience and the commandments to love God and 
neighbor into the story of the Good Samaritan stating, “These are the two 
denarii which the Savior gave to the innkeeper so that he might take care of 
you.” He continues with an exhortation, “but do not show yourselves as 
                                                 
66 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.70 (Cap. sulla car., 224). 
67 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.71 (Cap. sulla car., 224). 
68 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.72 (Cap. sulla car., 226).  
69 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.73 (Cap. sulla car., 226). 
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ungrateful by colluding with the robbers, lest you be found beaten again and no 
longer half-dead but [actually] dead.”70 To remind us of the matter at hand, 
Maximus in capitulum 4.76 exhorts his audience to cleanse their minds of anger, 
the remembrance of wrongs and shameful thoughts so that they will be able to 
know the indwelling of Christ. In capitulum 4.77, Maximus lists a series of 
activities and experiences had by the baptized that are meant to demonstrate 
the reality of God’s indwelling. I quote it in full here: 
Who illumined you with the faith of the holy, worshiped and 
consubstantial Trinity? Or who made known to you the incarnate 
dispensation (τὴν ἔνσαρκον οἰκονομίαν) of one of the Holy Trinity? And 
who taught you the λόγοι concerning the natures of incorporeal beings 
or those concerning the beginning and consummation of the visible 
world? Or [those] concerning the resurrection of the dead and eternal 
life? Or [those] concerning the glory of the kingdom of the heavens and 
the dread of judgment? Was it not the grace of Christ dwelling in you, 
that is, the pledge of the Holy Spirit? What is greater than this grace? Or, 
what is better than this wisdom and knowledge? Or, what is more 
sublime than these promises? If then we are idle and negligent and do 
not cleanse ourselves from the passions which defile us and blind our 
minds, so that we are able to see the λόγοι of these things more clearly 
than the sun, then we should blame ourselves and not deny the 
indwelling of grace.71 
This set of capitula concludes with a reminder that the same God “who 
promised eternal goods” and gave “the pledge of the Holy Spirit also commands 
the cultivation of life so that the inner man, being freed from the passion, might 
begin from this point the enjoyment of these goods” (4.78).72 
These capitula are an indicative example of Maximus addressing the 
long-standing issue of the perceptibility or rather lack of perceptibility of God’s 
presence in the baptized. Through this discussion Maximus demonstrates that 
                                                 
70 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.75 (Cap. sulla car., 226, 228). 
71 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.77 (Cap. sulla car., 144). 
72 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.78 (Cap. sulla car., 228).  
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the Trinity is beginning, means, and goal of ascent but also that it is through 
ascent that one properly participates and manifests this reality. Maximus plaits 
together several groups of ideas through his exegesis of texts from Colossians, 
Ephesians, Matthew, and I Corinthians and his already established means of 
discussing ascent. Maximus, like Diadochus, does not see this as an issue of an 
internal war between an indwelling of Satan and the Holy Spirit but rather an 
issue of active love. Likewise, key to the perceptibility of God’s gifts or 
indwelling is the redirection of desire through love of God and neighbor. Yet 
when he chooses to talk about how this perceptibility works in relation to 
ascent he chooses a formulation much like Mark’s: it is in proportion to one’s 
purification via the commandments of loving God and neighbor.73 The cleansing 
brought about by this reorientation of desire through self-mastery, which 
“makes all things clean”, and the more excellent way of love, allows the hidden 
treasure of Christ himself and all the wisdom and knowledge in him to be 
seen.74   
Up to 4.76 it is tempting to suspect that Maximus is once again taking us 
through the process of ascent as he has done elsewhere in the Capita (i.e. 1.86-
100). The material in 4.69-76 seems to fall within Maximus’ description of 
πρακτική and so 4.77 and 4.78 might well take us into θεωρία. This initial 
                                                 
73 While commenting on a large swath of texts across Maximus’ corpus, Plested 
underscores the overarching Macarian tenor of the Confessor’s understanding of the heart but 
also notes connections with Origen in capitula 4.73, Macarian Legacy, 239-242. As he observes 
elsewhere, the Macarian imagery surrounding the close association between the heart and the 
intellect or its identification and the heart’s place in the process of ascent can be found in 
Diadochus and Mark the Monk, Macarian Legacy, 106-107, 126, 136-137, 154-155 (esp. no. 60), 
157-158.  In these specific capitula (4.69-78), Maximus draws on this imagery and shows 
evidence of parallels with Ps.-Macarius and Mark the Monk. For example, the idea that one’s 
progress is in proportion (κατὰ ἀναλογίαν or κατ’ ἀναλογίαν) to love or other aspects (i.e. 
grace, faith, desire, virtue) of Christian life can be found variously in Ps.-Macarius and Mark the 
Monk. Diadochus retains the idea but does not use this Greek construction. Its origins can be 
found in the New Testament (Ro. 12.6) as “in proportion to faith”. This exact construction can be 
found in Ps.-Macarius and Mark the Monk (cf. the discussion in Macarian Legacy, 87-89) 
alongside other formulations. In comparison to Ps.-Macarius and Diadochus, one of Mark’s 
constructions is unique to him – “in proportion to the working of the commandments” (κατὰ 
ἀναλογίαν τῆς ἐργασίας τῶν ἐντολῶν), identifying “the commandments” with loving God and 
loving neighbor (De lege spirituali 28; Ex operibus justificari 56; De baptismo 5, 9, 17; cf. also De 
lege spirituali 151, Ex operibus justificari 210, 211). Maximus’ echoes this phrasing and 
identification in several of these capitula (4.67, 69, 4.70) but adds loving enemies. 
74 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.73 (Cap. sulla car., 226).  
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impression seems to be confirmed since much of the content of 4.77 has to do 
with illumination and knowing. Additionally, in light of Maximus’ use of a 
confession-like structure at the beginning of Liber asceticus, a similar set of 
elements can be observed in these capitula. Capitulum 4.77 begins with the 
Trinity moves on to the incarnation, creation, resurrection, eternal life, and 
eternal destiny. Yet there is missing here an account of the fall and Christ’s 
ascension. Furthermore the inclusion of “faith in the holy, worshipped, 
consubstantial Trinity” and “the λόγοι concerning the incorporeal beings” 
echoes earlier presentations that places faith, the investigation of the λόγοι and 
providence and judgment in the second and third movements.75 In either case, 
what is significant is Maximus’ emphasis on who or what accomplishes this 
illumination. Maximus’ answer is the grace of the indwelling Christ, the pledge 
of the Holy Spirit. In this case the grace spoken of (as in 4.72) is the indwelling 
Christ; however, there is, in a way similar to Diadochus, a correspondence 
between these phrases such that they serve as metonyms for one another.  
Like Liber asceticus, there is a close pairing of the Son as Christ and the 
Spirit. In this case, though their identities as indwelling realities are virtually 
interchangeable, whether the phrase “indwelling Christ” or “the pledge of the 
Spirit” is used the consequence is the same – both illuminate the mind. 
However, the capitula that discuss the Holy Spirit, 4.69, 77 and 78 form an 
inclusion which suggests that, while Maximus sees their reality as 
interchangeable, he still delineates that it is the Spirit which applies or mediates 
the presence of Christ. Virtually everything that Maximus has placed in the 
second stage of θεωρία is listed here. The only thing lacking is a direct 
identification of these things as θεολογία and prayer. Maximus means to 
demonstrate to his audience that if they have these things then they have not 
only the gifts or wisdom and knowledge of Christ but God himself. In this sense, 
God, specifically in the indwelling of Christ/pledge of the Spirit, is not only the 
goal of contemplation but also the one who initiates and illumines the mind 
toward their reality.  
                                                 
75 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.77 (Cap. sulla car., 228). 
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This is confirmed in another capitulum where Maximus shows that the 
activities of contemplation, theology, and prayer fulfill Paul’s admonition in 
Galatians 5.16.76 Similar to the previous capitula, it is the one who possesses 
perfect love who can say, “Lord Jesus, in the Holy Spirit,” fulfilling what Paul 
states in 1 Corinthians 12.3.77 This intertwining of scriptural texts regarding the 
Holy Spirit and the activities of the later stages of ascent follow a distinction he 
makes in the third century between image and likeness and demonstrates that 
his use of this distinction goes beyond the purpose of answering earlier 
Origenist conceptions of it and serves to regulate his descriptions of ascent in 
general. However, for Maximus there is a broader concern, akin to Mark, to 
demonstrate that every part of Christian life depends on God and that within 
ascent it is not simply those things that are designated as “by grace” that require 
God and specifically the Holy Spirit’s action but also the πρακτική and indeed all 
of life.78 The ascetic life and, more broadly, the Christian life from this 
perspective is an attention to one’s own heart through purification of the virtues 
and attainment of knowledge in an effort to see God, specifically to see the 
indwelling Christ – the pledge of the Holy Spirit that was received through faith 
and the grace of baptism.79 This all plays out on the field of God’s grace to 
humanity through being, well-being, and eternal being. Loosen comes to a 
similar conclusion stating, “Die Entfaltung des Gnadenlebens durch Tugend und 
Erkenntnis unter dem Einfluß des Pnuema ist Erscheinen des einwohnenden 
Christus.”80 The reality of the Triune life is only properly participated in and 
                                                 
76 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.64 (Cap. sulla car., 220).  
77 Maximus, Cap. Car. 4.39 (Cap. sulla car., 210). 
78  Maximus, Cap. car., 2.38, 39 (Cap. sulla. car., 110, 112). 
 79 Maximus expounds further the interaction and synergy between the human person, 
the Holy Spirit and grace in several there places in his corpus. Qua. Thal. 6 (CCSG 7:69-71), 
where Maximus explains the grace of baptism, is often cited in this regard and mention is often 
made of connections with Ps.-Macarius, Diadochus and Mark the Monk. Larchet, for example 
gives considerable space to the theme of synergy and baptism, see La divinization de l’homme, 
409-424, where he gives citations for the three authors listed above, Gregory of Nyssa and 
Gregory of Nazianzus. See also, Plested, Macarian Legacy, 35-40, 81-90, 150-156, 230-232; 
Blowers & Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery, 38-43, 103, 104 and Garrigues, La charité, avenir divin 
de l’homme, 188, 116-119.  
80 Josef Loosen, “Logos und Pneuma in begnadeten Menschen bei Maximus Confessor,” 
PhD. diss. (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 1940), 128.  
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manifested, indeed, perceptible within the purview of love pursued in a graced 
ascent. Otherwise, the baptized are blind to their own true status as indwelt by 
God and his grace.  
God serves as not only an example of goodness and loves through the 
incarnate Son’s life as in the Liber but also through God’s ἀπαθῆ, goodness, and 
love. The Trinity serves as the goal of an affective union whereby the entirety of 
human desire, led by the mind successively through creation and illumined by 
the Spirit, finds its place with God and is encouraged by his activities. Finally, 
the means of this process, the field of play so to speak, is one of grace where 
participation in love leads to a manifestation of an already existing grace. This 
process is described in terms of love and indeed as Maximus points out in the 
last capitulum, if love is possessed so is God since God is love. Love, indeed the 
Triune God, can be seen as the beginning, means, and end of Christian life. 
Maximus brings all the activities of Christian life and its sources under this 
rubric. To put it simply, in the Capita caritate and Liber asceticus, Maximus 
envisions love correlated with the Trinity as the unifying theme for the various 
concerns of philosophy and theology. 
§3.3 Maximus Engagement with Origenism & Tritheism 
§3.3.1 Capitula 3.21-36: The Irreducible Distinction of God and Creation in 
Maximus’ Early Anti-Origenist Thought 
 There are several capitula that can be identified as “anti-Origenist” and in 
this section I will demonstrate how they offer a new sub-theme. While serving 
to elucidate a cosmological and metaphysical basis for ascent, they also refine 
how God serves as beginning, means, and end. However, to accomplish this 
means briefly investigating some context for Origenist theology and the 
theology itself particularly as it was represented in the Fifth Ecumenical Council. 
Therefore, before I begin my analysis of specific passages, I discuss in the 
following paragraphs how Origenist theology, while a clear issue for Maximus, 
can also be seen in a broader philosophical context. Then, I briefly give a more 
specific historical context for the passages reviewed. Finally, I briefly discuss the 
literary context of these passages, in part to bring to mind the earlier review of 
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the flow of the Capita but also to locate what Maximus is doing within his 
conception of ascent.  
 While Maximus has Origenist thought here in mind, I want to suggest 
that Maximus’ critique can equally be seen as a criticism of philosophical 
accounts of life. This is not necessarily new but putting Origenist thought 
alongside a broader current of philosophical thinking helps provide a broader 
context for understanding Maximus’ thought.  It had long been an accusation 
that Origenism itself was the result of the influence of Greek pagan philosophy. 
Whether or not this is accurate in the end is worth study, but I think this 
question often overshadows a more straightforward observation – that the 
philosophy of Maximus’ time was indeed concerned with a more “spiritual” 
outlook and consequently often framed philosophical questions regarding 
cosmology and epistemology from this perspective. Maximus surely would have 
known this regardless of whether he had a formal education or not. There are 
plenty of materials available about pagan philosophy within Christian circles 
that he would not have had to go far to encounter it. Proving this is beyond the 
scope of my study here, but I raise it only to suggest that Maximus, while writing 
against Origenist tendencies in ascetic communities, may just as likely have 
been inoculating his audience against a broad spiritual movement in philosophy.  
 Yet even my description here may be over-simplified, especially in light 
of research that suggests Maximus is writing against and adapting the thought 
of John of Philoponus, a miaphysite philosopher.81 A common element in both 
Origenist and philosophical movements was the immanence of the divine, which 
could be conceived as dispersed throughout the spectrum of existing beings. 
Thus, the origin and goal of being is to go out from and return to the divine. This 
                                                 
 81 Gregory Benevich, “John Philoponus and Maximus the Confessor at the Crossroads of 
Philosophical and Theological Thought in Late Antiquity,” in Scrinium Vol. 7-8: Ars Chrisitan. In 
memoriam Michail F. Murianov (21.XI.1928-6.VI.1995). Part One, ed. by R. Krivko, B. Lourié & A. 
Orlov (Piscatway: Gorgia Press, 2011-2012), 102-130 and “Maximus Confessor’s Polemics 
Against Tritheism and His Trinitarian Teaching,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 105.2 (2012), 595-610 
and finally Torstein, Theodor Tollefsen, Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early 
Christian Thought, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 83-
132. 
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is accomplished not only in a moral sense but also in an ontological sense.82 For 
the Christian to retain any of this would mean articulating it in a way that 
preserved the hard-fought distinction between created existence and God but 
also explaining how it is that God is immanent and able to be participated in –  
how to see God as in whom, through whom and for whom all things exist.83 In 
John Philoponus, we see exactly this debate between Christian and Neo-Platonic 
conceptions on the eternity of matter although lacking any extensive attempt to 
address deification.84 Maximus, in his “anti-Origenist” material in Capita caritate 
and later in his Ambigua ad Iohannem and Capita gnostica, demonstrates exactly 
this desire to maintain the tension between God’s utter transcendence and 
personal accessibility in deification.  
In these next paragraphs, I will provide a specific, historical context for 
Maximus’ discussion of Origenist theology. Some of this discussion will be 
familiar to scholars of Maximus, having been covered by previous authors. 
However, I hope to draw attention to Maximus’ interest in distinguishing kinds 
of γνῶσις in his discussion and its relation to the triad Sherwood discovered 
was important for Maximus’ engagement. My goal, therefore, in providing this 
historical context is to fill in some areas where Sherwood’s discussion stopped 
or aspects of Maximus’ engagement that he did not notice. In particular, I will 
discuss the role of γνῶσις in relation to the triad οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια 
and why these terms were important to Origenism and were rejected by Fifth 
Council. 
In capitulum 3.21, Maximus begins by addressing what God knows about 
himself in contrast to “Holy Powers”. This is a rather odd starting point at first 
                                                 
 82 Eric Perl, in his Ph.D. dissertation, highlights these aspects in relation to Neo-Platonic 
thought but also draws a distinctions between “Origenist” theology which differed from Neo-
Platonic thought in describing the henad of rational being as actually pre-existent in God 
whereas the Neo-Platonic cycle suggest that the effect exists in its cause becoming differentiated 
upon procession (Methexis, Creation, Incarnation, 231-232). He goes on to say against Sherwood 
and others that Maximus “genuinely expresses the same philosophical insight into creation as 
the Neoplatonic cycle,” in his doctrine of the logoi (232-233). 
  83 cf. 1 Cor. 8.6, Heb. 2.10, Gal. 3.28, Col. 3.11, Eph. 4.4. 
 84 John writes against Proclus in De Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum. For a discussion 
of how this debate provides a context for understanding Maximus’ arguments see Joshua Lollar, 
“To See into the Life of Things,” 332-354. 
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and seems a disjunctive topic in relation to what has just preceded it. How does 
knowing what God knows about himself help develop self-control within 
ascent? However, when viewed alongside the evidence of Origenist thought 
available at the Council of Constantinople 553 CE, Maximus’ need to cover this 
material becomes clearer. Several pre and post-conciliar documents report that 
part of Origenist cosmology entailed asserting that human souls pre-existed as 
either minds or Holy Powers united to the monad, but upon being fully satisfied 
with the divine, they grew cold in their love for God and thus became souls. As 
part of their punishment, they fell into various instantiations of material 
existence within which they would migrate until returning to the monad. 
According to this cosmology, the original state of these minds was as a henad 
that possessed an “identity of οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια through their union 
with and γνῶσις of God the Word.”85 Notable here is the role of γνῶσις as the 
means by which an identity of οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια is accomplished. 
Elsewhere, the restoration of these minds to the henad is likewise described as 
an identity of οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, and γνῶσις. The first three of these 
terms have been reviewed by Sherwood and Von Balthasar at length. 
In looking for antecedents of the first three terms (οὐσία, δύναμις, and 
ἐνέργεια), Sherwood reviews several instances within the writings of 
Iamblichus and Proclus and then moves on to Ps.-Dionysius and John 
Scythopolis commentary concluding that it is of Aristotelian origin and has 
made its way into the “Neoplatonic heritage”, although he does not give any 
citations of Aristotle.86 Upon looking for other antecedents, one finds that the 
triad is actually quite prolific. Even a cursory search through the Thesaurus 
Linguae Graecae uncovers usages in Aristotle’s Metaphysica and in the works of 
his commentators Alexander Aprhodisias, Simplicus, John Philoponus as well as 
                                                 
85 Concilium 553, canon 2 (ACO 4.1:248). 
86 Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 103-106. For Iamblichus he gives the ninth question of 
De Mysteriis and from Proclus Elements of Theology, proposition 169 and De malorum substantia 
§40-44. The latter he ties to Ps.-Dionysius Divine Names 4.23 where a discussion bearing 
similarity to the ninth question of De Mysteriis ensues about the evil nature of demons. In 
addition to this discussion Sherwood cites Celestial Hierarchy 11.2 where the Areopagite 
suggests that these three are divine intelligences and Divine Names 4.1 where he describes them 
as hypostasized substances.    
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Plotinus who discusses it in Enneads 5 and 6 as does Proclus in his 
commentaries on Plato and Damascius in his De principiis.87 This would suggest 
that, at the very least, the discussion starting with Aristotle was certainly 
continued and that the terms played into the ongoing problem of unity, 
multiplicity, and causation.88 Outside philosophical treatises, Galen touches on 
                                                 
87 I searched for the terms οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια in their nominative, genitive, 
dative and accusative forms. The following are but a sample of vetted uses and the editions 
searched in the TLG: Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1042B, 1050B, 1071B, 1088B in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, 2 Vols., ed. W.D. Ross Reprinted and corrected (Oxford:Claredon Press, 1924); 
Alexander Aphrodisias, Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria in Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in 
Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 1 
(Berlin: Reimer, 1891), 545.36-38, 551.6-7, 555.26, 565.17-18, 592.36-37, 689.7, 804.30-32,  
Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria in Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum 
libros octo commentaria, ed. M. Wallies, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 
1891), 432.1; Plotinus, Enneades 5.3.5, 5.3.12, 5.9.5, 5.9.10, 6.2.5, 6.6.9, 6.7.37 in Plotini opera 3 
Vols., ed. P. Henry & H.-R. Schwyzer, Museum Lessianum. Series philosophica (Leiden: Brill, 
1951-1973); Porphyry, Platonis Timaeum commentaria, frag. 75 in Porphyrii in Platonis 
Timaeum commentariorum fragmenta, ed. A.R. Sodano (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 
1964); Simplicus, Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria in Simplicii in Aristotelis physicorum 
libros octo commentaria 2 Vols., ed. H.Diels, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 9 & 10 (Berlin: 
Reimer,  1882, 1895), 9.96.7, 9.148.21-22, 9.271.5-6, 10.820.30-31, 10.826.27-29; John 
Philoponus, Aristotelis libros de generatione et corruption commentaria in Ioannis Philoponi in 
Aristotelis libros de generatione et corruption commentaria, ed. H. Vitelli, Commentaria in 
Aristotelem Graeca 14.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), 14.2.44.27-29, In Aristotelis libros de anima 
commentaria in Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, 
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 15 (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), 15.15.30-31, 15.209.34-35, 
15.352.10-11, 15.519.19-20, 15.523.26-27, 15.523.34-35, 15.538.22, 15.540.10-12, 16.365.28-
30, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum in Ioannes Philoponus. De aeternitate mundi contra 
Proclum, ed. H. Rabe (Leipzig: Teubner, 1963), 250.11-12, 254.20-21; Proclus, Platonis 
Alcibiadem I in Proclus Diaodochus. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, ed. L.G. 
Westerink (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1954), 84.16-17, Platonis Timaeum 
commentaria in Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria 3 Vols., ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1965), 2.125.12-13, 2.306.15-17, 3.335.24-25;  Damascius De prinicipiis in Damascii 
succesoris dubitationes et solutions Vol. 1, ed. C.É. Ruelle (Paris: Klincksieck, 1889), 131.19, 20, 
132.2, 3, 14-15 135.6-8, 137.1-2, 138.2-4, 14-15, 142.23, 143.8-11, 20-21 26-27, 195.13-14, 
309.19-21, 311.23-25, 312.2-3 and In Parmenidem in Damascii succesoris dubitationes et 
solutions Vol. 2, ed. C.É. Ruelle (Paris: Klincksieck, 1899), 101.13-15, 26 in Thesaurus Linguae 
Graecae, s.v. “^ουσια*, ^δυναμ*, ^ενεργ*,” accessed October 19, 2014, http://www.tlg.uci.edu/. 
88 A very helpful explanation of the debate up until the time of Maximus, particularly as 
it related to Damascius, Proclus, and Iamblichus is found in Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Damascius' 
Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Damascius (480-550 CE) is one of the latest to be suggested as the author of the works 
attributed to Dionysius the Aeropagite. See, Carlo Maria Mazzucchi, “Damascio, Autore del 
Corpus Dionysiacum, e il dialogo Περι Πολιτικης Επιστημης,” Aevum: Rassegna di scienze storiche 
linguistiche e filologiche 80.2 (2006), 299–334.  Regardless of whether this evaluation is able to 
stand under further scrutiny, Damascius’ work, De Principiis, bears enough similarity to the 
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the term.89 In Christian circles of the fourth century, the terms show up in 
numerous places but especially in Trinitarian theology as a means of 
understanding how it is that God can be known if not by οὐσία.90 In this 
instance, the terms are seen as causal not simply sequential. The activity 
(ἐνέργεια) of God in creation, as an exercise of his δύναμις, flows from his οὐσία 
and gives access to knowledge about God albeit, as Gregory Nazianzus noted, in 
a limited way. Likewise, the sequence was applied to the persons of the Trinity 
as pro-Nicenes attempted to explain the designation of the Son as the power 
(δύναμις) of God and yet maintain his consubstantiality. This resulted in 
explanations of various kinds of causality.91 While Gregory of Nazianzus dealt 
with how this language could be used and the Son still be understood as 
consubstantial, eventually Basil and Athanasius would apply the entire 
sequence to the Godhead in discussions of the Son and the Spirit.92 The Father, 
Son, and Spirit have the same οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια and thus the causal 
sequence became a way of designating consubstantiality. As appealing as many 
                                                 
issues discussed by the Aeropagite, Maximus and the supposed Origenist doctrines to be worthy 
of a more thorough investigation.   
 89 Galen De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac facultatibus Book 11 in 
Claudii Galeni opera Omnia, Vol. 11, ed. C.G. Kühn (Hildesheim: Olms, 1965), 577.14-578.1 and 
Qoud animi mores corporis tempermenta sequantor in Claudii Galeni Pergameni scripta minora 
Vol. 2, ed. G. Helmreich, J. Marquardt & I. Müller (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1967), 774.17-19, De 
theriaca ad Pisonem in Claudii Galeni opera Omnia, Vol. 14, ed. C.G. Kühn (Hildesheim: Olms, 
1965), 14.225.13-226.1 in Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, s.v. “^ουσια*, ^δυναμ*, ^ενεργ*,” 
accessed October 19, 2014, http://www.tlg.uci.edu/. 
90  Pamphilus, Diversorum capitum seu difficultatum solutio, Quaestio 2, 9 and 11 (CCSG 
19: 142.176-180; 187.11-14; 204.104-205.115); Council of Ephesus ACO 1.1.7.51.34, Ps.-
Athanasius Sermo in annutiationem deiparae 2, 5, (PG 28:920B; 924A); Cyril, De sancta trinitate 
dialogi (SC 231:350.29-352.44), Thesaurus de sancta consubstantiali trinitate (PG 75:521B, 577B 
608C), Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium (Wernerus Jaeger, Gregorii Nysseni Opera Vol. 1.), 
1.1.244.2. 
 91 See for example the study on Gregory of Nyssa by Michel R. Barnes, “The Background 
and Use of Eunomius’ Casual Language,” Arianism After Arius: Essays on the Development of the 
Fourth Century Trinitarian Conflicts, eds. Michel R. Barnes and Daniel H. Williams (Edinburgh: T 
& T Clark Ltd., 1993), 218- 222. 
 92 Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 29.15 (PG 36.92B-93A: SC 250.208) discusses the relation 
of οὐσία and ἐνέργεια in response to Eunomian denials of the Son’s consubstantiality based on a 
specific understanding of causality. Maximus will eventually comment on this text in Ambigua 
26. For a discussion of the shift of language in Basil and its use by both Athanasius and Basil for 
the defense of the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit see Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 197-198, 
211-218. 
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of the philosophical and theological sources are, there does seem to be a more 
ready explanation. The terms appear in a letter of Justinian to the bishops that 
had gathered before the Fifth Council in 553 CE and later in its anathemas 
precisely as part of the description of the Origenist myth surrounding the henad 
of rational beings. The pertinent sections of the letter read, 
. . . they assert that there were minds without any number or name, with 
the result that there was a henad of all rational beings through identity of 
substance and operation and through power and their union with and 
knowledge of God the Word. . . 93 
. . . and that all will be raised again to the same henad and become minds 
(as they were in their pre-existence), when indeed the devil himself and 
other demons are restored to the same henad, and when impious and 
godless human beings will be with godly inspired men and the heavenly 
powers and will enjoy the same union with God that Christ too enjoys, 
just as in their pre-existence, with the result that there will be no 
difference at all between Christ and the remaining rational beings, 
neither in substance nor in knowledge nor in power nor in operation.”94 
Later, in canons 2 and 13 of the Council, the terms appear again, 
2. If anyone says that the origin of all rational beings was incorporeal and 
material minds without any number or name, with the result that there 
was a henad of them all through identity of substance, power, and 
operation and through their union with and knowledge of God the Word, 
but that they reached satiety with divine contemplation and turned to 
what is worse, according to what the drive to this in each one 
corresponded to, and that they took more subtle or denser bodies and 
were allotted names such that the powers above have different names  
just as they have different bodies, as a result of which they became and 
                                                 
93 Justinian, Epistola ad sanctum concilium in Georgii monachi Chronicon, Vol. 2, ed. 
Carolus de Boor, Bibliotheca scriptorium graecorum et romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1904), 630.18-21 and translation from The Acts of Constantinople 553, vol. 2, transl. by 
Richard Price, Translated Texts for Historians 51 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), 
282. Hereafter cited Price, TTH 51.2. 
94 Epistola, (Chronicon, 2.631.15-25, transl. by Price, TTH 51.2, 282-83). 
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were named some cherubim, some seraphim, and others principalities, 
powers, dominations, thrones, angels and whatever heavenly orders 
there are, let him be anathema.95 
13. If anyone says that there will not be a single difference at all between 
Christ and other rational beings, neither in substance nor in knowledge 
nor in power over everything nor in operation, but that all will be at the 
right hand of God as Christ beside them will be, as indeed they were also 
in their mythical pre-existence, let him be anathema.96  
 These few excerpts show clearly how the triad worked within the 
scheme of the Origenist cosmology. Rational beings are minds that have an 
identity of substance, power, and operation. Through satiety, all fell except for 
one, which became Christ. Those that fell became the various created powers 
and beings both visible and invisible. Canon 8 and 9 in the canons of 553 seem 
to further address issues raised in Justinian’s epistula regarding the relationship 
between the mind that did not fall and becomes Christ and God the Word. God 
the Word is only Christ “catachrestically” linked with the unfallen mind such 
that “the Word is called Christ because of this mind and this mind is called God 
because of the Word. . .”97 From these, we can already get a sense of the 
movement, which becomes so important to Maximus’ treatment of the Origenist 
myth later in the Ambigua ad Iohannem. 
 Canon 7 of 553 contains more detail on another theme that does not 
appear in epistula and makes a less coherent appearance in canon 4 of 543. This 
theme discusses how Christ, who became king and Creator, redeems all rational 
beings. In this account Christ, who is united to God the Word before all ages and 
passes through each level of existence,  
. . . took on various bodies and received various names, becoming all 
things to all, among angels and angel, among powers a power, and among 
                                                 
95 Acta concilium oecumenium Constantinopolitanum (553), canon 2 in (ACO, 4.1, 248-
249, transl. Price, TTH 51.2, 284).  
96 Acta, canon 13 (ACO, 4.1, 248-249, transl. by Price, TTH 51.2, 286). This theme 
continues in canons 14 and 15.   
 97 Acta, canon 8 and 9 (ACO, 4.1, 248-249). 
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the other orders or genera of rational beings took on appropriately the 
form of each, and then like us partook in flesh and blood and became for 
human beings a human being.98 
Canon 8 strongly affirms that the Logos is God and consubstantial with the 
Father and the Holy Spirit, one of the Holy Trinity and is the one who became 
incarnate.99 In the earlier eighth canon of 543, there is recorded more of the 
consequence of this fuller picture: mainly, that God’s power is finite, and 
creation is coeternal with God. 
Sherwood rightly points out the importance of the triad οὐσία, δύναμις, 
and ἐνέργεια but seems to miss the equal importance of the term “knowledge” 
(γνῶσις). The history surrounding the time between the first canons of 543 and 
later literature is helpful. Price notes an increased focus on Christological issues 
between the epistula ad synodum Origene and later anathemas of 553 and the 
earlier condemnation of 543.100 Within this ten-year span, changes within the 
Origenist party seem to have taken place. In order to understand this, and how 
it is relevant to our topic, some history will need to be reviewed. First, the 
condemnation of the three chapters by Theodore of Mopsuestia was, as Price 
outlines, a result of attempts to reconcile the miaphysites.101 In Palestine, where 
support for Theodore was strong and within this broader imperial activity the 
conflict between anti-Origenists and pro-Origenists played out. Eventually the 
Origenists themselves experienced internal tensions between Prōtoktists, which 
seemed to have retained the view that Christ would ever be superior to the 
saints as first created (πρωτόκτιστος), and the Isochrists (Ἰσόχριστοι), who held 
that the saints would attain equality with Christ. The Prōtoktists were accused of 
posing a quadrinity because they added another person to the Trinity. The 
Prōtoktists sought support against the Isochrists and eventually won the favor of 
Justinian.102 Price suggests that they did this by drawing out the aspects of the 
                                                 
 98 Acta, canon 13 (ACO, 4.1, 248-249, transl. by Price, TTH 51.2) 
 99 Acta, canon 8 (ACO, 4.1, 248-249) 
100 Price, TTH 51.2, 278-279.  
101 Price, TTH 51.2, 277-280; TTH 51.1, 20, 122-129.  
102 The source of much of this narrative is Cyril of Scythopolis see Daniel Hombergen, 
The Second Origenist Controversy: A New Perspective on Cyril of Scythopolis' Monastic Biographies 
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Isochrists’ Christology that most resembled Nestorianism and reluctantly agreed 
to condemn Theodore’s chapters against Cyril.103 Regardless of whether this 
portrayal is accurate it shows how Christology came to be a more important 
issue as time went on. 
So, from the canons of 543, 553 and Justinian’s epistula there can be 
discerned a clear narrative structure to the Origenist myth: primordial unity → 
fall → creation of material existence → descent of the Logos for redemption → 
shedding of material existence → return to primordial unity. This narrative 
shows how bound up in the Origenist cosmology the issue of Christology is. 
They are virtually inseparable. This is in part because of the linkage of the 
unfallen mind with God the Word. On both ends of this cosmology, there is a 
unity of οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, and γνῶσις with Word. It is also because the 
return to primordial unity is accomplished by the Logos who, united with the 
mind and becoming Christ, takes on all the various forms of existence between 
the Monad and human beings. In light of Trinitarian theology of the fourth 
century where the triad of terms was a way of communicating consubstantiality, 
it is not surprising that these affirmations were condemned specifically over the 
issue of how to describe creation’s, particularly human, union with God. 
                                                 
as Historical Sources for Sixth-Century Origenism (Roma: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 2001), 
190-200. 
103 Price, TTH 51, 2.277-280.  A problem for this way of explaining how Nestorianism 
and Origenism eventually were tied together at the Council is that it seems as if the issue 
between the two opposing Origenist sides is on the eschatological end of their cosmology; 
whether the saints and Christ will be equal or not. The Conciliar anathemas cut at the entire 
Origenist cosmology. The constant affirmations that Christ is one of the Holy Trinity, creator and 
God (anathemas 6, 7, 8) would cut as much against the Prōtoktists position as those which 
anathematize the equality of rational beings with Christ at consummation of all things 
(anathemas 13, 14, 15). In order to agree with the decisions of the council the Prōtoktists would 
not only have to condemn Theodore’s chapters, but also disavow their entire cosmology. While 
this is not impossible, it creates a slight problem for both Price and Hombergen because it seems 
as if such an about face by the Prōtoktists would have gained the attention of Cyril of Scythopolis 
and perhaps been the source of some gloating. It seems more likely that the Prōtoktists 
cosmology differed in more areas than eschatology and perhaps allowed them to align 
themselves with Justinian. Hombergen rejects Brian Daley’s suggestion that Origenists were 
lumped together by Neo-chalcedonians (Hombergen, Second Origenist Controversy, 190-198). He 
opines that the Prōtokrists had a closer affinity to the Antiochene tradition while the Isochrists 
were sympathetic to miaphysite Christology but does not make a detailed comparison.  
 181 
In light of this overall picture, it seems that if Maximus wanted to 
challenge the Origenist cosmology he would need to take several steps. 
Primarily, there must be a demarcation between created and uncreated 
existence but one that gives an account of unity and diversity both as it relates 
to the one God and diverse beings but also as it relates to union with God. 
Another step would entail addressing how the Logos redeems not only human 
existence but also the cosmos. To accomplish the first task the terms οὐσία, 
δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια must be dealt with on the level of time via the other two 
triads (γένεσις-κίνησις-στάσις/ἀρχή-μεσότης-τέλος) as Sherwood suggests. But 
there must also be an attempt to deal with how γνῶσις fits in this picture. 
Consequently, he must primarily deal with these terms since they are reported 
to have been used by the Origenists. In the Capita, Maximus does not explicate a 
Logos/logoi doctrine as much as he assumes it, nor does he directly tackle some 
of the other issues such as the issue of satiety, movement, or Christology.104 
Instead, Maximus tackles issues that allow him to highlight God’s transcendence 
in relation to knowledge, participation and the triad of terms οὐσία, δύναμις, 
and ἐνέργεια. 
These texts give background for why Maximus places such emphasis on 
the relationship between γνῶσις, ἀγνοία, and even ἀγάπη and suggests that 
already at this early phase of writing Maximus is concerned with Origenist 
teaching particularly as it was divined from Evagrian spirituality.105 Important 
to the development of self-control/mastery is the ability to perceive and 
understand clearly one’s self and created beings in relation to God.   
If, as was asserted earlier, self-control is the dominant theme of the third 
century of Capita cartitate and this means understanding the true nature of 
things and the proper use of material existence, then it should come as no 
                                                 
104 Maximus’ strategy takes another step in the Ambigua ad Iohannem commenting on 
texts that allows him to discuss the challenges of knowledge of God by highlighting both Gregory 
and Ps.-Dionysius’ chastening of theological language. Additionally, he deals with the 
cosmological dimensions of Christology and soteriology calling on what has been called his 
“Chalcedonian logic” to demonstrate how Christ is the union of creation and thus achieves 
salvation as mediator. He also deals with the sequence οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια as it relates to 
creation and the Trinitarian persons. 
105 Maximus, Cap. Car. 3.3 (Cap. sulla car., 144). 
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surprise that there are capitula that deal specifically with the contemplation of 
various kinds of existence. This plays directly into Maximus’ conception of 
ascent where the contemplation of visible and invisible things is meant to 
develop not only a discernment of right uses (2.17) but understanding divine 
judgment and providence according to God’s salvific purposes (1.99; 2.36-46, 
99; 3.33). This includes explaining various kinds of love (blessed, blameworthy, 
praiseworthy, self-love; 3.67, 71) and their various motivations and also 
different kinds of thought (impassioned or bare; 3.42, 43) and kinds of 
knowledge (mere or joined with blameless love; 3.66-67). It is also helpful to 
remember here Maximus’ conception of the δόγματα, which are concerned with 
God, visible and invisible creation, and also God’s providence for and judgment 
of them (2.78). It should also come as no surprise that in the third century there 
is a focused and straightforward comparison of God and his creatures in 3.21-
33.106 Maximus is dealing with δόγματα and how to see creation rightly in 
relation to God. 
With this background in mind, it is easier to locate the concern of 
Maximus’ “anti-Origenist” arguments. Maximus’ overall goal is to distinguish 
clearly between God and his creation. He does this in these thirteen capitula by 
highlighting the irreducible ontological gulf between God and his transcendent 
existence and that of his creatures and their dependent existence. As a result he 
successively explains this difference using the key concepts discussed above: 
γιγνώσκω in 21-23, γιγνώσκω and οὐσία (or φύσις) in 22 and 24, οὐσία (or 
ὕπαρξις) in 25-27, οὐσία and δύναμις in 28, δύναμις, γνῶσις and εἶναι in 29-32, 
γνῶσις, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in 33 and ἐνέργεια (or ἐνεργέω), δύναμις, φύσις 
in 34-36.107 Also, Maximus begins this discussion with God and the Holy Powers 
(3.21-22) and ends with the human body in 3.36 having discussed in ontological 
                                                 
106 Sherwood also notes that these 13 capitula are to be seen as a distinct group, see n. 
150 on 3.21 on pages 258 and 259. In general I agree with Sherwood’s summary of them but I 
would extend his observation concerning 3.21-24, 27, 28—that they are meant to distinguish 
God from his creatures—to the entire set. Additionally, I would add that Maximus’ goal to 
emphasize this distinction is why he feels the need to explain how it is that creation interacts 
with God. 
107 Maximus uses various metaphysical terms here (οὐσία, φύσις, ὕπαρξις, εἶναι, 
ὑπάρχω), not just οὐσία and I think Maximus uses them with the same purpose: to describe 
what a thing is.    
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order rational and intellectual creatures (human and angels) and their relation 
to God in 3.23-29, creation and the relation between created things in 3.30-33, 
and finally the tripartite aspects of humanity in 3.34-36. Maximus is carefully 
considering the various kinds of existence, their relation to each other and to 
God and highlighting how and in what way they exist and what that means 
concerning their participation in Him. This observation also helps make sense of 
why Maximus is determined to assert that God’s being has no contrary. If God’s 
οὐσία allows contraries then it means that he is not only ontologically on the 
same plane as his creation and, therefore, cannot grant to creatures being and 
eternal being but it also means he is liable to moral vacillation (3.28-30). While 
God is αὐτοΰπαρξις, αὐτοαγαθότης, and αὐτοσοφία, created existence by virtue 
of its dependent status takes on these things only through participation and 
grace. They, therefore, are liable to contrary qualities such as being and non-
being, ignorance and knowledge, virtue and vice. They are evil or good in 
proportion to their will (βούλησις), judgment (γνώμη), and activities 
(ἐνέργεια).108  
Beyond the ontological consequences of this distinction are the effects it 
has spiritual life, particularly as it is conceived as deification. Maximus, 
therefore, is concerned to show how created existence participates in God and 
so must deal with the issue of γνῶσις as related through οὐσία and the very 
constitution of created existence. Maximus, in 3.21, clearly distinguishes how 
God knows and how his creation knows. Only God knows his own essence. 
Likewise, he knows his works through his Wisdom through which and in which 
he made all things. Natures endowed with reason, even Holy Powers, know God 
only by participation (μετοχή and μετέχω). Maximus caveats this with the 
statement that God is beyond participation and with a capitulum (3.23) that 
emphasizes the difference between how the human mind works in knowing and 
how God knows. The mind takes up (ἀναλαμβάνει) comprehension of created 
things within itself despite their existence outside the mind. This is not the case 
with God who is “eternal, infinite and boundless and has graced (χαρισαμένου) 
                                                 
108 Maximus, Cap. car. 3.27 (Cap. sulla car., 156), 29 (Cap. sulla car., 156, 158); 3.34-36 
(Cap. sulla car., 160). 
 184 
creation with being (τὸ εἶναι), well-being (τὸ εὖ εἶναι), and eternal being (τὸ ἀεὶ 
εἶναι).”109 Maximus’ point would seem to be that, as Creator, God has a unique 
means of knowing. God knows creation as Creator through his Wisdom through 
whom and in whom they have been made. Whereas created rational beings 
contemplate creation and its λόγοι via the senses and the intellect in order to 
garner practical wisdom (τεχνική σοφία) which ultimately points to God, God’s 
knowledge is more intimate and completely unmediated.  
To make the point even more lucid, Maximus states that the knowledge 
rational beings possess is non-subsistent (ἀνυπόστατον). This is likely aimed at 
Evagrius’ conception of essential knowledge. As I pointed out earlier this 
concept may not have meant the same thing to Evagrius as it had to either 
Origenists or their accusers but nevertheless had the potential to be seriously 
misunderstood. The description of knowledge, participation and being as being 
‘taken up’ or ‘graced upon’ points to a unique need of creation to be dependent 
upon something outside itself for its existence and knowledge. Maximus has 
taken the transcendence of God to its logical epistemological conclusion: even 
knowing is experienced differently by God. 
Maximus emphasizes this further, describing God as beyond 
participation and his knowledge depending solely on himself. If the divide 
between created and Creator is such that even their knowledge is not of the 
same quality, exactly how is it that creatures know and participate in God at all? 
Maximus addresses this difficulty by suggesting that they know God 
simultaneously through the contemplation of his creation and through 
participation. The latter he approaches by two means. Firstly, he emphasizes the 
kind of existence endowed by God as either being, well-being, or eternal being. 
Human beings and angels are given an aptitude or suitability (ἐπιτηδειότης) for 
well-being while the other two, being and eternal being, are free gifts (3.24). It is 
God who graces (χαρισαμένου) all three kinds of existence to beings (3.23) and 
it is solely by his will (βούλησις) and power (δύναμις) that these 
“incontrovertible” free gifts are given (3.24, 3.28). 
                                                 
 109 Maximus, Cap. car. 3.23 (Cap. sulla car., 152), 
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 This distinction is laid over another in 3.25 made between image 
(εἰκών) and likeness (ὁμοίωσις) and is related to a list of four of God’s 
ἰδιώματα— τὸ ὂν, τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, ἡ ἀγαθότης and ἡ σοφία. Maximus relates these 
directly to humanity suggesting that being and eternal being, as part of 
humanity’s οὐσία, are an image of God’s being and eternal being. Likewise, 
goodness and wisdom in humanity are a likeness of God’s goodness and 
wisdom. These are God’s by nature and made humanity’s by grace. The 
utilization of this distinction is central to Maximus’ argument of showing how 
created rational beings participate in God on two levels. One level is by οὐσία 
concerning their existence and its duration and on another level, concerning 
God’s goodness and wisdom, is determined by a human’s γνωμική ἐπιτηδειότης 
which, as was noted above, is also an aspect of οὐσία but nevertheless does not 
automatically result in participation in God’s likeness. As a response to 
humanity’s gnomic suitability, they are graced with goodness and wisdom. 
Noticeably, absent in this discussion is the λόγος/τρόπος distinction. 
Eric Perl, in dealing with a similar formulation later in Ambiguum 7, 
suggests that the seemingly contradictory sets of concepts that state God cannot 
be participated in, followed by an affirmation that creation must participate in 
order to exist and be in union with God can be understood as an attempt by 
Maximus to overcome the dangers of monism and dualism and attempting to 
articulate an acceptable account of identity and difference. Monism would 
collapse participation into an identity of creation and Creator as seen in the 
Origenist cosmology. Dualism would create and unbridgeable gap between 
Creator and creation making participation at any level near impossible. Perl 
suggests that at least one way Maximus overcomes this is by accepting 
participation in God but distinguishing between creation and deification. 
Creation occurs in the move from non-existence to existence creating the 
necessary difference between Creator and creation while deification occurs in 
the voluntary exertion of will by rational beings toward unity with God.110  
                                                 
 110  Perl, Methexis, Creation, Incarnation, 221-233. Perl suggests that Maximus ultimately 
solves this issue not by actually denying the Neoplatonic conception of remaining or rest (μονή) 
but the Origenist’s conception utilizing the doctrine of the λόγοι. However, there are other 
aspects that should be taken into consideration in order to give a full picture at this early stage 
of his writing. For example, if creation is dependent on God for existence and that occurs 
 186 
Maximus seems to mean that God is beyond participation in that rational beings 
do not by fiat determine whether they participate in God. Even deification, 
which Maximus explicitly states involves the suitability of the will, must 
ultimately be graced by God in response to that suitability. The difference 
between creation and Creator means that participation is up to God albeit a very 
gracious God who grants both being and will even though it allows of 
contraries.111  
These capitula (3.21-36) focus their attention on the differences of 
creation from God in relation to knowledge and moral vacillation. This includes 
a description of the constitution of rational beings. Another set of “anti-
Origenist” capitula in century four (4.1-14) focus how to conceive of God and his 
ability to create and sharpens further how his constitution differs from that of 
creation. God’s ability to create and care for creation is through his 
consubstantial Word and Spirit and is a source of awe (4.1-2). There is a 
concern here to stem speculation into why God created when he did except to 
say that his creation was done when he willed to give substance to his eternally 
                                                 
through participation, is the participation continuous or is creation give enough self-sufficiency 
to be on its own? If this is done by an appeal to the λόγοι doctrine, how does Maximus address 
this issue in the Capita caritate, where no detailed λόγοι doctrine appears? In 4.4, Maximus 
states that God sets forth and gives οὐσία to his “eternally pre-existent knowledge (γνῶσις)” and 
two capitula later he denies any pre-existence of not only their essence (οὐσία) but also their 
qualities (ποιότητες). The latter phrase does not rule out a doctrine of the λόγοι, especially the 
way Perl explains the Neoplatonic doctrine of a cause carrying its effect. However, it would seem 
that in the Capita caritate, either because of reserve or by virtue of the development of his 
thought, he does not employ the λόγοι doctrine to solve the problem of participation. In the 
Capita, the λόγοι, while they can be tracked back to God, are not identified with the Logos and 
are not part of Maximus’ grammar of participation. In Cap. car. 3.27 and 3.28, Maximus presents 
a solution suggesting that participation is continuous in that God sustains the cosmos through 
his ἐξουσία. Thus, creation of humanity, including its will, is a gift and God’s sustenance of the 
cosmos provides enough space for human freedom; allowing the will to move the rational soul 
from creation to a suitability for deification (the redirection of desire), which is then graced by 
God (cf. 3.25,28, 4.10). This I think provides a better account of how Maximus solves the issue in 
the Capita caritate. To give this more detail and ultimately to locate this within his later 
explication of the λόγοι doctrine which does become part of his grammar of participation, would 
require explaining what Maximus means by ἐξουσία and ultimately how he locates the term in 
relation to the casual sequence οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια. Perl rightly sees the role of choice 
in Maximus (Perl, Methexis, Creation, Incarnation, 234-237) but at times does not consistently 
portray how Maximus sees all three modes (being, well-being, eternal well-being) as sustained 
by God’s ἐξουσία and thus ultimately dependent on God’s grace.  
 111 Maximus similarly states this in 4.10 and 13 (Cap. sulla car., 198). 
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pre-existent γνῶσις (4.3-5). Instead, one must seek the cause of creation. Here is 
the closest that Maximus comes in the Capita to associating the term “cause” 
with God himself or perhaps the Word. Despite this description, Maximus states 
creation is not, as the “Greeks” suppose, eternal and is a composite of οὐσία and 
qualities (ποιότητες) and not free from change (4.6, 9). In 4.7, Maximus asserts 
again that God is not knowable only through θεωρία of the things about him 
(τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸ) not through the things proper to him (τοῖς κατ’ αὐτό). In 
contrast to creation, the Holy Trinity is “infinite essence”, “all-powerful 
(παντοδύναμος)”, “Creator of all things”, “without habits” (ἕξεις) or “aptitudes” 
(ἐπιτηδειότητες) and “is alone simple (ἁπλῆ), uniform (μονοειδὴς), without 
qualities (ἄποιος) peaceable (εἰρηναία) and without faction (ἀστᾰσι αστος)”.112 
It’s likely these last two terms are echoes of a common critique of Greek gods by 
Christian authors. 
 Finally, two new ideas are introduced. Maximus states that it is only God 
that is participated in, while rational beings both participate in being and well-
being and share or communicate (μεταδίδωσι) well-being. To clarify, Maximus 
states in 4.12 that incorporeal beings communicate well-being through speech, 
action and being contemplated while corporeal beings are only contemplated. 
Maximus’ discussion in 3.25 stated clearly that it is God who makes common 
(ἐκοινοποίησεν) both being and eternal being but graces well-being through 
participation (κατὰ μετουσίαν). Thus, Maximus is not denying communication 
to God as much as he is denying participation amongst creation. The only one 
able to be participated in is God, everything else communicates. In this 
conception, participation is superior to communication and participation only 
occurs between creation and its God. This, it seems to me, is another cut at the 
Origenist conception of the cosmos, by eliminating any progressive ontological 
participation with other fallen minds on the way toward unity with the Monad. 
He ends this series by stating that evil is not a substance (4.14). The emphasis in 
these capitula is God’s ontological difference from creation and the dependence 
of created existence on God’s will. 
                                                 
 112 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.8, 9 (Cap. sulla car., 196, 198).  
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Maximus’ focus in both these sets is to clearly delineate the differences of 
Creator and creation. This is accomplished by addressing the terms οὐσία, 
δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, and γνῶσις and addressing how participation occurs. These 
differences run all the way down to the very way each “knows” and interacts 
and are a consequence of the differences in their very existence. God is present 
as beyond and infinite, with no contraries and self-existent (3.27).113 In contrast, 
everything humanity possess or could possess, both image and likeness, are 
given by God. God is utterly transcendent while creation is utterly dependent on 
him. These texts present us with a new sub-theme and broaden Maximus 
purview of ascent from just the baptized to creation. In the Capita, he is 
concerned to show how creation which is irreducibly distinct from God 
participates in God and only God and lays out humanity’s potential for 
deification which is predicated on God’s irrevocable gifts but nevertheless 
depends on its fulfillment in the interaction between God’s grace and human 
will. The human will, seeking to gain the likeness of God in wisdom and 
goodness, finds its goal in prayer and is perfected in its goal of imitation of 
Christ through maintaining a habit of love. 
In significant ways, these developments and refinements reinforce and 
shape themes I have already covered in the Liber. God is not only the beginning 
of Christian life, but he is the beginning of all life as Creator. Likewise, while 
grace is a consistent refrain within ascent, it also significantly characterizes 
God’s entire interaction with creation seen not only in its journey of love toward 
deification but in its creation. This distinction allows the first major theme, 
Trinity as beginning, means and end, to be possible since participation requires 
genuinely distinct subjects and yet allows for a kind of interaction that goes 
beyond basic communication to genuine participation based not only on nature 
but also will. These distinctions are a foundational part of Maximus’ 
understanding and become part of the grammar he will utilize for his theology, 
affecting the way he describes cosmology, ascent and eventually assists in his 
ability to delineate issues in later “Christological” debates. 
§3.3.2 Capitula 2.24-36: Theology, Trinity & the Hard Ways of Love 
                                                 
 113 Maximus, Cap. car. 3.27 (Cap. sulla car., 156), 
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In Capita caritate 2.24-36, Maximus again uses a series of capitula to give 
us an idea of progressive ascent. In this case, Maximus pulls together not only 
γνῶσις and πρᾶξις, but also discusses explicitly the relation of the divine 
persons of the Father and the Son in response to “Tritheism”. The explicit 
naming of Tritheism initially is odd especially when one reviews both the Liber 
and the rest of the Capita and finds no other heresy named even though it is 
clear Maximus is confronting “Origenist” theology. Thus, my review of this 
series of capitula will address two concerns. The first concern is how these 
capitula explain Maximus’ conception of theology and its relation to love. I will 
argue that there is here an instance of Maximus illustrating the importance of 
γνῶσις (conceived as θεολόγια) and πρᾶξις (displayed in love) together by 
drawing attention to proper Trinitarian theology and mirror aspects of that 
theology in his anthropology. The second concern addresses why Tritheism 
specifically is used as a kind of case study for θεολόγια in his illustration. I will 
argue that while Maximus’ main concern is to address the relationship of γνῶσις 
and πρᾶξις, he does so by illustrating how the Tritheism of his own day raises 
real theological, anthropological and ethical issues. It will be important for this 
argument to briefly review Tritheism, and so I will explore its contours by 
drawing together several important studies. 
Maximus begins this set of capitula with an aspect of the practical life 
(2.24-26) that eventually leads to a discussion of θεολόγια (2.26-29) and finally 
to perfect love (2.30). The first capitulum is a statement about the various kinds 
of words (λόγοι) given by the Lord: commandments (ἐντολαί), δόγματα, threats 
(ἀπειλαί), promises (ἐπαγγελίαι) (2.24). It is because of these words that the 
Christian has kept hard (σκληράς) ways citing Psalm 16.4 (LXX Ps. 17.4). He 
then lists specific hardships (σκληραγωγίαι) of ascetic discipline (i.e. fasting, 
vigils, service to others) and its harsher consequences (i.e. disgrace, torture, 
death).  The reward of self-mastery, if these ways are followed, is ἀπάθεια 
which gives rise to discernment (διάκρισις). Meanwhile, the reward of faith is 
knowledge which gives rise to love for God (2.25). The next capitulum (2.26) is 
more specific stating that the mind that has successfully accomplished the 
practical life (πρακτική) progresses toward prudence or practical wisdom 
(φρόνησις) and likewise the contemplative life (θεωρητική) progresses towards 
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knowledge (γνῶσις). Prudence allows for a discernment of virtue and vices and 
knowledge uncovers the λόγοι of incorporeal and corporeal creation. Maximus 
continues, 
Then at that moment when [the pure mind] is deemed worthy of 
theological grace, having traversed through all the aforementioned 
things by the wings of love and comes to be in God, it will carefully 
examine the logos concerning him (τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον) through the 
Spirit as much as is humanly possible.114 
Maximus regards θεολόγια as a grace presumably given by God or more 
specifically, as the latter part of the capitulum suggests, by the Spirit. In light of 
other areas I have explored, this is not unexpected. The Spirit was seen to be 
important in continuing aspects of the Son’s activity in the Liber and has been 
shown to be intricately related with the indwelling of Christ. Both of these 
function as a means of illumination of oneself, creation, and ultimately God. In a 
way he did not in the Liber, though, Maximus here and later in 4.77 underscores 
the assistance of the Holy Spirit in the heights of contemplation, which again can 
be seen as the height of prayer. Elsewhere Maximus correlates the Spirit with 
the activities of contemplation θεολόγια and prayer stating that this is what the 
Apostle Paul meant in Galatians 5.16 when he commanded “Walk in the 
Spirit.”115 This is further evidence of how the Trinity, specifically the Holy Spirit, 
serves as a means of Christian life. 
In the critical text, Ceresa-Gestaldo notes a variant toward the end of 
2.26, where he chooses περὶ αὐτοῦ instead of περὶ αὐτόν.116 However, given the 
earlier use of this language in 1.100 where Maximus used the phrase to indicate 
those λόγοι that can be known of God, I would have to disagree and favor περὶ 
αὐτόν. This reading is supported in the next capitulum were we find the same 
play of prepositional phrases that he made in 1.100. Here, when one is about to 
                                                 
 114 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.26 (Cap. sulla car., 102). 
 115 Maximus, Cap. car. 4.64 (Cap. sulla car., 220). 
 116 Ceresa-Gestaldo, Cap. sulla car., 102. While περί with the genitive can carry the same 
meaning as περί with the accusative, I think περὶ αὐτόν would be more consistent with 
Maixmus’ other uses. 
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theologize (Θεολογεῖν μέλλων) the Christian is enjoined not to seek the λόγος 
proper to him (μὴ τοὺς κατ’ αὐτὸν ζητήσῃς λόγους) since the human mind nor 
any other thing after God can find it. Rather one should search the λόγοι 
concerning him (τοὺς περὶ αὐτόν), carefully examining those λόγοι concerning 
his “eternity, boundlessness and limitlessness, and [concerning] goodness, 
wisdom and power as Creator, provider, and judge of existing things.”117 Here as 
in 1.100 we are met with both attributes of God but also titles that suggest the 
Trinity. 
The next capitulum (2.28), states that it is a powerful man who combines 
γνῶσις with πρᾶξις. To do so sets the three aspects of the soul aright and allows 
the man to “give wings to his mind and depart toward God.”118 This capitulum 
echos 2.25 where ascent is dealt with in terms of self-mastery and faith. Both of 
these demonstrate how when ascent is pursued γνῶσις and πρᾶξις come 
together to engender love (ἐγκράτεια → ἀπάθεια → διάκρισις; πίστις → γνῶσις 
→ ἀγάπη). In 2.29, Maximus then turns to two scriptural sayings from Jesus and 
exegetes them in contradistinction to “Tritheist” understandings of God. The 
first citation is John 10.30 (“I and the Father are one”) which Maximus states 
“means the identity of essence,” (τὸ ταὐτὸν τῆς οὐσίας σημαίνει) while John 
10.38 shows “the inseparability of the persons” (τὸ ἀχώριστον δηλοῖ τῶν 
ὑποστάσεων.).119 Maximus then contrasts this with “Tritheist” teachings which 
either suggest there are three Gods and origins by adhering to the Son’s 
coeternality with the Father but denying that he is begotten of him or by 
denying the Son’s coeternality altogether. The implication being the first 
“Tritheist” strategy denies the inseparability of the ὑποστάσεις while the second 
denies the identity of οὐσία. Maximus then calls upon Gregory Nazianzus to 
demonstrate that both one God and three ὑποστάσεις must be confessed. 
“Since,” he states quoting Gregory, “God is divided yet indivisible . . . and joined 
together yet divisible.” He concludes, 
                                                 
 117 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.27 (Cap. sulla car., 102, 104). 
 118 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.28 (Cap. sulla car., 104). 
 119 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.29 (Cap. sulla car., 104, 106). 
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For this reason, the division and the unity are a paradox. Yet why is it a 
paradox, if just as a human being is both united to and separated from 
[another] human being so also the Son is [united to and separated from] 
the Father and nothing else?120 
 The next capitulum (2.30) states that perfect love and the highest 
ἀπάθεια views humanity from the perspective of “one nature” and “in Christ”. 
There is a conflagration of ideas here from Galatians 3.28 and Ephesians 1.23. 
Consequently, categories such as “one’s own and someone else’s”, “one’s self 
and another”, “faithful and unfaithful”, “slave and freeman”, and “male and 
female” are mitigated by the realities of a common human nature and by being 
in Christ. Therefore, the one who possesses such love “considers all equally and 
is equally well-disposed toward all.”121 This capitulum is another example of 
Maximus’ conception of perfect love resulting in an equal consideration of 
human beings. Earlier, equal love was grounded in both God’s goodness and 
ἀπάθεια and because the baptized have the same nature as other human beings. 
What is different here, however, is that this equal love is given an additional 
grounding in the idea that human beings can be “in Christ.” 
  This conflagration of scriptural texts will become an important concept 
for Maximus’ later writings especially in the much celebrated and discussed 
Ambiguum 41. However, the proximity of these ideas concerning the unity of 
human nature despite difference and those so similarly reviewed in the 
previous capitulum concerning the Trinity should also be considered. While the 
connection between the Trinity and humanity is not explicitly made, when taken 
within the broader concerns of this series of capitula, Maximus appears to be 
giving an example of what he has already stated to be an important aspect of 
ascent – the joining of πρᾶξις and θεωρία. Θεολόγια as a subset of θεωρία or 
perhaps better stated, its peak, is explored in his discussion regarding the unity 
and distinction displayed in the Trinity. The interesting question at the end of 
2.29 is suggestive in light of 2.30. What does Maximus mean by this question? 
Given the broader context of the Capita, it seems unlikely that he means to infer 
                                                 
120 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.29 (Cap. sulla car., 104, 106). 
 121 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.30 (Cap. sulla car., 106). 
 193 
that the constitution of human beings and God are exactly the same. Yet he does 
seem to be drawing some parallels. Maximus is careful in these two capitula, 
refusing to use parallel ontological terms (οὐσία in 2.29 and φύσις in 2.30). The 
only parity of terms is “one”. 
A shared nature deserves shared treatment despite the variety of 
distinctions. In the case of the Trinity, this means shared worship. Maximus 
does not mention worship here, but clearly the point is to maintain a proper 
understanding of God. In the case of humanity, especially when seen “in Christ”, 
unity of nature means equal treatment in love. If this is the case then ascent is 
not purely a progression from πρᾶξις on to θεωρία; rather, they are 
coterminous. Contemplation of the divine and created realities has practical 
consequences. Clear vision regarding the δόγματα of the Trinity grants clear 
vision of the δόγματα of humanity with ethical consequences. Ascent is the 
proper habitus for approaching God but also for gaining a clear understanding of 
θεολόγια and the ethical life. 
Maximus’ train of thought here also bears marked affinity with Ps.-
Dionysius. Ps.-Dionysius, conceiving of God as the source of unity, saw God’s 
unifying power as drawing together humanity “into a godlike oneness, into a 
unity reflecting God.”122 Maximus, in this instance, portrays unity as inherent to 
things of the same nature but also because they are found “in Christ”. Maximus 
will build on the ideas found in 2.24-30 later in the Quaestiones et dubia, 
Ambiguum 7 and Mystagogia 1 where he is much more explicit with how he 
understands the relation between Trinity and anthropology, unity, and 
distinction. Regardless, Maximus can see a common concern to address the 
“logic of unity and distinction” in both Ps.-Dionysius and Gregory, specifically 
from the perspective of Trinitarian theology. 
The quotation of Gregory in 2.29 harkens back to Or. 39 in which the 
unity and distinction of the Trinity are discussed, but the same ideas can be 
found in other orations.123 Gregory Benevich, in a study done specifically on this 
                                                 
122 Ps.-Dionysius, De div. nom. 1.4 (CD 1:112.14). 
123  Törönen in his work Union and Distinction discusses the concepts of union and 
distinction in relation to the Trinity in the second part of his study (ch. 3-5), but does not treat 
this passage, focusing much-needed attention on Maximus untranslated letters and Opuscula. He 
does, however, highlight Sherwood’s footnote on the passage while commenting on Op. 13 in 
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capitula, notes that in there are actually several quotations from Gregory’s 
orations 20, 25 and 39 drawn together. In addition to a word-for-word phrase 
from Or. 20 that is also cited by Justinian in his Edictum rectae fidei, Maximus 
follows Gregory’s argumentation closely in his main explanation of the two 
errors of Tritheism.124 Using these quotations, he suggests that Maximus is 
directly confronting two versions of Tritheism one represented by Damian in 
his debate with Peter Callinicum and another by John Philoponus. In this first 
version, Damian attempts to confront Tritheism but instead fails to properly 
distinguish between a property of a divine ὑπόστασις (ἰδιότης) and the 
ὑπόστασις itself. John Philoponus’ theology was developed specifically around a 
theory of universals and particulars that valued highly Aristotle’s discussion of 
first and second substances. For Philoponus, this meant seeing first substances 
as particular and real while second substances were universal and perceived 
only in the mind. Initially, one might grant that Philoponus is not interested in 
denying universals their own reality, only their reality apart from particulars. 
However, several witnesses seem to make clear Philoponus means to deny their 
actual existence favoring a kind of conceptualism over realism.125 This included 
an equation in which φύσις and ὑπόστασις are near equivalents and an 
affirmation that a ὑπόστασις with its qualities constitutes an entirely different 
species.126 Both of these versions of Tritheism in miaphysite communities were 
criticized by pro-Chalcedonians. As Benevich points out, Photius of 
Constantinople records Eulogius’ criticism of both although does not name 
                                                 
order to point out that the Tritheism Maximus has in mind is that of John Philoponus (Törönen, 
Union and Distinction, 65).  
124 Benevich, “Maximus Confessor’s Polemics Against Tritheism and His Trinitarian 
Teaching,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 105.2 (2012)600, 603-604. Benevich, also notes how the 
direct quotation is also reproduced in Justinian’s, Edictum rectae fidei. 
125 The best witness actually seems to be Damian whose Epistula Synodica is preserved 
by Michael the Syrian’s Chronicle, see Christophe Erismann, “The Trinity, Universals, and 
Particulars: Philoponus and Roscelin,” Traditio 63 (2008), 293 and the same quote in Uwe M. 
Lang, “The Tritheist Controversy of the Sixth Century,” in The Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the 
Fathers of the Church, eds. D. Vincent Twomey & Lewis Ayres (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 
99. 
126 For two recent and helpful studies on Philoponus’ theology see Christophe 
Erismann, “The Trinity, Universals, and Particulars,” 277-305 and and Uwe M. Lang, “The 
Tritheist Controversy of the Sixth Century,” 79-99, but also CCT 2/3, 268-280. 
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Damian directly. Likewise, and also mentioned by Benevich, Sophronius of 
Jerusalem’s catalogs two versions of Tritheism. One represented by John 
Philoponus, Conon and Eugenius and another which he calls “minor Tritheism” 
(μικρά τριθεῖα) represented by Peter the Syrian (Callinicum) and Sergius the 
Armenian. Interestingly, Damian makes his list but is not called a Tritheist but a 
“new Sabellius”.127   
Behind the use of these quotations, Benevich, suggests several motives. 
Firstly, to strike at the identification of ὑπόστασις with ἰδιότης as found in 
Damian but also to exonerate Gregory whose, perhaps more ambiguous 
formulations, were used to support Damian’s stance. Likewise, at first blush 
Maximus’ account does not demonstrate any specific knowledge of Philoponus’ 
theology but on closer examination can be seen to address the concerns raised 
by Philoponus’ teaching. Maximus’ question at the end of the capitula, Benevich 
suggests, is actually a subtle criticism of an analogy offered by Philoponus. In 
this analogy, human beings are described as one substance in thought, yet many 
men in reality. Consequently, there is a single God in thought only, yet in reality 
three consubstantial ὑποστάσεις.128  
Benevich notes a similar analogy made by Gregory of Nyssa in Ad 
Ablabium but also draws attention to Ad Graecos where Gregory explicitly 
denies the application of particular substance to the divine persons.129 While 
stating that, properly speaking, three men must be called three persons, Gregory 
does not state that since “man” is one, God must be one in exactly the same 
way.130 Gregory of Nazianzus more explicitly denies the applicability of the 
analogy since, when speaking of humanity, its unity is in thought only while 
with God the unity is substantive.131 Benevich rightly states that Maximus never 
                                                 
 127 Sophronius, Epistula synodica ad Sergium Constantinopolitanum, §2.2.5, 2.6.1 in 
ACO2 2.1. but now also with English translation and critical text in Sophronius of Jerusalem and 
Seventh-Century Heresy: The Synodical Letter and Other Documents, intro., texts, transl. and 
comm. by Pauline Allen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 80, 142-144. 
128 Benevich, “Against Tritheism,” 607. 
 129 Benevich, “Against Tritheism,” 604-605. For Gregory of Nyssa, see n. 35 on these 
pages. 
130 Benevich, “Against Tritheism,” 605 n. 35.   
131 Gregory, Or. 31.15 (PG 36.149A-C: SC 250: 304). Benevich notes this, (“Against 
Tritheism,” 606 n. 35) but see the discussion concerning this “principle of parity” in Christophe 
 196 
makes this exact analogy but to state that Maximus does not draw attention to 
God as a kind of type or figure of union and distinction in humanity would 
ignore not only Mystagogia 1 but also the series of capitula reviewed here 
especially 2.29 and 2.30. Interestingly, when Maximus later explicitly cites how 
the Church is a type of God in Mystagogia 1, he does not mention the one nature 
of humanity but instead draws out the unity, despite diversity, of persons “in 
Christ”. 
Benevich also attempts to give some historical background for Maximus’ 
engagement with Tritheism offering three hypotheses. The first option finds 
Maximus writing against John Philoponus, which he states is universally cited in 
relation to this capitula. However, this seems unexpected since the Capita is not 
“dedicated to Trinitarian theology” or “dogmatic polemics”.132 The second 
option is that both Sophronius and Maximus saw the relationship between 
miaenergism and Tritheism and so Maximus incorporates it. Here he cites 
Lang’s study which ties miaenergism and Tritheism. Yet, he notes, the Capita 
came long before the miaenergist crisis.133 The third option is that Maximus 
means to meet problems posed by an unnamed set of Tritheists, whose thought 
nevertheless was important to engage for pro-Chalcedonians.134  In this case, he 
suggests perhaps there is some group within the pro-Chalcedonian community 
that may be struggling with these concepts and need some help articulating 
them. 
I offer another explanation, which I hope meets some of the questions 
raised by Benevich’s study. The placement of this passage is, as I have presented 
it, towards the end of a section that intends to highlight the importance of 
joining together θεωρία and πρᾶξις. I suggest that Maximus, in order to 
illustrate this point, gives a “real life” example in order to show it affects not 
only love of God but also love of neighbor. Yet, if the entirety of Benevich’s 
exegesis of 2.29 is taken into consideration, Maximus is far too careful for this to 
                                                 
Erismann, “The Trinity, Universals, and Particulars: Philoponus and Roscelin,” Traditio 63 
(2008), 277-305.   
 132 Benevich, “Against Tritheism,” 596.  
 133 Benevich, “Against Tritheism,” 596-597. 
 134 Benevich, “Against Tritheism,” 597.  
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be merely a heuristic example. Maximus does not use an obscure, antiquated 
example but rather reaches into a contemporary debate regarding the Trinity. It 
is a real and live problem, and Maximus means to show why. If part of ascent is 
accomplishing a “durable state of vision” which sees God and creation rightly, 
then understanding the Trinity, which lies in the realm of θεωρία or more 
specifically θεολόγια, will have consequences for πρᾶξις.135 In this particular 
passage, the Trinity properly understood reveals a unity with distinction and 
the implication is that the Father, Son and, by extension, the Spirit are divine 
and, therefore, worshiped as the One God. The next passage, 2.30, follows a 
similar line of thinking, pointing out that the one who is perfect in love looks 
beyond difference to discern the one nature in all human beings and thus “is 
equally well-disposed toward all”. This is further reinforced by an appeal to a 
conflagration of Galatians 3:28 and Ephesians 1:23 where difference is 
swallowed up “in Christ”.136  
Tritheism is the only heresy that Maximus specifically names in either 
the Liber or Capita caritate. Tritheism by his day, as has been noted by many, 
was usually associated with the later writings of John Philoponus, despite 
having a more complex history in miaphysite communities that antedate the 
philosopher’s involvement.137 It has been said that Tritheism for pro-
Chalcedonian authors was not of great concern.138 In one sense, this seems to be 
an accurate assessment since there is a general lack of pro-Chalcedonian 
sources addressing the issue as if it were an imminent danger to pro-
Chalcedonian communities. It rarely ever seems to be an issue raised between 
                                                 
 135 Maximus, Cap. car. 3.69 (Cap. sulla car., 176). 
 136 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.30 (Cap. sulla car., 106). 
137 For this history see Albert Van Roey, "La controverse trithéite depuis la 
condemnation de Conon et Eugene jusqu' à la conversion de l'eveque Elie," in Von Kanaan bis 
Kerala, 487-497 (Kevelaer: Butzon und Bercker, 1982); Albert Van Roey, “La controverse 
trithéite jusqu’à l’excommunication de Conon et d’Eugéne (557-569),” Orientalia Lovaniensia 
Periodica 16 (1985), 141-165 and Albert Van Roey and Pauline Allen, Monophysite Texts of the 
Sixth Century, Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 56 ( Leuven: Peeters, 1994) and for John 
Philoponus in particular see Uwe Michael Lang, John Philoponus and the Controversies over 
Chalcedon in the Sixth Century: A Study and Translation of the Arbiter, Spicilegium Sacrum 
Lovaniense Études et documents Fascicule 47 (Leuven: Peeters, 2001). 
138 Allen & Van Roey, Monophysite Texts, 105. 
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pro-Chalcedonians. However, in another sense this determination seems to 
overlook some basic connections pro-Chalcedonian authors themselves make 
with miaphysite communities in mind and evidence of its concern in the very 
heart of Byzantium.139 Only 20 years before Maximus is born, Tritheism had 
become enough of a concern that Theodosius, the miaphysite patriarch of 
Alexandria who had been exiled and living in Constantinople, felt the need to 
address it within his host city.140 Likewise, there is evidence that pro-
Chalcedonian leaders presided over debates between Tritheist groups.141 Why, 
if they have no particular interest in it?  
An excellent example of pro-Chalcedonian engagement can be found in 
the corpus of Anastasius I, who served twice as the pro-Chalcedonian patriarch 
of Antioch from 558-570 and 593-599 CE. One of his works entitled, Adversus 
eos qui in divinis dicunt tres essentias, portrays a dialog between an obviously 
pro-Chalcedonian “orthodox” protagonist and an anti-Chalcedonian 
Ἀκοινώνητος antagonist. Despite the title, nearly the entire dialog involves a 
debate about whether Christ has one or two natures and whether those natures 
persist after the incarnation.142 It is only after nearly three-quarters of the 
dialog has passed that issues specific to the Trinity begin to take center stage. 
When he does finally address these issues, he identifies the same metaphysical 
issue underlying both Tritheism and miaphysite Christology: the lack of a clear 
and consistent understanding of and language for the relationship between 
what is what is one and what is many. Especially significant in the discussion is 
how to understand and locate the term φύσις within the range of ontological 
                                                 
139 Allen and Van Roey, Monophysite Texts lists Ps.-Leontius (Liber de sectis, PG 86.1231-
1234), Timothy of Constantinople (De iis qui ad ecclessiam accedunt, PG 86.44), Sophronius, 
Epistula synodica, (Allen, Sophronius of Jerusalem, 65-157). Other helpful studies include 
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140 Van Roey and Allen, Monophysite Texts, 105-107, 122-143.  
141 Uwe  M. Lang, “The Tritheist Controversy of the Sixth Century,” in The Mystery of the 
Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church, eds. D. Vincent Twomey & Lewis Ayres (Dublin: Four 
Courts Press, 2007), 81-82.   
142 The two most significant works done on Anastasius I are Stergio N. Sakkos, 
ΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΟΥ Α' ΑΝΠΟΧΕΙΑΣ ΑΠΑΝΤΑ: ΤΑ ΣΩ ΖΟΜΕΝΑ ΓΝΗΣΙΑ ΕΡΓΑ, (Thessalonike, 1976) and 
Karl-Heinz Uthemann, “Des patriarchen Anastasius I. Von Antiochien Jerusalemer Streitgespräch 
einem Tritheiten (CPG 6958),” Traditio 37 (1981), 73-108. 
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terms available for both Christ and the Trinity. In Anastasius I’s eyes, to confront 
one means to uncover the other and to address either is to tackle the same 
metaphysical ambiguity.  
Does the appearance of Tritheism in pro-Chalcedonian writings mean 
that the author is attempting to confront miaphysite Christology?  For 
Anastasius I, this seems to be the case, and there is some evidence that an 
analogous imperial strategy was used as well, although for more political 
reasons. Meyendorff, in tracking the Tritheism of this period, suggests that 
Heraclius’ cousin, Nicetas adjudicated between the miaphysite communities of 
Alexandria and Antioch on the issue of Tritheism in order to unify the adherents 
of his empire and gain support against Persian invasion.143 These, and activities 
like it, were not always received with the greatest appreciation by pro-
Chalcedonians.144 Returning again to Sophronius, for example, it should be 
noted that he goes out of his way in his catalogue of heresies to point out several 
personalities associated with the trouble of Tritheism referring specifically to 
names prominent within miaphysite communities.145 All of this suggests that 
Tritheism, while it may not have been an imminent danger within pro-
Chalcedonian communities, was nevertheless a concern since theologically it 
highlighted problematic areas within miaphysite Christology and politically 
because, if it could be addressed, then it might give room for theological 
compromise and political unity during an era of constant war. 
With this in the background, is Maximus tackling Tritheism as a way to 
get at miaphysite theology? I would suggest that given the background it is 
likely that Maximus is using real life Tritheism, found in miaphysite 
communities, to illustrate the necessity of clear theological thinking and its 
consequences. Maximus uses Tritheism to draw out the necessity of aligning 
θεωρία/θεολόγιαand πρᾶξις/ἀγάπη for the proper love of God and love of 
                                                 
143 John Meyendorff, Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions. The Church 450-680 AD 
(Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1989), 275-276. Meyendorff sees the presence of the 
Emperor’s cousin Nicetas as likely playing a key role in the reconciliation of the miaphysite 
communities of Antioch and Alexandria. 
144 Booth, Crisis of Empire, 104-105. See especially notes 65 and 66.  
145  Sophronius, Epistula Synodica §2.2.4-2.2.5, 2.6.1 (Allen, Sophronius of Jerusalem, 78-
83, 137-145 [142-143].  
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humanity. This maxim plays out in real life suggesting that if one’s theology of 
the Trinity is amiss, like that of miaphysite Tritheism or more generally 
miaphysitism, so will one’s love for humanity and those “in Christ”.  While other 
pro-Chalcedonians were quick to point to Tritheism as the Trinitarian 
consequence of miaphysite Christology, Maximus adds to the critique an 
anthropological and ethical appraisal. Maximus, perhaps for the first time in his 
writing, deals with the concepts of union and distinction specifically within the 
context of Trinitarian theology. From this perspective, it seems less a 
philosophical problem than it is a theological insight that Maximus will 
eventually apply to that problem. This theology becomes a means of 
illuminating an analogous reality in humanity and introduces a new theme into 
Maximus’ grammar suggesting another way that the Trinity is both goal by 
virtue of being the goal of contemplation but also means by providing 
illumination about the joining of θεωρία and πρᾶξις and specifically about union 
and distinction. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show how Maximus has built on his baseline 
Trinitarian grammar for Christian life that I identified and contrasted in 
chapters one and two. Several of the capitula show how he has developed and 
refined his thought regarding the Trinity as end; specifically as the goal of 
ascent and imitation. For imitation, this means rooting God’s equal love not only 
in his goodness but also in his ἀπαθῆ. His capitula on the Trinity as the goal of 
ascent entailed a fuller description of ascent specifically θεωρία/θεολόγια and 
the activities of contemplation in relation to created reality and God himself. 
Maximus’ assertion that God cannot be known in his οὐσία but can be through 
his activities will continue to inform and shape his theology and his descriptions 
of ascent. His loose correlation of those activities with the divine persons was 
also noted. Elsewhere, Maximus made more explicit the connection between the 
Spirit as means of illumination and the perceptibility of God’s presence in the 
baptized. In fact, whenever the concept of illumination is found, the Spirit’s role 
and activities quickly follow usually with a correlation to Christ’s indwelling. 
Finally, through an analysis of Maximus’ engagement with Origenism and 
Tritheism, I showed how Maximus supplement his grammar for the Trinity as 
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beginning, means, and end. By highlighting the irreducible distinction between 
Creator and creation, Maximus shows how the Trinity can be beginning, means, 
and end while avoiding ontological confusion and allowing space for genuine 
interaction and participation. Maximus, through his theological insight 
concerning union and distinction, draws out the problems of miaphysite 
Tritheism and miaphysitism more generally and contributes his own distinctive 
judgment to an often made pro-Chalcedonian critique. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Transition, Synthesis & a New Grammar for Trinity & Christ 
 
In this final chapter, I cover the last three of Maximus’ works written 
before, by, or in 626/627 CE: Quaestiones et dubia, Ep. 2 and Op. 13. As I stated 
in the introduction, the first two works I suggest are written after Liber asceticus 
and Capita caritate but before Op. 13. In these works, Maximus is in a period of 
transition, synthesis, and discovery, building on his earlier work but also 
incorporating new technical vocabulary to his already established Trinitarian 
grammar for Christian life. After a brief overview of each section, I will cover 
Quaestiones et dubia (4.1) and Ep. 2 (4.2) briefly before looking closely at Op.13 
(4.3). This last section requires some background on Maximus’ pro-
Chalcedonian context and so before I analyze his work, I will explore the 
traditional canon of authors in an attempt to give a nuanced presentation of the 
issues.  
In Quaestiones et dubia, Maximus employs the literary style of quaestio-
responsio in order to tackle scriptural and patristic ἀπορίαι but more 
importantly it reveals an even broader set of sources upon which he draws. 
While there are many areas that could be explored, I will review 1) areas where 
Maximus adds some complexity to his presentation by continuing to utilize and 
refine language and concepts used in the Liber and Capita, but will 2) focus 
primarily on issues related to Maximus’ direct reflection on Trinitarian thought. 
Here, finally, we see Maximus apply not only technical language regarding Christ 
but also the application of the λόγος/τρόπος distinction to the Trinity as a way 
of discussing what is three and what is one.  
In Epistula 2, I will explore how some of the refinements observed in 
Quaestiones et dubia, along with how the λόγος/τρόπος distinction and technical 
language for Christ are synthesized with his already established Trinitarian 
grammar for Christian life. 
Finally, in Opusculum 13, I will explore how Maximus engages a 
particular stream of pro-Chalcedonian theology and how it shapes his 
conception of the relationship between the Trinity and Christ presenting us 
with a new grammar for talking about both. This will require delving into 
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Maximus’ background, which I hope to accomplish by tracking a particular 
saying from Gregory of Nazianzus Epistula prima ad Cledonium (Ep. 101) in the 
post-Chalcedonian period. While Op. 13 only introduces Maximus’ engagement 
with this trajectory, I will attempt to provide a basic sketch from which the 
mature themes celebrated by other scholars from his later works can be located.  
§4.1 Transition: More Questions and New Answers in Quaestiones et Dubia 
  §4.1.1 Overview 
In this part of the chapter, I will look at Maximus’ engagement with 
various issues in Quaestiones et dubia related to the Trinity.1 In many ways, this 
work is like a set of brief sketches and notes - a transitional piece where 
Maximus first deals with questions that he will develop later in the Ambigua. It 
is, for example, the first time he deals with the ἀπορία found in Gregory of 
Nazianzus’ Or. 23.8.2 This judgment is based partly on the themes he explores 
and his engagement with earlier concepts such as the λόγοι and γνῶσις as 
mediated through the nexus of faith, praxis, theōria, and Trinity. In this regard, 
he begins to clearly explain the relationship between the Logos and λόγοι and 
identify God, particularly the Father, as Cause. He is not as focused on refuting 
Origenist ideas as he was in the Capita, although there are several questions that 
clearly have that tenor. Taken together, these suggest that it was written after 
the Capita and is among the last of the early writings before his major wrestling 
with Origenism in the Ambigua ad Iohannem. Perhaps the most telling evidence, 
however, is his engagement with the λόγος/τρόπος distinction. While Maximus 
touches on the λόγοι in Capita caritate, the λόγος/τρόπος pairing does not occur 
even in places one might expect it, such as a discussion of the Trinity (2.29, 4.8) 
and the distinction between image and likeness in humanity (3.25) nor the 
constitution of created beings (4.8, 9). Similarly, his account of the incarnation 
                                                 
1 The critical edition is Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones et dubia, ed. José H. Declerck 
CCSG 10 (Turnhout: Brepols-Leuven, 1982). The most recent English translation with 
introduction and notes is St. Maximus the Confessor’s Questions and Doubts, transl. Despina D. 
Prassas (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010) and contains an excellent 
bibliography for its study.  
2 Maximus, Qua. dub. §105 (CCSG 10:79-80). Maximus deals with it again along with a 
similar saying from Gregory’s Or.29.2 (PG 36.76A-C: SC 250.178-180) in Ambiguum 1 (CCSG 
48:6-7)  
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in the Liber, which affirmed Christ as God and human by nature, lacked the 
technical language he uses later in the Ambigua ad Iohannem. Maximus engages 
all three of these items in Quaestiones et dubia and from this point forward will 
usually utilize them as part of his standard presentation of the ontological 
constitution of the Trinity, Christ, and creation.  
Before I begin a closer readings of specific passages, I want to state that I 
do not attempt to treat every reference to God or the Trinity in Quaestiones et 
dubia but will review only a selection of passages that give a taste of how 
Maximus builds or refines his Trinitarian grammar for Christian life or signal 
potential emphases in latter phases of writing. Prassas, for example, has in her 
2010 translation touched on the importance of several themes: Logos/λόγοι and 
θεωρία /πρᾶξις. Both of these will be discussed here but from a slightly 
different perspective. There is a nexus of themes surrounding the activities of 
the Son and the Spirit, those of theōria and praxis and how this relates to 
sources of γνῶσις. Likewise, there is another set of concepts surrounding 
Logos/λόγοι which make a distinction that will be important to later phases of 
writing. While the exact sitz im leben of the work remains unclear, Maximus’ 
writing fits a mind that is in transition from the ideas expressed in the Liber 
asceticus and Capita caritate toward the more focused and detailed anti-
Origenist arguments of the Ambigua ad Iohannem and his major scriptural 
treatise Quaestiones ad Thalassium. As Prassas notes, there is no argument in 
Quaestiones et dubia regarding the Origenist triad στάσις, κίνησις, and γένεσις 
but there is an engagement with the exegetical writings of Origen, Evagrius, and 
Didymus the Blind as well as a clear attempt to work out the relationships 
involved in the two themes she named.3 
§4.1.2 – Refinements & Clarification of Trinity as Beginning, Means, and 
End   
§4.1.2.1 Ascent & Descent of the Logos & God as Cause  
In this brief section, I have two goals. The first goal is to show how 
Maximus now explicitly names God as Cause. The second goal is to show how he 
                                                 
3 Prassas, Questions and Doubts, 14-16.  
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also conceives of ascent using a more detailed account of the Logos/λόγοι 
doctrine. These lay inchoate in the Capita caritate, but now become explicit. 
They also signal how Maximus is adding another layer of complexity to his 
description of ascent and its relation to God. 
In Quaestio 64, Maximus interprets a set of questions taken from 
Proverbs 30.4:  
. . . Who ascended into heaven and descended? Who has gathered together 
the winds to [his] bosom? Who has smashed together water in [his] 
clothing? Who keeps the uttermost parts of the earth? What is his name?4 
 Maximus’ exegesis of this text gives him an opportunity to reflect on the 
purpose (σκοπός) of humanity. Commenting on the first question, he discusses 
how human beings were meant, “to ascend in desire to their Cause” and then, 
“descend to created things that are after the Cause”, and when they have been 
“properly examined with knowledge to raise them up to their maker.”5 The verb 
for “examined” is ἐπισκοπέω and easily sets up the reader to anticipate the next 
section which discusses how, when humanity failed in their role, Jesus Christ as 
a “second Adam” recapitulates this ascent and descent first in his humanity and 
then in his divinity and then ascends again with both his humanity and divinity. 
This ascent and descent are presented as an example of how ascent must be 
pursued. 
 The next section relies on the rest of the quote from Proverbs to explain 
how “descending” into created things means gathering together “the winds in 
his bosom” through the examination of the λόγοι of beings. As a result, once one 
has gathered the diverse λόγοι “in the productive and contemplative part of the 
heart, he births the one Logos of God. For the many λόγοι of beings is drawn 
together into one.”6 Maximus ends his response by correlating other areas of the 
passage with what he calls the “ethical parts of philosophy.”7 I want to draw 
attention to how Maximus has linked together explicitly several ideas that were 
                                                 
4 Maximus, Qua. dub. §64 (CCSG 10:50.1-3).  
5 Maximus, Qua. dub. §64 (CCSG 10:50.4-8).   
6 Maximus, Qua. dub. §64 (CCSG 10:51.27-28). 
7 Maximus, Qua. dub. §64 (CCSG 10:51.33): . . . ἐν τῷ ἠθικῷ μέρει τῆς φιλοσοφίας . . . 
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only embryonic in his earlier presentations of ascent. The first explicit link is the 
title “Cause” with God. Specifically, Jesus’ ascent is described as “moving toward 
the Cause”. This could easily be understood as referring to the Father. Maximus 
does not explicitly correlate the title “Father” with “Cause” here but, if the 
incarnate Logos is moving toward the Cause, the inference is that this Cause is 
the Father. This is not without precedent. As Maximus suggests, these 
movements mirror the incarnation. Additionally, since the Son ascends to the 
right hand of the Father, it makes sense that once contemplation finds its goal in 
the Logos, and the Logos is seen as God then the mind goes together with him, in 
him or through him to the Father.8 While in earlier presentations of ascent Jesus 
served as an example of love and ascent, his activities were not described as 
“moving toward the Cause” but instead as obedience to the Father in his keeping 
of the commandments of love. Even more though, this set of movements shows 
the way in which ascent and contemplation depend on the activities of the 
divine persons to reveal or lead the mind to one another. 
The second explicit link is between the λόγοι and the Logos. In Capita 
caritate, the λόγοι drew the mind toward their cause and towards recognizing 
God’s goodness, wisdom, providence, and judgment, whereas in this case 
Maximus states they are drawn together to the one Logos. I do not mean to say 
that Maximus could not or did not have this relationship in mind before, only 
that here he makes this connection explicit. Maximus links the idea of “bosom” 
with “navel” to draw out that image of birth, which is meant to describe the 
process of the λόγοι coming together to “birth” the one Logos of God. Already, 
Maximus is using language that ties several themes together: the contemplation 
of the λόγοι and the manifestation or, in this case, “birth” of God as Logos in the 
human person. This last phrase is not as clear as the translation might suggest. 
In the Liber, Maximus uses the title “The Eternal Word” and attaches the relative 
clause “who is of God the Father” which makes a clear identification of the term 
λόγος with the title “Son”. In the Capita, his uses are equally clear (4.3, 3.2) and 
yet in neither of these early works does he describe the gathering of the λόγοι 
                                                 
8 The same or similar movements are stated elsewhere in §142 (CCSG 10:101), §I.68 
(CCSG 10.155-158), §136 (CCSG 10.97).  
 207 
into one – the Logos.  So, a natural question would be: does Maximus mean the 
second person of the Trinity or something less heightened like God’s one 
principle? Elsewhere in Quaestio 48, Maximus makes a similar statement using 
the image of chain mail to describe how the λόγοι are linked together toward 
the “one”.9 Here “one” lacks the genitive phrase “of God” although the inference 
by way of ellipsis is one λόγος. A similar ambiguity initially accompanies 
Quaestio 53, where Maximus states “Nature having being united to the λόγος 
has held all knowledge,” but, later, λόγος is clearly identified as the “Lord, who 
having become incarnate [and] has summed up all things in himself, measured 
out these λόγοι.”10 Yet the initial phrase does not contain the genitive “of God”.  
However, there are places that make the connection clear. For example, in 
Quaestio 105, there is a clear identification of the title “Logos of God” with the 
“Son”, thus making explicit the identification of the phrase with the second 
person of the Trinity.11 Likewise, when one takes into consideration Maximus’ 
statements that equate doing the commandments with having or possessing 
God in the Capita additional quaestiones can be added as support.12 In later 
literature, particularly Ambiguum 7, this linkage is made equally clear. 
Yet there is still a slight ἀπορία. If Maximus has inferred the Cause as the 
Father and the λόγοι draw the mind to the birthing of the Logos there still 
remains the corresponding movement of ascent to the Cause, which the 
incarnate Logos exhibits. Maximus does not elaborate on this movement here. 
Nevertheless his explanation, because it highlights the life of the incarnate 
Logos, demonstrates a Trinitarian texture since it is understood that he is 
ascending to the Cause – the Father. Maximus in the Liber and Capita already 
suggested that the Spirit’s illumination is an extension of the activities of the 
Son’s incarnate life. Here the λόγοι lead to the Logos, who will lead to the Father. 
Ascent and illumination depend on the activities of the Son and Spirit. 
                                                 
9 Maximus, Qua. dub. §48 (CCSG 10:44.7-8; 11-13).  
10 Maximus, Qua. dub. §53 (CCSG 10:44.7-8; 11-13).  
11  Maximus, Qua. dub. §105 (CCSG 10:79.22-23). Compare §55, 111, 190 (CCSG10:45.1-
11; 82.1-8; 131.1-132.45) 
12 Maximus, Qua. dub. §142, 166 (CCSG 10: 101.1-21; 116.1-5). 
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 In Quaestiones, Maximus has built and refined his conception of ascent in 
relation to God. Firstly, he does this by explicitly using the title “Cause” for God, 
likely the Father, and secondly, through his description of the λόγοι being drawn 
into one – the Logos. Thirdly, he does this by utilizing language that shows not 
only how fulfilling God’s commandments leads to a manifestation of the Logos in 
the human person but also contemplation of the λόγοι. However, it is not clear 
that the perceptibility of God’s presence is the source of his reflection as much 
as explaining the means by which the baptized experience this reality. This 
language will find further expression in his later writings, particularly Expositio 
orationis Dominicae and Ambigua ad Iohannem. These small changes show how 
Maximus has incrementally added clarity to his description of God and how they 
shaped his language for ascent. God is beginning and end because the Father is 
Cause. Likewise, God is the goal of the contemplative stage of ascent because the 
Word is the locus of the λόγοι and when this stage has run its course results in a 
realization of the one Logos in the human person. Finally, Jesus Christ as the 
Logos exemplifies this ascent and descent and so serves as a source of imitation.  
§4.1.2.2 Trinity & Participation Revisited – Quaestio 3.1: The Image of God 
& God’s Οὐσία & Ένέργεια 
In this section, I look at Maximus’ continued reflection on issues 
surrounding the activity of God in the human being’s journey toward union with 
him. Specifically, God functions as the means of human life because he provides 
the basis for existence and deification through participation. 
In Quaestio 3.1, Maximus addresses what it means for human beings to 
be made in the image and likeness of God from Genesis 1.26 and why in 1.27 
being made in God’s likeness is absent. Maximus’ response to the first part of the 
question is that the image of God is located in the soul as part of its οὐσία. What 
is given (δέδωκεν) is incorruptibility, immortality, and invisibility (ἡ ἀφθαρσία, 
ἡ ἀθανασία, τὸ ἀόρατον) along with self-governance and self-determination 
(τὸ αὐτοδέσποτον καὶ αὐτεξούσιον).13 Those things that correspond to the 
likeness are “impassibility (ἀπάθεια), meekness, longsuffering and the rest of 
                                                 
13 I follow Prassas’ translation of αὐτοδέσποτον as it fits the context of the discussion 
much better than the lexical entry of “self-mastery”. 
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the characteristics of God’s goodness all of which are indicative of God’s 
activity.”14 To address the second question, Maximus restates the correlation 
that those things κατ’ εἰκόνα are from God’s οὐσία while those καθ’ 
ὁμοίωσιν are characteristic of his activity (ἐνέργεια). The latter, however, are 
not immediately given to the soul but are reserved for its self-determining will 
(ταῦτα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αὐτεξουσίῳ ἀφῆκε γνώμῃ) awaiting its maturity when the 
soul establishes itself in God through the imitation of the “God-befitting 
characteristics of virtue” (τῶν θεοπρεπῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς γνωρισμάτων).15 
Maximus’ exegesis of the text suggests that verse 27 only records the beginning 
of this process while God awaits humanity’s response before it is granted 
likeness with him giving an eschatological dimension to the creation account.  
A quick comparison with Cap. car. 3.25 might suggest Maximus has 
changed his conception of the human constitution and participation based on 
his explanation of the image and likeness pairing. In the Capita, it was being and 
ever-being that were given to the οὐσία and goodness and wisdom to likeness. 
However, a closer reading shows that Maximus carries forward several ideas. 
All of the characteristics (τὰ γνωρίσματα) given to the οὐσία or φύσις of 
humanity – incorruptibility, immortality, and invisibility – can be seen to align 
with being and eternal being while those given in response to the self-
determining will  – ἀπάθεια, meekness, longsuffering – can be aligned with the 
goodness and wisdom of Cap. car. 3.25. The trigger for God’s giving of these 
things according to likeness is still the same, although here instead of “by the 
fitness of will” (τῇ γνωμικῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι), Maximus uses “by our self-
determining will,” (τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αὐτεξουσίῳ . . . γνώμῃ).16   
However, Maximus’ description in the Quaestiones does make some 
things more explicit and even adds aspects that were not in his previous 
account. For example, Maximus states that the soul is what receives those things 
κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ while in the Capita it is ἡ λογικὴ καὶ νοερὰ οὐσία to which God 
                                                 
14 Maximus, Qua. dub. §3.1 (CCSG 10: 170.11-13): . . . ἡ ἀπάθεια, τὸ πρᾶον, τὸ 
μακρόθυμον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἀγαθότητος τοῦ θεοῦ γνωρίσματα, ἅπερ πάντα ἐνεργείας θεοῦ 
εἰσιν παραστατικά. 
15 Maximus, Qua. dub. §3.1 (CCSG 10: 170.18). 
16  Maximus, Qua. dub. §3.1 (CCSG 10: 170.16). 
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communicates (ἐκοινοποίησεν) his divine attributes (τὰ θεῖον ἰδιωμάτὰ). This 
terminology, like the list of characteristics, is not entirely out of place. The soul, 
specifically, is the place of the rational and intellectual οὐσία. What Maximus 
makes more explicit is that self-determination and self-governance, as 
“imagings” (εἰκονίσματα) of the divine, are also given to the soul. Taking both 
the Capita and Quaestiones together, this means the “self-determining” will is as 
much a gift of God as being and eternal being. The most significant addition is 
Maximus’ distinction between those things that are “imagings” of the οὐσία of 
God and those things that are indicative (εἰσιν παραστατικά) of God’s ἐνέργεια. 
The former are given without human action, the latter “anticipate the maturity 
of the human being” specifically their imitation of virtue. This imitation in the 
Capita and the Liber is primarily of Christ or God and secondarily of biblical 
examples. Here, perhaps because it deals with the creation of humanity in the 
Genesis text, Maximus highlights simply God’s ἐνέργεια. In the Capita caritate, 
all of the τὰ θεῖον ἰδιωμάτὰ are an image or likeness of God’s οὐσία. In 
Quaestiones, however, only the first set are aligned to God’s οὐσία while the 
later are aligned with God’s ἐνέργεια. Is this merely another reformulation of 
the same idea or does this distinction demonstrate Maximus’ further reflection 
on the terms οὐσία, δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια? How does he understand the 
relationship between these terms? Does this affect his Trinitarian theology? At 
this point, it is unclear, however, that human beings mirror or unite with God’s 
ἐνέργεια – a theme he will utilize in Ep. 2 and eventually Mystagogia 1. 
Regardless, these slight differences in language show that Maximus is 
continuing to reflect and perhaps refine his account of participation. 
§4.1.2.3 Θεολόγια – Prayer, Death, & Coming to be in God 
 In this section, I want to cover briefly four texts that show ways 
Maximus reflects on theology. In the Capita, theology and theological truth were 
a grace and activity associated with the illumination provided by the Spirit. The 
Liber portrayed illumination as an extension or appropriation of the activities of 
the Son – a notion preserved, at times, in the ambiguous correlation of the 
indwelling Christ and Spirit in the Capita. Maximus continues using the language 
of illumination and grace to characterize the activities of the Spirit, but these 
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references are scattered throughout the Quaestiones and are not concentrated in 
one particular passage.17 Also, because God’s οὐσία is unknowable and because 
human knowledge is attained differently than God’s, it is through his 
μεγαλοεργία that human beings perceive his goodness and wisdom. God’s 
unknowability and irreducible difference from creation shape the way he 
conceives of ascent and the theological enterprise. Theology in this presentation 
is not only reflection on the Trinity in creation but also depends on the gracious 
and illuminating activities of the persons of the Trinity. In Quaestiones, Maximus 
refines this idea further. I will comment on each of the passages below and then 
discuss in what ways they help refine his previous portrayals. 
 In Quaestio 46, Maximus presents an interpretation of the character of 
Zacchaius and his interaction with Jesus from Luke 19:1-10. Maximus’ tactic, 
which Blowers has shown to be typical of the Confessor’s exegesis, is to explain 
the scene and it details in a way that provides “new insights into the dynamics 
of the ascetic life.”18 In the first part of the passage, Maximus uses the scene to 
discuss the stages of ascent, using Zacchaius’ ascent and descent from the tree 
as a response to the Logos and as a way to discuss the process of moving from 
repentance, to a redirection of desire to “intense prayer”. In the second part, he 
makes this connection more dense and technical stating,  
The passage speaks of the active, the natural, the theological and of prayer. 
For prayer is higher than theology. For the one theologizes about the 
divine from those things that had come to pass but the other joins the soul 
to God himself unknowably and ineffably.19 
                                                 
17 Maximus, Qua. dub. §31, 142, 163, 180, 191, I.28, I.3, II.7 (CCSG 10:26.1-10; 101.1-21; 
114.1-21; 123.1-16; 132.1-134.63; 147.1-148.20; 138.1-139.13; 166.1-10). A notable exception 
is 191, which I will discuss below. 
18 Paul M. Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy in Maximus the Confessor: An 
Investigation of Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 7 (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 52-56. 
19 Maximus, Qua. dub. §46 (CCSG 10:39.21-25): Ἢ τὴν πρακτικὴν λέγει καὶ φυσικὴν καὶ 
θεολογικὴν καὶ εὐκτικήν· ἡ γὰρ εὐκτικὴ τῆς θεολογίας ἐστὶν ὑψηλοτέρα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν 
γεγονότων τὸ θεῖον θεολογεῖ, ἡ δὲ αὐτῷ συνάπτει ἀγνώστως καὶ ἀπορρήτως τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ 
θεῷ.  
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 In the Capita, the exact relationship between θεολόγια and prayer could 
initially seem unclear because of the heightened language used of both. For 
example, in the Capita, prayer was consistently cast as both the end goal of 
intellectual focus and the redirection of desire (cf. Cap. car. 2.6). Θεολόγια was 
consistently described as the height of the contemplation. For example, 
Maximus uses heightened language like “being in God” to describe the searching 
out of the λόγοι concerning God.20 Likewise, this language from Capita caritate 
1.100 was also used to talk about θεολόγια in capitula 2.26-27 – having come to 
be in God, one examines through the Spirit the λόγος concerning God (τὸν περὶ 
αὐτοῦ λόγον) as opposed to God in himself (κατ’ αὐτὸν). This was followed by 
the exact same list of items that can be known about him that appeared in 
capitulum 1.100. Similar language was also used for prayer. In capitulum 2.6, the 
supreme state of pure prayer for the contemplative life occurs when the soul is 
completely captivated by God and “when it is moved by the λόγοι concerning 
God, it receives pure and clear reflections.”21 Despite the equally heightened 
language, prayer is a natural movement from θεολόγια. In capitulum 3.46, 
contemplation, θεολόγια and prayer are all subsumed under the Apostle Paul’s 
command in Galatians 5:16 to “walk by the Spirit”. These activities are distinct 
but nevertheless an interlinking progression associated with the Spirit. Whereas 
the Capita description of θεολόγια and prayer could lead one to think they are 
one and the same, Quaestiones makes such an equivocation improbable. In light 
of this material, it is likely that Quaestio 46 is not disparaging θεολόγια as 
simply unnecessary talk about God from the past but rather is pointing out that 
θεολόγια is a distinct movement on the way to a higher goal – prayer. 
 Quaestio 46 also shows another way that Maximus can portray ascent. 
Here there is a four-part presentation the πρακτική, the φυσική, the θεολογική, 
and the εὐκτική. This formulation is more common in Quaestiones and at times 
the first term is replaced by πραγματική or ἠθική and will continue in his 
                                                 
20 Maximus, Cap. car  2.26, 1.100 (Cap. sulla car.:  88, 102, 104) 
21 Maximus, Cap. car. 2.6 (Cap. sulla car.: 92). Maximus’ language here intentionally 
plays off of the pluriform meanings of both λόγος and  ἔμφασις. The latter meaning “reflection” 
as in a mirror or water but also “outward appearance”, “exposition”, “explanation” and 
“meaning”. 
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descriptions in the Ambigua ad Iohannem.22 The first three terms corresponds 
with the earlier Capita presentation of πρακτική, θεωρία φυσική, θεωρία τῆς 
ἁγίας Τριάδος except that prayer is now distinctly named at the end of the 
progression.   
 The second text is Quaestio 173. Maximus sets out to answer briefly what 
Eph. 1:23b (“the fullness of the one who fills all things with all”) means. The first 
part of the response makes a clear distinction between God and creation 
according to essence, suggesting he is “by negation excluded from all beings” 
and is followed by a statement that his essence, “. . . cannot be spoken of, 
thought of, or participated in at all by anyone. Yet he is participated in by many 
according to a providential going forth, and they also fill him.”23  
Maximus now turns to explain how this can be the case by expounding a 
succinct account of the λόγοι doctrine. Everything exists according to its λόγος 
and the λόγοι exist in God, are members of God and have a place in God. When 
someone moves in accordance with their λόγος that person comes to exist in 
God and fulfills “their own place and dignity in the body of Christ as a member 
who works usefully.”24 Not moving in accordance with their λόγος results in a 
“rightly paid eternal penalty.”25  
 This particular passage gives us several ways in which Maximus refines 
his understanding. Firstly, Maximus uses the term ἀποφατικῶς. While in the 
Capita, Maximus clearly uses apophatic statements favoring alpha-privatives, he 
did not explicitly identify this approach with the term ἀπόφασις or 
ἀποφατικῶς. Here he consciously identifies it as such. The appearance of the 
term is more common in Quaestiones and the pairing of the terms ἀπόφασις and 
κατάφασις (or at least καταφασκόμενον) will occur in Quaestio 190 but is more 
developed in the Ambigua, specifically Ambiguum 10. Maximus consciously 
                                                 
22 Maximus, Qua. dub. §17, 29, 31, 58, 167, 192 (CCSG 10:13.1-16.91; 24.1-25.44; 26.1-
10; 46.1-7; 116.1-11; 134.1-135.16).  
23 Maximus, Qua. dub. § 173 (CCSG 10: 120.4-7): οὔτε γὰρ λέγεται, οὔτε νοεῖται, οὐδὲ 
μετέχεται οὐδαμῶς ἀπό τινος· κατὰ δὲ τὴν προνοητικὴν πρόοδον ὑπὸ πολλῶν μετεχόμενος, ὑπ’ 
αὐτῶν καὶ πληροῦται. 
24 Maximus, Qua. dub. §173 (CCSG 10:120.10-12). 
25 Maximus, Qua. dub. §173 (CCSG 10:120.14). 
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identifies the irreducible difference between Creator and creation with the term 
apophasis. This difference is according to essence, and the result is that the 
divine cannot be wholly delimited by either speech or thought, nor participated 
in at will by creatures. Participation is on God’s terms according to his 
“providential going forth”. This last phrase can be understood in light of the 
Capita where God’s giving of his divine attributes and power were identified as 
the means by which he sustained created beings. Significantly, Maximus does 
not equate the Logos with the λόγος of each created being purposely placing the 
qualifying terms “its” (ἑαυτοῦ) and “own” (ἴδιος). Each being has its own λόγος.  
 The last two texts are Quaestiones 190 and 191, both of which touch on 
the biblical narrative leading up to and describing the transfiguration.26 Thus, I 
will analyze each before explaining how they refine Maximus’ conception of 
θεολόγια. In Quaestio 190, Maximus attempts to navigate an apparent 
discrepancy between Mark 9.1 and Matthew 16.28, both of which record Jesus 
stating to the Apostles that some will not “taste death”. However, the condition 
attached to this statement differs slightly. Mark states “until they see the 
kingdom of God come with power” while Matthew states “until they see the Son 
of Man coming in his kingdom.” Maximus interprets these differences in three 
ways. The first way is as a foreshadowing of the transfiguration that is soon to 
follow in both texts and is given by the Logos of God who “is not circumscribed” 
by the events of history, is “active everywhere”, and “shines forth justice like 
light from a sun.”27 The transfiguration itself served as a foreshadowing of a 
glorious eschatological future.28 The second way is as a means of understanding 
ascent. The transition between each stage of ascent is cast as a death. So, the 
transition from the πρακτική to θεωρία φυσική is a death to praxis toward 
being at rest. The transition from θεωρία φυσική to the Cause of all things is by 
the death of theological negation (διὰ τῆς θεολογικῆς ἀποφάσεως / τῇ κατὰ 
ἀπόφασιν θεολογίᾳ) which he further explains takes place when,  
                                                 
26 On Maximus’ explanation of the Transfiguration here and in his other works and its 
relation to Ps.-Macarius see Plested, Macarian Legacy, 216-223. 
27 Maximus, Qua. dub. §190 (CCSG 10:131.6-8). 
28 Maximus, Qua. dub. §190 (CCSG 10:131.13-15). 
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. . . the transfigured Lord will disclose himself, no longer by making a 
positive statement from an affirmation of the things that are but 
disclosing by theological negation the inaccessible secret of his divinity.29  
The third way is by setting the two conditions at the end of two poles to 
show eschatological fulfillment as a result of Christ being both God and human. 
The Markan condition, using the title “Son of Man”, points to Christ’s humanity 
while the Matthean condition “until they see the kingdom of God come with 
power” indicates his divinity since as Son of God “he had eternally possessed 
glory” but also shows how the eternal kingdom was only present in power (ἐν 
δυνάμει) but not in activity (ἐνεργείᾳ).30 
 Finally in Quaestio 191, Maximus investigates the transfiguration. In this 
case, Maximus begins by seizing on another discrepancy between Luke’s 
account and that of Matthew and Mark concerning the number of days leading 
up to the transfiguration in order to highlight aspects of ascent. He then 
comments on why it was only Peter, James, and John that accompanied Jesus, 
using their names to show that the virtues of faith, hope and love are necessary 
to ascend with the Logos up the “mount of theology”.31 The transfiguration itself 
then comes to center stage and Maximus, as in the previous quaestio, comments 
how affirmation is left behind and the Logos is, 
 . . . therefore no longer counted as God, and holy and king and other such 
things by affirmation but by negation he is counted as beyond God and 
beyond holy and all things because of [his] pre-eminence.32  
Maximus then draws attention to Christ during his transfiguration 
successively interpreting Christ’s face as the “hiddenness of his οὐσία”, his body 
as “the οὐσία of the virtues”, and his clothes as “the words (ῥήματα) of Scripture 
and the workings of the cosmos that have been produced and received being 
from God.”33 Both Scripture and creation witnesses to a beauty that is ultimately 
                                                 
29 Maximus, Qua. dub. §190 (CCSG 10: 132.29-32) 
30 Maximus, Qua. dub. §190 (CCSG 10:132.43-45). 
31 Maximus, Qua. dub. §191 (CCSG 10:133.10, 20). 
32 Maximus, Qua. dub. §191 (CCSG 10:134.43-46). 
33 Maximus, Qua. dub. §191 (CCSG 10:134.47-48; 53-55; 55-57). 
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from the Creator but must be interpreted “by the contemplation of the Spirit” 
and “by the removal of the deception because of sense”.34  
 In this text, Maximus is pushing the contingency and limitation of 
language further by calling the Logos beyond God and beyond holy. Likewise, 
Maximus interprets the transfiguration by seeing the virtues, the Scriptures and 
creation in or on Christ himself. This particular interpretation will be repeated 
and expanded in Ambiguum 10. Important as well is how Maximus continues to 
incorporate the Spirit as the means by which contemplation and discernment 
are accomplished. While there is no tight pairing of activities here as was seen in 
the Liber and Capita the role of the Spirit in ascent remains significant.  
 All four of these texts show ways that Maximus’ conception of theology 
and ascent are refined and clarified. Prayer and θεολόγια are distinct 
movements but nevertheless interrelated parts of the same process of ascent. 
Discussing God’s transcendence is now consciously identified as ἀπόφασις and 
is placed in contrast to “making affirmative statements”. Likewise, Christ as the 
Logos becomes the touch point for the virtues, the Scriptures, and creation and 
is discerned by the Spirit. Θεολόγια is not just reflection on the Trinity in 
creation and the Scriptures but depends on acknowledging the irreducible 
distinction between God and creation and the illuminating activity of the Spirit 
concerning the Logos. 
§4.1.3 Technical Language for Trinity & Incarnation 
Perhaps the most noticeable difference when looking at Trinitarian 
theology between the earlier Liber and Capita is the use of the λόγος/τρόπος 
distinction. In this section, I will first briefly look at Quaestio 1.34 where 
Maximus speaks specifically about the relationship of the Father, Son, and Spirit 
and then look more closely at his use of the λόγος/τρόπος distinction in 
Quaestiones, and end with a brief discussion of new technical language for the 
incarnation. 
§4.1.3.1 Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ, & the Father as Cause 
                                                 
34 Maximus, Qua. dub. §191 (CCSG 10: 134.57-63). 
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 In Quaestio 1.34, Maximus tackles a question similarly found in Mark the 
Monk concerning the ascription of the Holy Spirit as “of God” and “of Christ”, 
except that the focus is on the relationship between the Son and Spirit. 
Specifically, he addresses why Christ cannot be said to be of the Spirit in the 
same way that the Son is said to be of the Father and why is it that “Spirit of 
God” and “Spirit of Christ” are both used. Maximus’ reply is to give the analogy 
of νοῦς, λόγος, and φωνή, “Just as the νοῦς is the cause of the λόγος so [it is] also 
of the πνεῦμα yet through the intermediate λόγος. So also, it cannot be said that 
the λόγος is from the φωνή nor the Son from the Spirit.”35 Maximus here argues 
for the Father as the cause of the Son and the Spirit, yet the latter is through the 
intermediate Logos. The causal relationship only works in one direction, and so 
the Spirit cannot be said to be the cause of the Son. One could argue here that in 
the incarnation the Spirit serves as an intermediate cause of Christ’s humanity, 
but the question confines the issue to the way the Father causes the Son and 
Spirit. The analogy certainly has its limitations but regardless, it shows how 
Maximus is attempting to deal with the relationship between correlation and 
cause seeking to preserve the Father as the sole cause of both Son and Spirit. 
§4.1.3.2 The Λόγος/Τρόπος Distinction & Technical Language for the 
Trinity 
Before I go too far into investigating the λόγος/τρόπος distinction, it will 
be helpful to outline the terms and concepts used in this section. The first set of 
concepts is the Logos/λόγοι nexus of ideas. Several studies have been done to 
determine what exactly the λόγοι are and their relationship to the Logos.36 It has 
also been look at from the perspective of participation since Maximus expounds 
                                                 
35 Maximus, Qua. dub. 1.34 (CCSG 10:151.1-7):  Ὅτι οὐ δύναται λέγεσθαι ὁ Χριστὸς 
πνεύματος καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, ὅτι λέγεται ⟨ἀ⟩διαφόρως πνεῦμα θεοῦ καὶ 
πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ. 
Ὥσπερ ἐστὶν αἴτιος τοῦ λόγου ὁ νοῦς, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, διὰ μέσου δὲ τοῦ 
λόγου· καὶ ὥσπερ οὐ δυνάμεθα εἰπεῖν τὸν λόγον εἶναι τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸν υἱὸν λέγειν 
τοῦ πνεύματος. 
36 Irénée Henri Dalmais, “La Théorie des «Logos» des Créatures chez s. Maxime le 
Confesseur,” Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques 36 (1952), 244-249. Andrew 
Louth, “St Maximos’ Doctrine of the logoi of Creation,” Studia Patristica 48 (Leuven: Peeters, 
2010), 77-84. 
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the doctrine most thoroughly in Ambiguum 7 while commenting on how, as 
Gregory Nazianzus states, human beings can be considered “portions of God”.37 
Despite the attention these concepts have received separately, the relationship 
between the Logos/λόγοι doctrine and the λόγος/τρόπος distinction has 
received less reflection. The Logos is the Son, as we saw in the opening response 
of the old man in the Liber. The λόγοι and their relationship with the Logos is a 
much more difficult task to ascertain. The λόγοι can be any number of items in 
created existence that when drawn together point toward God and, as I 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the Word. These can be words of Scripture, 
δόγματα, or God’s μεγαλοεργία of creation. From the stance of cosmology, the 
concept draws out several aspects of rational beings. The first aspect is 
teleological. The λόγος defines the purpose of each created thing which 
ultimately finds its goal in the Logos. Reaching this goal though is not automatic; 
it depends on the will choosing love. The second aspect is ontological and, in 
addition to defining a thing’s purpose, also defines what a thing is — ὁ τοῦ εἶναι 
λόγος — its nature. While these aspects are distinguishable, they are 
nevertheless the one λόγος of each created thing and so are inseparably linked.  
This Logos/λόγοι doctrine is related to the λόγος/τρόπος distinction but is not 
identical. This distinction can be found in a variety of contexts in Quaestiones 
but from a metaphysical standpoint the distinction emphasizes ὁ τοῦ εἶναι 
λόγος, which is one, while ὁ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπος can be many. Maximus will 
eventually correlate φύσις and οὐσία with ὁ τοῦ εἶναι λόγος, and ὑπόστασις and 
πρόσωπον with ὁ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπος. However, when looked at from the 
perspective of ascent, the function of the λόγοι is always the same in θεωρία 
φυσικά — it draws the mind back to the Logos and ultimately the Father as 
Cause.  
In his early works such as the Liber Asceticus and Capita Caritate, 
Maximus does not employ the λόγος/τρόπος distinction in his explanation of 
the Trinity. When we come to Quaestiones et dubia it is a different story. There 
                                                 
37 Polycarp Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 166-180; Eric Perl, “Methexis: Creation, 
Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus Confessor,” Ph.D. Diss. (Yale University, 1991); 
Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) and also Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early 
Christian Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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are places where Maximus utilizes this distinction in regard to meaning. For 
example in Quaestio 129, Maximus explains the sorrow that God and the saints 
experience and suggests that, while the word “sorrow” is one 
(Εἷς οὖν ὁ λόγος τῆς λύπης), it takes on many ways of being disposed (πολλοὺς 
ἐπιδέχεται τρόπους διαθέσεων).38 This example shows that Maximus can apply 
the distinction to meaning.  However, Maximus also begins to apply the 
distinction to the Trinity.  In Quaestio 105, Maximus treats for the first time in 
his writing, Gregory’s Or. 23.8 in which there is a discussion of movement from 
monad to dyad and then to triad regarding the Trinity. Maximus, in this 
responsio already interprets the passage along the lines of the mind’s movement 
from the oneness to the threeness of the Trinity rather than viewing this as a 
metaphysical development within God. This move of the mind, Maximus says, is 
done by God himself who moves the mind to reflect on him as γενεσιουργὸν 
(author of existence) from the οὐσία of existing things but also “mystically 
teaches us the manner of existence of the more than ineffable Godhead from 
some symbols corresponding with existing things.”39 Maximus reinforces divine 
agency in the next few lines utilizing variants of the verb κινέω to emphasize 
that it is the Holy Godhead itself that moves the mind toward knowledge 
(ἐπίγνωσις) of itself and of its “extraordinary manner of existence.”40 Maximus 
then explains how the threeness of God is discerned. A Trinity is suggested 
because “being (τὸ ὂν) itself is not without wisdom and life.”41 Wisdom is the 
Son and Word of God while life is the Holy Spirit. The last sentence gives the 
example of the human soul which Maximus states is made in the image of God 
and is perceived in three things: mind, λόγος and spirit. Maximus, while 
attempting to address the ἀπορία, is also demonstrating how the mind, when 
moved by God, cannot only perceive God as one but also as three. A similar 
                                                 
38 Maximus, Qua. dub. §129 (CCSG 10:94.1-95.20). 
39 Maximus, Qua. dub. §105 (CCSG 10:79.9-12): Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν ὄντων 
τὸν γενεσιουργὸν ἐννοοῦμεν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ὑπεραρρήτου θεότητος ἔκ 
τινων τῶν κατὰ τὰ ὄντα συμβόλων μυστικῶς διδασκόμεθα . . . 
40 Maximus, Qua. dub. §105 (CCSG 10:79.15): . . . τὸν τρόπος τῆς ὑπερφυοῦς αὐτῆς 
ὑπάρξεως. 
41 Maximus, Qua. dub. §105 (CCSG 10:79.21-21): . . . αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔξω σοφίας καὶ ζωῆς 
ἐστιν . . . 
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concern can be seen in Quaestio 136, where the question of what nature can tell 
of the Trinity is addressed directly. This quaestio forgoes highlighting any 
scriptural or patristic ἀπορία and asks, “Is it possible to find a natural proof 
concerning the Holy Trinity?” Maximus answers, 
All beings are believed to be in three ways, in essence, in 
difference and in life. On the one hand, from the principle of essence of 
beings we believe there exists some essence who is the Father. On the 
other hand, from the difference of beings there is wisdom, that is to say, 
the Son. For wisdom imparts to each nature its suitable distinctive 
character.  Then from life there is the Holy Spirit. Yet things of God are 
and are spoken of as subsistent but with created things they are a 
contingent attribute.42  
 These passages are helpful for several reasons. Most importantly, 
Quaestio 105 gives us the first evidence of Maximus applying the λόγος/τρόπος 
distinction explicitly to the Trinity. It also shows another example of how 
Maximus understands the image of God and relates it analogously to the 
Trinitarian persons. Whereas in Capita caritate, Maximus related the image of 
God to being and eternal being here he relates it to the ὑποστάσεις of the Trinity 
although what exactly this entails for him, especially his anthropology, he does 
not explain. Finally, in relation to ascent we find that God reveals himself as one 
and three and both of these aspects can be discerned from created things. 
Firstly, the oneness of the Godhead is perceived, indicating the existence of an 
author and then the threeness since wisdom and life are correlative with being. 
The Father is not specifically named in Maximus’ responsio, however, based on 
the alignment of the Son with “wisdom” and the Spirit with “life”, it seems as if 
“being” could easily be aligned with the Father. This is made clearer when 
Quaestio 106 is taken into consideration. Yet Gregory does not utilize the 
                                                 
42 Maximus, Qua. dub. §136 (CCSG 10:79.21-21): Πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐν τρισὶν τρόποις εἶναι 
πεπίστευται, ἐν οὐσίᾳ, ἐν διαφορᾷ, ἐν ζωῇ· καὶ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν ὄντων λόγου τὸ εἶναί 
τινα οὐσίαν πιστούμεθα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ πατήρ· ἐκ δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ὄντων τὴν σοφίαν, 
τουτέστιν τὸν υἱόν—σοφίας γὰρ τὸ ἀπονεῖμαι ἑκάστῃ φύσει τὴν πρόσφορον ἰδιότητα, καὶ 
εὐκρινῆ καὶ ἄφυρτα καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ διατηρεῖν ἕκαστον τῶν γεγονότων—ἐκ 
δὲ τῆς ζωῆς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ ταῦτα ἐνυπόστατα εἰσὶν καὶ λέγονται, ἐπὶ 
δὲ τῶν κτισμάτων συμβεβηκότα. 
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λόγος/τρόπος distinction in the passage Maximus reviews, nor does it play a 
prominent role in his description of the Trinity in the same way it would for 
Basil and Gregory of Nyssa.43 
At various points in this investigation I have suggested that there are 
areas where Maximus later uses the λόγος/τρόπος distinction for Trinity, the 
incarnation, and creation in ways that he does not in either the Capita or the 
Liber. Here I will review a few of these examples to show how later this 
distinction becomes central. A helpful example is the discussion of the 
constitution of human beings, which in Capita caritate did not resort to the 
λόγος/τρόπος distinction. In the Ambigua ad Iohannem, one finds this 
distinction utilized universally for all created things including discussions of the 
soul and body in Ambiguum 42 and for creation, incarnation and salvation in 
Ambiguum 36.44 
 I will delve briefly into Ambiguum 36 in order to demonstrate how this 
language is developed in relation to similar areas from the Liber and Capita. In 
this Ambiguum, Maximus discusses humanity’s initial creation where God first 
brought humanity “into communion with himself through in-breathing” and 
through “sharing (μεταδιδόντα) with the likeness the divine beauty according to 
the divine image”.45 In this instance, human nature did not obtain unity with 
God according to “mode, principle either of οὐσία or ὑπόστασις according to 
which all beings universally are seen to exist” but in the incarnation unity is 
achieved when the Word is “united to it in a union according to ὑπόστασις” 
wherein human nature “receives its subsistence in a divine manner”.46 This is 
done without change on the level of essence where difference with the divine 
nature is maintained. In just these brief phrases, Maximus can clearly be seen 
using the λόγος/τρόπος distinction to discuss the constitution of all beings but 
particularly human beings. Likewise, he describes the incarnation using the 
                                                 
43 Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 156-161. 
44 Maximus, Amb. 42 in On Difficulties of the Church Fathers: The Ambigua, Vol. 2, ed. & 
transl. by Nicholas Constas, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2014), 70, 72: PG 91 1321C-1325B).  
45 Maximus, Amb. 42 (The Ambigua 2, 70: PG 2189B) 
46 Maximus, Amb. 42 (The Ambigua 2, 72: PG 91:1289C). 
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same language and adds the technical terminology “according to ὑπόστασις.” 
Maximus thus demonstrates two ways of explaining human nature using the 
image/likeness distinction but also λόγος/τρόπος distinction. Although 
Maximus does not explicitly say so here, one can correlate image with λόγος and 
οὐσία and likeness with τρόπος and ὑπόστασις.47  
§4.1.3.3 Technical Language for the Incarnation 
Finally, in this section I want to draw attention briefly to the use of an 
important phrase καθ’ ὑπόστασιν. Maximus uses this phrase at the end of a 
Quaestio 59. The passage Maximus comments on is taken from Proverbs 24:16a 
(. . . a righteous person will fall seven times and rise again. . .). Maximus 
discusses how despite human nature falling seven times, Christ, who alone is 
righteous, “raised it, having been moved by an unspeakable love of humanity, 
uniting our nature to himself according to ὑπόστασις.”48 The phrase “union 
according to ὑπόστασις” initially seems like it could be easily identified as an 
appropriation of Chalcedonian language yet this exact phrase is not found in the 
definition of Chalcedon but can be found in Justinian’s Edictum rectae fidei. 
There it serves as part of a multi-pronged strategy to utilize a Trinitarian 
grammar to identify the ὑπόστασις of Christ as that of the Son and encourage 
the use of “one composite ὑπόστασις” over against the miaphysite “one 
composite φύσις”.49 Maximus has no such strategy here but simply uses it as a 
way to understand how human nature is united to the Son. He does not use the 
phrase anywhere else in Quaestiones yet it does signal more engagement with 
the material of the Fifth Council. In the Liber and Capita, Maximus uses non-
controversial language: Christ is both God and human and this what allows him 
                                                 
47 Maximus makes similar statements elsewhere see Amb. 42 (The Ambigua 2, 124: PG 
91 1316D-1317A). 
48 Maximus, Qua. dub. §59 (CCSG 10:47.18-20): . . . ταύτην ἀφάτῳ φιλανθρωπίᾳ 
κινηθεὶς ἀνέστησεν ὁ κύριος, αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν ἑνώσας ἑαυτῷ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν. 
49 Justinian, Edictum (Drei dogmatische Schriften, 132:23-24, 28; 138:36; 146:7; 
156:29); canon 4 (148:35); canon 12 (152:19). The phrase “one composite ὑπόστασις” and the 
similar phrase “one composite Christ” is often put in direct contrast with “one composite φύσις 
or “one φύσις”, see 136:13; 144:21-23; 144:36-146:3 and canon 4 (148:29-36). In canon 4, 
Justinian draws together both sets of phrases. I will discuss this strategy more in the last section 
of this chapter. 
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to demonstrate a “heavenly manner of life” - to be an example of and, therefore, 
the means and ends of love. Here the incarnation of the Son raises human nature 
by uniting that nature to himself according to ὑπόστασις.   
Quaestiones et dubia is transitional piece between the earlier Liber 
asceticus and Capita caritate and the expansive Ambigua ad Iohannem. This is 
based partly on the absence of the λόγος/τρόπος distinction, even when we 
might have expected it, in the Liber and Capita and the fact that it takes a central 
role in descriptions of the Trinity, incarnation, creation, and salvation in the 
Ambigua, Maximus’ later scriptural and liturgical commentaries and 
importantly in his Christological treatises. This is bolstered by evidence of a 
more developed Logos/λόγοι doctrine, where the λόγοι of creation are drawn 
back to the Logos and the explicit identification of God as Cause within 
Quaestiones et dubia. Additionally, it is supported by the fact that Maximus, 
while not specifically citing works that contain the distinction of λόγος/τρόπος, 
explicitly engages various works by Cyril, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, authors 
whom Sherwood notes either developed or utilize this distinction.50 
§4.2 Epistula 2 – Shedding the Thorns of Selfish Existence through Christ 
the Door to the Unapproachable Beauty of the Trinity 
Epistula 2 stands as one of Maximus’ most celebrated works. In this 
letter, Maximus builds on ideas he has discussed in both the Liber and the Capita 
                                                 
50 Prassas in Questions and Doubts, 21 gives us a list of some of the sources Maximus 
explicitly cites, including Ireneaus, Basil of Caesarea and Cyril of Alexandria. Gregory of Nyssa 
can also be added to this list, see Qua. dub. §19, 57, 96. The appearance of these authors only 
goes a small way toward showing that Maximus begins to take hold of the λόγος/τρόπος 
distinction and integrate it into his thinking by demonstrating his exposure to the authors that 
used it. Sherwood lists several authors who use the terms but only Basil and Gregory pair the 
phrases λόγος οὐσίας with τρόπος ὑπάρξεως together (Earlier Ambigua, 153-164). However, 
tenuous his earlier knowledge may be, it is clear that by the controversies of miaenergism and 
miathelitism Maximus has read and commented on texts that would give him exposure to the 
distinctions use for Trinity and specifically Christ. Prassas also argues for Maximus’ reading of 
and incorporation of Didymus the Blind’s style, suggesting that Maximus is attempting to fill a 
literary hole left by the condemnation of Origen, Didymus and Evagrius since 553 CE. This 
seems plausible since there is evidence that the writings of the three condemned authors were 
read together within monastic communities. I might refine it further by saying that despite their 
condemnation these authors continued to be read and so rather than filling a literary vacuum, 
Maximus recognizes the need for an alternative and, in his mind, more orthodox reading of long 
treasured questions and commentary. Maximus utilization of Origen, Evagrius, and Didymus 
thus shows that he recognized their influence and attempted to incorporate their material with 
the benefit of hindsight.  
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caritate but also interweaves new vocabulary in order to frame his account of 
Christian life. He does this by utilizing the more technical language for Christ I 
drew attention to in Quaestiones et dubia. Also, while he employed the 
λόγος/τρόπος distinction in Quaestiones, it was not connected with his 
descriptions of Christ nor was it integrated into an account of how Christ 
exemplifies a new manner of subsisting that can heal humanity’s divided and 
evil ways. Maximus does so in Ep. 2, constructing a vision of Christian life which 
gathers together so many of areas I have already explored under the rubric of 
love and God as beginning, means, and end. In the following paragraphs, I will 
discuss briefly the dating of Ep. 2, give a short overview of the letter’s way of 
describing ascent and then look closely at several specific areas that employ the 
new vocabulary discussed above. 
§4.2.1 Dating of Ep. 2 
Why have I placed Ep. 2 in the later part of this early period? In the 
introduction, I stated that by “early works” I mean those works written before, 
by, or in 626/627 CE. In the absence of a more refined set of dates, I offered the 
sequence: Liber asceticus, Capita caritate, Quaestiones et dubia, Epistula 2 and 
Opusculum 17.  One might object that Epistula 2 should be considered earlier 
than the Liber based on Sherwood’s comments which base the dating of the 
letter on the use of “will” language, although already I must point out that 
Sherwood stated that “perhaps” Ep. 2 may be his earliest work.51 The reasoning 
goes that the presence of will or activity language must suggest an early date 
since Maximus would have avoided such language until he openly opposed 
miaenergism and miathelistism in 640 CE. Yet the criteria of “will” or “activity” 
language seems to me to be more of a guideline than an absolute rule. For 
example, Maximus does not use the questionable phrases “one will” or “one 
activity” in the Liber or Capita caritate although one can find texts that point in 
this direction (Cap. car. 4.90, 4.38, 4.55).  The Liber, in fact, does not use γνώμη 
and contains only one non-controversial instance of θέλημα.52 Based on the 
absence of this language and the reason described above, why couldn’t these 
                                                 
51 Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 25. 
52 Maximus, Lib. asc. § 42 (CCSG 40:115.981). 
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works equally be written during the middle period of his life? Yet even a casual 
reading of these two works reveals a level of complexity and the use of 
distinctive features, which are not the same as those from 628 CE onward, 
especially around similar topics and contexts. Additionally, if the Ambigua ad 
Iohannem has a similar phrase revolving around ἐνέργεια in 628-630 CE, why 
couldn’t the use of “will” in Ep. 2 indicate that it be written from at least the 
same period, especially since the controversies concerning Christ’s wills come 
after those concerning ἐνέργεια? It seems to me, then, that dating cannot be 
established simply on whether this language appears or does not appear. I have 
suggested that another criteria may be the complexity of his thought in tandem 
with the absence of particular concepts, especially those that appear later in 
similar contexts, can assist in the ordering of his earlier works even though 
more precise dates still remain elusive. In the remaining parts of this section, I 
will review some of the areas of complexity that can be seen in Ep. 2 and 
highlight aspects that do not appear. 
§4.2.2 Overview 
In his praise of love, Maximus constructs an account of human existence 
around several interrelated ways of speaking and processes. The first and most 
important is a continued portrayal of God as love. The second is that, as love, 
God is both means and goal of the Christian life. These have already been 
observed in the Liber and Capita. Thirdly, existence, in general, is portrayed as 
consisting of a principle of being and a manner of subsisting. The principle of 
being not only defines what a thing is but also bears in itself the potential for its 
ultimate telos according to God’s will.  In terms of processes, one finds 
throughout Ep. 2 a progression of things coming to unity from separation. Thus, 
the telos of a habit of divine love is reached and fulfilled in loving God and loving 
others. This can be understood variously as 1) an aligning or a unity of λόγος 
and τρόπος, 2) living according to the λόγος or νόμος of nature, 3) a unity of 
γνώμη, θέλημα, κίνησις, and βούλησις, or 4) what is divided into parts becoming 
simple. The series of scenes Maximus creates around these ideas is a forceful 
presentation of love and thus God as beginning, means, and end.  
§4.2.3 The Separation of Self-Love to the Wholeness of Divine 
Φιλανθρωπία: Maximus Account of Ascent in Ep. 2 
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A central theme that runs through Ep. 2 has to do with humanity being 
parted or whole and finding unity through love. Maximus utilizes both verbs and 
adjectives to emphasize the “partedness” of human existence based on the word 
group μερίς/μεριστός/μερίζω while expressing the goal of “wholeness”, 
“oneness”, or “unity” with the words ὅλος, εἷς, σύν (as a verbal prefix), and 
ἑνόω. The contrast here emphasizes separation and unity rather than union and 
distinction both of which are found together later in Ambiguum 41. Maximus 
uses this contrast when speaking about humanity under the influence of the 
devil and self-love. In this condition, human beings may share one nature but 
their τρόπος is diverse, and their divergent wills separate them from one 
another. Humanity was deceived and distracted into self-love and in its manner 
of subsistence was scattered, parted and divided so that human beings came in 
conflict not only with each other but with God and their own intended principle 
of being. This separation is a result of their inclination. Yet since the Maker of all 
things in his φιλανθρωπία came as man and lived a life of love, he offers a new 
manner of being. Thus, humanity must choose to imitate this new manner of 
being, aligning both their principle of being and their manner of being so that 
they are one. The incarnation makes possible a healing of this separation and 
allows for one λόγος and τρόπος to characterize humanity. This unity is 
achieved by a voluntary imitation of God’s activities of love. The Word leads the 
baptized to the Father. Then the Word, who is the way of truth and door 
through which one must enter to behold the Holy Trinity, heals their division.53 
In Quaestiones, I suggested that the divine appropriation meant that the persons 
reveal one another. The Spirit, in particular, allowed the contemplation of the 
Son and the Son as Logos leads the baptized to the Father as Cause. Here again 
we see the Word leading to the Father and indeed being demonstrated as the 
door to the beauty of the Trinity. This is only a half-step away from Maximus’ 
celebrated statement in his Expositio orationis Dominicae.54  
 Within this account, Maximus is found using the more technical language 
that was but briefly used in Quaestiones. In two places, he states that God or the 
                                                 
53 Maximus, Ep.2 (PG 91:404A). 
54 Maximus, Or. Dom., (CCSG 23:87-89): “For indeed by becoming flesh the Word of God 
teaches us theologia because he shows forth in himself the Father and the Holy Spirit.” 
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Maker of nature “without change united this [human nature] to himself 
according to ὑπόστασις.”55 While this was only mentioned once in Quaestiones, 
it was nevertheless significant since it described how Christ “raised” human 
nature. In Ep. 2, the phrase is similarly used sparsely yet becomes the 
centerpiece of explaining how God, through love, gathers to himself and makes 
whole a fragmented nature. Louth notes the use of one of the Chalcedonian 
adverbs (ἀτρέπτως).56 I would quickly add that there is only one adverb rather 
than the full set and Maximus does not dwell much on it, emphasizing the effect 
more than giving an expanded comment on union and distinction in relation to 
Christ nor union and distinction in relation to the divine nature and the divine 
persons. The focus is on separated and whole human nature, the latter of which 
Christ is an example serving as “the door” to “the unapproachable beauty of the 
holy and royal Trinity”.57  
As I have pointed out at various times in my investigation, Maximus in 
both his descriptions of humanity and God does not use the λόγος/τρόπος 
distinction in Capita caritate exactly in those places one would expect him to if 
compared to similar contexts in later works (i.e. Cap. car. 3.21-28; 4:1-15). He is 
satisfied with simply talking about λόγος and φύσις/οὐσία. The distinction does 
not make an appearance in the Liber either. It would seem reasonable to see a 
similar level of engagement with these concepts in Ep. 2, if it was from this same 
period, especially since all three touch on the same subject (i.e. love and ascent). 
In this letter, the use of the λόγος/τρόπος distinction first appears in relation to 
the commandments and the virtues (PG 91:396D). In this case, Maximus 
incorporates the “parted” terminology as a way to serve the role of τρόπος 
while λόγος serves the role of “unity”. Divine love draws together “the particular 
(μερικός) commandments toward a universal (πρός τόν καθόλου λόγον) 
principal.” Yet the λόγος/τρόπος terminology itself soon becomes a central 
distinction. In the same sentence, Maximus suggest that universal principle is 
that “by which all things are uniformly (μονοειδῶς) contained according to 
                                                 
55 Maximus, Ep. 2 (PG 91:397B): ἀτρέπτως ἑαυτῷ καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν ταύτην [φύσιν] 
ἑνώσας, and (PG 91:404B): ἑνώσας ταύτην [φύσιν] ἀτρέπτως ἑαυτῷ καθ᾿ ὑπόστασιν.   
56 Louth, Maximus, 87, 205, n. 8. 
57 Maximus, Ep. 2 (PG 91:404A). 
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[God’s] good pleasure and from which he gives of himself in many ways 
(πολυτρόπως) according to his οἰκονομία.”58 These two brief sentences show 
Maximus utilizing several sets of terminology interchangeable – 
universal/particular, λόγος/τρόπος and mono-/poly- prefixes.  
 In another example, the distinction is used to describe how the virtues 
serve as part of love’s power aligning one’s τρόπος through an exercise of the 
will toward its one true λόγος. Maximus makes explicit that in order to come to 
what is simple and the same one must become simple and the same and it is in 
this process that one’s λόγος and φύσις are preserved.59 This plays off of several 
other themes in the Capita where Maximus recognizes that, since human beings 
have a common nature, they also share a common λόγος and so through an 
exercise of their will toward love, they become one with each other and with 
God and can be described as being both in each other and in God.60 Indeed, it is 
at the level of τρόπος that there is “inequality and difference in will”.61 This 
overall process has several effects. It makes the human being whole with one’s 
self, with others, and ultimately with God so that “in him, they are contemplated 
together and ascend toward him as cause and maker. . .”62 Likewise, deification 
takes place, and God is made manifest in human beings.63 Remarkably, Maximus 
does not extend the λόγος/τρόπος distinction nor his whole and parts language 
to a robust discussion of the Trinity as he will in Mystagogia 23.64 
 In Ep. 2, Maximus shows a synthesis of newer terminology witnessed to 
in Quaestiones hung on the scaffolding of his established Trinitarian grammar 
from the Liber and the Capita. While Maximus does not apply the λόγος/τρόπος 
distinction with full force to a description of the Trinity, he does show how he is 
already incorporating a set of ideas that all mean to make this distinction a 
central part of his overall framework for describing ascent. The use of language 
                                                 
58 Maximus, Ep. 2 (PG 91:393C). 
59 Maximus, Ep. 2 (PG 91:400B, D-401A). 
60 Maximus, Ep. 2 (PG 91:400B). 
61 Maximus, Ep. 2 (PG 91:396D, 400A). 
62 Maximus, Ep. 2 (PG 91:400A-B). 
63 Maximus, Ep. 2 (PG 91:400B, 401B-C, 405A; 400D-401B). 
64 Maximus, Mystagogia 23 (CCSG 69: 52.839-54.868). 
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from the Fifth Council (καθ’ ὑπόστασιν) albeit not the full set of adverbs, the 
limited application of the λόγος/τρόπος distinction in Ep. 2 and the lack of 
either of these in the Capita Caritate and the Liber suggest that the letter is 
perhaps not the earliest but should instead be seen shortly before the time 
Maximus begins to use the λόγος/τρόπος distinction in earnest and nearer to 
the Ambigua ad Iohannem (628-630 CE). In fact, it is in both sets of Ambigua that 
the Chalcedonian language, the language from the Fifth Council and the use of 
the λόγος/τρόπος for creation, Christ and Trinity converge. 
§4.3 Opusculum 13’s New Grammar – Maximus’ Engages Miaphysitism 
§4.3.1 Pro-Chalcedonian Context & Gregory of Nazianzus’ Ep. 101.18-21 
In this section, I will show that Maximus’ direct exposure to 
miaphysitism opens a door to literature and ways of framing issues surrounding 
Trinity and Christ that are garnered from the period of 518 to 553 CE 
culminating in the work of the Fifth Council. This period saw intense efforts by 
Justinian and many others to solve the theological and political issues that had 
arisen as a result of the fallout following the Council of Chalcedon. While pro-
Chalcedonian authors varied in their approaches, there are discernable parallels 
such that a particular trajectory for dealing with Christological issues by appeal 
to Trinitarian grammar can be observed. The theology of this trajectory and 
ways of contextualizing these issues become part of Maximus’ way of viewing 
things and eventually will be applied against miaenergism and miathelitism. 
Firstly, I will discuss aspects of the historiography of the post-Chalcedonian era, 
then I will give a short overview of the theological activity of the 518-553 period 
and finally I will show how Maximus has adopted and adapted this trajectory in 
Op. 13. 
In the literature about the post-Chalcedonian period, there are several 
commonly stated assumptions that in themselves rarely receive direct 
investigation. I want to highlight two as a way of introducing this section and 
the post-Chalcedonian era. The first assumption is that the adherents of this era 
drew upon the Trinitarian theology of “the Cappadocians” in order to solve 
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Christological problems.65  This is usually accompanied by the citation of one of 
several places where Basil of Caesarea defines the terminological distinction 
between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις and is usually followed by an explanation of how 
a particular author from this period was able or unable to move beyond Basil’s 
definition of ὑπόστασις.66  
For Grillmeier, specifically, Basil is too “materialistic” in his approach and 
understanding and he and his associates’ description of ὑπόστασις/πρόσωπον 
is too impersonal focusing on “what” rather than “who”. This judgment is 
extended to all the Cappadocians, and he connects this thinking with Stoic 
philosophy. 67 However, according to Grillmeier, though the Cappadocians may 
have brought in these concepts “they remain Platonists, above all, in their 
analysis of ‘spiritual being’”.68 This was the inheritance of the pro-
Chalcedonians but because of its supposed problems is considered their 
“greatest handicap”.69 Severus and the supposed Cyrillian tradition “escaped 
this problem by wanting to use the Basilian teaching about ὑπόστασις only for 
θεολόγια, not for οἰκονομία.”70 To put the critique more clearly, the supposed 
problem of Basil’s definition for both the Trinity and Christ is that it does not 
deal with how the concrete individual is derived from the definition of 
ὑπόστασις. It is only Gregory that begins to go this direction, but none of the 
Cappadocians finish the work.71 It is in this last statement that Grillmeier draws 
attention to the text I cover here from Gregory’s Ep. 101.18-20, suggesting that 
Gregory resorts to an “extremely simple linguistic means” when he describes 
the relationship between “unity in Christ and the difference of the natures” by 
pointing out a “reverse” relationship with these same concepts in the Trinity. 
                                                 
65 CCT 2.2 430.  
66 Grillmeier for example consistently complains that Basil’s conception of ὑπόστασις is 
too material (CCT 1, 2.2) and that it restricts or even traps those who attempt to utilize it (CCT 
2.2, 200, 299, 309, 508). Patrick Gray objects to this characterization of Leontius of Jerusalem, 
Defense of Chalcedon, 130-131. 
67 CCT 1, 372. 
68 CCT 1, 372. 
69 CCT 2.2, 278. 
70 CCT 2.2, 278, cf. 505. 
71 CCT 2.2, 505. 
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This is the extent of Grillmeier’s presentation of Gregory’s role during the post-
Chalcedonian era. While in several places he footnotes some usage of Gregory’s 
Ep. 101, it is not always about lines 18-20 nor is there a consistent monitoring 
or articulation about how it helped formulate important strategies for pro-
Chalcedonian theology.72 He does not note it in Leontius of Jerusalem nor even 
its importance in Severus’ exchange with Sergius.  
Several other authors are worth noting. A critique similar to that of 
Grillmeier concerning Basil’s conception of ὑπόστασις is carried forward by 
Bathrellos when he covers the pro-Chalcedonian Christology of the Sixth 
century. In particular, he chides John of Caesarea for attempting to apply the 
“Trinitarian” definition to “Christology.”73 As he states it, John, “reduces 
personhood to particularity.”74 Patrick Gray, similar to Grillmeier, notes the 
attempts by John of Caesarea and the Leontius of Byzantium and even Leontius 
of Jerusalem to use the “Cappadocian definitions” but does not cite either Basil’s 
Epistulae ad Amphilicum or Gregory’s Epistula prima ad Cledonium.75 Likewise in 
his monograph Leontius of Jerusalem he does not note the importance of 
Gregory’s saying to Leontius’ theology nor the historical comparison the 
Jerusalemite attempts between miaphysitism and Apollinarianism based on that 
same saying. Even more recent treatments of the era can be said to move 
beyond assumption and to completely dismiss its importance. Christopher 
Beeley, in his Unity of Christ, goes so far as to say, 
The fabled ‘Cappadocian solution’ to the Trinity which distinguishes 
between nature and hypostasis and thus resolves intractable problems of 
                                                 
72 CCT 2.2, 73 n. 158 concerning Gregory’s use of “synapheia”, 76 n. 167 concerning 
Gregory’s “assumption” language, 78 n. 179 concerning a florilegium which contains the phrase 
“anthropos kyriakos", 192 n. 23 where he notes to compare part of Gregory’s saying from 18-20 
to a section in Leontius of Byzantium’s Epilysis (PG 86.1945A-D). The most substantial footnote 
is n. 99 on 56-57 where he notes John of Caesarea’s use of Gregory’s saying and Severus’ 
intentional, according to Grillmeier, obfuscation of his meaning. 
73 Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, 37.  
74 Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, 37. 
75 Patrick Gray, Defense of Chalcedon, 116, 118, 131, 160. 
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Trinitarian metaphysics, is largely the invention and retrojection of 
Leontius of Byzantium.76  
This evaluation completely misses the importance Basil’s and Gregory’s 
sayings had for several important pro-Chalcedonians and for the role Gregory’s 
saying served within Cyril’s own defense of his theology at the Council of 
Ephesus 431 CE which is repeated at the Council of Chalcedon 451 CE. In fact, as 
I will show below, the usage of these sayings was considered such a threat that 
Severus and his successors are consistently presented as offering objections 
throughout the era. It seems then that the assumption that Trinitarian theology 
was used to tackle Christological problems has had meager and at times 
begrudged evidence provided, mostly through Basil and a few times through 
Gregory by Grillmeier and Gray only to be repeated or dismissed by later 
scholars. I want to suggest that the assumption bore some truth but that there is 
more evidence to be considered. When it is, I suggest that several strategies can 
be identified that grew up around Basil and Gregory’s sayings which represent a 
forceful trajectory that cannot be dismissed as one ancient author’s hopeful 
reconstruction nor simply classified as Trinitarian theology solving 
Christological issues. 
The second assumption is a very broad presentation that debates about 
Trinitarian theology, by the Fifth and Sixth century, have simply given way to 
Christological controversies.77 On one level, these two assumptions are 
understandable. The Cappadocians’ Trinitarian theology as a heritage of 
theology, in general, informs what has now become a debate about Christ 
specifically. However, when one looks closely, these two affirmations are nearly 
contradictory. If the Trinitarian theology of a previous generation is the source 
of solutions for Christology then how can that era not equally be considered to 
                                                 
76 Christopher Beeley, Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 286. 
77 Brian E. Daley gets at exactly this point and even cites Gregory perhaps inspired by 
his work on Leontius of Byzantium in “The Persons in God and the Person of Christ in Patristic 
Theology,” The Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church: The Proceedings of the 
Fourth Patristic Conference, Maynooth 1999, ed. D. Vincent Twomey & Lewis Ayres (Dublin: Four 
Courts Press, 2007), 9-64. Daley only covers this ἀπορία in historiography up to the time of Cyril 
but I would suggest it can be extended up through the Sixth century. 
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be about Trinitarian theology? Even further, if Christ is one of the Trinity then 
how can these kinds of descriptions be maintained without thoughtful caveats? 
These questions, I argue, hit closer to the issues of this era rather than the first 
two assumptions. The theological activity of the post-Chalcedonian era was not 
simply about how theologians easily and without hesitation applied the 
Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians to explaining the incarnation but was 
fixated on whether doing so was even valid. Thus, while one’s faithfulness to 
Cyril and Chalcedon was surely a clear touch point, this era tackled broader 
issues of theological heritage.  
In order to flesh this out and briefly sketch the strategies of various 
author’s during this era, I will not primarily follow citations of Basil’s saying but 
will look closer at another saying that often finds its way into footnotes but is 
not cited as playing a significant role in this era’s theology. I will attempt to 
show briefly how a particular text from Gregory of Nazianzus’ Ep. 101.18-21 
became prominent in the theological argumentation during the era of 518-553 
CE to the extent that it became a paradigm for viewing and understanding the 
relation between Trinitarian theology and explanations of the incarnation.78 It 
                                                 
78 Here I cite Gregory’s saying from SC 208: 44, 46 with a translation. I have preserved 
the Greek phrases in some cases as they will be important in the following discussion. Here is 
the Greek text:  
18. Εἴ τις εἰσάγει δύο Υἱούς, ἕνα μὲν τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρός, δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἐκ τῆς 
μητρός, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ τῆς υἱοθεσίας ἐκπέσοι τῆς ἐπηγγελμένης τοῖς ὀρθῶς 
πιστεύουσι. 19. Φύσεις μὲν γὰρ δύο Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα· υἱοὶ δὲ οὐ δύο, 
οὐδὲ Θεοί. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα δύο ἄνθρωποι, εἰ καὶ οὕτως ὁ Παῦλος τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ 
τὸ ἐκτὸς προσηγόρευσε.  20. Καὶ εἰ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, ἄλλο μὲν καὶ ἄλλο τὰ ἐξ ὧν ὁ Σωτὴρ 
(εἴπερ μὴ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἀόρατον τῷ ὁρατῷ καὶ τὸ ἄχρονον τῷ ὑπὸ χρόνον), οὐκ ἄλλος δὲ καὶ 
ἄλλος· μὴ γένοιτο. 21. Τὰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ἓν τῇ συγκράσει, Θεοῦ μὲν ἐνανθρωπήσαντος, 
ἀνθρώπου δὲ θεωθέντος, ἢ ὅπως ἄν τις ὀνομάσειε. Λέγω δὲ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, ἔμπαλιν ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς 
Τριάδος ἔχει. Ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος, ἵνα μὴ τὰς ὑποστάσεις συγχέωμεν· οὐκ ἄλλο δὲ καὶ 
ἄλλο, ἓν γὰρ τὰ τρία καὶ ταὐτὸν τῇ θεότητι. 
Translation: If anyone introduces two sons, one from our God and Father and a second 
from a mother but not one and the same [son], they will also be deprived of the adoption that 
was promised to those who believe rightly. For there are two natures – God and human, since 
there is both a soul and a body, but not two sons, nor gods. For there are not two human beings 
here, just as also [there are not] when Paul names the “inner” and the “outer” [parts] of the 
human being. And if it must be said concisely, the things from which the Savior is are ἄλλο and 
ἄλλο, since the unseen and timeless are not identical with the seen and that which is under time, 
but [they are] not ἄλλος and ἄλλος. May it never be! For each of the two are one by the 
commixture. On the one hand, God became human and on the other humanity has been deified, 
or in whatever way someone would assert it. But I say ἄλλο and ἄλλο; the inverse is held for the 
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was often found in tandem with Basil’s definition of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις and 
its usage was likely prompted by Cyril’s citation of it at the Council of Ephesus 
531 CE. After being recorded in the minutes in 531 CE, it then was recited and 
recorded again at Chalcedon 451 CE.79  
§4.3.1.1 John of Caesarea – The Tendering of the Παράδειγμα 
 The first development I was able to discover in regard to Gregory’s 
saying was on the pro-Chalcedonian side. John of Caesarea, writing to a 
miaphysite audience in his Apologia concilii Chalcedonesis (c. 515-518 CE), does 
not cite the saying explicitly but nevertheless quotes and exploits it to suggest 
that the relationship between plurality and unity in Christ is inversely related to 
that of the Trinity.80 In the build up to this section of his argument, he draws in 
the saying from Basil of Caesarea’s Ep. 214 where it is explained that when 
speaking of the Trinity οὐσία indicates what is common or general (τὸ κοινὸν) 
and ὑπόστασις what is particular (τὸ ίδιον). John, using this logic, then attempts 
                                                 
Trinity. For on the one hand there is ἄλλος and ἄλλος so that we do not confuse the ὑποστάσιες, 
but on the other there is not ἄλλο and ἄλλο. For the three are one and the same in the Godhead. 
79 The text from Ephesus 431 CE can be found in ACO 1.I.2, 43-44. The Greek text as 
reviewed at Chalcedon can be found in ACO 1.I.7, 93. A translation can be found in The Acts of the 
Council of Chalcedon, Vo1. 1, translated with introduction and notes by Richard Price and 
Michael Gaddis (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005), pp. 173-7. See also Price and 
Gaddis’ notes on this section, p. 297 n. 339.  
80 Grillmeier, CCT 2/2, 24-25; 52-72.  Marcel Richard judges this work, against earlier 
assessments by Lebon and de Halleux, as the result of a synod in Alexandria between 514 and 
518 CE. He bases his conclusion on 1) a note that appears in the margin of one of the fragments 
in the manuscript tradition, and 2) a description of the synod’s work found in a letter by 
Philoxenus. For the discussion see CCSG 1: vi-xii.  
John’s Apologia is found mostly in quotations preserved by Severus in Liber contra 
impium Grammaticum, which contains three orations. Richard provided a Latin translation of 
the Syriac in CSG 1. The Syriac can be found in CSCO 93, 101, 111. There are, however, six (I-VI) 
fragments preserved in the Greek Doctrina Patrum from Eulogius, which are also given in CCSG 
1. Richard identified these as John’s by crosschecking them with the Syriac. All of the Greek 
extracts from the Doctrina Patrum can be identified either in part or in total with Syriac extracts 
from Severus’ orations except I, V and VI. Fragment I begins the argument cited by Severus in 
Fragment II. Fragment V is attributed to John based on the use of two phrases ὑπόστασις 
χαρακτηριστική and ὅ ἐστι. Fragment VI is attributed to him based on its affinity with Fragment 
V and the employment of a scriptural reference from John 1.14 which is used in the same 
fashion in John’s Capitula XVII Contra monophysitas (CCSG 1:xviii-xxv.) Richard was not able to 
find Fragment V cited by Severus. However; Severus’ objection to John’s use of Gregory’s saying 
is a clear indication of his knowledge of this part of John’s argument, see Contra impium 
Grammaticum, Or. III.12 (CCSO 45:225). 
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to consolidate terms so that φύσις and οὐσία essentially indicate what is 
general while ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον indicate what is particular. 81 In the 
section where he quotes Gregory’s saying, he suggests that Trinitarian doctrine, 
in particular, the correlation of unity and plurality in the Trinity along with its 
key ontological terms, should serve as a paradigm (παράδειγμα) for 
understanding “the οἰκονομία of Christ”.82 In the same section, he argues for a 
consistent transferability of language between Trinity and Christ and replaces 
φύσις with ὑπόστασις when utilizing Cyril’s μία φύσις formula in order to 
explicitly highlight that the ὑπόστασις of which he speaks is none other than 
that of the Word.83 So, according to John, while for the Trinity there is one οὐσία 
and three ὑπόστασις, inversely in Christ, there are two οὐσία and one 
ὑπόστασις. The key ontological language stays consistent but, the location of the 
unity and plurality is inversely related. In the course of his argument, John must 
deal with the way Cyril, Athanasius and, other Fathers use these terms.84  
 It is clear that John’s strategy is an attempt to interpret Christological 
issues with direct reference to the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians. 
However, Basil is not the only Cappadocian drawn upon nor is there ignorance 
about the problems associated with Cyril, Athanasius and other authors’ use of 
key ontological terms. There are several aspects of his argument that are 
important to note. One aspect is his attempt to use Trinitarian theology as a 
context or, as he puts it, a παράδειγμα, for understanding the incarnation. For 
the latter, John uses the term οἰκονομία, but as my review of this era illustrates, 
                                                 
81 John, Apologia, I.2.I.1-15; I.2.III.1.63-2.79 (CCSG 1:49, 51).  
82 John, Apologia Concilii Chalcedonesis, I.2.V.228-246. (CCSG 1:56-57). Compare also a 
similar assertion on who the subject of the incarnation is earlier in the work, Apologia, I.1.21-22 
(CCSG 1:11): Igitur, cum dixit “unam naturam Dei Verbi” unum illum de Trinitate intelligendum 
praebet, qui est hypostatica persona Verbi, eum qui Patri consubstnatialis est, utpote eandem 
genitoris sui substantiam possidents. 
83 This seems to go against several accounts of John of Caesarea by Gray and Bathrellos. 
Gray suggests that John does not identify the subject of the incarnation. Bathrellos suggests John 
reduces personhood to particularity and then denies the particular idioms of human nature. Yet 
the quote above cuts against both criticisms since it is clear that John identifies the personal 
subject and ὑπόστασις of the incarnation as the Word.   
84 John, Apologia I.1.21-22; I.2.6.202-205 (CCSG 1:11, 55).  
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θεολόγια comes to designate the former and the pair will be used together.85  
The tactics John uses to employ this strategy is to assign φύσις on the side of 
οὐσία and πρόσωπον on the side of ὑπόστασις by an appeal and development of 
Basil’s saying. Once this terminology is consolidated, he utilizes Gregory’s saying 
to argue for the transferability of terms between the two contexts and that the 
relationship between unity and plurality in each context should be seen as 
inversely related.  In the ensuing years, others would use a remarkably similar 
strategy although it is unclear whether he is a direct influence of these 
subsequent authors.  
§4.3.1.2 Severus of Antioch – Surrounded by Grammarians 
 Severus, in his response to John, quickly identified the reference from 
Gregory of Nazianzus’ letter to Cledonius but argues that John has misused it 
and interprets John’s consolidation of terms as an attempt not only to sneak in 
two natures and thus two subjects but also means that John’s understanding of 
οὐσία results in Jesus assuming the entire human race.86 Severus states that 
οὐσία is divisible and appeals to God’s transcendence to show the futility of 
human language for describing God. He then cites Or. 38 where Gregory 
celebrates the assumption of the human nature exclaiming, “O new mingling! O 
paradoxical blending! The one who is comes to be, and the uncreated is 
created!”87 By calling on this last quotation, while not explicitly making the 
                                                 
85 The post-Chalcedonian era is not when these two areas of theology are assigned the 
terms θεολόγια and οἰκονομία but the issue of their relation certainly becomes prominent. For 
forays into how these two terms came to designate distinct areas of theology see Gerhard 
Richter, Oikonomia der Gebrauch des Wortes Oikonomia im Neuen Testament, bei den 
Kirchenvätern und in der theologischen Literatur bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2005), and Brian E. Daley, “Boethius’ Theological Tracts and Early Byzantine 
Scholaticism,” Mediaeval Studies 46 (1984), 158-191.   
86 Severus suggests that John has misunderstood and misused Gregory countering that 
he should understand Gregory’s dual φύσεις language as controlled by the idea “from which” or 
“out of two there is one” found in Ep. 101.20 (SC 208:44) and Or. 38 (SC 358:132.25-134.1). See 
Severus, Contra impium Grammaticum, Or. III.12, 23 (CSCO 45:224-225, 50:20-21). On the 
accusation that John wants him to accept that Christ assumed the entire human race see Or. 
II.17, 22 (CSCO 58:152, 187-188). A translation of parts of Severus’ response can be found in 
Pauline Allen and C. T. R. Hayward, Severus of Antioch, The Early Church Fathers (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 59-106. 
87 The quotation of Gregory is from Or. 38 (SC 358:132.25-134.29: PG 36.325B-C): Ὢ 
τῆς καινῆς μίξεως! ὢ τῆς παραδόξου κράσεως! ὁ ὢν γίνεται, καὶ ὁ ἄκτιστος κτίζεται . . .” It can 
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point, Severus indicates that something new and extraordinary has happened 
through the incarnation. 
 Severus would go on to use the exact same saying from Ep. 101 against a 
fellow miaphysite, Sergius. In this instance, he argues that some terms cannot be 
used in exactly the same manner for both Trinity and Christ since they are 
“diametrically opposed.”88 It is likely that the term he interprets to indicate a 
“diametrically opposed” relationship is the same term (ἔμπαλιν) John 
highlighted from Gregory’s saying to indicate the inverse quality of unity and 
plurality between Christ and Trinity. Yet Severus clearly uses the saying with 
different effect. In this case, the term Sergius attempts to transfer from the 
Trinity is συμφυΐα. Sergius seeks to use this term in exactly the same way for 
both the Trinity and Christ –a term for unity. Severus, however, will not allow it 
and suggests that, for Christ, it must mean a composite of natures, in which the 
marks of each nature are preserved (but not two natures), but for the Trinity it 
cannot mean composition but must mean “a community of ousia and identity of 
divinity.”89 Severus’ critique in this context clearly identifies issues with 
transferring certain terms between θεολόγια and οἰκονομία but it is puzzling 
that he could not see how other terms, particularly φύσις and ὑπόστασις, could 
be transferred. His caution is likely prompted by his complex understanding of 
                                                 
be found in Severus’ Contra impium Grammaticum, Or. III.37 (CSC 50:235) toward the end of a 
larger section where Severus explains further how to understand Gregory, Cyril and other 
authors’ two-nature language. 
88 While Severus’ Greek for this correspondence is lost, we are fortunate that one of the 
manuscripts reveals that the translator was interested in notating the meaning of the term 
translated “diametrically opposed”. In fact, the Syriac of this term is simply a transliteration of 
the Greek term “διάμετρος”. Ian R. Torrance in his translation of the correspondence translates a 
note from the Syriac translator in the margin of one of the manuscripts, “A diameter is where 
there are two things which confront each other in a primary sense, as is the case of the position 
at full-moon, when the moon is on the eastern side of the sky and the sun in the western,” see 
Iain R. Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon: Severus of Antioch & Sergius the Monophysite, 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Pub, 1998), 186, esp. n. 90. While this gives us no definitive 
indication of whether Severus himself intended “antithetical”, “inverted”, or simply “opposite”, it 
demonstrates that Severus attempted to allude to imagery to describe the relation between 
Christ and Trinity and thus went beyond simply reproducing the term ἔμπᾰλιν. 
89 Severus, Epistula secunda ad Sergium (CSCO 119: 126; trans. Torrance, After 
Chalcedon, p. 186). For a plausible explanation for how Severus conceives this is possible see 
Roberta Chesnut, Three Monophysite Christologies: Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug and 
Jacob of Sarug, (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 9-11. 
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the relation between φύσις, ὑπόστασις, and οὐσία. Sergius himself shows signs 
of frustration in the exchange from what he feels is an inconsistent use of οὐσία, 
ὑπόστασις, and φύσις.90 
 Amongst pro-Chalcedonians, the strategy employed by John of Caesarea 
was continued and took on additional issues related to a two-nature conception 
of Christ. These issues mirrored similar problems dealt with in the Trinitarian 
debates of the fourth century such as whether applying number or counting 
divides its subject, whether oneness disallows of distinction, and whether φύσις 
is a synonym for οὐσία, or ὑπόστασις for πρόσωπον.91 
§4.3.1.3 Leontius of Jerusalem – Gregory Saying & the Select Fathers 
In Leontius of Jerusalem’s Liber contra Monophysita (Pt. 1: Testimonia 
and Pt. 2: Quaestiones, c. 536-538 CE), two tactics are joined to John’s strategy of 
placing issues related to Christ within a Trinitarian grammar.92 In addition to 
Gregory and Basil, Leontius marshalls a gantlet of “select Fathers” to serve as a 
context for interpreting Cyril’s theology. Additionally, several times Cyril’s 
Epistulae ad Succensum play a central role in demonstrating how each nature is 
found to remain after the union. This same set of letters was also used by John 
and focused on Cyril’s explanation that the term “incarnate” in the phrase “one 
incarnate nature” meant to indicate the human nature while “one . . . nature” 
referred to his divine nature.93 His efforts are much more straightforward, and it 
is clear that Leontius is utilizing a shared assumption that when these Fathers 
                                                 
90 Sergius, Epistula prima ad Seuerum (CSCO 119:71-72), Epistula secunda ad Seuerum 
(Ep. 2) (CSO 119:99-100), Epistula tertia ad Seuerum (CSCO 119:151-152). In this last citation, 
Sergius quotes Basil’s distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις and Cyril’s discussion in Ep. 46 
concerning how the term “one” can be predicated of things that are simple by nature or 
composite.  
91 Bathrellos in Byzantine Christ, 38-39, suggests that John of Caesarea’s work “falls into 
oblivion” and is not taken up by other pro-Chalcedonians. While there are aspects of John’s 
thought that needed work, the tactic of pairing Basil’s saying with Gregory’s was not abandoned, 
neither was the consolidation of terms with φύσις/οὐσία on one side and ὑπόστασις/πρόσωπον 
on the other, nor attempts to utilize Trinitarian theology as a way to tackle issues when 
describing the incarnation. 
92 For the dating, circumstances and critical text of Leontius’ treatise see Patrick T. R. 
Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem: Against the Monophysites: Testimonies of the Saints and Aporiae, 
Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
93 Sergius highlights this pro-Chalcedonian argument in his complaints against Severus. 
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are properly understood they are not at variance with one another in their 
meaning.94 He applies this assumption in an effort to show that if the miaphysite 
interpretation of Cyril’s explanation of the incarnation is correct, then Cyril 
himself is in conflict with other great luminaries of the Church. This is not 
merely a rhetorical strategy for Leontius; it serves as a hermeneutical strategy 
for reading Cyril. In addition to serving as part of Leontius’ theological 
hermeneutic, Gregory’s saying also highlights the affinities of miaphysite 
theology with the theology of Apollinarius. In this vein, Leontius draws out how 
the historical conflict between Apollinarius and Gregory was precisely over 
Gregory’s two nature understanding of Christ and heresiarch’s own one nature 
formulation.95 Leontius quotes Apollinarius in order to demonstrate how he 
used the terms φύσις and πρόσωπον interchangeably. Leontius rebuts, “Yet the 
divine persons (πρόσωπα) are three, and there is one nature (φύσις) for which 
the understanding of the incarnation (οἰκονομία) is the inverse of this, as 
Gregory the Theologian says.”96 Like John, Leontius explicitly states that 
πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις can indicate the same thing.97 Elsewhere Leontius 
confronts the confused theology of the Trinity that would result if φύσις and 
ὑπόστασις or πρόσωπον were taken as equivalent—one would be found in the 
company of Arius. In another passage from Quaestiones, he attempts to use a 
shared premise that the Son is distinguished from the Father according to 
ὑπόστασις as the starting point for a set of syllogisms that show how the 
affirmation of the two natures does not divide Christ but distinguishes the Word 
from his flesh. He ends the section by citing a “Father” who states that “the 
words of the mystery of Christ are inversely held for the Holy Trinity.”98 He later 
                                                 
94 Leontius Jer., Testimonia, 1849D (Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem, 63). The phrase “the 
select Fathers” (οἱ ἔκκριτοι πατέρες) is used several times in his Testimonia, see 1816C, 1817A, 
1849D (Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem, 60, 62, 104). Gray discusses this argument in Leontius of 
Jerusalem, 25-28. See also, Gray’s “The Select Fathers’: Canonizing the Patristic Past,” SP 23 
(Leuven: Peeters Press, 1989), pp. 21-36. 
95 Leontius Jer., Testimonia, 1864B-1872A (Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem, 118-128).  
96 Leontius Jer., Testimonia, 1869B-1869C (Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem, 126). 
97 Leontius Jer., Testimonia 1869C. (Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem, 126). 
98 Leontius Jer., Quaestiones §18 (1780D; Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem, 180), §34 (1789D-
1792A; Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem, 198), §35 (1792A, B; Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem, 198), 
compare also §51 (1797B, C; Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem, 210).  
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extends this discussion to explain how number (ἀριθμός) can be used to 
distinguish without dividing.  
Leontius shares a similar strategy with John of Caesarea. However, his 
tactic enlarges the patristic context pulling on other authors to demonstrate 
how the miaphysite interpretation of Cyril’s language would put him in conflict 
numerous ecclesial luminaries. He highlights the importance of the 
transferability of language between Christ and the Trinity but furthers the tactic 
by drawing out the consequences of confusing this language for both Christ and 
the Trinity. In this case, he uses the example of Apollonarius and Arius. 
Likewise, he appeals to the inverse relation of unity and plurality between 
Christ and Trinity in Gregory’s saying and applies it to support his tactic of 
arguing for how things can be distinguished but not divided. 
§4.3.1.4 Leontius of Byzantium – Solutions, Syllogisms & Gregory’s Sayings  
Leontius of Byzantium presents the most extensive theological 
development of Gregory’s saying in tandem with Basil’s saying from both Ep. 
214 and Ep. 236. In Triginta capita contra Seueri, Leontius presents as series of 
syllogisms based on the inverse logic of Gregory’s saying to support the 
counting and continued existence of the two natures of Christ after the union. 
Additionally, Leontius comments on the two phrases from Gregory’s saying 
stating that ὸ άλλος καὶ άλλος serves as a pronoun (ἀντωνυμία) of ὑποστάσεις 
and τὸ άλλο καὶ άλλο as a pronoun (ἀντωνυμία) of φύσεις.99 In his Solutio 
argumentorum a Seuero objectorum, Leontius also gives us a possible look at 
how miaphysite theology had developed Severus’ thought. In several places, one 
can hear echoes of Severus’ initial objections that some terms cannot mean the 
same thing for both Trinity and Christ and an appeal to the “newness” of the 
incarnation. In the Solutio, these objections have become a blanket principle 
such that in one context (θεολόγια) the terms φύσις, οὐσία, and ὑπόστασις have 
distinct meanings but in the οἰκονομία they are equivalent and this is because 
the natures have been “instituted anew” and therefore their definitions have 
also.100 To support this conclusion, the dialogue’s miaphysite antagonist cites 
                                                 
99 Leontius Byz., Triginta capita contra Seueri, Capitula 11-13 (PG 86B.1904A, B). 
100 Leontius Byz., Solutio (PG 86B.1921B). 
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the use of these terms in Cyril and Athanasius.101 Leontius rejects this 
explanation and while acknowledging the variance of language nevertheless 
affirms that Cyril and Athanasius intent was clear.102 Finally, Leontius, perhaps 
in response to Severus’ objections to the transferability of union language, 
states that the union for both Trinity and Christ is “more unifying” than those 
that divide and “richer” than those that confuse preserving identity (τὸ ταὐτόν) 
on one level and otherness (τὸ ἕτερον) on another although inversely.103 
§4.3.1.5 Justinian & the Imperial Employment of Gregory’s Saying 
 Justinian’s own works also bears some remarkable parallels to the ideas 
already found in John, and both Leontii.104 However, he moves away from 
explicitly citing the latter part of Gregory’s saying to support the inverse logic of 
θεολόγια and οἰκονομία and favors the first part of the saying. Despite this shift, 
he continues to apply the logic of latter part of the saying. Justinian will continue 
to use Gregory’s saying explicitly in other ways. For example, he uses it to 
highlight the validity of enumerating the two natures and uses a historical 
comparison that is similar to that found in Leontius of Jerusalem’s work to 
highlight the affinity of Apollinarian theology with miaphysite theology and the 
conflict of both with Gregory.105 To tackle the transferability of language he 
                                                 
101 Leontius Byz., Solutio (PG 86B.1924C-D).  
102 Leontius Byz., Solutio (PG 86B.1925A-B).   
103 Leontius Byz., Solutio (PG 86B.1940C-1941C).   
104 The two works that were reviewed were Contra monophysitas and Edictum rectae 
fidei. I will focus on Contra monophysitas in this section but I do note instances of uses from the 
Edictum in the footnotes. On the dating of these documents see Price, TTH 51.1, 122-3.  The 
critical text is Drei dogmatische Schriften Iustinians, 2nd ed., eds. Eduard Schwartz, Mario 
Amelotti, Rosangela Albertella, and Livia Migliardi Zingale, Legum Iustiniani imperatoris 
vocabularium, subsidia 2 (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1973). For ease of citation the section numbers 
from the critical text are used along with the page number and line. 
105 Justinian discusses the exposure and theology of the Apollinarian forgeries of 
Athanasius, Julian and Jovian as well as the known writings of Apollinarius and Timothy and 
contrasts them with Athanasius, Cyril, Gregory and others to show that Severus is the “successor 
of Apollinarius”. The sections dealing with the forgeries and exonerating Athanasius are §70-82 
(Schriften Iustinians, 28.9-46.21). The main contrast stretches from §82-167 (Schriften 
Iustinians, 32.23-64.9) but he begins the section on forgeries by placing the responsibility for the 
term “composite nature” at the feet of Apollinarius §58-70 (Schriften Iustinians, 24.34-28.8). The 
reference to Severus as Apollinarius’ successor is in §150 (Schriften Iustinians, 54.27) but the 
critique is expanded to all those whose theology share affinity with him §67 (Schriften Iustinians, 
26.29). Justinian does not use σύνθετον in reference to ὑπόστασις in contra Monophysitas. A 
 242 
administers two new tactics. The first tactic is subtle but occurs in the way he 
frames his confessio at the beginning of his Contra monophysitas where he 
begins with a Trinitarian confession that ends with a description of the Son and 
transitions into the incarnation using the same terms he has just introduced to 
explain the incarnation.106 This description highlights that the subject of the 
incarnation is the ὑπόστασις of the Son. He then interweaves parts of Gregory’s 
saying to show that while there are two natures this does not mean two sons.107 
What was initially a set of arguments built on the semantic distinctions of 
Gregory’s saying, becomes a deeper literary principle. Justinian uses the 
confession of Trinitarian theology as a linguistic context— a grammar— for 
discussing Christ. In this section, he illustrates rather than arguing the 
consistency of terminology between θεολόγια and οἰκονομία. The second tactic 
was to draw upon Cyril’s own Trinitarian theology expressed in the Thesaurus 
in tandem with the Trinitarian theology of Gregory and Basil as an additional 
context for interpreting Cyril’s explanation of the incarnation.108 Justinian is also 
concerned to highlight the biblical data that leads to his own explanation of 
Christ and casts the Fathers as authorities because of their skill in interpreting 
this same biblical data.109 While Leontius of Byzantium had developed Gregory’s 
                                                 
large portion of his argument is devoted to refuting “one composite φύσις” and showing its 
affinity with Apollinarianism. The closest he comes is positing that there is one composite 
Christ, see Contra monophysitas, §70 (Schriften Iustinians, 28.10). The language of “one 
composite Christ” or “composite Christ” is continued with more frequency in the Edictum and 
leads up to his endorsement of “one composite ὑπόστασις,” Edictum (Schriften Iustinians, 
132.14-16; 134.29-31; 136.13-14; 144.21-23; 144.36-146.3; 148.32-36). See Price’s discussion 
of this language in TTH 51.1, 124-8. 
106 Justinian, Contra monophysitas, §2-3 (Schriften Iustinians, 6.26-8.16). A similar tactic 
is used at the beginning of Edictum rectae fidei (Schriften Iustinians, 130.13-136.4), but within 
the section on the incarnation he is explicit about what positions he is arguing against.  
107 Justinian, Contra monophysitas, §5 (Schriften Iustinians, 8.25-35). Compare his 
discussion of Gregory’s use of the terms “φύσεις” and “δύο” from Ep. 101.19 in his Edictum 
rectae fidei. In this instance, Justinian argues that enumeration can be applied to show the 
difference of natures in Christ but condemns it use as meaning two πρόσωπα following 
Gregory’s censure (Schriften Iustinians, 140.15-142.12). 
108 Justinian, Contra monophysitas, §173; 176-7(Schriften Iustinians, 66.9-11; 66.30-
68.22). 
109 An example of this is can be seen in Contra monophysitas, §169-173. (Schriften 
Iustinians, 64.28-66.11) but throughout the work he highlights Scriptural references and their 
interpretation by the “Fathers”. 
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saying into a compelling set of arguments and syllogisms, Justinian 
demonstrates remarkable skill in drawing the various arguments that grew up 
around the saying together and funneling it into a portrayal that attempts to 
highlight a portrayal of the incarnation that is faithful representation of 
scripture, the Fathers, Cyril and ultimately Chalcedon’s intention.  
 In the interim between Justinian and his contribution to Council of 
Constantinople and Maximus, these arguments and Gregory’s saying can 
variously be found. One finds Gregory’s saying, for example, applied in a range 
of places. John Climacus in his Divine Ladder appeals to the inverse location of 
plurality and unity in the incarnation and the Trinity as an analogy of quietness 
and obedience.110 Towards the end of a long correspondence in the Tritheist 
debate between Peter and Damian, one finds the same saying.111 Pamphilus also 
writes briefly against Tritheists in Quaestio 11 of his Diuersorum capitum but 
also exhibits similar features with Justinian, not citing Gregory’s saying directly 
but adopting such terms as one of the Trinity, composite ὑπόστασις and 
utilizing Basil’s letters to do the work of defining ὑπόστασις in distinction from 
φύσις.112 While the work is meant to address questions specifically about Christ, 
Pamphilius consistently places the question within a Trinitarian context 
illustrating how the language from the Trinity is transferable to the divine 
οἰκονομία.113  
 Another important figure between the council and Maximus is 
Sophronius of Jerusalem. In Crisis of Empire, Booth posits that Maximus was an 
intimate in a circle of ascetics around John Moschus, which included Sophronius. 
                                                 
110 John Climacus, Scala paradisi §27.85 (PG. 88.1117A). 
111  Michael the Syrian, Chronnicle, Bk. 10, Ch. 26 in Chronique de Michel Le Syrien: 
Patriarche Jacobite d’Antioche (1166-1199), Vol. 2, ed. and transl. by J.-B.Chabot  (Paris: Ernest 
Lerourx, 1901), 388. Michael the Syrian reports this in his Chronicle as part of the Synod hosted 
by Nicetas between the patriarchs Athanasius of Antioch and Anastasius of Alexandria.  
112 For example see, Pamphilius, Diuersorum capitum seu difficultatum solutio, §1.106-
131 (CCSG 19:132-133) and §7.93-98 (CCSG 19:176-177) for the use of Basil’s letters and see §6, 
7, 8 (CCSG 19:155-172, 173-177, 178-186) for the utilization of “one of the Trinity” which he 
sometimes interchanges with ”one of the holy and worshipped Trinity”, and for “composite 
ὑπόστασις”. 
113 For example see Pamphilius, Diuersorum capitum, §7, §10, §11 (CCSG 19:173-177, 
194-200, 202-212). See also CCT 2.3, 144-150. 
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John Moschus, in his Spiritual Meadow, rather than arguing over terms and 
definitions in favor of a pro-Chalcedonian explanation of the incarnation 
illustrates its power by telling stories of miraculous healings and events done by 
those who held true to its faith. As Booth points out in the introduction and 
subsequently discusses throughout his book, this literary tactic that uses stories 
and contexts to show the correctness of pro-Chalcedonian theology and, 
eventually, as a critical response to imperial attempts at theological and political 
compromise, was in used by John and Sophronius.114 In the context of this 
rhetorical strategy and especially in the political and theological context of 
Sophronius’ frustration over imperial activity, Sophronius’ Epistula synodica can 
be seen applying a similar tactic as that found in Justinian’s Contra 
monophysitas. Trinitarian theology, uncontroversial on the surface, becomes the 
linguistic context for discussing his portrayal of the incarnation and illustrates 
the importance of consistent use of terminology for both θεολόγια and 
οἰκονομία by highlighting how the ὑπόστασις that becomes incarnate is that of 
the Son.115 Certainly, one would expect his letter to contain a confession of faith 
but despite its effusive praise for Sergius the Bishop of Constantinople, it equally 
betrays a letter that was meant as veiled critique of the theological innovations 
of the Constantinopolitan See. Booth’s review of the letter only confirms this 
further and his analysis shows how sharp the critique would have been. Perhaps 
it was not so veiled.116  
§4.3.1.6 Summary of Gregory’s Saying & the Post-Chalcedonian Era 
The relation of this all this material to Maximus is important not only as a 
way of explaining some of his arguments but also toward providing a context for 
his rhetorical and hermeneutical strategy. The use of Gregory’s saying in 
tandem with Basil’s saying, Cyril’s Epistulae ad Succensum and Thesaurus 
                                                 
114 Booth, Crisis of Empire, 1-6. 
115 Sophronius, Epistula synodica §2.2 -2.3(Sophronius of Jerusalem and Seventh-Century 
Heresy: The Synodical Letter and Other Documents, ed. & transl. with intro. and commentary by 
Pauline Allen, Oxford Early Christian Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 74-
118. 
116 Booth, Crisis of Empire, 234-237 and also Allen’s assessment of the letter in 
Sophronius of Jerusalem, 44-46 where she also notes its similarity with Justinian Edictum and its 
unsurprising rejection. 
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demonstrate a much broader set of issues than is usually discussed for this 
period. It shows that the garnering of patristic witnesses was as much about 
reconciling variant language and theologies that grew up around them as it was 
about bolstering one’s arguments with recognized authorities. In addition, it 
unveiled a disagreement about whether or not, and how, Trinitarian 
understandings of key metaphysical terms could be applied consistently to 
Christ. The relationship between θεολόγια and οἰκονομία was not as nearly as 
settled as is sometimes portrayed in the literature of this period and it could be 
argued that while the controversies following the Council of Chalcedon were 
sparked by ambiguities concerning Chalcedon’s faithfulness to Cyril, by the 
middle of the sixth century it had morphed to include questions about Cyril’s 
faithfulness to the Trinitarian theology of Gregory and Basil, indeed, all the 
“select Fathers” and ultimately his own Trinitarian theology. The 
correspondence between Severus and Sergius serves as evidence that the 
concern was found not only in rapprochements between pro-Chalcedonian and 
miaphysite communities but within miaphysite communities themselves. An 
additional witness in this regard is the conflicts within miaphysitism over 
Tritheism. As noted in the study by Uwe Lang, this debate started very similarly 
over how to reconcile variant language in patristic texts concerning the key 
ontological terms οὐσία, φύσις, and ὑπόστασις. He argues that one significant 
impetus behind John Philoponus’ attempts to articulate his later Tritheist 
position was an attempt to present a seamless theological passage for 
miaphysites between θεολόγια and οἰκονομία and involved delving into the 
various conceptions of particulars and universals.117 The success of framing or 
perhaps reframing the debate by pro-Chalcedonians and its imperial 
employment through the Council of Constantinople 553 CE seemed formidable 
but, as might be expected, was only marginally successful in winning back 
miaphysite leaders and churches.  
§4.3.2 Maximus, Trinity, Christ & Opusculum 13 
                                                 
117 Uwe M. Lang, “Patristic Argument and the Use of Philosophy in the Tritheist 
Controversy of the Sixth Century,” in The Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church: 
The Proceedings of the Fourth Patristic Conference, Maynooth 1999, eds. D. Vincent Twomey & 
Lewis Ayres (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 88. 
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 So how does Maximus fit into this tradition? Unfortunately, as I have 
chosen to focus on Maximus’ early writings, a full investigation of his 
engagement with this broader context and its trajectories must remain for a 
future study. However, the last text from the early period that I focus on, Op. 13, 
is in itself an importance witness. I have translated the text in full and will parse 
out its various sections but first some preliminary observations. Thus far in my 
investigation it is notable that at least two of the major theologies that Maximus 
confronts during his lifetime “Origenism” and “miaphysitism” were both dealt 
with at Constantinople 553 CE.  I have already shown how Maximus has 
engaged this material in relation to Origenism, and additional interaction was 
hinted at through some descriptions of Christ (“one of the Trinity” and 
“according to ὑπόστασις”). Absent thus far are other indicators such as 
Justinian’s “composite ὑπόστασις”, an appeal to the inverse logic of θεολόγια 
and οἰκονομία and consequently the transferability of language between the 
two. It is likely that Maximus has read this material, but his engagement has, at 
least in relation to explanations of the incarnation, stayed on uncontroversial 
grounds. Maximus has used the concepts of composite and incomposite before 
but they served in both the Capita caritate and the Quaestiones et dubia as a 
contrast between God, who is incomposite, and humanity, indeed all of creation, 
which is composite.118 However, this language was not applied to discussions 
about the relation between Christ’s two natures. In Op. 13 this changes and, if 
indeed this is the earliest work against miaphysitism, we see a much fuller 
picture of Maximus’ conception of the incarnation on metaphysical grounds. 
 Maximus’ occasion for this piece had long been conjectured to be 
meetings he refers to concerning a dispute with Severian bishops on the island 
of Crete in Op. 3.119 Larchet and Booth suggest that because these debates 
discussed the wills and energies of Christ and Op. 13 does not, this connection is 
tenuous. Despite his divergence from Sherwood’s suggested date, Larchet still 
                                                 
118 Maximus, Cap. car 2.8, 9 (Cap. sulla car., 92-94) and Qua. dub. §13 (CCSG 10:10-11). 
119 Op. 3 (PG 91.49B-C). An example of this connection is Louth, Maximus, 195, n. 11. 
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locates the piece sometime between 626-627 CE.120 Indeed, Op. 13 does not 
mention wills or energies but, as will be shown below, does reflect an 
engagement with pro-Chalcedonian strategies against miaphysitism. I would 
add that this seems to fit the timespan 626-633 CE where Maximus writes 
several pieces against miaphysitism before the Psephos of 634 and his 
subsequent thoughts about it in Ep. 19 to Pyrrhus.121 Amongst these pieces are 
Op. 18, Ep. 17, and Op. 5. Opusculum 18, dated sometime in the 626-633 CE 
period, is a set of short definitions and as Sherwood states is an investigation 
into the issue of union. These, Sherwood notes, are reminiscent of a similar list 
by Leontius of Byzantium.122 Of particular interest is “union according to 
ὑπόστασις”, which I have already suggested Maximus likely garnered from 
reading materials from the 553 council.123 Opusculum 5, which Sherwood dates 
by 633 CE, seems to be his earliest direct investigation into miaenergism and is 
dated slightly before the Psephos.124 It essentially writes against three 
formulations of how the two ἐνέργειαι come together in Christ, all of which for 
Maximus create problems. This work does not display any of the strategies I 
have investigated above but provides a date around which he would have 
needed to engage this material. Op. 18 then seems suggestive but another work, 
                                                 
120 See Larchet’s introduction to Opuscules théologiques et polémiques, transl. and notes 
by Emmanuel Ponsoye, Sagesses chrétiennes (Paris: Cerf, 1998), 19. See Sherwood’s dating in 
Annotated Date-List,  
121 In addition to Op. 13, there are several pieces written specifically against 
miaphysitism and, according to Sherwood, fall within the timespan stated above : Op. 18 (626-
633 CE, Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 30; Winkelmann, Der monenergetisch-monotheletische 
Streit, Berliner Byzantinistiche Studien 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001), 56), Ep. 17 (by 
633, Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 30 but note Larchet’s objection in the intro to Lettres, 
transl. and notes by Emmanuel Ponsoye, Sagesses chrétienes (Paris: Cerf, 1998), 55), Op. 5 (by 
633, Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 37; Winkelmann, Der monenergetisch-monotheletische 
Streit, 72-73). For the Psephos see Winkelmann, Der monenergetisch-monotheletische Streit, 73-
74. For Ep. 19 see Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 37-39 and Winkelmann, Der monenergetisch-
monotheletische Streit, 77. 
122 Op. 18  (PG 91.213A-216A) See, Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 30 and Friedhelm 
Winkelmann, Der monenergetisch-monotheletische Streit, Berliner Byzantinistiche Studien 6 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001), 56. 
123 Op. 18 (PG 91.213A, 216A). 
124 Op. 5 (by 633, Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 37; Winkelmann, Der 
monenergetisch-monotheletische Streit, 72-73). 
 248 
Ep. 17, is also dated by 633. Larchet suggests, while criticizing Sherwood’s 
dating for this letter, that Maximus discusses miaphysitism well into the 
miaenergist and miathelite period.125 While this is certainly true, the strategies 
Maximus uses to confront both in later writings depend on readings from pro-
Chalcedonian authors and Maximus does display at least one of these strategies 
in Ep. 17. Maximus’ reading strategy for Cyril’s “one incarnate nature of God the 
Word” is one I have suggested was regularly employed by pro-Chalcedonian 
authors. This strategy was based on Cyril’s own Epistulae ad Succensum and 
while Maximus could have simply read Cyril’s letters, when he employs this 
interpretation he says it is not only Cyril’s exegesis but that of patristic 
tradition.126 While this could be an empty claim, it is more likely that Maximus 
has in mind the pro-Chalcedonian strategies I have reviewed above and would 
have depended on the same sets of readings that would have produced Op. 13. 
Thus, Ep. 17 along with Op. 18 in the 626-633 CE time span display an 
engagement with the pro-Chalcedonian writings against miaphysitism that was 
not present in other early writing but whose strategies were called upon during 
the miaenergist and miathelite writings. This does not even take into 
consideration significant works such as the Expositio orationis  
dominicae, both sets of Ambigua and Mystagogia all of which were written in 
628-634 CE and demonstrate an engagement with his “Chalcedonian logic” and 
more technical language for the incarnation. This provides a context for Op. 13, 
and I argue shows that while it may not be a product of the meetings reported in 
Op. 3, it certainly need not be dated late. I will now examine Op. 13.  
 According to Sherwood’s dating, the earliest direct interaction with 
miaphysitism can be seen in Op. 13 (PG 91:145A-149A) who dates it to about 
626/7.127 Here is the translation: 
1. Arius confesses three ὑποστάσεις but denies the oneness and does not 
speak of the Holy Trinity as ὁμοούσια. Sabellius, confesses the oneness 
but denies the threeness. For he speaks of Father and Son and Holy Spirit 
                                                 
125 Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 30; Larchet, Lettres, 55. 
126 Ep. 17 (PG 91.381D-384A).  
127 Sherwood, Annotated Date-List, 27. 
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as the same [ὑπόστασις]. However, the Church of God confesses the 
oneness and proclaims the threeness. Macedonius was an elder similar to 
Arius. For he presents the Holy Spirit as a creature, but the Church extols 
the Holy Spirit as ὁμοούσια with the Father and the Son and how 
strongly it affirms [him] as God!  Likewise, for one of the Holy Trinity, 
Nestorius also speaks of the natural difference but does not confess the 
union for he does not speak of it as done according to ὑπόστασις. Also, 
Eutyches, on the one hand, confessed the union, but, on the other hand, 
denied the distinction according to οὐσία leading to the confusion of the 
φύσεις. However, the Church maintains both the unity according to 
ὑπόστασις because he is undivided and maintains the distinction 
according to οὐσία because he is unconfused. 
2.  How does the utmost union have both identity and difference? There is 
the identity of οὐσίαι and the difference of πρόσωπα and vice-versa. Such 
as there is for the Holy Trinity, on the one hand there is an identity of 
οὐσία and, on the other hand, a difference of πρόσωπα. For we confess 
one οὐσίαand three ὑποστάσεις. Also, for a human being, on the one 
hand, there is an identity of πρόσωπον and a difference of οὐσίαι — the 
soul is of one οὐσία and the flesh of another.  It is equally so for Christ, 
the Master. On the one hand, there is an identity of πρόσωπον and a 
difference of οὐσίαι. For while being one πρόσωπον, that is to say, 
ὑπόστασις, one οὐσία is divine, and the other is human. For just as it is 
impossible to confess the union of the Holy Trinity and not promulgate 
the difference, so it is also entirely necessary to proclaim both the union 
and the difference for one of the Holy Trinity.     
3. For just as neither difference or union are signified by the same phrases 
but, difference, by speaking of the three ὑποστάσεις, and the union, by 
confessing the one οὐσία, so also for one of the Holy Trinity. The 
difference is confessed through pointing out the two φύσεις and the 
union by means of proclaiming the one composite ὑπόστασις.   
4. Just as we anathematize Arius, not for proclaiming the difference 
according to ὑπόστασις for the Holy Trinity, but because he does not 
speak of the natural union, so also we anathematize Nestorius, not for 
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making known the natural difference for Christ but because he does not 
speak of the union according to ὑπόστασις. 
5. Just as we anathematize Sabellius, not for proclaiming the natural union 
for the Holy Trinity but because he does not speak of the difference 
according to ὑπόστασις, so we anathematize Eutyches not for speaking 
of the union according to ὑπόστασις for Christ but because he does not 
make known the natural difference. 
6. It is not necessary to speak of the difference according to ὑπόστασις of 
the Holy Trinity nor the natural difference for one of the Holy Trinity in 
perception but to apprehend it by the eyes of the mind. Also, how can 
you promulgate the three ὑποστάσεις by the difference according to 
ὑπόστασις for the Holy Trinity and not promulgate two φύσεις in one 
ὑπόστασις for one of the Holy Trinity by the natural difference? 
7. Just as you can say there is one οὐσία because of the ὁμοούσια of the 
Holy Trinity and three ὑποστάσεις because of the ἑτεροϋπόστατον, so 
speak of two οὐσίαι because of the ἑτεροούσιον of the Word and the 
flesh and of one ὑπόστασις because [each nature] is not hypostasized on 
its own. 
8. Just as there is one essence for the Holy Trinity [and] we do not speak 
about a confusion of the three ὑποστάσεις nor, since there are three 
ὑποστάσεις, do we speak about a division of the one essence, so for one 
of the Holy Trinity as one hypostasis we do not speak about a confusion 
of his two φύσεις nor as two φύσεις do we speak about a division of the 
one ὑπόστασις. 
9. The one who does not say for Christ that there is the union according to 
ὑπόστασις because of the two different φύσεις is a Nestorian and the one 
who does not speak of the natural difference in the union according to 
ὑπόστασις is a Eutychian. However, the one who proclaims the union 
according to ὑπόστασις and the natural division for one of the Holy 
Trinity holds fast the royal and blameless faith. 
10. Therefore the one who says there is both difference and union for Christ, 
neither destroys the difference nor confuses the union. For the Divine 
Cyril anathematizes those who, because of the difference, destroy the 
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union according to ὑπόστασις and the ecumenical synod anathematizes 
those who, because of the union according to ὑπόστασις, destroy the 
natural difference for one of the Holy Trinity.  
 This text has remarkable parallels with the writings of both Leontius of 
Byzantium and Justinian yet there is no mention of Gregory nor of Gregory’s 
saying. In the first capitulum, just as we saw with other pro-Chalcedonians, the 
passage begins with a discussion of the Trinity, specifically Trinitarian heresies 
contrasted with the teachings of the Church. It then moves, using the same ideas 
of union and distinction in contrast to confusion and separation, to discuss 
heresies concerning Christ, or as the passage states “one of the Holy Trinity” 
another moniker of Justinian’s writings and the Fifth Council. The latter part of 
the capitulum clearly shows that Maximus is using οὐσία and φύσις 
interchangeably and, as a result, means to highlight the transferability of 
language when speaking of the Trinity or Christ. This tactic is reinforced 
throughout by the series of the conjunctions “Just as . . . so also” (ὥσπερ . . . 
οὑτῶς) seeking also to highlight the subject of the incarnation through the 
persistent use of “one of the Holy Trinity”.  
 The second capitulum discusses the “utmost union”. The phrase refers to 
the union of the Trinity as is clear from the following sentences, but it can be 
conceived “inversely”. Importantly, the phrase το ἕμπαλιν makes an appearance 
and is used to indicate an inverse relationship between identity and difference 
in relation to the key ontological terms οὐσία and πρόσωπον.  Using the 
example of the Trinity and then of the human constitution, Maximus moves to 
Christ, arguing for an analogous balance of difference and union for both Trinity 
and Christ. The union of both contexts preserves an identity and difference but 
does not fall into either a confusion or division. This focus on union and the 
concepts of difference and identity has its closest parallels with Leontius of 
Byzantium’s Solutio and as far as I was able to discover has no parallel in 
Justinian. For the Trinity, the difference is on the level of the ὑποστάσεις, while 
the identity is found on the level of οὐσία. For the human being the identity is on 
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the level of πρόσωπον and the difference on the level of οὐσία.128 For Christ, 
identity is on the level of πρόσωπον and difference on the level of οὐσία. His 
short statement identifying πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις as equivalent terms is an 
indicative feature pro-Chalcedonian argumentation reviewed in the authors 
above. A word that seems to be unique to Pamphilius, ἰδιοϋπόστατος, also 
occurs here and hints that Maximus may have also drawn on his works.129 
 Finally, the reference to the ὑπόστασις as “composite” is paralleled in 
Justinian and Constantinople 553.  In fact, it seems to go into a great deal of 
detail in order to demonstrate exactly where the points of difference and union 
are located in both contexts, attempting to portray a middle path between the 
Trinitarian heresies of Arius, Sabellius and Macedonius and the heresies of 
Nestorius and Eutychius concerning the understanding of the incarnation. This 
feature mirrors both Leontius of Jerusalem and Justinian. There is no mention of 
Severus, which goes a small way towards suggesting that this was meant to 
serve as an agreement between miaphysites and pro-Chalcedonians. If that is 
the case, it might also explain the absence of any mention of Gregory of 
Nazianzus, especially in those areas of the text where it seems like a direct 
citation would have been easier, and why instead there is an attempt to shows 
these ideas are faithful to the “Divine Cyril”. A move away from citing Gregory’s 
saying to address the transferability of language was already observed in 
Justinian. Perhaps in order get beyond wrangling over more than one Father at 
a time, he is not named here at all.  
 What this text demonstrates is a profound engagement with the broad 
tradition and trajectory of the pro-Chalcedonian literature reviewed. So much so 
that he can use the strategies and knowingly avoid its patristic source. If 
Maximus wrote this text en route to Africa, where did he come upon the 
necessary texts? It would require not only the literature of the Council of 553 CE 
                                                 
128 Maximus will eventually qualify this example in the Disputatio cum Pyrrho. Pyrrhus 
objects assigning ἐνέργεια to φύσις stating that if that were the case then the human being 
would have two ἐνέργειαι since human beings are made of both body and soul. Maximus 
rejoinders that there is a distinction between unity κατ᾽ εἶδος of the human being and unity κατ᾽ 
οὐσίαν of soul and body (PG 91.336A-D).  
129 Maximus, Op. 13 §7 (PG 91.148C). For ἰδιοϋπόστατος see Pamphilius, Diuersorum 
capitum, §10.117 (CCSG 10:200), cf. also §5.28, 40; §7.84-85 (CCSG 10: 154, 176). 
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itself, which Maximus has likely already read but also literature that was not 
included with conciliar documents such as Leontius of Byzantium’s writings. 
Regardless, Maximus has now delved directly and deeply into issues 
surrounding miaphysite and pro-Chalcedonian theologies. Maximus’ 
engagement here must go beyond the label “Chalcedonian logic” and be seen to 
represent a broad engagement of the trajectories of post-Chalcedonian theology 
which clearly included not simply assuming the use of Trinitarian theology to 
address understanding the incarnation but arguing for it. 
 Interestingly, there are some similarities to his earlier works, even 
though the context differs. Maximus has already begun to use “union according 
to ὑπόστασις” in Quaestiones and Ep. 2 but in Op. 13 the term “composite” is 
added. Likewise, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, he refers to Christ briefly in the 
Capita as “one of the Trinity”. Maximus in both works also demonstrates a 
concern to locate Christ within a Trinitarian framework although noticeably 
without the technical language seen in Quaestiones and Ep. 2 and without 
reflection on how to locate the unity and plurality of both Christ and Trinity in 
relation to one another. This suggests that his deep engagement begins in Op. 
13. However, even in this case, not all the pieces are found together. The 
λόγος/τρόπος distinction is absent in this opusculum. In later works, such as 
Mystagogia and Exposition orationis dominicae he will use it for the Trinity but it 
appears clearly in reference to both Christ and the Trinity as well as in relation 
to the ideas seen in Op. 13 in the Ambigua ad Thomam and Op. 3.130  
 As a consequence of the scope of my study, I cannot give a thorough 
review of later writings. I can say that Maximus will eventually display several 
more features from this broader pro-Chalcedonian trajectory. For example, in 
Epistula 12, Maximus displays the full array of strategies and tactics that were 
reviewed in Op. 13 above. By the time of the Disputatio cum Pyrrho, Maximus 
has refined his argument against miaphysitism and extended it to miathelitism 
and miaenergism, identifying the same theological problem with all three – an 
ambiguity over how to understand what is “natural” and what is “hypostatic” 
                                                 
130 Myst. 23 (CCSG 69:52.839-54.868), Or. Dom. (CCSG 23:53.440-54.467), Ambiguum 
1.3-4 and 5.11-23 (CCSG 48:24.105-33.284), Op. 3 (PG 91:48B-49A; 56C). 
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and a refusal to allow the transferability of language and principles between 
θεολόγια and οἰκονομία.131 As noted in the introduction, several scholars have 
noted Maximus ability to place Christological issues in the context of Trinitarian 
theology and looked to examples in the Cappadocians and others but draw no 
attention to the intervening years between the Council of Chalcedon and 
Maximus where so much energy was spent exactly over the relation between 
θεολόγια and οἰκονομία. 
 Yet one searches in vain to find a direct reference to Gregory’s saying in 
Maximus’ writing, even though many of the strategies for which it was 
employed are observably reproduced and advanced by him. It is clear that 
Maximus has read Gregory’s Ep. 101, at least by the time of the Ambigua ad 
Iohannem, since he uses the term περιχώρεσις as a way to describe the 
relationship between the two natures of Christ in a way that is uniquely 
witnessed to by Gregory’s letter.132  
Conclusion 
 In these three works, Maximus has built on and drawn together several 
ways he talked about the Trinity as beginning, means, and end but also embarks 
on new ground. In the Liber, Maximus established as grammar that illustrated 
the Trinity as beginning, means, and end of the Christian life, specifically 
through, baptism, prayer, how the activities of the Son and Spirit are correlated 
and how the life of the incarnate Son served as the primary example of love. 
Accounts of the Trinity in the Capita drew on Gregory’s and the Areopagite’s 
language to highlight transcendence and union and distinction but focused on 
placing this way of speaking within ascent. On this scaffolding, the Capita also 
interwove language that added other layers of complexity. This language 
                                                 
131 Maximus, Disput. Pyh., (PG 91.289D, 292A and 336D, 337A). See also, Vita graecae, li. 
352-361 in Brownen Neil & Pauline Allen, The Life of Maximus the Confessor (Recension 3), Early 
Christian Studies 6 (Strathfield: St Pauls Publications, 2003), 66. 
132 See Maximus’ use of the term: 1) for the energeiai of Christ in Ambiguum 5 (CCSG 
48:27.153), 2) for deification, a) “whole man pervading the whole God” in Ambiguum 41 (The 
Ambigua 2, 108: PG 91:1308B; transl. Constas, The Ambigua 2, 109), b) God “wholly 
interpenetrating those who are entirely worthy” in Ambiguum 7 (The Ambigua 2, 90; PG 
91:1076C), 3) for the grace of the Spirit (Disput. Pyh., 320D) d) for the two natures of Christ 
themselves (Disput. Pyh., 345D-348A) and by proxy through an example of reason and thought 
(Disput. Pyh., 337C-D). 
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revolved around issues related to Origenism, drawing a sharp contrast between 
Creator and creation while still maintaining participation in God based on his 
grace. In Quaestiones, the λόγος/τρόπος distinction provided more technical 
language for locating oneness and threeness in the Trinity but also continued 
the emphasis on the illuminating and helping activities of the Holy Spirit and 
briefly used more technical language for how the two natures of Christ came 
together. Here too Maximus refined and clarified language for his Logos/λόγοι 
doctrine and his conception of θεολόγια. The appearance of the λόγος/τρόπος 
distinction in Quaestiones signaled a watershed for Maximus as it would be 
applied not only to the Trinity but then more fully to Christ and humanity in Ep. 
2 and later served as a key distinction for his descriptions of creation, Christ, 
and Trinity. 
 In Ep. 2 the λόγος/τρόπος distinction and the logos/λόγοι doctrine are 
integrated into Maximus’ baseline grammar being applied to Christ and his 
salvific work and describing other ways that God as love is the beginning, 
means, and end of Christian life. Here, God makes whole the fragmented 
existence of human beings, specifically through the example of Christ and the 
alignment of a person’s τρόπος to its λόγος in love. In tandem with this 
integration, there is a growing use of more technical language for Christ likely 
based on his reading of materials from the Fifth Council rather than just 
Chalcedon. 
 In Opusculum 17, the processes of ascent that had so characterized his 
earlier works are absent and Maximus reflects consciously and directly on the 
relationship between Trinity and Christ. Union, identity and difference and their 
inverse relationship in Christ and Trinity become an occasion for him to reflect 
again on union and distinction. Despite this connection, the works polemical 
context allows this language to take shape as yet another grammar for the 
Trinity. Noticeably absent is an explicit use of the λόγος/τρόπος distinction, 
although Maximus likely has it in mind.  
The Trinitarian grammar for Christian life presented and developed in 
the Liber, Capita, Quaestiones and Ep. 2, and the grammar found for Trinity and 
Christ in Op. 13 are two distinct ways Maximus wrote about the Trinity. The first 
grammar was developed within the context of explaining ascent and had added 
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layers of complexity that grew out of his engagement with Tritheism, Origenism, 
and a broader set of works in Quaestiones. The second grammar developed out 
of engagement with post-Chalcedonian theology in light of miaphysite activity. 
These will not always appear in mutually exclusive works, and one must be 
cautious that the differing contexts not suggest that Maximus has abandoned 
one in favor of the other. However, the absence of earlier themes in Op. 13 
(especially the λόγος/τρόπος distinction) and the lack of a similar articulation 
of Christ and Trinity in earlier works, strongly suggest that each should be seen 
as distinct. It is not until later works that both ways of speaking become 
synthesized within his larger vision of the cosmos. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study, I have sought to lay bare Maximus’ Trinitarian thought in 
his early writings up to 626/7, an often-neglected set of writing in earlier 
portrayals of his doctrine of God. My thesis has been that Maximus’ engagement 
with the ascetic concerns and the theological controversies of the sixth and 
seventh century helped develop his early works toward a unique and 
distinctively Trinitarian articulation of Christian life and post-Chalcedonian 
theology. This articulation can be discerned in two distinct grammars. The 
baseline Trinitarian grammar for Christian life was found in the Liber. In 
subsequent writings (Capita, Quaestiones and Ep. 2), it grew increasingly 
complex through engagements with Origenism, Tritheism, a broader set of 
writings witnessed to by Quaestiones and ascetic concerns such as the workings 
and perceptibility of the God in the human person. These sets of concerns and 
engagements were met with his synthesis drawn from other traditions, ascetic 
writings, celebrated authors, and the symbols of faith.  
Specifically, the Liber offered a distinct explanation of the rationale of 
ascent and Christian life, which centered on loving God, neighbor and enemies. 
In this account, the Trinity was illustrated as beginning, means, and end. 
Baptism was in the name of the deifying Trinity and served as the beginning of 
the Christian life. The incarnate Son’s life served as an example of love and 
therefore a means and goal of ascetic life. Also, important to his vision was 
highlighting the common nature of the divine persons and thus a common set of 
actions. Particularly, with the Son and Spirit, these actions were inseparable yet 
allowed for distinct roles and activities within the divine expression of 
φιλανθρωπία. Additionally, it also gave a framework for explaining the Spirit’s 
appropriation of the activities of the incarnate Son to the baptized. The 
Trinitarian texture of Christian life was also exhibited through the old man’s 
prayer for mercy. As a result of a comparison with previous ascetic writers in 
Chapter 2, Maximus’ distinctiveness was located in his conception of the 
incarnate Son who fulfills the command of love and whose example serves as 
the means and goal of Christian life.  
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His baseline grammar continued in the Capita with some refinements but 
was also augmented by making explicit what was only inferred or illustrated in 
the Liber. Additionally, Maximus also tackled issues related to Origenism and 
Tritheism. His enhancements were visible when Maximus gave a more robust 
explanation of the activities of contemplation and prayer. The Trinity served as 
the ultimate goal of these activities and the Spirit become an important means 
of accomplishing their task of redirecting desire and knowledge toward love. 
While this was illustrated in the Liber through meditation on the σκοπός of the 
incarnation and calls for ceaseless prayer, the stages of contemplation received 
focused attention in the Capita. Additionally, the quality of love that was to be 
imitated was supplemented by Maximus’ description of God as not only good 
but ἀπαθής. This meant that God’s love was equal towards all and thus served 
as an example of the kind of love that the baptized should strive to emulate. 
While the Liber illustrated the Trinity as beginning, means, and end through the 
actions of the divine persons, especially the love of the incarnate Son, the Capita 
enhanced this illustration by directly stating God is love per 1 John 4:8. As a 
result of his engagement with Origenism, the differences between creation and 
Creator were brought out, especially as it related to the terms οὐσία, δύναμις, 
ἐνέργεια, and γνῶσις. Despite this irreducible difference, Maximus still offered a 
portrayal of participation that allowed for existence and deification. Maximus 
also engaged Tritheism, using it as means to demonstrate the importance of 
integrating γνῶσις and πρᾶξις under the rubric of love and gives an early 
example of his reflection on union and distinction in the Trinity.   
In Quaestiones et dubia, the appearance of the λόγος/τρόπος distinction 
signaled an important moment in his theology, especially as it related to the 
Trinity. Furthermore, this distinction and the more technical language for Christ 
– where the natures are united “according to ὑπόστασις” – revealed his 
engagement with a broader set of sources. Maximus begins to fix his language 
for the stages of ascent while continuing to refine his conception of θεολόγια, 
the Logos/λόγοι doctrine and his understanding of God as cause.  
In Ep. 2, Maximus further synthesizes the developments and refinements 
that were begun in Quaestiones. This synthesis exhibited more use of the 
technical terminology for the incarnation and toward an extensive use of the 
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λόγος/τρόπος distinction for ascent and the incarnation. Maximus 
demonstrates how love and, in particular, God as love heals humanity’s divided 
nature through the incarnation. It could be argued that of the two grammars 
presented in this thesis, his articulation of the Trinity as love and as the 
beginning, means, and end of Christian life is his most unique contribution. 
Finally, I ended with a retelling of the context of Op. 13 and its brief 
analysis. This remarkable text, which has a close affinity with the language and 
theology of Leontius of Byzantium, unveiled a focused engagement with the pro-
Chalcedonian theology that fed the Fifth Council. While there were certain 
affinities between the grammar he developed in his accounts of ascent and what 
was found in Op. 13, the text’s deep engagement suggested that its grammar be 
seen as distinct. Maximus embraced this new grammar and used it to ground his 
conception of Christ as being two-natures and one composite ὑπόστασις. His 
argument locates and argues for the inverse relationship between the plurality 
and unity in θεολόγια and οἰκονομία and consequently for the transferability of 
ontological terms.  
 The various concerns, traditions and trajectories covered in this 
investigation have all fed his early writings and supplied the general lineaments 
of his theology. His thought will be further developed during his stay in Africa 
and later in his life. Using the Liber as a baseline and observing how each of 
these works displays increasing layers of complexity, allowed a fascinating look 
into how Maximus’ engagements with Origenism, Tritheism, ascetic concerns 
and miaphysitism shaped his theology. These engagements were eventually 
what allowed him to expand his vision of the Trinity as love and as beginning, 
means, and end into an increasingly cosmological vision. This vision would 
capture the attention of generations to come and provided the basis for his 
continued fight against miaphysitism and his eventually struggle against 
miaenergism and miathelitism. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 Correlation of Conterella’s & Sherwood’s Numbering with CCSG 40 
    
Conterella’s & 
Sherwood’s 
Numbering  
of Lib. asc. CCSG 40 
Conterella’s & 
Sherwood’s 
Numbering  
of Lib. asc. CCSG 40 
§1 1-31 §24 418-430 
§2 32-48 §25 430-455 
§3 49-63 §26 456-466 
§4 63-70 §27 467-523 
§5 70-91 §28 523-530 
§6 92-109 §29 530-547 
§7 110-131 §30 548-561 
§8 132-160 §31 562-581 
§9 160-173 §32 581-618 
§10 174-199 §33 618-638 
§11 199-215 §34 639-669 
§12 215-242 §35 669-677 
§13 243-254 §36 678-716 
§14 254-271 §37 717-815 
§15 271-295 §38 815-838 
§16 296-311 §39 838-851 
§17 311-327 §40 852-911 
§18 328-354 §41 912-967 
§19 355-364 §42 968-981 
§20 365-373 §43 982-1002 
§21 373-380 §44 1003-1017 
§22 380-400 §45 1018-1044 
§23 401-417   
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